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SUN JIANQIANG v. CHAN TAI KAU AND ANOTHER

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80777-CH-2012-03-09

孫建強 對 CHAN TAI KAU 及另一人

HTML content

HCPI 1375/2000

香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

傷亡訴訟2000年第1375號

_______________

原告人孫建強 

對

第一被告人CHAN TAI KAU 
第二被告人Intercontinental Hire Cars Ltd 

_______________

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官歐陽桂如

聆訊日期:2012年3月8日

判案書日期:2012年3月9日

判案書

 

1.  今天的聆訊要處理四個傳票申請:

(1)  孫先生的申請,更改2012 年 1 月 19 日的訟費暫令;

(2)  孫先生的申請,把繳存於法院的餘款支出給他;

(3)  第二被告人的申請,把2012 年 1 月 19 日所評估的訟費和利息由該法庭存款中支出;

(4)  第一及第二被告人的申請,把法院存款的累積利息發還給第一及第二被告人。

2.  本席將第(2)個申請放在最後處理。

第(1)個申請

3.  2012 年1 月 19 日,本席拒絕給予孫先生延展上訴期限,維持吳美玲聆案官的判決。故此訟費應隨判決結果,由孫先生支付。

4.  孫先生所提出更改訟費暫令的理據可見於其傳票上,簡單而言,孫先生並不接納本席的判決,其在傳票中提出,應由前僱主環島公司,而非第二被告人在DCEC 858/2001及CACV 20/2003兩案中進行上次聆訊的申請,及建議將本案及上述兩件案件由高等法院首席法官批准後,轉交CACV 20/2003的法庭處理。這些論點均已在本席2012 年 1 月 19 日的判詞中處理過(見判詞的第23-26段)。

5.  而孫先生在傳票中第3 項所提出的,是基於其和被告方已於2011 年11 月 1 日協商達成本案的和解,相應此令的訟費應由與訟雙方各自承擔。本席認為其理據不充分,因為支出繳存法院的款項的申請,是因孫先生不支付第二被告人的訟費而引起的,與雙方協商和解的問題無關,孫先生提出的上訴並不成功,他是應該負責被告方的訟費的。

6.  孫先生並沒有質疑評估的訟費金額 $10,000 的合理性。本席認為,孫先生沒有理據反對訟費暫令,因此本席撤銷其申請,並將訟費暫令轉為絕對命令。

7.  本申請的訟費歸第二被告人,本席循簡易程序評估金額為 $2,000。

第(3)個申請

8.  第二被告人要求把2012 年 1 月 19 日所評估的訟費$10,000及利息由法庭存款中支出。

9.  孫先生並非本港居民,在港亦無任何資產,他曾拒絕按命令支付第二被告人過去的訟費,導致被告人要申請押記令及從押記的款項中支取訟費。本席認為,第二被告人今次的申請是有理據的,而原告人也無任何反對的理由。因此,本席批准第二被告人從存於法庭的本金中支取 $10,000及其滾存至2012 年 3 月 8 日的利息 $109.85給第二被告人。

10.  關於本申請的訟費,本席認為應由孫先生支付予第二被告人。由於申請簡單,也與第 (1)個申請相關,因此,本席批准第二被告人收取訟費 $1,000元。

第(4)個申請

11.  第一及第二被告人要求發還法庭存款利息的申請。

12.  2010 年 3 月 16 日,暫委法官郭靄誠判決原告人勝訴,並就賠償金作出裁決。其後,暫委法官郭靄誠於2010 年 6 月 8 日頒下判令,指出孫先生在訴訟方面有拖延,故此判令以2006 年 9 月 1 日當為判決日計算利息。

13.  就着該利息判令的指示,孫先生當時的代表律師(法律援助署)已跟第一及第二被告人達成協議 ,而第一及第二被告人亦於2011 年 9 月 23 日前把賠償金、訟費、及有關的利息全數支付給法律援助署。第一及第二被告人認為孫先生再沒有理由取得在法庭存款的累積利息,否則的話,孫先生便得到意外之財。累積的利息應歸第一及第二被告人所有,因為第一及第二被告人把有關款項存於法庭的期間,失去運用該些款項的機會。據關律師所知,案件完成時,法庭往往會按一貫做法,把累積利息發還給存款方。不過關律師並未能向本席指出這做法是基於什麼法律原則。

14.  本席並不完全同意關律師的說法。在與法律援助署磋商訟費及利息的過程中,雙方一直是以存放於法庭的本金 $980,000用作抵償部分判決金額為基礎的。而雙方於2011 年 9 月23 日才就欠款、訟費、利息達成共識。2011 年 11 月 1 日的同意命令(和解包括所有欠款、訟費及利息的命令)是後來總結雙方同意的條件,並不影響第一及第二被告人於2011 年9 月 23 日正式讓孫先生提取存於法庭的款項的事實。因此,本席認為應以2011 年9 月 23 日為分水嶺,該日之前的累積利息應歸第一及第二被告人所有。該日及之後,款項已屬於孫先生,若他將該款項提取,存放於自己的銀行中,利息也是歸於他的。

15.  訟費方面,第一及第二被告人應被視為勝訴者,訟費應歸第一及第二被告人。關律師所作的誓章約有一半的內容是無關旨宏的,涉及無意義的對質,因此訟費應予扣減。孫先生存檔了許多份冗長的誓章。本席認為合理的訟費應為$10,000。

第(2)個申請

16.  在扣除上述各項訟費及利息後,孫先生可取得法庭的存款及利息。

總結

17.  本席的總結如下:

(1)  撤銷孫先生所提出更改訟費暫令的申請,訟費暫令變為絕對命令,第二被告人就着2012 年 1 月 19 日的判決可得訟費 $10,000 。第 (1)個申請的訟費由原告人支付第二被告人,循簡易程序評估為 $1,000;

(2)  第二被告人可從繳存於法院的存款中支取2012 年 1 月 19 日獲判的訟費$10,000及其積存至2012 年 3 月 8 日的利息$109.85 。第 (3)個申請的訟費由原告人支付第二被告人,循簡易程序評估為 $1,000;

(3)  法院存款的累積利息以2011 年 9 月 23 日為分界線,該日前的累積利息發還給第一及第二被告人,該日及之後的累積利息發還給原告人。第 (4)個申請的訟費由原告人支付第一及第二被告人,循簡易程序評估為 $10,000 ;

(4)  第一及第二被告人須於2012 年 3 月 13 日或之前向法庭提取上述款項;

(5)  在支取上述所有訟費及利息給第一及第二被告人後,繳存於法院的餘款(本金及利息)支付給孫先生。

18.  本席感謝關律師的協助。

(歐陽桂如)
高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

原告人:無律師代表,親自出庭。

第一及第二被告人:由葉嘉棟關朗儀律師事務所關朗儀律師代表。

80017-CH-2012-01-19

孫建強 對 CHAN TAI KAU 及另一人

HTML content

HCPI 1375/2000

香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

傷亡訴訟2000年第1375號

--------------------------
原告人孫建強 

對

第一被告人CHAN TAI KAU 
第二被告人INTERCONTINENTAL HIRE CARS LTD 
-------------------------

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官歐陽桂如

聆訊日期:2012年1月17日

判案書日期:2012年1月19日

--------------------------

判案書

--------------------------

 

1.  聆案官作出支出繳存法院的款項以支付第二被告人的訟費的命令,原告人孫先生不服,提出逾期上訴許可申請,要求:

(1)  撤銷該命令;及

(2)  「第二被告人代表律師 [葉嘉棟 關朗儀律師事務所]關姓律師,不適宜將其與另案CACV20/2003上訴訟案及其DCEC858/2001僱員補償訟案的被告僱主Trans-Island Limousine Service Limited之間糾纏不清的純物權性質轉讓債權債務,帶來[干]預擾亂本案的人身傷害賠償判決的正常執行及引發更多法律混亂。」

背景

2.  吳聆案官的判詞清楚列出有關事實及判決理由,本席節錄於下文第3至14段。

3.  1999 年孫先生因一次意外而受到身體傷害,在被告人承認法律責任下,暫委法官郭靄誠進而於2010年評估賠償,得出金額為1,643,124.22 元。被告人就著評估金額提出的上訴於2011 年遭駁回。

4.  期間,第一和第二被告人於2001年及2006年分別繳存了330,000 元及650,000 元於法院,於孫先生獲評估賠償後,該些存入法庭的款項歸於賠償一部份,總額980,000 元連累積的利息。

