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Competition Tribunal Enforcement Action2022

COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS

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Files (3)

[2025] HKCT 3-EN-2025-03-25

COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

CTEA 2/2022 and CTEA 2/2023

(HEARD TOGETHER)

[2025] HKCT 3

CTEA 2/2022

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 2 OF 2022

____________________

BETWEEN

 COMPETITION COMMISSIONApplicant
 and 
 ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LIMITED1st Respondent
 ANALOGUE HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Respondent
 SHUN HING ENGINEERING CONTRACTING COMPANY LIMITED3rd Respondent
 SHUN HING HOLDINGS COMPANY LIMITED4th Respondent
 SER KA WAI5th Respondent
 CHENG KIT SHUN6th Respondent
 KWAN SIU KIN7th Respondent

____________________

ANDCTEA 2/2023

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 2 OF 2023

____________________

BETWEEN

 COMPETITION COMMISSIONApplicant
 and 
 ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LIMITED1st Respondent
 JOHNSON CONTROLS HONG KONG LIMITED2nd Respondent
 YORK INTERNATIONAL (NORTHERN ASIA) LIMITED3rd Respondent
 JOHNSON CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL PLC4th Respondent
 LEE YUI MING5th Respondent

____________________

(HEARD TOGETHER)

Before: Hon Harris J, President of the Competition Tribunal in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 6 June 2024
Date of Decision: 6 June 2024
Date of Reasons for Decision: 25 March 2025

_________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_________________________________

1.  On 6 June 2024 I heard at the same time case management conferences in CTEA 2/2022 and CTEA 2/2023. The reason they were heard together was because the Commission had listed a summons in each proceeding that they be consolidated. I indicated at the outset of the hearing that I would not make such an order, although I had no objection (and neither did the Respondents in the two proceedings) to them being heard one after the other. As can be seen from the titles to the two proceedings they have one common party. They both concern alleged contraventions of the First Conduct Rule (“FCR”) in connection with tendering for air-conditioning maintenance, installation, repair or replacement works. There is little overlap between the facts other than for the business activity, which is the subject of the alleged anti-competitive practices and the identity of the 1st Respondent. It seemed to me clear that the opposition to the application to consolidation of the principal Respondents in both proceedings, principally on the grounds that it would result in them having to participate in a longer, more complicated trial, is justified. It also seemed to me that although the total hearing time for the trial of the two proceedings might be shortened, there was potentially plenty of room for complication, because the Tribunal would be hearing two different cases simultaneously. I have, therefore, reserved dates for the trial in CTEA 2/2022 from 26 October 2026 to 13 November 2026 and CTEA 2/2023 from 30 November 2026 to 18 December 2026.

2.  The Commission has also sought directions that “the evidence in the trial of CTEA 2/2022, insofar as it is relevant to the issues in CTEA 2/2023, do stand as evidence in the trials thereof”. I am not prepared to make such a direction until the evidence (in the form of witness statements) have been served and an informed view can be taken on whether this is practical or will create more challenges than it avoids. I dismissed the Commission’s summons filed on 12 April 2024 in CTEA 2/2022 and CTEA 2/2023. The costs of the summons be the Respondents’ costs in the cause.

3.  The directions sought by the Commission for the further conduct of the two proceedings are largely conventional. There were differences over the inclusion of some and directions and time periods for compliance with the directions for exchange of witness statements. I made the directions contained in the orders dated 6 June 2024, which for ease of reference I have included as Annex 1 and 2 to these reasons.

Further and Better Particulars sought by 2nd to 4th Respondents in CTEA 2/2023

4.  The 2nd to 4th Respondents (“Johnson Controls”) seek further and better particulars of various paragraphs of the Notice of Originating Motion (“ONA” and “Particulars” respectively). I will approach the dispute over Johnson Control’s entitlement to the Particulars, by first setting out the Request and the paragraphs of the ONA to which they relate, followed by the principles I consider relevant in determining Johnson Control’s entitlement to them and then how they apply to the facts.

“1. Under paragraph 11(b) of the Originating Notice of Application dated 23 May 2023 (‘ONA’)

Of the plea that:

‘Orders under section 93(1) of the Ordinance that the Undertakings and the Individuals do pay to the Government a pecuniary penalty in such amount as the Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) considers appropriate;’

Request

1.1 Please state the amount of any pecuniary penalty sought against the 2nd to 4th Respondents (the ‘Proposed Penalty’);

1.2 Please state the methodology for calculation of the Proposed Penalty and any assumptions, parameters and alleged facts underlying the methodology, including but not limited to:

(a) The value of sales alleged to be related to the Proposed Penalty;

(b) The area of commerce alleged to be affected by the alleged Collusive Conduct (as defined in paragraph 7 of the ONA) and how, if at all, the alleged area of commerce affects the Proposed Penalty;

(c) The financial year(s) applied in calculating the Proposed Penalty and the basis for selecting the financial year(s);

(d) The gravity percentage applied in calculating the Proposed Penalty and the basis for selecting that gravity percentage;

(e) The duration multiplier applied in calculating the Proposed Penalty and the basis for selecting that duration multiplier; and

(f) Any aggravating, mitigating and other factors alleged to be relevant to the Proposed Penalty and the effect of those aggravating, mitigating and/or other factors on the Proposed Penalty.

2. Under paragraph 11(d) of the ONA

Of the plea that:

‘For the purpose of securing compliance with any order made by the Tribunal pursuant to §11(c)(i) of this Application, orders under section 1(b) of Schedule 3 of the Ordinance that the Undertakings do adopt and implement, to the reasonable satisfaction of the Commission, effective competition compliance programmes in such time period and manner as the Tribunal shall determine;’

Request

2.1 Please state the basis for seeking an order that the 2nd to 4th Respondents ‘do adopt and implement, to the reasonable satisfaction of the Commission, effective competition compliance programmes in such time period and manner as the Tribunal shall determine’, including but not limited to:

(a) Any alleged defects in the 2nd to 4th Respondents’ existing compliance policies; and

(b) The proposed changes (both in terms of the time period and manner) to the existing compliance policies.

3. Under paragraph 11(e) of the ONA

Of the plea that:

‘Orders under section 96(1) of the Ordinance that the Undertakings do pay to the Government an amount equal to the reasonably incurred costs of and incidental to the Commission’s investigation into their conduct or affairs, to be assessed;’

Request

3.1 Please state the particulars of the alleged ‘costs of and incidental to the Commission’s investigation’ sought against the 2nd to 4th Respondents, including but not limited to the alleged costs attributable to the 2nd to 4th Respondents.”

5.  As can be seen what is sought is details of the relief that the Commission invites the Tribunal to order against Johnson Controls.

The Relevant Legal Principles

6.  The function of properly particularised pleadings is well-established. They include:

(1)  to inform the other side of the nature of the case they have to meet as distinguished from the mode in which that case is to be proved;

(2)  to prevent the other side from being taken by surprise at the trial;

(3)  to enable the other side to know what evidence they ought to be prepared with and to prepare for trial;

(4)  to limit the generality of the pleadings, the charge and the evidence;

(5)  to limit and define the issues to be tried; and

(6)  to tie the hands of the party so that he cannot, without leave, go into any matters not included (although if the opponent omits to ask for particulars, evidence may be given which supports any material allegation in the pleadings).

