HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Civil Action2011

梅啟明 AND ANOTHER v. HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTD

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV151/2023莊裕安 v. 特首李家超 AND ANOTHER
  • CACV153/2017東莞市枝記市場投資管理有限公司 AND ANOTHER v. YIP KWOK CHI
  • CACV158/2018郭卓堅 v. 立法會主席梁君彥AND ANOTHER
  • CACV170/2013厚恩有限公司 對 梅啟明
  • CACV21/2015覃美金 對 HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTD 及另四人
  • CACV216/2019莊裕安 v. 終審法院司法常務官 AND ANOTHER
  • CACV263/2020深圳市深超科技投資有限公司 v. 世紀晶源科技有限公司 AND ANOTHER
  • CACV88/2013TOPWELL CORPORATION LTD v. 關錦泉 AND ANOTHER
  • CACV96/2021CENTRE CHASE INVESTMENT LTD v. THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF CASTLE PEAK ROAD INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL BUILDING AND ANOTHER
  • CAMP135/2018TAO SOH NGUN (also known as LO TO LI KWAN or LO TO LEE KWAN) v. HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTD
  • CAMP136/2018TAO SOH NGUN (also known as LO TO LI KWAN or LO TO LEE KWAN) v. HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTD
  • CAMP139/2018TAO SOH NGUN (also known as LO TO LI KWAN or LO TO LEE KWAN) v. HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTD
  • CAMP140/2018TAO SOH NGUN (also known as LO TO LI KWAN or LO TO LEE KWAN) v. HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTD
  • CAMP217/2024曹雯娟小姐 v. 馬惠屏小姐 AND ANOTHER
  • CAMP73/2019MAN LIN HEUNG THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MAN KWAI YIN ALSO KNOWN AS MAN KWAI YIN v. 梁根林AND ANOTHER
  • CAMP74/2019MAN TIN FOOK ALSO KNOWN AS MAN TIM FOOK, DECEASED, AS REPRESENTED BY MAN MAY YUNG UNDER O.15 R.15 RDC v. 梁根林AND ANOTHER
  • DCCJ206/2020李早珠 AND ANOTHER v. 施純禧
  • DCCJ2373/2002大通行文儀有限公司 AND ANOTHER v. CHERIE-MINT IMPEX LTD AND ANOTHER
  • DCCJ3374/2022楊嬡 v. 南華金融控股有限公司 AND ANOTHER
  • DCCJ5245/2025莊如芬 v. 黃志輝 AND ANOTHER

Files (2)

80593-EN-2012-02-28

梅啟明 AND ANOTHER v. HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTD

HTML content

HCA 1184/2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1184 OF 2011

____________

BETWEEN

 梅啟明1st Plaintiff
 梅德明2nd Plaintiff

and

 HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTDDefendant
 (in the capacity as the sole executor and trustee named in the Will of Mui Yim Fong dated 3rd December 2003) (also in the capacity as the Trustee of the Karen Trust which is the sole devisee named in the Will of Mui Yim Fong dated 3rd December 2003)  

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Lok in Chambers

Date of Summary Assessment of Costs: 28 February 2012

_____________________________________________

SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF COSTS

_____________________________________________

 

1.  On 13 December 2011, I struck out the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim and ordered the plaintiffs to pay for the defendant’s costs of this action, including the costs of the striking-out application, on an indemnity basis.  This is the summary assessment of such costs.

2.  I refer to the defendant’s Statement of Costs dated 16 January 2012. 

3.  I allow the photocopying charges in full. 

4.  This is a rather simple application.  In my view, the handling solicitors did not need to obtain a lot of instructions from lay client to prepare the application.  Even taking into account that the costs should be taxed on an indemnity basis, I am of the view that the time spent on communication under Item C was very much excessive.  I reduce the amount by 50% and only allow a sum of $33,631.

5.  For Item D1, I allow the fee of Mr Gilchrist in full ($3,125).  For the fee of Mr So, the time spent was excessive, in particular counsel was involved in the argument of the application.  I allow 7 hours of his work in the sum of $25,760.

6.  Even taking into account that the costs are to be taxed on an indemnity basis, the time spent on the perusal of documents under Item D2 was excessive.  I allow 1 hour for the work of Mr Gilchrist in the sum of $6,250 and 3.5 hours for Mr So in the sum of $12,880. 