5.  就著同一意外,孫先生和他的僱主有一宗工傷賠償的案件,DCEC858/2001。在該案中,孫先生同意接受僱主所存入法庭的款項,區域法院法官作了一個有關賠償的裁決,扣除已收取的款項,法官只是將存入法庭的330,000 元發放予孫先生的代表律師。然而上訴庭於CACV20/2003一案擱置了區域法院的判決 ,然後頒下許可予孫先生,接受僱主存入法庭的330,000 元作為案件最終的解決,亦容許孫先生從法庭支出該款項,所以案件完結的方式就是將DCEC858/2001擱置,而沒有作出一個裁決。其後上訴法庭更於2007 年否決孫先生就上訴法庭的裁決而提出向終審法院上訴的許可申請。

6.  就著上訴法庭所作出的兩個判決 ,DCEC858/2001的僱主(被告人)共取得兩個訟費命令,經評定後,法庭已於2006年及2007年發出了共兩份訟費評定書,說明孫先生需要支付的訟費分別為73,176 元及226,769.67 元。

7.  2010 年9 月2 日,僱主藉轉讓書將其應得訟費轉讓予本案的第二被告人。

8.  就著已評定的訟費,第二被告人於2010 年12 月31 日,取得高聆案官所頒的絕對押記令,押記就著本案而繳存於法院的金額。第二被告人也獲判7,000 元訟費。雙方沒有就著該絕對押記令提出上訴。

9.  2011 年11 月8 日,第二被告人的代表律師(關律師)申請從繳存法庭的980,000 元款項中支出,以作孫先生欠第二被告人作為受讓人所應得的經評定的訟費、絕對押記令下獲判的7,000 元訟費及利息 。關律師在其支持誓章中呈上一封法援署的函件(11 月8 日函件)。該函件表示絕對押記令下所提的法援署的第一押記應不會超逾450,000 元,如果繳存於法庭的款項能保留450,000 元,則該署對於第二被告人執行訟費並不會提出異議,換言之,存於法庭的餘款530,000 元可用於執行第二被告人所獲取的絕對押記令下的訟費及累計利息。

聆案官的裁決

10.  吳聆案官認為:上訴法庭在CACV20/2003的裁決為終極裁決。同樣地,經評定的訟費及絕對押記令未經上訴,所以對雙方也具約束力,即使孫先生質疑上訴法庭的裁決、僱主和第二被告人的轉讓書,但不能改變的事實就是孫先生須依據上訴法庭的命令支付訟費,而第二被告人作為受讓人是有權執行相關的訟費令及申請累算利息的。

11.  孫先生向吳聆案官指出,他並不知悉11月8日函件。他也指稱,就著這個僱員賠償可能會有其他押記令。不過吳聆案官認為,鑑於法援署已就著其自身的押記表示立場,同意不會從繳存於法庭的款項中拿取多於450,000 元,所以吳聆案官並不認為再要得到法援署進一步或者其他方面的確認。

12.  孫先生指稱,這個申請並不公平及不合理,因為存於法庭的款項是他應該取得的賠償,因其受到工傷,及依據普通法之下應得的賠償,第二被告人是應該支付賠償的一方,不應該就著已由法庭評定的賠償取回任何款項,否則對孫先生不公平。

13.  吳聆案官認為原告人賠償方面得直,應該取得就著本身身體受傷而得的賠償,但不改變的事實乃法庭同時間亦作出有關裁決,就是孫先生就著訴訟須支付訟費給他的僱主,根據絕對押記令,該僱主就著訟費方面的命令,現在歸於第二被告人。所以孫先生就著上訴法庭的命令是有責任和義務支付相關訟費的。

14.  孫先生指稱,如果將款項支付給第二被告人,後果就是令到孫先生的賠償因而減少。如果不應第二被告人的要求,而將該款項保留予孫先生,就等同孫先生取得他的賠償,而不須要履行支付訟費的責任。吳聆案官認為,兩個命令都是一個對原被告雙方屬終極及具約束力的命令,除了法援署的第一押記之外,孫先生就著存於法庭的980,000 元及累算利息,一般是屬於他的賠償,但第二被告人同時間亦是訟費命令的受讓人,原告人亦有責任支付相關訟費。鑑於雙方就著賠償及訟費都得直,吳聆案官看不出為何該些訟費不應該由存於法庭的金額中作出相關扣取支付。吳聆案官看不出原告人在陳詞中提出的各項理由能構成一充分的理由,以致申請須要押後爭辯。再押後的話,未付的評定訟費仍然會繼續累計相關利息,亦會在法庭繳付的款項中扣取,令到孫先生最終收取的款項更少。吳聆案官信納關律師所計算的訟費及利息總欠額,因此批准:

1.       從繳存法院的港幣980,000.00元及所衍生的利息,受制於及在保留在法庭的款項不能減少至低於港幣450,000.00的情況下,支出以下款項,經由第二被告人的律師至第二被告人:

i.        一筆港幣453,586.05的款項;

ii.       該款項的日息,以每日利率港幣67.27計算,由2011年11月10日起至支出款項的日子為止;

2.       第二被告人須要由當日起不少於7天向高等法院會計部作出如以上所說的支出款項申請;及

3.       此申請的訟費由原告人繳付予第二被告人,以簡易程序評估為港幣3,000 元,此款項將由法院儲存金經由第二被告人的律師支出至第二被告人。

孫先生針對此命令提出本逾期上訴。

逾期上訴

15.  根據《民事訴訟程序2012》第 58/1/9 段,法庭應考慮第3 號命令第 5規則下,延展時限的原則。正確的原則不是在法庭行使酌情權之前,申請人必須顯示有可接受的延誤原因,反為法庭須考慮所有事宜,包括延誤的理由是否足夠,並平衡各項因素才作出決定:Mobil Petroleum Co. Inc. & Another v Registrar of Trade Marks [2001] HKLRD 225, 夏正民法官(當時官階)。因此法庭需要考慮的因素為延誤的時間、延誤的理由、上訴成功的機會及對答辯人負面影響的程度。

16.  吳聆案官的命令是於2011 年11 月22 日作出的。根據《高等法院規則》第 58 號命令第 1(3) 規則,上訴期限是14 天,即於12 月6 日屆滿,本上訴卻於12 月28 日才提交,遲了22 天。

17.  根據孫先生所稱,延誤的原因為:不懂法律程序、需時索取吳聆案官的判決謄本、其須先與法律援助署處理其上訴/投訴程序,及簽證和交通上的不便。

18.  孫先生雖在本上訴中無代表律師,然而他是知道上訴期只有14 天的,此點由他分別於2011 年12 月2 日致函高等法院司法常務官,及於12月8日向原審的暫委法官郭靄誠,申請延展上訴期可見一斑。然而他未獲批延展期限。

19.  他於那14 天期限中致力向法援署投訴謝士芳律師代署長發出11 月8 日函件的處事方法,及上訴法援署長拒絕繼續批予其法援的決定,他清楚知道那是有別於向法院上訴本案的命令的,他在那14 天期限內卻沒有提出本上訴。

20.  孫先生說是簽證及交通不便的問題,但事實上他已於12月5日再取得來港的簽證,本可趕及於12月6日發出上訴申請。然而他於12月13日收到謝士芳律師有關覆函信件才於12月16日擬辦理上訴登記事宜。在被告知上訴文本方式不符合法院規定而不可辦理排期登記時,他又重新簽證,於12月23日來港,因過境人數太多而於抵達法院登記處時,該處已結束當日的工作。他只能於聖誕假期後提出上訴。

21.  對於12月6日或以前的延誤,孫先生並不具合理解釋,其於12月6日後盡力嘗試發出上訴通知書,也無補於事。本席不認為他的延誤具充分理由。

上訴可能得直的機會

22.  孫先生交來了三份誓章(含陳詞)連附件,及補充論據。他提出許多上訴理由,本席歸納如下:

(1)     CACV20/2003訟案判決失實;

(2)     他質疑前僱主和第二被告人之間的轉讓協議;

(3)     法援署向孫先生隱瞞11 月8 日函件及不當干預;

(4)     損害賠償應優先於訟費;

(5)     第二被告人應於DCEC858/2001訟案中申請支付訟費。

本席將逐點作出分析。

(1)     CACV20/2003訟案判決失實

23.  孫先生認為CACV20/2003的判決失實,而法援署暗中冒充他向「冒名頂替」的被告僱主進行工傷案訴訟的葉關律師事務所,繳付超過300,000 元所謂訟費。而法院未予確實研判清楚CACV20/2003失實判決前,署長絕不可擅自代孫先生提取區院的存款來支付訟費。