See Angela Chen v Wai Wai Chen[1].

7.  As Stuart-Smith J (as he then was) observed in Pedro Emiro Florez Arroyo v EquionEnergia Limited[2]:

“9. … it must now be axiomatic that the purpose of statements of case is to ‘enable the court and the parties to identify and define the real issues in dispute’ … That is necessary for the furtherance of other aspects of the Overriding Objective, including ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing, saving expense and ensuring that litigation is dealt with expeditiously and fairly.

10. Seen in this light, the necessity for amendments arises where a party wishes to raise or pursue an issue which the existing pleadings do not accurately and fairly identify for the Court and the other party. The touchstone should be whether the existing pleadings identify the issue with sufficient particularity to enable the opposing party to understand the case it has to meet so that it can take appropriate steps to prepare to meet it (which may include accepting that it is well founded, assessing and pursuing the prospects of settlement, attempting to defeat it, or any variation on these themes) and, if necessary, to enable the Court to rule on the issue in due course…

14. In my judgment, the level of precision that is required when pleading an issue or case… should be determined by the need to provide a fair and sufficient indication to the Court and the opposing party of the case that is being brought and that the opposing party has to meet. … If that information is not provided, there can be no equality of arms and the opposing party is unfairly disadvantaged.” (emphasis added)

8.  A similar point in relation to a party’s ability to consider a settlement being assisted by proper particulars is made in CS Low Investment Ltd v East Asia Warburg Ltd & Others[3]:

“A plaintiff must plead his case with sufficient particularity to enable the defendant to gauge its strength, to admit or deny the allegation made and reasonably to assess the propriety of a payment into court.”(emphasis added)

9.  Rule 7 of the Competition Tribunal Rules (Cap. 619D) (“CTR”) provides that all proceedings before the Tribunal must be commenced by filing an originating notice of application in Form 1 in the Schedule, which must state the reliefs sought and the grounds on which the reliefs are sought. More specifically, Competition Tribunal Practice Direction No.1 (“CTPD 1”) [88] provides that:

“The originating notice of application, initiating the proceedings in the Tribunal, should contain not only the material facts relied upon, but also a succinct presentation of the arguments of fact, economics (if applicable) or law supporting the findings and relief sought, so that from the outset the Tribunal and the respondent are apprised of the substance of the case advanced by the applicant.” (emphasis added)

This is reinforced by [12], which states that “Cases will be managed and directions given by the Tribunal so that the parties’ respective cases are disclosed and the real issues identified and focused upon as early as possible” and the Tribunal will [10] “ensure that cases are as efficiently, inexpensively and expeditiously disposed of as is consistent with fairness”.

10.  I agree with Mr Shieh that in considering how these principles apply it is relevant that they involve the determination of a criminal charge[4] (within the meaning of the Arts. 10 and 11 of the Bill of Rights, albeit not criminal proceedings) and that the Commission invites the Tribunal to impose significant penalties. It is all the more important given the character of the proceedings that a respondent is fully informed at outset of the case, including the relief, advanced against it[5].

Discussion

11.  It is not in dispute that Johnson Controls is entitled to know the case against it in sufficient detail to be able to respond to it either by defending it or proposing a settlement. The Commission’s position assumes that liability will be tried first and only if the Tribunal finds that Johnson Controls has contravened the FCR will the proceedings move onto the penalty stage at which time the Commission will have to provide the type of particulars that Johnson Controls seek. Thus says the Commission it is not necessary at this stage to provide the particulars that Johnson Controls seek.

12.  Johnson Controls dispute this. It says, correctly, that as the Commission’s pleaded case is currently formulated they assume that any penalty will be determined in accordance with the four-stage process explained by Godfrey Lam J (as he then was) in Competition Commission v W Hing Construction Co Ltd (No3)[6]. This involves:

(1)  Stage 1: determining a base amount;

(2)  Stage 2: making adjustments for aggravating, mitigating and other factors;

(3)  Stage 3: applying the statutory cap;

(4)  Stage 4: applying any reduction considered appropriate because of the contravenor’s cooperation and considering a plea of inability to pay.

13.  Stage 1 has several components. First, the value of the undertaking’s sales directly or indirectly related to the contravention in the relevant geographical area. Secondly, a gravity percentage. Thirdly, the period during which the contravening conduct took place (i.e. the duration), which is used as a multiplier applied to the relevant value of the undertaking’s sales. Johnson Controls say that consistent with Form 1 in the Schedule of the CTR and CTPD 1, it is necessary for it to be told, albeit succinctly, “the arguments of fact, economics (if applicable) or law supporting the findings and relief sought, so that from the outset the Tribunal and the respondent are apprised of the substance of the case advanced by the applicant[7].” These will include the following facts and matters, which Johnson Controls seek by way of Particulars:

(1)  §1.1: The amount of the pecuniary penalty;

(2)  §1.2(a): The value of sales;

(3)  §1.2(b): The area of commerce directly or indirectly related to the alleged contravention (for calculating the value of sales);

(4)  §1.2(c): The relevant financial year (for calculating the value of sales);

(5)  §1.2(d): The gravity percentage and its basis;

(6)  §1.2(e): The duration multiplier and its basis; and

(7)  §1.2(f): Any aggravating, mitigating and other circumstances relevant to the calculation of the pecuniary penalty.

14.  It seems to me clear that Johnson Controls is correct and that the combined effect of footnote 5 to Form 1 and [88] is that a compliant Originating Notice of Application will provide the particulars that they seek at the very least of the penalty and the investigation costs. In the case of the compliance program I incline to the view that it is not necessary to provide a draft programme, but the ONA should identify what the Commission says its principal components should be.

15.  The Commission argued before me relying on Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A, O18 r12(3B), that the Tribunal should not make an order for particulars unless it is satisfied that it is necessary to fairly dispose of the matter or to save costs. CTPD 1 [25](b) provides that O18 is not applicable unless there are pleadings. Plainly the ONA is not a pleading for this purpose otherwise this rule would be rendered meaningless as the proceedings are always commenced by an ONA.

16.  The Commission is bringing a complaint of a criminal nature, which if made out would normally result in a penalty being imposed, often of a significant amount. Although, CTPD 1 [89] encourages succinctness, it is clear from [88] that an ONA is meant to be a comprehensive exposition of the case a respondent has to meet and that this includes “the findings and relief sought”. It seems likely that the express reference to relief was included, because it is not something that will necessarily be apparent from the matters relied on to prove a contravention, but it forms an important part of the case against the respondent and one, which the respondent is entitled to be told at the outset. The Commission argues that the Tribunal is entitled to take into account in determining the penalty to impose all the circumstances of the case including findings made after a trial on liability and, therefore, it is premature to require the Commission to plead its case as to the calculation of the penalty. It seems to me that this consideration rather than suggest that it is not necessary for the Commission to state its case on the determination of the penalty at this stage, points to the opposite conclusion. If it is thought that evidence may be called and arguments advanced at the trial on liability, which prove to be relevant to the penalty then it is all the more important that the parties know what the competing cases on penalty are before trial in order that the kind of matters the Commission has in mind (but has not identified) as being relevant to the four-stage process I have briefly summarised earlier, might be properly investigated at trial.