7.  Even taking into account that the costs are to be taxed on an indemnity basis, the time spent on the preparation for the hearing was also excessive.   In particular, the hearing on 13 December 2011 was attended by counsel.  I allow the 1 hour for the hearing on 7 September 2011 and 1.5 hours for hearing on 13 December 2011.  The total sum allowed under Item D3 is $9,200.

8.  For the attendance of hearing under Item D4, I allow the sum claimed for the hearing on 7 September 2011 in full.  For the hearing on 13 December 2011, since the hearing was attended by counsel, I do not think that it was necessary and reasonable to have 2 solicitors attending the hearing.  Since the preparation work was mainly done by Mr So, I only allow the attendance of Mr So in the sum of $7,360.

9.  Although the application was not a complicated one, taking into account that there were still some issues of law involved in the application, I would not say that the engagement of counsel was unreasonable. For the drafting work, I allow the fee claimed in full.  For Item E2, this is not a kind of application which should involve a lot of time in the taking of instructions from lay client or solicitor.  I allow 1 hour in the sum of $4,000.  For Item E3, I think that the counsel fee is on the high side taking into account that the application was not a particular difficult one.  However, since the costs are taxed on an indemnity basis, I cannot say that the fee charged is unreasonable and so I allow the brief fee in full.

10.  Based on the aforesaid, the defendant’s taxed costs can be listed out as follows:

B1Photocopying charges$2,291
CCommunications$33,631
D1 Preparation of documents$28,885
D2Perusal of documents$19,130
D3Preparation for hearing$9,200
D4Attendance of hearing$8,280
ECounsel fee$76,000
 Total:$177,417

(David Lok)
Deputy High Court Judge

The 1st plaintiff appeared in person

The 2nd plaintiff did not appear in person

Mr Kevin So, of Clifford Chance, for the defendant

79871-EN-2012-01-10

梅啓明 AND ANOTHER v. HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTD

HTML content

HCA 1184/2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1184 OF 2011

_____________

BETWEEN

 梅啓明1st Plaintiff
 梅德明2nd Plaintiff
and
 HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTD.Defendant
 (in the capacity as the sole executor and trustee named in the Will of Mui Yim Fong dated 3rd December 2003)(also in the capacity as the Trustee of the Karen Trust which is the sole devisee named in the Will of Mui Yim Fong dated 3rd December 2003) 

_____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Lok in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 13 December 2011

Date of Decision: 13 December 2011

Date of Reasons for Decision: 10 January 2012

__________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

__________________________

 

1.  This is an application by the Defendant to strike out the Writ and the Statement of Claim on the ground that the Plaintiffs’ action is plainly misconceived. I allowed the application in the hearing on 13 December 2011 and I now give my reasons.

The striking out application

2.  The Plaintiffs are the brothers of the well known singer Anita Mui (“the Deceased”) who died in December 2003.

3.  The Defendant is the trustee of an inter vivos trust, the Karen Trust, set up by the Deceased shortly before her death.  The Defendant is also the executor appointed under the Deceased’s last will dated 3 December 2003 (“the Will”).

4.  The Will essentially left all her estate to the Karen Trust.  The Karen Trust, in turn, is a discretionary trust with beneficiaries including the Deceased’s mother and 4 nieces and nephews of the Deceased.  There was also a trustee memorandum which contained suggestions made by the Deceased as to how the discretion under the Karen Trust should be exercised.

5.  So far as I can understand it, in the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs claim that:

(i)   the Karen Trust and the Will were invalid;

(ii)   the Deceased’s estate should all go to the Deceased’s mother, Madam Tam; and

(iii)   the Defendant had caused loss to the Deceased’s estate by reason of its negligence and wrongdoing.

6.  It is clear that the Plaintiffs’ claim is wholly misconceived and should be struck out.

7.  The Plaintiffs claim that the estate of the Deceased ought to vest in their mother, not them.  It follows that they have no locus standi to bring the present action.  It is trite law that a son cannot assert a mother’s cause of action (see also: 梅啓明 v Doris Lau & Ors, unreported, HCA No. 597 of 2006, decision of Registrar Chan on 11 August 2006).