24.  本席同意吳聆案官所說,上訴法庭在CACV20/2003案中的裁決為最終裁決,是有效約束雙方及法庭的命令,不容視為失實的判決。吳聆案官拒絕重開葉關律師行是否獲授權代表被告人的事宜是正確的決定。本席也無權按孫先生的要求,將涉及所謂CACV20/2003失實判決的相應爭議,轉交上訴庭再審理。這個上訴理由並不成立。

(2)     孫先生前僱主和第二被告人之間的轉讓協議

25.  孫先生質疑有關轉讓的事宜,他認為轉讓書只是於前僱主的僱員面前簽署,並非於律師面前簽署。但吳聆案官認為一個轉讓書並不需要在律師席前簽署才生效,更重要的是轉讓書並不改變一個事實,就是孫先生就著上訴法庭訟費裁決方面須要支付有關已評定的訟費。本席同意這一裁定。

26.  而且法庭已在作出絕對扣押令前接納了該份轉讓協議為證據。孫先生指出高聆案官在判決絕對押記令的聆訊中,沒有給予孫先生質疑該轉讓關係的機會。問題是孫先生從沒有就該絕對押記令提出上訴,現今才作出質疑已是太遲了。本上訴理由並不成立

(3)     法援署向孫先生隱瞞11 月8 日函件及不當干預

27.  11月8日函件確實只有抄送副本予第二被告人的律師而沒有給孫先生。孫先生得知後向法援署查詢,得知該署為他收回的賠償金約為1,160,000 元,支出的訟費及其他費用為1,600,000 元(包括DCEC858/2001、CACV20/2003、HCPI 1375/2000、CACV81/2010等四宗訟案),差額440,000 元。他認為署長第一押記款額約為1,600,000 元,大於本案存於法庭的賠償金,故他有權主宰決定“將980,000 元法庭存款先行歸納用於扣(減)署長第一押記,不足部份再從被告人已付法援署的賠償和後續收回的勝訴訟費中扣除,並將餘款儘快分次還付他中期支付,直至支付完成本案他本人所應得賠償為止。”而法援署的唐律師據說也作出過類似的承諾,但此點已被法援署否認。

28.  孫先生又指出絕對押記命令是在沒有法援情況下,他自己訴訟所得結果,因此,在不涉及署長第一押記發生有誤的情況下,署長不宜干預孫先生如何理性處理該絕對押記命令。

29.  他憑記憶指高聆案官宣讀命令的主要內容是:

「“本案賠償[法庭存款]港幣980,000 元須應先行滿足支付[署長第一押記],然之後才可再作被告方該庭[持令申請]第二押記;…被告所勝訴該庭聆訊訟費港幣7,000 元,亦只能是在此[法庭存款]支付完[署長第一押記]的餘款中,與其第二押記同時執行…”。並且,高勁修聆案官亦同時向被告方關姓律師和原告我本人作出清楚解釋:“被告人能否收取該[押記判令]所裁定的押記款項、以及該庭訟費的可能性是非常之微少”。」

30.  法援署的第一押記是不爭的事實,此點也於高聆案官所發出的絕對押記令中反映出來。11 月8 日函件,只是署長履行他在絕對押記令下及對法庭的責任,提供資料協助法庭處理繳存於法庭的款項。11月8日函件已隨關律師的支持誓章送達給孫先生,故他可於11月22日聆訊前得悉。

31.  此外,孫先生所引述高聆案官所宣讀的判詞並沒有謄本紀錄為證。但憶述的內容即若屬實,也顯示出高聆案官正確述及各項訟費支出的優先次序,他當時只論及被告人收取押記的款項的可能性,並沒有也無需要定奪第一押記所涵蓋的金額。

32.  但無論孫先生如何不滿法援署怎樣調配賠償金和已收的訟費,那只是他和法援署之間的事,並不影響第二被告人在本案作出申請的權利 ,更未能顯示吳聆案官的判決有何錯誤。

(4)     損害賠償優先於訟費

33.  孫先生認為,從人道公義理解,無論是人身傷亡賠償或是工傷案,損害賠償應優先於訟費。然而孫先生認為他遭遇的卻是訟費不止於優先,更要超過工傷僱員補償。

34.  繳存於法庭之內的金額及滾存的利息,在扣除法援署的第一押記所押記的金額後,餘款是屬於孫先生實益擁有的。第二被告人於CACV20/2003中的訟費命令中已獲判及獲評定的訟費,是第二被告人可向孫先生追討的判定債務。既然孫先生沒有支付對第二被告人的欠款,第二被告人是可以根據第50 號命令第1及第10 規則向法庭申請押記令的。這不是損害賠償和訟費誰有優先的問題,是法律賦予判定債務人執行訟費令的權利。孫先生認為不能動用工傷賠償金作為支取訟費是他一廂情願的看法,吳聆案官的決定並無錯誤。

(5)     第二被告人應於DCEC858/2001案中申請支付訟費

35.  孫先生認為葉嘉棟關朗儀律師事務所沒有權代表第二被告人,他們的命令是騙回來的,且該律師樓應於DCEC858/2001訟案中申請支付已評定的訟費,因為被評定的訟費屬於該案衍生出來的程序。此乃其上文第 1 (2) 段所指。

36.  吳聆案官已經指出僱傭賠償的案件已終結,她拒絕重開葉嘉棟關朗儀律師事務所是否有權代表第二被告人的議題,本席認為其裁定正確。況且DCEC858/2001訟案未見有繳存於區域法院,足以抵償第二被告人應得的訟費的款額,故第二被告人無理由在該訟案作出申請。

結論

37.  本席認為,吳聆案官正確地在判詞中列出主要事實,及正確地應用法律,其判決無懈可擊,本席同意其結論及命令。

38.  孫先生所提出的上訴理由均不能成立,尤其是他與法援署之間的轇轕,根本與第二被告人無關。加上其延誤提出上訴,即使給予逾期上訴許可,其結果也將徒然。

39.  因此,本席駁回其延展上訴期限的申請。

40.  暫令孫先生須支付第二被告人的訟費。本席考慮過關律師所提交的訟費陳述書,本上訴實為簡單的申請,上訴理據大部份已在吳聆案官席前處理過。不過孫先生實在存檔了冗長的誓章和陳詞,以致律師須要花費時間閱讀。本席認為應以一個較低的每小時收費作評定。因此循簡易程序評估訟費總數為10,000 元,由孫先生支付。除非任何一方在14 天之內申請更改本暫令,否則14 天後本暫令將成為正式命令。

(歐陽桂如)
高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

原告人:無律師代表,親自出庭。

第二被告人:葉嘉棟關朗儀律師事務所關朗儀律師代表。

71405-EN-2010-06-08

SUN JIANQIANG v. CHAN TAI KAU AND ANOTHER

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70183-EN-2010-03-16

SUN JIANQIANG v. CHAN TAI KAU AND ANOTHER

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HCPI 1375/2000

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 1375 OF 2000

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BETWEEN  
 SUN JIANQIANG Plaintiff
 and 
 CHAN TAI KAU  1st Defendant
     INTERCONTINENTAL HIRE CARS LTD  2nd Defendant

 

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Before: Deputy High Court Judge Carlson in Court

Dates of Hearing: 20–23 October 2009, 9 November 2009

Date of Judgment (Handed Down): 16 March 2010

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J U D G M E N T

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Introduction

1.  This is an assessment damages for personal injury and consequential losses suffered by the Plaintiff, Mr Sun Jianqiang on 27 October 1999.  The Plaintiff was employed as a cross-border coach driver by a company called Guandong Ananda Bus Company Limited.  On the day in question, at about 8 p.m., the Plaintiff, who had parked his coach at the depot car-park of TransIsland  Limousine Service Limited, which is situated at Shui Chong Street, Shatin, was walking towards the depot’s office when he was knocked down by a tour bus registration no. GZ2631 owned by the 2nd Defendant and driven on its behalf by its employee, Mr Chan Tai Kau, the 1st Defendant.  Liability in negligence and breach of statutory duty has been accepted by the Defendants as a result of which, on 8 March 2001, Master C B Chan entered interlocutory judgment on liability with damages to be assessed.

2.  Unhappily, the Plaintiff has sustained serious injuries which I will need to examine as part of his claim for pain, suffering and loss of amenity which is substantial, as well as his claim for loss of earnings, which includes a head of damage for loss of future earnings which is continuing.