17.  It is difficult to see how requiring the Commission to state what at the time the proceedings are commenced it will invite the Tribunal to order by way of penalty and how it should be calculated is imposing an unreasonable burden on the Commission given the character of the proceedings. It is also likely to facilitate rather than hinder the prospects of the parties agreeing to dispose of the proceedings by way of the Kam Kwong procedure.

18.  I will, therefore, make an order in the terms of paragraph 1 of Johnson Controls summons filed on 9 May 2024. I note that the Commission has not provided an alternative formulation were I minded to make an order for Particulars of paragraph 11(b) of the ONA.

19.  So far as paragraph 2 of the summons (competition compliance programmes) is concerned, I will order request 2.1(a). In my view if the current compliance policies are said to be defective the defects should be identified in order that they can be examined at the trial on liability as in my view it is foreseeable that this may have relevance to liability, as they may be relevant to Johnson Control’s staff actions, as well as the possible penalty. I do not think that at this stage the proposed changes are necessary.

20.  The final request in paragraph 3 of the summons is an order that the costs of the investigation be paid by Johnson Controls. The Commission’s response to this request is that it is not necessary to dispose of the matter fairly or save costs. I disagree. For the reasons I have explained the Commission is required to provide details of the relief that it seeks. In the case of the costs of the investigation this is a liquidated amount that must be known to the Commission, even if it may increase. This is a fact that supports the relief sought and should be provided.

Costs

21.  I will make a costs order nisi that the Commission pays Johnson Controls costs of the summons filed on 9 May 2024 in CTEA 2/2023 with a certificate for two counsel, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

  (Jonathan Harris)
President of the Competition Tribunal

Mr Norman Nip SC and Ms Leticia Tang, instructed by Dentons Hong Kong LLP, for the Applicant (in both actions)

Mr Peter So, of Deacons, for the 1st Respondent (in CTEA 2/2022) and the 1st Respondent (in CTEA 2/2023)

Mr Daniel R Fung SC and Ms Ebony Ling, instructed by Wong Heung Sum & Lawyers, for the 3rd Respondent (in CTEA 2/2022)

Mr Dicky Cheung, instructed by Au Yeung, Chan & Ho, for the 4th Respondent (in CTEA 2/2022)

Mr Patrick Siu, instructed by Tang & Ku, for the 5th and 6th Respondents (in CTEA 2/2022)

Mr Taylor Li and Ms Polly Li, instructed by KCL & Partners, for the 7th Respondent (in CTEA 2/2022)

Mr Paul Shieh SC and Mr Jonathan Ng, instructed by Baker & McKenzie, for the 2nd to 4th Respondents (in CTEA 2/2023)

Mr Stephen Crosswell, solicitor advocate of Baker & McKenzie, for the 2nd to 4th Respondents (in CTEA 2/2023)

The 5th Respondent was not represented and did not appear (in CTEA 2/2023)

Order dated 6 June 2024 in CTEA 2/2022

IT IS ORDERED that:-

A.  Witness (as against the Applicant and the 3rd, 4th and 7th Respondents (the “Shun Hing Respondents”) only)

1.  The deadline for the filing and exchange of witness statements as to fact be extended to 112 days from the date of this Order;

2.  All witness statements as to fact in reply (if any) to be filed and exchanged within 56 days thereafter;

3.  Such witness statements shall stand as evidence in chief of the respective witnesses unless otherwise directed by the Tribunal;

B.  Counsel’s advice (as against the Applicant and the Shun Hing Respondents only)

4.  Parties do within 28 days after the exchange of witness statements as to fact obtain Counsel’s advice (if necessary).

C.  Interlocutory Applications (as against the Applicant and the Shun Hing Respondents only)

5.  The deadline for parties to take out all interlocutory applications as may be advised, including any witness summons application under Rule 36 CTR, be extended to 28 days after §4 above.

D.  Hearsay Evidence (as against the Applicant and the Shun Hing Respondents only)

6.  The requirement under section 47A of the Evidence Ordinance (Cap. 8) that notice shall be given by any party proposing to adduce hearsay evidence in these proceedings be dispensed with.

E.  4th CMC and trial window

7.  The matter be adjourned to a date to be fixed for the Fourth Case Management Conference (“4th CMC”) with 3 hours reserved before the Honourable Mr Justice Harris.

8.  Parties shall within 14 days from the date of this Order, confer with each other and write to the Tribunal to:

(a)  fix a date for the 4th CMC; and

(b)  fix a trial window.

9.  Parties shall confer with each other and submit a list of all proposed directions not less than 14 days before the 4th CMC.

F.  Language

10.  The language to be used in these proceedings (including at trial) will be English.

11.  Witness statements and documents in a language other than English must be submitted with a proposed translation for use at trial. Only those parts sought to be relied upon by the parties at the trial, and such other parts as are necessary to give fair and proper context, need to be translated.

12.  Parties shall endeavour to reach an agreement on any proposed translation of documents within 28 days of receipt thereof, failing which the party serving the proposed translation shall obtain a certified translation of the relevant document.

G.  Other Matters

13.  The list of documents filed by the Applicant on 27 March 2024 be provided by the Applicant to the 1st Respondent within 7 days from this Order and any amended or supplemental list of documents filed by the Applicant by provided by the Applicant to the 1st Respondent on the same day when such list is served on the other Respondents in these proceedings.

14.  Liberty to apply.

15.  Costs of the 3rd CMC hearing on 6 June 2024 be in the cause.

Order dated 6 June 2024 in CTEA 2/2023

IT IS ORDERED that:-

A.  Witness (as against the Applicant and the 2nd – 5th Respondents only)

1.  All witness statements as to facts shall be filed and exchanged within 56 days from the date of: (a) the determination of the Summons of the 2nd to 4th Respondents dated 9 May 2024 for Further and Better Particulars of the Originating Notice of Application dated 23 May 2023; or (b) service of the Further and Better Particulars (if so ordered), whichever is later.

2.  All witness statements as to fact in reply (if any) to be filed and exchanged within 56 days thereafter;

3.  Such witness statements shall stand as evidence in chief of the respective witnesses unless otherwise directed by the Tribunal;

B.  4th CMC and trial window

4.  The matter be adjourned to a date not before 11 June 2025 for the Fourth Case Management Conference (“4th CMC”) with 3 hours reserved before the Honourable Mr Justice Harris.

5.  Parties shall within 14 days from the date of this Order, confer with each other and write to the Tribunal to:

(a)  fix a date for the 4th CMC; and

(b)  fix a trial window.