8.  Further, any attempt to challenge the validity of the Will is bound to fail.  In HCAP No. 2 of 2004, the Deceased’s mother challenged the validity of the Will and the trust arrangements.  A Cheung J, as he then was, dismissed the challenge and found that the Will had been proved in solemn form.  The mother’s appeal was dismissed first by the Court of Appeal (CACV No. 200 of 2008) and then by the Court of Final Appeal (FACV No. 11 of 2010).

9.  The proof of a will in solemn form will bind not only the persons who were parties to the proceedings, but also those who were privy to the proceedings, ie those who, being of full age and sui juris, elected to stand aside though notified of their interest in the proceedings (see: Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks, Executors, Administrators and Probate (19 ed, 2008) §20-4).

10.  The Plaintiffs are clearly persons of full age and sui juris.  They clearly had knowledge of the proceedings.  In §14 of the judgment, A Cheung J mentioned the Plaintiffs as persons, alongside the mother, who could not accept the contents of the Will and the trust arrangements.  In such circumstances, it is beyond doubt that the proof of the Will in solemn form binds the Plaintiffs.

11.  Further, it is equally impossible to see how the Defendant, as trustee or executor, owes any duty to the Plaintiffs, who are not beneficiaries of the Karen Trust, under the Will or on intestacy had there been one.

12.  Based on the aforesaid, the Plaintiffs’ claim is wholly misconceived and has to be struck out.

Costs

13.  Costs should follow the event.

14.  In an earlier action, HCA No. 597 of 2006, the 1st Plaintiff had already made a claim against the present Defendant and other parties relating to the administration of the estate of the Deceased.  On 11 August 2006, Registrar Chan struck out his claim on the ground that, inter alia, the 1st Plaintiff had no locus standi to commence the claim.  In such circumstances, it is wholly unreasonable for the Plaintiffs to have brought another action against the Defendant. I therefore ordered the Plaintiffs to pay the costs of this action, including the costs of the striking out summons dated 11 August 2011, on an indemnity basis.

15.  In the hearing, the Defendant asked for summary assessment of costs.  I agreed.  However, since the Plaintiffs were unrepresented and only received the Statement of Costs in the hearing, opportunity should have been given to the Plaintiffs to study the Statement.  That was the reason why I preferred the assessment to be done at a later date.

16.  I therefore make the following directions:

(i)   the summary assessment of costs shall be dealt with on paper;

(ii)   the Defendant do file and serve the Statement of Costs, either in Chinese or in English with Chinese translations, together with a Chinese translation of the directions herein, within 7 days of the handing down of this Reasons for Decision; and

(iii)   the Plaintiffs do file and serve a brief List of Objections to the said Statement within 7 days thereafter.

Restricted proceedings order (“RPO”)

17.  As I have mentioned above, the 1st Plaintiff had brought a similar action against the Defendant in 2006 and the same was dismissed.  With clear knowledge that he had no locus standi to do so, he nevertheless commenced the present action against the Defendant.   In the hearing, I raised the possibility of making a RPO against at least the 1st Plaintiff.

18.  Mr Man, counsel for the Defendant, indicated to me that the Defendant was also considering whether to make such application.  As rightly pointed out by Mr Man, evidence needs to be filed by the Defendant in support of such application, and directions need to be given by the court in respect of the filing of affidavit evidence.

19.  After further consideration, I decide to leave this matter with the Defendant.  If the Defendant sees it fit to make an application for a RPO, it can take out an appropriate summons so that the court can give directions for the filing of affidavit evidence.  Hence at this stage, no direction will be given by the court in relation to such application if any.

(David Lok)
Deputy High Court Judge

The Plaintiffs appeared in person

Mr Bernard Man, instructed by Messrs Clifford Chance, for the Defendant

Please refer to HCMP245/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

Please refer to HCMP245/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

Please refer to HCMP245/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

有關向上訴法庭提出的相關上訴,請參閲HCMP245/2012

有關向上訴法庭提出的相關上訴,請參閲HCMP245/2012

有關向上訴法庭提出的相關上訴,請參閲HCMP245/2012

有關向上訴法庭提出的相關上訴,請參閲HCMP245/2012