3.  As will become apparent a particular feature of the Plaintiff’s case is that although a mainlander, he was employed by a mainland Hong Kong-related company earning a salary based on Hong Kong rates of pay which, as everybody knows, are considerably higher than rates of pay on the mainland.  His claim for loss of earnings, both pre-trial and for future losses is put on the basis that as a result of his injuries he is unable to resume work as a driver and certainly not able to resume his pre-accident employment.  This head of damage therefore is based on a comparison of what, but for the accident and his injuries, he would have earned in the 2nd defendant’s employment and what he has been able to do in terms of work on the mainland.  It is this which has elevated his claim and which has served to make this a highly contentious assessment in which the Defendants have maintained that the Plaintiff is something of a malingerer who has exaggerated his physical disabilities and who has not done his reasonable best to get better paid employment since he was able to resume work, all of which has been put forward by him to try and persuade the court to award him more damages than he is fairly entitled to.  In order to try and prove its case on exaggeration, the Defendants’ solicitors have had the Plaintiff secretly filmed over period of time on the mainland and whilst he has been in Hong Kong.

4.  This brief summary provides a sense of how the assessment has proceeded with just about every issue of importance being sharply contested.  I now propose to give separate consideration to the various heads of damage under which the Plaintiff seeks to be compensated.

Pain, Suffering and Loss of Amenity

5.  There is no doubt that the Plaintiff sustained an extremely serious fracture of the left femur and he also suffered a number of cracked ribs.  He was admitted to the Prince of Wales Hospital where he was diagnosed with “an open fracture of the left femur” [C/1].  He was admitted on the date of the accident, the 27 October 1999, and discharged on 8 November 1999.  During this period he underwent three operations.  Firstly, on 28 October a closed reduction of the fracture together with an internal fixation by the insertion of a long Gamma nail to hold the fracture together.  On 30 October and 4 November, he underwent excisional debridement of the wound.  On 11 August 2001, a further operation was performed to remove the long Gamma nail.

6.  The progress of the Plaintiff’s recovery can be obtained from a number of reports prepared by the treating doctors.  For this, I gratefully take a summary prepared by Miss Cruden, who appears for him.  This can be found as Appendix I to the note of her closing speech.  Following his discharge, it was noted by Dr Lai, at the Prince of Wales, that the Plaintiff was able to walk with the aid of crutches but that he required strengthening and mobilisation exercises.  Between 24 December 1999 and 24 January 2000, the Plaintiff attended five physiotherapy sessions at the Prince of Wales.  There is a physiotherapy report dated 6 April 2000 from Mr Ng, a physiotherapist [C/5-6] which notes that at first the Plaintiff needed two elbow crutches and that the left leg was painful and that movement was limited.  By the fifth session, the Plaintiff had some temporary relief from pain.  The lower left leg muscles showed wasting and diminished strength.

7.  On 27 March 2000, five months after the accident, the Plaintiff attended for a follow-up consultation with Dr Tsui, who was one of his surgeons, and he reported on 20 April 2000 [C/1] that the fracture had united satisfactorily and the Plaintiff was advised to walk with full weight bearing. On 25 July 2000, Dr Tsui provided a further report [C/7] noting the fractures of left lower ribs and that the high degree of muscle wasting was due to lack of exercise after the Plaintiff’s discharge from hospital.  He advised him to give this his attention.  On 11 October 2000, Dr Tsui provided a memorandum concerning the Plaintiff’s fractures of his third to his tenth ribs [C/15].  A chest drain was inserted, presumably to remove excess fluid, and the drain was removed the following day.

8.  It is also right to observe that for the period from December 1999 to March 2001, the Plaintiff was treated at the Guangzhou Provincial People’s Hospital.  The final operation, which I have already referred to, was in August 2001 at the Prince of Wales Hospital where the long Gamma nail was removed, there having been a satisfactory union of the fracture.

9.  There are also agreed reports from the parties’ experts, Dr David Cheng and Dr Lam Kwong Chiu.  Miss Cruden has helpfully summarised what they have reported at Appendix 2 of her note which I also gratefully adopt.

10.  He was examined by Dr Cheng, on the Plaintiff’s solicitors behalf on 11 August 2000, about 10 months after the accident, who reported that he had not yet reached maximal improvement and suggested that he should continue with his physical exercises [C/14].  On examination, Dr Cheng found that the Plaintiff’s general health was good, that he walked with a limp and that he could not support himself on the left (the injured) leg alone.  He could only squat down half way.  There were multiple scars over the left hip and the middle of the right thigh and leg.  There was limitation of motion of the left hip.

11.  And so one can see that after a year, there had been some improvement but there was still work to be done to strengthen the left leg in general.

12.  Dr Lam, the Defendant’s expert, provided his first report on 14 March 2001 [C/16] based on an examination on 8 March.  Dr Lam noted that the Plaintiff gave up his crutches in mid-2000 and started to use a walking stick.  He recorded the Plaintiff’s complaints as left hip pain, which became worst with exercise, pressure or poor weather.  The left shin wound would swell in the afternoon and the left calf would get cramp about two or three times a week.  He walked with a stick and could tolerate walking for half an hour.  Dr Lam noted that the Plaintiff walked with a limp and used a walking stick with his right hand.  There was wasting of the left thigh and calf.  There was reduced range of movement of the left leg.  A significant finding by Dr Lam is at para.11 of the report [C/21].  He said this:

“After fracture of the major bones, some limitation in walking and pain is expected, particularly in the early months.  However, Mr Sun made very slow progress after the surgery, with persistent complaints of pain and weakness, of such an extent which was considered as unreasonable by the therapist.”

At paragraph 13, Dr Lam noted that the Plaintiff had:

“very poor weight bearing at the left side, which is rather out of proportion to a well-healed femoral fracture.  He had 4cm wasting of muscles at the left thigh and 1cm at the calf.”

He found that the fracture had healed well and with good alignment.

13.  He agreed with Dr Cheng that further improvement was to be expected and that the Gamma nail ought to be removed as it was protruding.  He thought that this would reduce hip pain and improve flexibility.  This was done in August 2001.  Dr Lam said that patients with a well-healed femoral fracture could return to work even with strenuous manual jobs.  He expected that the Plaintiff to return as a coach driver.  He considered the one year sick leave ample and that this Plaintiff’s recovery was “unexpectedly long”.

14.  Dr Cheng saw him again on 12 March 2001, basically at the same time as Dr Lam [C/25].  Unsurprisingly, his clinical findings were similar.  He noted that the Plaintiff had made little progress since he had seen him seven months earlier.  He put this down to an exercise regime that was not sufficiently demanding and the protrusion of the Gamma nail.  He recommended its removal.  He said that further improvement would follow with a six-month course of physiotherapy. 

Reports Prepared for the Trial

15.  These reports were jointly prepared by Dr Lam and Dr Cheng.  The first is dated 7 November 2006 and is based on an examination on 27 June 2006.  On this occasion, the Plaintiff was seen to walk well with a slight limp.  He could squat more than half way.  He could support himself on either leg on toes and heels.  There was slight stiffness over the left hip and the Plaintiff complained that the left leg was weaker.  The left thigh circumference was 4cms less than the right thigh.  Both doctors agreed that seven years after the accident, the Plaintiff’s condition had now stabilised and that the prognosis was fair to good.  He was advised to do more exercise to increase muscle bulk and strength.  The effect of the injury was described as moderate and they advised against heavy manual work.  Their conclusion was that:

“[the Plaintiff] may resume his pre-accident occupation of a coach driver which is not a job of high physical demand … Alternative job can be chauffeur, watchman, shop keeper, office worker etc. …”

16.  A final joint report was prepared on 6 January 2009 based on an examination on 20 November 2008.  On this occasion, they viewed the surveillance VCD’s.  They are both agreed that the Plaintiff has now reached maximum medical improvement.  They assessed him as not suitable for heavy manual work.  On this occasion, they said that:

“[he] may probably be able to resume his pre-accident work of a coach driver as the job is not one of high physical demand; and that [he] should be capable to operate the coach in spite of the weakness, i.e. [he], probably should be capable to drive a coach.”

17.  The Plaintiff complained of frequent pain over the left leg and needed pain-killers.  There were also more generalised aches and pains.  Overall, he was found to be in good health.  He was now more flexible and could squat almost fully.  A soft swelling was detected in the mid-shin area of his left leg.  They thought that this was caused by a gap in the deep fascia.  They considered that surgical repair may help.  They concluded that the effect of the injury was “moderate”.  They advised regular exercise.  Their conclusion on employment was as I have previously stated it.  They added that if he was to drive a coach he should drive one fitted with an automatic gearbox.