6.  Parties shall confer with each other and submit a list of all proposed directions not less than 14 days before the 4th CMC.

C.  Language

7.  The language to be used in these proceedings (including at trial) will be English.

8.  Witness statements and documents in a language other than English must be submitted with a proposed translation for use at trial. Only those parts sought to be relied upon by the parties at the trial, and such other parts as are necessary to give fair and proper context, need to be translated.

9.  Parties shall endeavour to reach an agreement on any proposed translation of documents within 28 days of receipt thereof, failing which the party serving the proposed translation shall obtain a certified translation of the relevant document.

D.  Other Matters

10.  Liberty to apply.

11.  The list of documents filed by the Applicant on 21 March 2024 be provided by the Applicant to the 1st Respondent within 7 days from this Order and any amended or supplemental list of documents filed by the Applicant be provided by the Applicant to the 1st Respondent on the same day when the such list is served on the other Respondents in these proceedings.

12.  Costs of the 3rd CMC hearing on 6 June 2024 be in the cause.



[1]  [2024] HKCFI 60 at [6].

[2]  [2013] EWHC 3150.

[3]  CACV 37/1990, 12 July 1990 at [4] per Kempster JA.

[4]  Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Limited[2019] HKCT 2 [50]-[51], [2019] HKEC 1490.

[5]  See the observations of Tang VP at [29] of HKSAR v Chu Chi Wah (No. 2) [2010] 4 HKLRD 715.

[6]  [2020] 2 HKLRD 1229.

[7]  [88].

[2024] HKCT 1-EN-2024-01-11

COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

CTEA 2/2022 and CTEA 2/2023

(HEARD TOGETHER)

[2024] HKCT 1

CTEA 2/2022

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 2 OF 2022

____________________

BETWEEN

 COMPETITION COMMISSIONApplicant
 and 
 ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LIMITED1st Respondent
 ANALOGUE HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Respondent
 SHUN HING ENGINEERING CONTRACTING COMPANY LIMITED3rd Respondent
 SHUN HING HOLDINGS COMPANY LIMITED4th Respondent
 SER KA WAI5th Respondent
 CHENG KIT SHUN6th Respondent
 KWAN SIU KIN7th Respondent
ANDCTEA 2/2023

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 2 OF 2023

____________________

BETWEEN

 COMPETITION COMMISSIONApplicant
 and 
 ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING1st Respondent
 LIMITED 
 JOHNSON CONTROLS HONG KONG LIMITED2nd Respondent
 YORK INTERNATIONAL (NORTHERN ASIA) LIMITED3rd Respondent
 JOHNSON CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL PLC4th Respondent
 LEE YUI MING5th Respondent

____________________

(HEARD TOGETHER)

Before: Hon Harris J, President of the Competition Tribunal in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 27 November 2023
Date of Decision: 27 November 2023
Date of Reasons for Decision: 11 January 2024

_________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_________________________________

1.  On 25 October 2023 I handed down my decision in respect of applications heard on 29 August 2023 in CTEA 2/2023 (“1st Action”). The applications were for an order that a Kam Kwong application that had been made in the 1st Action (although wrongly formulated as an order for a declaration and penalty by consent[1]) by the Commission and the 1st Respondent (“ATAL”) be heard together with a similar application in CTEA 2/2022 (“2nd Action”), although no such application had been issued and listed in the 2nd Action before 29 August 2023. I determined that the applications in the 1st Action and (necessarily when the requisite application was made) in the 2nd Action, be heard at or immediately after the trial of the Actions or when all the Respondents had agreed that the Actions be determined by Kam Kwong applications for the reasons explained in my decision. The Commission seeks leave to appeal that decision along with directions to which ATAL and 5th and 6th Respondents (employees of ATAL) agree for the Kam Kwong applications in the 2nd Action to be heard at the same time as the Kam Kwong applications to be made in the 1st Action.

2.  I wrote to the Parties in both Actions on 18 September 2023 directing that as the Commission and ATAL sought one penalty of HK$150,000,000 be imposed in both the Actions that at the next CMC the following questions be addressed:

“2.1 Issue 1: whether one pecuniary penalty can be imposed in two proceedings;

2.2 Issue 2: if yes, the matters to be taken into account in determining the appropriate penalty;

2.3 Issue 3: when the pecuniary penalty in Action 1 should be determined (this matter was addressed in Action 2); and

2.4 Issue 4: whether the facts of the Actions make it appropriate for a single pecuniary penalty to be imposed.”

3.  It was apparent from ATAL’s skeleton that it understood that my concern was whether the Tribunal could properly give one composite judgment imposing one composite fine in two proceedings. At the hearing it was accepted by both the Commission and ATAL that this would not be appropriate, although the calculation of the penalties would need to be calculated so as to avoid unfairly imposing in each proceeding a penalty, which duplicated the penalty imposed in the other proceeding. This seems to me broadly correct. As a consequence, the 2nd and 4th questions did not require consideration.

4.  The 2nd question is academic, because it is the same issue as that already determined in the 1st Action and in respect of which leave to appeal is sought, namely, whether the Kam Kwong application in respect of ATAL should be determined at this stage or, as I have directed, at trial or, if all the Respondents reach agreement with the Commission, at that stage. For the same reasons it seems to me that the Kam Kwong Proceedings in the 2nd Action should be dealt with after trial or if all the Respondents reach agreement with the Commission, at that stage. As I understand it the Commission and ATAL accept, unsurprisingly, that the Kam Kwong Applications should be dealt with together, whenever that may be. I refused to grant leave to appeal. The question of when a Kam Kwong application be determined is, in my view, clearly a matter of discretion and its determination ultimately a case management decision. There is no material point of law involved. The Commission simply wish to reargue the matter before the Court of Appeal.

5.  I also determined, on the 1st Respondent’s application, that the Commission should disclose correspondence relating to cooperation agreements entered between two of ATAL’s employees and the Commission. Leave is also sought to appeal that decision (“Decision”). I also refused leave in respect of this application. It does not seem to me that it has been demonstrated that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or raises an issue on which in my view it would be helpful for the Court of Appeal to opine. However, I ordered an interim stay of my Decision until the determination of ATAL’s application to Court of Appeal.

6.  I will direct on the consent summons dated 18 August 2023 in CTEA 2/2023 and the summons dated 27 September 2023 in CTEA 2/2022 that the two proceedings be heard together with liberty to apply, and costs reserved. I will make no other directions until the Court of Appeal has determined the leave application in CTEA 2/2023 other than in respect of costs. In my view the vast majority of the time at the Case Management Conference involved dealing with the applications for leave to appeal and the questions I refer to in [2], which in the case of issue 1 seems from the lengthy submissions filed by the Commission to have been misunderstood by the Commission. I order that 80% of the costs in both proceedings be paid by the Commission; 20% be paid by the 1st Respondent to the  3rd to 7th Respondents in CTEA 2/2022 and 2nd to 5th Respondents in CTEA 2/2023 with a certificate for two counsel.

  (Jonathan Harris)
President of the Competition Tribunal

  

CTEA 2/2022

Mr Norman NIP SC, Ms Leticia Tang and Mr Jonathan Fung, instructed by Dentons Hong Kong LLP, for the applicant

Mr Abraham Chan SC and Mr Joshua Chan, instructed by Deacons, for the 1st and 2nd respondents

Ms Ebony Ling, instructed by Wong Heung Sum & Lawyers, for the 3rd respondent

Mr Dicky Cheung and Mr Jonathan Ip, instructed by Au Yeung Chan & Ho, Solicitors, for the 4th respondent

Mr Patrick Siu, instructed by Tang & Ku Solicitors, for the 5th and 6th respondents

The 7th respondent appeared in person

CTEA 2/2023

Mr Norman NIP SC, Ms Leticia Tang and Mr Jonathan Fung, instructed by Dentons Hong Kong LLP, for the applicant

Mr Abraham Chan SC and Mr Joshua Chan, instructed by Deacons, for the 1st respondent

Mr Paul Shieh SC and Mr Jonathan Ng, instructed by Baker & McKenzie, for the 2nd to 4th respondents

Mr Stephen Crosswell, solicitor advocate of Baker & McKenzie, for the 2nd to 4th respondents

The 5th respondent was not represented and did not appear



[1] See [3] of my decision in Competition Commission v Kam Kwong Engineering Co Ltd [2020] 4 HKLRD 61.

[2022] HKCT 4-EN-2022-08-31

COMPETITION COMMISSION v. ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LTD AND OTHERS

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CTEA 2/2022

[2022] HKCT 4

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 2 OF 2022

________________

BETWEEN

 COMPETITION COMMISSIONApplicant

and

 ATAL BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERING LIMITED1st Respondent
 ANALOGUE HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Respondent
 SHUN HING ENGINEERING CONTRACTING COMPANY LIMITED3rd Respondent
 SHUN HING HOLDINGS COMPANY LIMITED4th Respondent
 SER KA WAI5th Respondent
 CHENG KIT SHUN6th Respondent
 KWAN SIU KIN7th Respondent

________________

Before: Hon Harris J, President of the Competition Tribunal in Chambers

Dates of Hearing: 26 July 2022

Date of Decision: 31 August 2022

________________

D E C I S I O N

________________


Introduction

1.  This is the first case management conference for proceedings commenced by the Competition Commission (“Commission”) by Originating Notice on 16 June 2022. The directions for the progress of the proceedings until close of pleadings have been agreed by the Parties. The 3rd, 4th and 7th Respondents (“3,4,7 Respondents”) have issued an application to strike out parts of the Originating Notice, which I have listed for hearing on 1 to 2 December 2022, although the Commission proposes to amend the Originating Notice to address their complaints, which may render the hearing unnecessary.

2.  What has been contentious today has been the orders dealing with redaction of information in the Originating Notice and the terms of an order to establish a confidentiality ring to which disclosed documents believed by a party to justify limited circulation will be produced. The Respondents do not object to the redaction of information in the Originating Notice; but then they have no reason to do so. I have, however, declined to order redaction of the Originating Notice today and adjourned the application in order that it can be presented again when the problems I consider exist with the currently proposed redactions can be addressed. I will explain these in the following paragraphs. They are also relevant to the formulation of the confidentiality ring order.

Confidentiality: the Statutory Scheme

3.  The Competition Ordinance, Cap 619 (“Ordinance”) is concerned with conduct that prevents, restricts or distorts competition in Hong Kong. It also prohibits mergers that lessen competition in Hong Kong. The present proceedings concern the former. The Ordinance established a Commission, which is required to investigate possible breaches of the First and Second Conduct Rules. The Ordinance gives the Commission powers to require persons to provide it with information. The provider of the information may legitimately consider it confidential. Some of it maybe information that the Commission itself considers should not be made public because to do so may have an anti-competitive effect by virtue of it providing to competitors of a commercial party who produced it detailed information about the pricing of goods or services, which allows other participants in the market to adjust their prices in a manner which distorts competition. To address these potential issues the Ordinance contains in Part 8 a regime for the Commission or other person to seek an order from the Tribunal, which restricts distribution of information the Commission is satisfied it is undesirable should either be made public or provided to respondents to proceedings.

4.  Section 123 of the Ordinance defines what constitutes confidential information for the purposes of the Ordinance:

“Confidential information

(1) In this Part—

confidential information (機密資料) means—

(a) information that has been provided to or obtained by the Commission in the course of, or in connection with, the performance of its functions under this Ordinance, that relates to—

(i) the private affairs of a natural person;

(ii) the commercial activities of any person that are of a confidential nature; or

(iii) the identity of any person who has given information to the Commission;

(b) information that has been given to the Commission on terms that or in circumstances that require it to be held in confidence; or

(c) information given to the Commission that has been identified as confidential information in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) If a person—

(a) identifies information that the person has given to the Commission as confidential; and

(b) provides a statement in writing setting out the reasons why, in that person’s opinion, the information is confidential,

the information is also to be regarded as confidential information under this Part.”

5.  Section 124 imposes on the Commission a duty to establish procedural safeguards to prevent unauthorised disclosure of information. The Ordinance also imposes an obligation on specified categories of persons (specified person, defined in s122) not to disclose confidential information obtained from the Commission or from a specified person.

6.  Section 151 empowers the Tribunal to order a person not to publish or otherwise disclose any material the Tribunal receives.

7.  Although the Ordinance, does not expressly address restrictions on the circulation and use of confidential information in proceedings commenced before the Tribunal in my view it is implicit in the provisions that I have explained that restrictions might be placed by the Tribunal on the use of confidential information adduced in proceedings before it. Section 158 of the Ordinance provides that the Chief Judge may, after consultation with the President of the Tribunal, make rules regulating the practice and procedure of the Tribunal. Consistent with it being implicit in the Ordinance that restrictions may be placed on the use of confidential information in proceedings before the Tribunal, Rules 24 and 37(1) of the Competition Tribunal Rules (Cap 619D) (“Rules”) provide:

“24. Discovery and inspection of documents

(1) A party may apply to the Tribunal for an order for discovery and production of a document relating to the proceedings from a person for inspection.

(2) The application may be determined by the Tribunal with or without a hearing.

(3) The Tribunal may make or refuse to make an order for discovery and production of a document having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including—

(a) the need to secure the furtherance of the purposes of the Ordinance as a whole;

(b) whether the information contained in the document sought to be discovered or produced is confidential;

(c) the balance between the interests of the parties and other persons; and

(d) the extent to which the document sought to be discovered or produced is necessary for the fair disposal of the proceedings.

(4) Order 24 (except rules 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6) of the RHC applies to the discovery and production of documents in any proceedings.”

“37. Confidential treatment of information

(1) A party (the applicant) may apply for an order to treat the whole or part of the following document as confidential—

(a) a document (other than an originating document) filed in connection with any proceedings; or

(b) a document (including an originating document) intended to be filed, served or otherwise disclosed in connection with any proceedings.”