18.  In respect of the surveillance VCD’s the two doctors have commented as follows [C/43]:

“(i)  December 2001

This showed Sun walking with a stick on the right hand.

No signs of any pain.

(ii) April 2002

This shows Sun walking with a slight limb, but at good pace and without any walking aid.  He is seen going downstairs normally without need to hold onto railing.

(iii)    February 2007

The recording was taking on 26.2.2007, i.e. 11 days after discharged from hospital for gastric bleeding.

Sun is seen walking with a stick on the right hand.

The pace is good and he appears not to depend on the stick.

Sun is seen walking for a rather long time.

At the end Sun is seen walking without the stick, quite normally.

There are no signs to suggest any pain or discomfort during the waling.”

I have watched these VCD’s on three occasions and I am in broad agreement with these views.  What they show, of course, is marked improvement over the years to the final position in February 2007 where the Plaintiff is able to walk very freely over a substantial distance unaided and at a very decent pace.  Even in 2001, just over two years after the accident, the Plaintiff was able to walk well although with a limp.  Six years later in February 2007, he appears to have got over most, if not all, of the effects of his unpleasant injuries.

19.  The present position is that the Plaintiff works in a mainland garment factory.  I will consider later whether this amounts to him doing his reasonable best to maximise his earning capacity or whether he should and is capable of returning to better paid employment such as a coach driver.  The Defendants’ case is that by January 2002 or at worst a few weeks after that, the Plaintiff was well enough to return to work as a coach driver after which he should have no further loss of earnings claim.

Quantum for Pain, Suffering and Loss of Amenity

20.  As so often happens, the parties are far apart.  Miss Cruden says I should award $500,000 and Miss Lau, for the Defendants, submits that I should not go above $300,000.

21.  Both counsel have referred me to a number of comparables from decided cases.  It seems to me that these injuries are more comparable to cases referred to by Miss Cruden.  The significant aspects are that the Plaintiff had to undergo three operations in 1999 and another in 2001.  There is also the prospect of another, to deal with the problem of his shin although it is by no means certain that he will undergo such an operation.  There is also a degree of cosmetic defect caused by the operation scars which are usually covered up by his trousers but this should also weigh in the assessment.  He has had to live with pain, but now well reduced and judging from the fluency of his walking as shown in the final VCD, this has greatly diminished.  Most of his mobility is now restored to him.  As I will discuss more fully in considering his loss of earnings claims  I find that he cannot return to his previous occupation as a coach driver although most other jobs, short of heavy manual labour involving serious lifting and consequent strain on his injured leg, are open to him.  He has had restored most of his amenity of life in terms of what he can now do compared to what he could do before the accident.  It seems to me that he has made a good, albeit slow, recovery from a very unpleasant break of his femur.  I will award him $430,000 under this head of damage.

Loss of Earnings

22.  This has been the most contentious aspect of the case.  It divides itself up into pre-trial losses, future loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity.

Pre-trial Loss of Earnings

23.  The first period that I need to consider is the period of sick leave.  The Plaintiff has the benefit of sick leave certificates from 27 October 1999 to 3 January 2001 and then from 23 March 2001 to 1 December 2003.  These are certificates given to him by his treating doctors at the Prince of Wales Hospital [D/9-112].  The Plaintiff in fact obtained employment in June 2002, during his certificated period of sick leave.  The parties’ experts, Dr Chang and Dr Lam are agreed that sick leave would have been reasonable up to January 2002 and in fact the Defendants’ case is predicated on the basis of this joint opinion so that Miss Lau feels able to submit that after this date, the Plaintiff was fit to return to work as a coach driver so that he can have no loss of earnings claims beyond that date or so soon after it as I consider reasonable for him to have found work.

24.  Miss Cruden relies on a case called Ho Ho Ming v Tse Po Wah & Ors, unreported, HCPI 1168/2003, a decision of Suffiad J where he was prepared to allow sick leave for a much longer period, three years instead of two years, based on sick leave certificates granted by the Plaintiff’s treating doctors in preference to the opinion of the experts who had contended for two years as the appropriate period.  The judge preferred the views of the treating doctors whose opinions were contemporaneous with the Plaintiff’s medical condition as opposed to the experts who had examined him, in that case, more than two years after the date of the accident.

25.  In this case, there is not very much in it.  The fact is that the Plaintiff did return to employment 18 months before the expiry of his sick leave certificates.  Miss Lau has rightly conceded, that even on her case, the Plaintiff must be allowed a period of time to re-enter the job market.  I am content to say that it was perfectly reasonable for the Plaintiff not to have resumed work before June 2002.  I will therefore award him pre-trial loss of earnings in full from the date of the accident until June 2002.  This is a period of 32 months.

26.  The next question is to determine what a cross-border coach driver like the defendant would have earned during this period.  It is agreed that the Plaintiff was earning $10,000 a month at the time of the accident.  Miss Cruden has contended for an average 5% increase per annum on that salary based on figures provided by the Defendants for two limousine drivers.  It is regrettable that there are no income figures for cross-boarder coach drivers.  What can be said is that there was an upward trend in salaries for the 2nd Defendant’s drivers but I am really left to do my best on sketchy information.

27.  What I have decided to do is to take an overall figure which reflects the apparent rise in salaries.  I propose to adopt as the average figure over this first 32 months, $12,000 per month.  Accordingly, for the period from the date of the accident [27 October 1999] to the resumption of employment in June 2002, the award will be $12,000 x 32 months which is $384,000.

28.  The next period to consider is from June 2002 until the date of trial [16 March 2000] which is a period of 92.5 months.

29.  This requires me to consider a number of contentious issues.  I must decide what the Plaintiff would have earned over this period but for the accident and deduct from it either what he has actually earned which would be a perfectly straightforward arithmetical exercise or, as the Defendants submit, what he should have earned which would be alot more than he has actually earned, which they say is as a cross-border coach driver.  This would mean that he would have suffered no loss at all after June 2002.  It is this latter aspect that has occupied most of the evidence.

30.  It is convenient to deal with this first.  Miss Lau, relying on the agreed opinions of Dr Chang and Dr Lam that the Plaintiff could return to his pre-accident employment provided he drives coaches with automatic transmission submits that he could and should have followed that course, as a result of which there will be no loss of earnings claim from, on my finding, June 2002 when he returned to employment.

31.  I have had to follow the detail of, principally, the Plaintiff’s evidence as he has described his travails not only with his slow medical recovery but also mainland bureaucracy as he has been examined by government doctors to see if he was fit to have restored to him his mainland Chinese driving licence.  He has put in, with impressive detail, the medical reports both at first instance, as it were, when the medical staff found him unfit to drive due to his leg injury and then on appeal by way of review when the initial findings were found to be correct and the decision confirmed.

32.  I have had to rely on the mainland medical certificates in arriving at my conclusions on this very important part of the case.  Miss Lau has very properly challenged the overall authenticity of the Plaintiff’s case.  She has challenged the Plaintiff on whether he has managed to dupe the mainland doctors into believing that his symptoms and disabilities were as bad as their conclusions suggest so that they failed him.  In this regard, Miss Lau has had a very difficult row to hoe in that she has had no evidence of her own to contradict what the Plaintiff and his documents have indicated.  It also needs to be remembered that on issues that affect public safety as to a candidate’s fitness to hold a driving licence, the responsible medical authorities will be slow to approve somebody beset by a leg injury of this type.

33.  It seems to me that Miss Cruden must be right in this regard.  There is nothing to suggest that the medical records from the mainland are not authentic and it would have been open to the Defendants to have this investigated in order to show otherwise.  I must therefore proceed on the basis that the Plaintiff has been found medically unfit by the mainland licensing authority to hold a driving licence.  In this regard, he has failed the medical examination in 2006, 2008 when he took it again and in 2009.  It is a big thing to suggest that somehow the mainland doctors have come to the wrong medical decision.  I have no evidence to suggest that this might be so.

34.  As to his Hong Kong licence, that expired and was subsequently revoked.  He now has another licence from Hong Kong which permits him to only drive automatic transmission vehicles.  Whilst this is so, it does not help the Plaintiff in obtaining work as a cross-border driver in circumstances where he has not got a mainland driving licence.  There are also immigration and work permit difficulties in that he is a mainland resident and as such his right to be employed in Hong Kong is limited.  He is unable to live and work here.  He is restricted to working on the mainland.  Before his accident, the 2nd Defendant had been able to employ him as a cross-border driver which required both a PRC licence and a Hong Kong licence.  Now that he has no PRC licence, such employment is not open to him.