8.  Rule 37(1) allows the Commission to make an application to the Tribunal, as it has done in the present case, for an originating notice, or part of it, to be redacted on grounds of confidentiality if it is “intended to be filed, served or otherwise disclosed…..”. This sub-rule envisages and enables the Commission to apply for an order that an originating notice be redacted prior to issues. Sub-rule (1)(a) provides that such an application cannot be made under the Rule after the originating notice has been filed. This would appear to conflict with [11] of Competition Tribunal Practice Direction No. 2 (Confidential Information), which provides a procedure to be followed by the Commission if it wishes information in the originating document (which the Commission accepts includes an originating notice of application, which was the originating process used in the present case) to be redacted from the version, which the public can obtain on payment of a fee (see Rule 56). For completeness I set out both [11] of the Practice Direction and Rule 56:

(1) [11] of the Practice Direction:

“An originating document filed in the Tribunal is open to inspection by the public upon payment of a fee. Where a party wishes to keep confidential any information in such a document, he should:

(1) file in the Tribunal the full, unredacted version of the originating document with the words ‘Confidential Treatment Claimed" prominently marked at the top left corner on the first page and contained in an envelope marked "Confidential Treatment Claimed’;

(2) file in the Tribunal in addition a redacted non-confidential version of the originating document, which is open to inspection by the public;

(3) apply to the Tribunal in writing before or at the time of filing, specifying the information for which confidential treatment is requested and providing full justification.

For samples showing how to mark an originating document, see Annex 2 to this Practice Direction.”

(2) Rule 56:

“Right of persons (other than parties) to inspect, etc. certain documents filed in Tribunal

(1) A person (other than a party to the proceedings concerned) may, on payment of the prescribed fee, search for, inspect and obtain a copy of any of the following documents—

(a) the copy of an originating document filed in respect of the proceedings;

(b) any judgment given or order made by the Tribunal or the copy of that judgment or order;

(c) with the leave of the Tribunal, any other document filed in respect of the proceedings.

(2) An application for the leave under subrule (1)(c) may be made ex parte.

(3) The person may search for, inspect and obtain a copy of the documents during the hours that the Registrar may direct.”

9.  Rule 37(1) requires an application for confidential treatment of an originating notice to be made to the Tribunal before the proceedings are issued, not, as [11] necessarily assumes at the time it is issued. If the Tribunal has not issued an order that part of an originating process should be redacted a member of the public can pursuant to Rule 56 seek a copy of the unredacted version. The Rules take precedence to the Practice Direction. Thought needs to be given by the Tribunal to amending the Practice Direction. In the meantime the Commission should apply in writing to the President of the Tribunal in writing before proceedings are commenced for an order treating part of an originating notice or such other originating document as may be relevant, as confidential and to be redacted in versions available to the public. Rule 6(1) and (2) provide:

“6. Effect of non-compliance with these Rules

(1) Non-compliance with any of these Rules, or with any rule of practice that is in force, does not render any proceedings void unless the Tribunal so directs.

(2) However, the Tribunal may—

(a) set aside the proceedings, either wholly or in part, as irregular; or

(b) amend, or otherwise deal with, the proceedings in the manner and on the terms that the Tribunal thinks fit.”

10.  In my view sub-rule (2)(a) is sufficiently widely worded to allow me to waive the irregularity constituted by the Commission applying for a confidentiality order in respect of the present Originating Notice, and I shall so waive it. As I have already mentioned the application for a confidentiality order has been adjourned. This is in order that the Commission can consider further whether it is necessary for all the information of which it has sought redaction to be treated as confidential (which includes all the names of individuals referred to in the Originating Notice other than the 5th, 6th and 7th Respondents) and file further evidence; the necessity for the latter is explained in [25] below.

Hong Kong Authorities—The Principles relevant to redaction of confidential information and confidentiality circles

11.  I have already explained the sections of the Ordinance and Rules which are relevant. There are two authorities of the Tribunal that deal with applications for redaction and confidentiality rings. The first is the decision of G Lam J in March 2017 in Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Ltd, & others[1], at which time he was the President of the Tribunal. This is a short decision in which Lam J was satisfied, at least on an ex parte basis, that the following information contained in the originating notice should be kept confidential as against the public: (1) prices submitted in two tenders; (2) the identities of the individuals employed or formerly employed by YWCA and the five respondents referred to in the originating notice of application; and (3) the identity of the complainant.

12.  Au-Yeung J gave a more extensive decision discussing the principles, which guide the Tribunal in making confidentiality orders in Taching Petroleum Company Ltd v Meyer Aluminium Ltd; Shell Hong Kong Ltd v Meyer Aluminium Ltd[2]. Taching was an unusual case because it was a writ action brought by Taching and Shell to recover a debt and Meyer’s defence was that Taching and Shell had breached the First Conduct Rule. At the second case management conference Shell sought an order that permitted it to redact part of its points of reply and Meyer sought to add two non-legal representatives to the confidentiality ring that had been proposed by Shell and Taching, but not agreed by Meyer. The parties agreed that the Tribunal had the power under section 143(1)(b) of the Ordinance which deals with production and inspection of documents to order a confidentiality ring.

13.  In considering the principles that guide the Tribunal in determining whether or not to order a confidentiality ring, and, if one is to be ordered, on what terms, Au-Yeung J held the following.

(1) “Under r.24(4) of the Competition Tribunal Rules (Cap.619D, Sub.Leg.), the Tribunal may make an order for discovery having regard to, amongst others, the confidential nature of the information, the balance between the interests of the parties and other persons, and the extent to which the discovery is necessary for the fair disposal of the proceedings.”

(2) The starting point in any civil proceedings is that it is the party who will be affected by a decision, not their advisers to decide how to advance or respond to a case: [12]. Discovery is made to a party not their solicitors: [13]. This allows the parties to litigate on equal footing and is a principle of natural justice: [14]. There is a difference between discovery and inspection: [15].

(3) It would be exceptional to prevent a party from having access to information, which would play a substantial part in a case: [16]. A balance needs to be struck between the need to preserve confidentiality and the principle of natural justice: [17].

(4) Care must be taken to distinguish between cases involving private litigants and those involving a regulator such as the Commission: [18]. The issue is not a matter of ensuring that parties to commercial litigation are placed on an equal footing. The question is how much confidential information provided to the regulator by third party for the purpose of the regulatory function should be disclosed to the applicant: [18].

(5) Mere confidentiality is not enough to justify restricting its inspection. Confidentiality and sensitivity of information is to be proved by evidence: [19] and [20]. The onus is on the party seeking to show that the case is sufficiently exceptional to justify restrictions on disclosure to the other party, notwithstanding undertakings as to confidentiality, rather than on the party who is prime facie entitled to see the document: [21].

(6) It is recognised in competition law that one man’s market advantage is invariably another’s market disadvantage. It is difficult for the recipient of confidential information to unlearn information once it is received: [22]. So the starting point mentioned in (2) above, may be modified and derogated from to take account of the confidential nature of the information by the use of confidentiality rings: [23]. However this is the exception rather than the rule: [24].

(7) A staged approach to the use of confidentiality rings is necessary. As issues crystallise and lawyers are able to make more informed decisions about the relevance of documents, they can form a view on whether individuals from clients not in the confidentiality ring need to see documents: [25]–[29].

(8) Au-Yeung J gives an examples in [30]–[36] of how in practice confidentiality rings can be used. I have not been taken to the cases to which Au-Yeung J refers, but from my reading of them after the hearing it would appear that all the cases (Roussel Uclaf v ICI[3] ; IPCOM GmbH v HTC Europe Co. Ltd & others[4] and TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications UK Ltd[5]) are patent cases and the controversy arose from a party requiring limitations to be imposed on the representatives of the other party, who were part of a confidentiality ring and were to have access to confidential documents. Rather than address in a regulatory context what principles govern confidentiality they serve more as illustrations of how confidentiality is to be understood and managed in cases in which the confidential information (intellectual property) is the subject matter of the dispute. In a competition case in which the subject matter is an alleged contravention of the First Conduct Rule, the confidential information has a less central role to that in a patent case, it being evidence relevant to the determination of whether a contravention has taken place.

14.  The Commission was not represented in Taching, but I did not understand Mr Nip who appeared for the Commission to suggest that Au-Yeung J’s analysis was incorrect or needed material supplementation. Having said that, I recognise that the Commission may wish to address the principles further when the application is brought on again. It may be helpful if at this stage if I identify matters, which in my view require further consideration.

15.  The 5th, 6th and 7th Respondents are individuals. The Commission seeks against each of them pecuniary penalties. G Lam J explains in Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Limited & others[6] that as the Tribunal was invited to impose penalties, the proceedings involved, as the Commission accepted, the determination of a criminal charge. Lam J says this in [50]:

“50. The Commission accepts, in my view correctly, having regard to the well-known Engel criteria[7] and the pecuniary penalties that the Tribunal is invited to impose, that these proceedings involve the determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of Arts. 10 and 11 of the Bill of Rights.[8] The parties are in dispute, however, as to whether the standard of proof to be applied in these proceedings is the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt or the civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities.”

16.  In my view the Commission’s suggestion that at the commencement of proceedings individual respondents, who have no representatives other than their lawyers, should be excluded from the confidentiality ring is unsustainable. Self-evidently, the individual respondents need to know the contents of documentary evidence before they can give instructions. Excluding the individual respondents from the confidentiality circle at the outset only serves to delay a substantive decision about whether they should be included in the circle. The Commission has not in my view demonstrated at this stage a legitimate reason for preventing them having access to information, which they clearly need in order to defend themselves against serious allegations of misconduct, which as Lam J explains in Nutanix is properly characterised as a criminal charge. In these circumstances in my view they should be included in the confidentiality ring.

17.  The same also applies in my view to the boards of directors of the corporate respondents. A company makes important decisions about its affairs by resolutions passed by its board; it cannot do so if some directors are deprived of relevant information. If the Commission wishes to argue that limitations be imposed on the information available to some of the directors the Commission must adduce credible evidence supporting whatever concerns the Commission suggests it has about all information being made available to all board members. It may be, for example, that the Commission proposes that the directors have to sign express undertakings to the Tribunal only to use the information they receive for limited purposes. Something more than the general concerns advanced by Ms Charlotte Ho, who is the Head (Investigations II) at the Commission is required. As Ms Ho’s evidence is brief I will quote it in full to demonstrate how vague are the Commission’s reasons for seeking redactions. No evidence has been filed directed specifically to the scope of the proposed confidentiality ring.

“21. With respect to all of the Relevant Information, the Commission wishes to seek confidential treatment against the public at large for the following reasons:

(a) in relation to the Requester Prices and the Cover Prices, the Commission considers that this information is competitively and/or commercially sensitive information and should be kept confidential as against the public. Were such information to be disclosed to the public, competitors of ATAL and Shun Hing Engineering may potentially take such information into account when bidding against ATAL and Shun Hing Engineering in future. This applies to both the Requester Prices and the Cover Prices (which were usually set using the Requester Prices as reference); and

(b) in relation to the Identities and Job Titles of Individuals Not Pursued, the disclosure of the same to the public at least before the trial of this case might significantly harm their interests, including by subjecting them unnecessarily to public scrutiny, the consequences of which may be embarrassing or damaging to both their personal and professional reputations. The Commission therefore takes the view that it would not be in the interests of justice or indeed the public interest to unnecessarily expose them to the risks mentioned above before the trial of this case.”

The right of the Respondents to a fair and public hearing

18.  Open justice is a central feature of our legal system. Article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, Cap 383, provides:

“Equality before courts and right to fair and public hearing

All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgment rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.”

19.  In the criminal law context the English House of Lords in R v Davis[9] considered the practice of a court authorising witness anonymity. The House of Lords held that such a practice was irreconcilable with the common law rule that subject to recognised exceptions and statutory qualifications a defendant in criminal proceedings should be confronted by his accusers so he might cross-examine them and challenge their evidence. Changes to this rule was a matter for the legislature not the court and such a practice was inconsistent with Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention of Human Rights, which provides:

“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.

2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

…

(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.”

20.  The judgment led to the prompt passing of the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act2008, which introduced a new procedure for witness anonymity orders. The new statutory regime was comprehensively analysed by the Court of Appeal in R v Mayers, R v Glasgow, R v Bahmanzadeh, R v P[10].Section 11 of the Act provides:

“(1) This section applies where—

(a) an appeal court is considering an appeal against a conviction in criminal proceedings in a case where the trial ended before commencement, and

(b) the court from which the appeal lies (“the trial court”) made a pre-commencement anonymity order in relation to a witness at the trial.

(2) The appeal court—

(a) may not treat the conviction as unsafe solely on the ground that the trial court had no power at common law to make the order mentioned in subsection (1)(b), but

(b) must treat the conviction as unsafe if it considers—

(i) that the order was not one that the trial court could have made if this Act had been in force at the material time, and

(ii) that, as a result of the order, the defendant did not receive a fair trial.”

21.  Lord Judge CJ explains the new Act in [5]–[7] of his judgment:

“5. Section 1 creates the new rules which apply to witness anonymity in criminal proceedings. The section continues:

‘(2) The common law rules relating to the power of a court to make an order for securing that the identity of a witness in criminal proceedings is withheld from the defendant (or, on a defence application, from other defendants) are abolished.

(3) Nothing in this Act a›ects the common law rules as to the withholding of information on the grounds of public interest immunity.’

Notwithstanding the abolition of the common law rules, it is abundantly clear from the provisions of the Act as a whole that, save in the exceptional circumstances permitted by the Act, the ancient principle that the defendant is entitled to know the identity of witnesses who incriminate him is maintained.