35.  I can therefore only proceed to assess his damages on the basis of what he can now do in turns of employment on the mainland.  The Hong Kong cross-border option is no longer available. 

36.  What this means therefore is that the Defendant’s case on the Plaintiff being able to drive automatic transmission coaches or limousines is out of the picture.  Where the mainland authorities will not give him a licence, and this has been proved to my satisfaction, the onus is on the Defendant to make out its case on licences being available on the mainland for drivers to be issued with automatic coach or limousine driving licences.  They could have provided that evidence themselves if it were available especially as they are concerned in the employment of cross-border mainland-based drivers.  They have not done so and I am not prepared to speculate as to whether such licences exist and whether there are drivers from the mainland who hold such licences.  The Plaintiff says that this is not an option and so, this being the state of the evidence, I need to proceed on that basis.  This part of the claim will have to be assessed on what the plaintiff should reasonably have earned from June 2002 until the present, which will then have to be deducted from what he would have earned as a cross-border driver with the 2nd Defendant but for his injuries.

37.  Before I pass on, I ought to make reference to the evidence of Mr Keung, who the Defendants have been obliged to call in the circumstances of the unavailability to them of Madam Leung and of Mr Leung.  Unhappily, and this is no fault of Mr Keung, he is in no position to confirm what the two unavailable witnesses have spoken to in their witness statements.  Mr Keung’s position in the 2nd Defendant is as a transport officer which is very much on the administrative side of running their business, such as insurance, licensing and so forth.  He is in no position to give evidence about driver’s earnings.  As his evidence developed it became clear that he had little knowledge of the structure of the group of companies of which the 2nd Defendant is a part, nor did he know anything really meaningful of the situation of mainland drivers nor of the terms of their employment or of their earnings.  I am therefore put in the position of very largely having to, if not completely ignoring his evidence, place very little weight on it.

38.  From this finding as to the Plaintiff’s permanent unemployability as a cross-border driver, I now turn to consider what he would have earned from June 2002 until the present as a cross-border driver.  In this regard, both sides evidence is not particularly compelling and I have to make some assumptions.  The starting point is the Plaintiff’s agreed salary at the date of the accident of $10,000 a month.  There had been an upward trend which from the date of the accident until the date of the Plaintiff’s return to work  I have averaged out at $12,000 and awarded him total loss of earnings until his return to work in June 2002.  Miss Cruden has urged as a basis for calculation an upward trend of 5% per annum and so arrives at a present day figure of $15,627.93 per month for a cross-border coach driver.  It should not have been difficult to provide the court with almost precise figures as to the earnings of a cross-border coach driver but this has not been done.  I am therefore going to have o do my best on the available material which recognises an upward trend but also has regard to blips caused by the world-wide recession and the need to be careful not to arrive at an extravagant conclusion without any firm or reliable figures to guide me.  What I have arrived is at an overall average from June 2002 to the present of $12,500 per month which will need to be multiplied by 92.5 months giving a total of $1,156,250.  These are the Plaintiff’s gross loss of earnings.  I must deduct from this amount either what he has actually earned or, if I take the view that the Plaintiff could have reasonably earned more than his actual earnings (a rather meagre $62,383.20), what I consider he should in all the circumstances have earned.

39.  It seems to me that on this part of the case, the Plaintiff has been unimpressive.  He has worked part-time in a domestic capacity and now works in a garment factory earning about $800 a month.  His then wife, for whom he has claimed for her lost earnings whilst she was in Hong Kong caring for him was earning $5,400 a month.  This Plaintiff is a capable man who had held down a responsible job as a coach driver.  It really is asking too much of the court to only deduct an amount of less than $63,000 as total earnings from June 2002 to the present day.  This is not reasonable.  I am of the view that I must attribute a considerably greater level of earnings to him since June 2002 to the present day.  It may be that his wife is better qualified than he is academically which meant that she was able to command a salary in excess of $5,000 a month.  Nevertheless, it is not reasonable to believe that this Plaintiff could not have earned in the order of at least half of what she was then making and on this basis I will attribute to him as his earning capacity over this period monthly earnings of $2,500 a month.  Where this case is sparse on hard evidence  I have had to do my best with what is available.  I have observed this Plaintiff in the witness box over a number of days.  He has a strong presence and personality.  By June 2002, he was sufficiently mobile in terms of his recovery to work in an office or to do other physical work short of hard manual labour.  In my judgment, this sum of $2,500 a month is a perfectly reasonable target which he should have achieved had he tried sufficiently hard.  And so, $2,500 multiplied by 92.5 months is $231,250 which must be deducted from the gross loss of earnings over this period which produces a total of $925,000 as partial pre-trial loss of earnings.

40.  The total award for pre-trial loss of earnings, comprising full loss of earnings from the date of the accident to June 2002 which is $384,000 and partial loss of earnings from June 2002 to the present of $925,000, is the sum of $1,309,000.

Future Loss of Earnings

41.  The multiplicand will be $12,500 (what he would have earned) less $2,500 (what he should have earned) which is $10,000 a month.  As to the multiplier, the Plaintiff was born on 10 December 1957.  He is now 52 years and 3 months old.  Miss Cruden has submitted that given his age, the cases of Lau Pai Yam v Tai Tung Coffee Co. Ltd [2003] HKLRD (Yearbook) 435 and Mak Ping v Choi Po Chun [1995] HKLY 532 indicate a multiplier of between seven and eight years.  As Miss Lau says there should be no future loss, she has made no particular submission as to a multiplier.  For my part, I do not consider that the Plaintiff would have expected to go beyond the age of 60 as a cross-border coach driver.  He is 52 now.  I will allow a multiplier of five years.  The total for future loss of earnings therefore is $10,000 x 12 months x 5 years which comes to $600,000.

Loss of Earning Capacity

42.  I do not believe that this is now justified.  The Plaintiff has been provided with substantial damages for future loss of earnings and he has effectively regained his physical capacity.  I do not think that this particular Defendant will ever be at any disadvantage in the labour market in finding other employment in the event of becoming unemployed.

Special Damages

43.  Miss Cruden has provided the following list which I will allow in full:

Hospitalisation at PWH and Cheshire HomeHK$106,420.00
Hospitalisation at PWHHK$21,910.00
PhysiotherapyHK$2,275.00
Orthopaedic follow-upHK$2,800.00
Outpatient treatment in GuangdongRMB2,500.00
Traveling expensesHK$13,600
Traveling expensesRMB4,500
Damages to clothing and personal itemsRMB2,120
Costs of walking stickHK$101.00
Strengthening therapy in GuangzhouRMB5,000.00

In addition he will be compensated for tonic food over what is a lengthy period in the sum of $10,000.  He has asked for $35,000 but can only produced receipts for $6,024 but I am willing to give more to reflect the period over which he would have taken such foods.  $10,000 it seems to me is a reasonable amount.  I will also allow HK$5,400 for his wife’s loss of earnings in coming to care for him in Hong Kong.

44.  In respect of special damages, some have already been paid.  I have indicated what I will allow.  I leave it to the parties’ solicitors to make the final calculations based on what has already been paid, for which credit will be given, and on the appropriate calculation in the exchange rate for the RMB and the Hong Kong dollar which will mean that the award will be expressed in Hong Kong dollars.

The Awards

45. 

PSLA$430,000
Pre-trial loss of earnings  $1,309,000
Future loss of earnings   $600,000
Loss of earning capacity   Nil
Special damages   (To be finally calculated based on my indication of what I am prepared to award.) 
There must be deducted   EC payment$524,635.70.
Interim payment$150,000.
Amounts already paid to the Plaintiff$151,721.90

The total award will be drawn up based on these amounts which the parties’ solicitors will submit for my approval before the judgment is entered into the court’s record.

To this, interest must be added at the appropriate rate and for the appropriate period for general and special damages.

46.  I will leave the calculations to be agreed and prepared by the parties’ solicitors.  I will also make an order nisi that the Plaintiff will have his costs of the assessment, taxed on a party and party basis together with legal aid taxation of the Plaintiff’s costs.

     

 (Ian Carlson)
Deputy High Court Judge

Liza-Jane Cruden, instructed by Legal Aid Department for the Plaintiff

Selina Lau, instructed by Messrs Ip Kwan & Co. for the 1st and 2nd Defendants

Appeal by the defendants against the award to Court of Appeal dismissed. Please refer to CACV81/2010 dated 29 November 2010

65027-EN-2009-03-26

SUN JIANQIANG v. CHAN TAI KAU AND ANOTHER

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51599-EN-2006-02-15

SUN JIANQIANG v. CHAN TAI KAU AND ANOTHER

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30126-EN-2001-04-11

SUN JIANQIANG v. CHAN TAI KAU AND ANOTHER

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HCPI001375/2000

HCPI 1375/2000

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HEADNOTE

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Personal injury action - interim payment - Order 29, rule 11 - whether any requirement to show need by the plaintiff - exercise of discretion - what factors should be considered in the exercise of such discretion.