6. The Act simultaneously seeks to address the provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, by seeking to preserve the delicate balance between the rights of the defendant, including his entitlement to a fair trial and public hearing, and to examine or have the witnesses who inculpate him properly examined, (article 6) and the witness’s right to life (article 2) and physical security (article 3) and indeed the right to respect for his or her private life (article 8). The need for this balance has been addressed in a number of decisions of the European court, including Kostovski v The Netherlands (1989) 12 EHRR 434; Doorson v The Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330 and Van Mechelen v The Netherlands (1997) 25 EHRR 647.

7. In his commentary on R v Davis [2008] AC 1128 in the House of Lords Professor Andrew Ashworth [2008] Crim LR 917 highlighted a point of contrast between the approach of the House of Lords in R v Davis, which focused significantly on the protection of the interests of defendants, and R v G(Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening) [2008] 1 WLR 1379, which appears to have concentrated more closely on the rights of witnesses. The Act must be taken to reflect Parliament’s view of how best to address the countervailing interests which arise in every criminal trial, those of the defendant, the witnesses and victims, as well as the public interest in a fair trial process which protects the interests of both, and so far as possible, secures the conviction of those who are guilty and the acquittal of those who are not. It provides a comprehensive statutory structure to deal with the many potentially conflicting problems to which witness anonymity may give rise. It does so in the context of numerous other provisions which address the fairness of the trial process as well as the protection of witnesses and the preservation of their rights, whether they are to be found in statute, the common law or in the jurisprudence of the European court.”

22.  In [16]–[17] Lord Judge CJ explains the preconditions which must be satisfied before a witness anonymity order may be made:

“16. Section 4 identifies the express preconditions which must be established before a witness anonymity order may be made. It provides:

‘(1) This section applies where an application is made for a witness anonymity order to be made in relation to a witness in criminal proceedings.

(2) The court may make such an order only if it is satisfied that conditions A to C below are met.

(3) Condition A is that the measures to be specified in the order are necessary—(a) in order to protect the safety of the witness or another person or to prevent any serious damage to property, or (b) in order to prevent real harm to the public interest (whether affecting the carrying on of any activities in the public interest or the safety of a person involved in carrying on such activities, or otherwise).

(4) Condition B is that, having regard to all the circumstances, the taking of those measures would be consistent with the defendant receiving a fair trial.

(5) Condition C is that it is necessary to make the order in the interests of justice by reason of the fact that it appears to the court that—(a) it is important that the witness should testify, and (b) the witness would not testify if the order were not made.

(6) In determining whether the measures to be specified in the order are necessary for the purpose mentioned in subsection (3)(a), the court must have regard (in particular) to any reasonable fear on the part of the witness—(a) that the witness or another person would suffer death or injury, or (b) that there would be serious damage to property, if the witness were to be identified.’

17. We immediately emphasise that all three conditions, A, B and C, must be met before the jurisdiction to make a witness anonymity order arises. Each is mandatory. Each is distinct. However clearly two of the three conditions are met, the jurisdiction to make an order does not arise unless the third condition is also satisfied. When all three conditions are met, but not until they are met, the jurisdiction to make a witness anonymity order arises. We shall defer attention to these conditions until we have addressed the statutory considerations which bear on the decision.”

23.  In [37] he addresses the burden of proof:

“The court must be satisfied that the conditions are met. There was some discussion about the burden and standard of proof, but in the context of the witness anonymity process as established by the Act, the topic proved arid. The short answer is found in the language of the conditions A to C itself. The use of the word ‘necessary’ requires that the court must be satisfied to the highest standard. ‘Probably’ necessary will not do. Even if the ‘necessity’ foundations for conditions A and C are established, the order cannot be made unless the court is also satisfied that the forthcoming trial, or the current trial, would be, or continues to be fair.”

24.  What emerges from these two English decisions, which is relevant is (1) the strong presumption that all evidence should be available to a person, who has to defend a criminal charge; (2) rendering evidence anonymous whether by hiding the identity of a witness from a defendant (or in the present case a respondent) is exceptional; and (3) a party seeking anonymity must adduce evidence that establishes that it is necessary, not that it is probably necessary.

25.  This, as one would expect, is broadly consistent with the principles discussed by Au-Yeung J in her judgment in Taching, in particular that the need to redact information, and it seems to me that generally it does not matter whether it is the identity of a prospective witness or information, must be proved by evidence and that such orders will be exceptional. In my view the fact that the proceedings are commenced by a regulator (as opposed to, for example, a party attempting to protect intellectual property rights) is not of itself a significant consideration. What is relevant is how evidence has been obtained, the character of the proceedings and the case the respondent has to meet. What are likely to be important considerations are, first, the wish of a third party, who had been compelled to provide to the Commission information it legitimately considers confidential, that the information is kept confidential and secondly, the Commission’s concern that information is not made public if the consequences of it being made public are to facilitate anti-competitive practices. These are considerations to be taken into account when assessing an application and balancing them against the rights of a respondent. As I have emphasised, applications to keep information confidential must be supported by evidence capable of demonstrating that the restrictions sought are necessary. Ms Ho’s evidence in my view falls far short of satisfying this criterion. If Ms Ho’s evidence is the best the Commission can do it probably means the application is misconceived.

26.  These principles and how they apply to competition cases can be considered further when the application comes back before the Tribunal. It is desirable that they are clarified as soon as possible. My impression is that the Commission has erroneously assumed that obtaining confidentiality orders is routine and easy. For example in the present case the Commission proposes that the names of all individual mentioned in the Originating Notice other than the Respondents is redacted. Not attempt has been made to distinguish between them. This approach is wrong and needs to be reconsidered.

The Confidentiality Ring

27.  I will make an order in the terms as agreed by the Parties subject to my decision in respect of the inclusion of the individual respondents and the directors of the corporate respondents. They will be included in the confidentiality ring.

 (Jonathan Harris)
 President of the Competition Tribunal

Mr Norman Nip SC and Ms Leticia Tang, instructed by Dentons Hong Kong LLP, for the applicant

Mr Abraham Chan SC and Mr Joshua Chan, instructed by Deacons, for the 1st and 2nd respondents

Ms Catrina Lam and Ms Tinny Chan, instructed by William Lam & Co, for the 3rd, 4th and 7th respondents

Mr Patrick Siu, instructed by Morley Chow Szeto, for the 5th and 6th respondents



[1]   CTEA 1/2017, 28 March 2017.

[2]   [2019] 6 HKC 553; [2019] HKCT 1.

[3]   [1990] RPC 45 TQ.

[4]   [2013] EWHC 52 (Pat).

[5]   [2018] EWHC 1515 (Ch); [2018] FSR 34.

[6]   CTEA 1/2017, 17 May 2019; [2019] HKCT 2.

[7]   See Engel v The Netherlands (No 1) (1976) 1 EHRR 647 for the criteria, namely, (1) the classification of the offence under domestic law; (2) the nature of the offence; and (3) the nature and severity of the potential sanction.

[8]   Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383).

[9]   [2008] UKHL 36, [2008] 1 AC 1128.

[10]   [2008] EWCA Crim 2989, [2009] 2 All ER 145.