 

HCPI 1375/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO.1375 OF 2000

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BETWEEN
SUN JIANQIANGPlaintiff
AND
CHAN TAI KAU1st Defendant
INTERCONTINENTAL HIRE CARS LTD2nd Defendant

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Coram: Hon Suffiad J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 6 April 2001

Date of Judgment: 11 April 2001

 

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J U D G M E N T

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1. This is an appeal from the decision of a Master dismissing an application by the plaintiff for interim payment.

Background

2. The plaintiff suffered personal injuries when he was knocked down by a tour coach owned by the 2nd defendant and driven at the material time by the 1st defendant on 27 October 1999. The Writ herein was issued on 7 November 2000 and interlocutory judgment was entered against both defendants and for damages to be assessed upon the plaintiff taking out summary judgment application under Order 14. The interlocutory judgment was dated 8 January 2001.

3. On 23 February the plaintiff made an application by summons for interim payment. The summons asked for an amount of $200,000.00 interim payment. This application was heard by the Master on 16 March 2001 and was dismissed after arguments. The plaintiff now appeals from this decision of the Master.

4. As a result of that accident, the subject matter of the claim herein, the plaintiff suffered fractures of the 3rd to the 10th ribs of his left chest. He also suffered a compound fracture of the femur bone of his left leg. He was admitted into the Prince of Wales Hospital and surgery was performed the following day to fix the fracture site with an intramedullary nail inserted into the left femur. Two further operations were performed for debridement of the wound. The plaintiff remained in hospital for some five weeks and was then transferred to the Cheshire Home for convalescence for a further 40 days after which he continued with physiotherapy treatment. At the end of January 2000, the plaintiff, a national of the People's Republic of China, returned to China.

5. The plaintiff's case is that before the accident, the plaintiff, who was 43 years old, was employed by a Mainland company as a tour coach driver commuting between Hong Kong and the Mainland and has been a professional driver for over 20 years. The plaintiff gives his pre-accident salary as $10,000.00 per month. Since the accident the plaintiff claims that he has not been able to resume his pre accident work. Apart from not having fully recovered from the effects of the injuries he has suffered, the plaintiff says that his driving license has not been renewed by the Chinese authorities which requires that he be fully fit for the job of a tour coach driver before a driving license would be issued.

6. The plaintiff was examined by Dr David Cheng in August 2000. A report prepared by Dr Cheng indicates that while the fracture to the ribs have satisfactorily healed with no residual disability, the fracture to his left femur has resulted in some reduced movement to his left hip, there is muscle wasting in the left thigh the plaintiff still walks with a limp and cannot fully squat. There is also weakness in the left leg. Dr Cheng further recommends the removing of the nail inserted into the left femur by a further operation and indicates that the plaintiff's condition is expected to further improve therefore it is too early to make any precise assessment as to his permanent disability.

7. The defendants have also instructed Dr Lam Kwong Chin to examine the plaintiff. Dr Lam holds very similar views to those expressed by Dr Cheng.

8. An update report has been obtained from Dr Cheng dated 29 March 2001 in which Dr Cheng opines that while there is still some discomfort in the plaintiff's left thigh, they would settle with time. The fractured femur has satisfactorily healed with some residual stiffness of the left hip and knee and some wasting of the muscle leading to weakness in the left leg. These are common complications of a fracture and with physiotherapy and exercise improvement is these aspects are a distinct possibility.

9. Dr Cheng further states that the plaintiff has not reached maximal medical improvement and recommends the removal of the intramedullary nail to be followed by a course of physiotherapy for six months after the surgery.

The Appeal

10. When the learned Master dismissed the plaintiff's application for interim payment, she gave short reasons as follows :

"Even if 'need' element abrogated by later case quoted in the White Book, the Court still has to have regard to what reasonable requirement of applicant is and to other factors such as overpayment. Satisfied that the defendant has been regularly paying RMB8,600 per month to plaintiff who lives in Mainland. Whilst that sum would obviously not be sufficient in Hong Kong, that is different for people living across the border. Having weighed all the circumstances, exercise discretion not to order interim payment."

11. At the hearing of the appeal before me, Miss Liu, who appears for the plaintiff submits that the plaintiff does not need to prove any need or requirement or even hardship in applying for interim payment and in that respect the learned Master had wrongly exercised her discretion in refusing the plaintiff's application.

12. On the other hand, the defendants argue that while there is nothing in Order 29, Rule 11 to indicate that a plaintiff has to prove any need or requirement before an interim payment is ordered, since such an order is an exercise of discretion by the court, all the circumstances including the plaintiff's needs and requirements should be taken into account by the court in exercising that discretion.

The Law

13. I start off with the footnote at 29/11/7 of the 1999 U.K. White Book which reads :

"The former custom in personal injury actions for interim payments to be limited to sums for which the plaintiff can show a need, Schott Ken Ltd. v. Bentley [1990] 3 WLR 397 has been abrogated by Stringman v. McArdle [1994] 1 WLR 1653; the former case was a two judge decision of the Court of Appeal and the latter was a three judge decision."

14.Schott Kem Ltd v. Bentley was not a personal injuries case. However, Neill L J drew a distinction between personal injuries cases and other civil cases in respect of the practice relating to interim payment when giving the judgment of the court in that case. The relevant part of his judgment at page 406 is as follows :

"As I understand the present practice, it is customary in personal injury actions for interim payments to be limited to sums for which the plaintiff can show a need. This is a sensible course because large interim payments in such cases may lead to difficulties if an order for repayment is subsequently made under Ord.29 r.17.

I am not satisfied, however, that there is any restriction implicit in the rules which prevents an interim payment order being made in the absence of evidence of need or prejudice. By the use of the words 'if it thinks fit' both rules 11 and 12 confer a discretion on the court whether to order an interim payment at all. Moreover the amount of the payment is expressed to be 'of such amount as [the court] thinks just,' with the additional limitation in the case of damages that the amount is not to exceed 'a reasonable proportion of the damages which in the opinion of the court are likely to be recovered by the plaintiff' after taking into account the matters specified. For my part I can see no basis for any further limitation on the jurisdiction of the court to order interim payment other than those set out in Order 29 itself."

15. In the Hong Kong White Book, while it does not repeat what is stated in the 1999 White Book, it has the following passage at 29/11/4 :

"The Court must not risk overpaying the plaintiff (r.11(1)) since a final adjustment under r.17 may not be effective in such a case. There is nothing in the rules which requires the plaintiff to show need in order to found jurisdiction and the plaintiff's reasons for seeking an interim payment and the degree of his need are irrelevant to the exercise of the court's discretion."

16. The case of Stringman v. McArdle, referred to in the 1999 White Book, the plaintiff there was a minor severely injured and became tetraplegic in a road accident when she was 11 years old. Interlocutory judgment was entered against the driver of the car with contributory negligence agreed at 5%. Two earlier applications for interim payments had been ordered totalling 87,000 pounds for the purchase of a car and a house. A third application for a further 100,000 pounds to adapt the house already bought was refused by a district judge and a High Court judge both taking the view that the plans for conversion of the house were over-elaborate and might leave the plaintiff insufficiently provided.

17. The Court of Appeal in England allowed the appeal by the plaintiff holding that the plaintiff was not required to demonstrate any particular need beyond the general need to be paid her damages as soon as reasonably possible and the court should not, when considering whether to order such a payment, investigate how the money was to be used.

18. If there is any confusion in the local courts as to a plaintiff being required to show need before he can succeed in an application for interim payment, particularly in the context of personal injuries cases, that confusion may have arisen as a result of certain passages in some judgments given locally in the past, many of which were decided before the case of Stringman v. McArdle.

19. In the case of Yeung Sek-sung v. Cheung For Ming [1991] 1 HKLR 1, a decision of Jones J in chambers in 1990 (therefore before Stringman v. McArdle), that was a personal injuries case in which Jones J decided that the object of an application for an interim payment is to alleviate hardship or prejudice to the plaintiff during the period from the institution of proceedings up to the date of trial. In that case, he also decided (inter alia) that although the plaintiff, on the balance of probabilities, is likely to succeed in obtaining judgment against the 1st defendant and will be awarded substantial damages, no evidence of hardship having been provided by the plaintiff an award for interim payment should not be made.

20. It seems to me that the last part of the decision by Jones J above would go against what was decided in Stringman v. McArdle and what is now stated in the Hong Kong White Book to be the present practice in Hong Kong today.

21. A later decision in Hong Kong is to be found in the judgment of Kaplan J in chambers in the case of Paul Y Construction Co. Ltd v. A.G. of Hong Kong [1992] 2 HKLR 120. This was not a personal injuries case and was decided by Kaplan J in March 1992, again before the judgment of Stringman v. McArdle. In that case, the plaintiff was claiming a sum of over $2 million from the defendant as a certified sum due from the defendant under a construction contract between them. While the defendant did not dispute the claimed amount to be certified under the construction contract between the parties, the plaintiff's application for interim payment was opposed by the defendant on the grounds firstly, that the defendant had a set-off against the plaintiff's claim and secondly, that an interim payment can only be ordered where the applicant show need or hardship.

22. On the first ground, Kaplan J decided on the facts that the proposed set-off raised by the defendant is insufficiently connected to the plaintiff's undisputed claim.

23. As for the second ground, Kaplan J also drew a distinction between personal injuries cases and non-personal injuries cases holding that there is no rule that an order for an interim payment cannot be made under Order 29, rule 12 unless the plaintiff would suffer hardship or prejudice if it was made, though the rationale behind such a practice in personal injury actions is self evident relying on and agreeing with the decision in Schott Kem Ltd. v. Bentley. (which is now abrogated by Stringman v. McArdle).

24. In the unreported case of Pham Van Ngo v. Attorney General (High Court Action No. 4985 of 1990), a decision of Jones J in chambers given on 12 June 1992 (therefore again before Stringman v. McArdle), Jones J seemed to have taken a slightly different view after his decision in Yeung Sek sung v. Cheung For-ming. Perhaps the difference in views by the same judge in those two cases can be explained by the distinction which was thought, in those days, to apply to personal injury cases and other civil cases where interim payment was concerned since Pham Van Ngo was not a personal injuries case. Whatever the reason, Jones J had this to say when his earlier decision in Yeung Sek-sung was cited to him in the later case of Pham Van Ngo :

"Although Mr. McCoy indicated that I had in Yeung Sek-sung v. Cheung For-ming and another said that hardship had to be established before an interim award could be made, in fact I said that the provision for an award is intended to alleviate hardship. If any confusion has arisen as a result of my decision, I hasten to say that I agree with both the above decisions, but although hardship does not have to be proved, it is a matter to be taken into consideration when the court is asked to exercise its discretion."

25. The two decisions referred to by Jones J and which he agreed with in the above cited passage are the cases of Schott Kem Ltd v. Bentley and the Paul Y Construction Co. Ltd v. A.G. of Hong Kong, both of which I have already referred to above in this judgment.

26. Viewing all these cases, and the somewhat confused state of the law, the time has come when there should be a standard practice adopted in respect of applications for interim payment irrespective whether the case is a personal injury case or not. This is the effect of the decision by the Court of Appeal in Stringman v. McArdle. Of particular note are the following passages of the judgment of Stuart-Smith L.J in Stringman v. McArdle at p.1657 where he said :

" Once the threshold conditions in R.S.C. Ord.29 r.11(1), sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) are satisfied, what the court has to do, if it thinks fit, is to make an interim payment of such amount as it thinks just not exceeding a reasonable proportion of the damages which in the opinion of the court are likely to be recovered by the plaintiff after taking into account contributory negligence and any set off or counterclaim. It should be noted that the plaintiff does not have to demonstrate any particular need over and above the general need that a plaintiff has to be paid his or her damages as soon as reasonably may be done. It will generally be appropriate and just to make an order where there will be some delay until the final disposal of the case. Therefore what the court is concerned with in fixing the quantum is that it does not exceed a reasonable proportion of the damages which in the opinion of the court are likely to be recovered. ... That is all the judge should have been concerned with. In the case of an adult of sound mind, the court making an order under R.S.C. Ord.29 r.11 is not concerned in any way with what the plaintiff does with his damages. In the case of an infant, the money will normally be paid into court and then the next friend will apply to the district judge for payment out as and when the money is required."

27. I find myself in full agreement with Stuart-Smith L.J in respect of the passage cited above and the reasons given. Those words should henceforth apply equally to personal injury cases as much as it does to non personal injury cases and there should be no distinction.

28. I do not discount the possibility that there will be some personal injuries cases where a plaintiff can show, because of the injuries suffered or for some other reason, that he is suffering some hardship and there is a real need or requirement for an interim payment. Provided that the other threshold conditions of Order 29, rule 11 are met, I can see nothing to stop a court from taking that into account in making an order for interim payment. In other words a plaintiff's need, requirement or hardship may be taken into consideration in an enabling way but not in a restrictive way in the exercise of the court's discretion.

29. Applying these principles to the present case, the learned Master had wrongly exercised her discretion in that she dismissed the application on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to show the need for an interim order to be made.

The Present Application

30. Since an appeal from a Master's order to a judge in chambers is by way of complete rehearing, the parties renewed in toto their arguments before me in this appeal.

31. In opposing the application for interim payment, apart from the argument that the plaintiff has failed to prove a need for an interim payment which I have dealt with above, the rest of the defendants' arguments can be summarized as follows - firstly, that the plaintiff's claim is not a substantial claim; secondly, since the accident, the plaintiff has been paid a monthly payment as well as all his hospital and medical expenses incurred in Hong Kong and thirdly, the plaintiff has been delaying these proceedings, but for that delay, the assessment of damages would have been heard. In all the circumstances, the defendants submit that there is therefore a risk of overpayment if interim payment is ordered.

32. In so far as the first point is concerned, it was submitted by the defendants that the plaintiff is looking at the region of $150,000.00 as respect general damages for pain suffering and loss of amenities. Next I was asked to disregard the bulk of the special damages claimed because the evidence from the defendants, as contained in the affirmation of Kwan Long Yee Corrina, is that the former employers of the plaintiff, Guangdong Ananda Bus Co. Ltd, a related company of the 2nd defendant herein, had been paying to the plaintiff a monthly sum of RMB8,678 per month since the accident up to March 2001. Moreover, the defendants have also paid HK$109,605.00 being the medical or hospital expenses incurred in Hong Kong.

33. In so far as these payments are concerned, the plaintiff accepts that he has been paid monthly sums of about RMB8,000 odd and also accepts that the defendant has paid the HK$109,605.00 being the hospital and medical expenses he had incurred in Hong Kong as a result of the accident.

34. Although the defendants accept that there may be some loss of earnings capacity or possibly even future loss of earnings, I have been urged by counsel for the defendants to disregard both general damages for pain and suffering as well as all claims for future loss on the basis that these do not impact on the plaintiff's present need. On that basis, the defendants say that for this application the plaintiff is only looking at several tens of thousand of dollars which is not substantial and thus a risk of overpayment if an order for interim payment is made.

Decision

35. I do not accept the submission made by the defendant that I should not consider damages for pain and suffering as well as future loss for the purposes of this application for interim payment. Order 29, rule 11 makes no such distinction. What I have to consider for present purposes is "the damages which in the opinion of the Court are likely to be recovered by the plaintiff". In this case, interlocutory judgment (with damages to be assessed) has already been entered. There is therefore no question of any contributory negligence nor any set-off or cross claim.

36. From all the facts and the contents of the medical reports which are now apparent, and taking into account the plaintiff having already received $109,605.00 for medical and hospital expenses from the defendant to date, I should think that a very conservative estimate of the total damages which the plaintiff is likely to recover would not be less than $300,000.00, perhaps even much more depending on the evidence to be adduced at the assessment hearing and which I do not have the benefit of at present. In arriving at this figure, I have taken into account the fact that the general damages for pain and suffering is likely to be much higher than what has been suggested by the defendants in the light of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. I have also taken note of the fact that in the affirmation of Kwan Long Yee Corinna, it is stated there that the plaintiff had been paid RMB8,678 per month since the accident by his employers. Although it is also stated in the same affirmation that the plaintiff's former employers are "a related company" to the 2nd defendant, it is accepted by the defendants that they are separate legal entities. Whether or not the total amount of damages that the defendant has to pay at the end of the day should be reduced by such monthly payments to the plaintiff by his former employers must again depend on the evidence to be adduced at the assessment hearing in due course.

37. Lastly, I do not accept that there was any delay on the part of the plaintiff. There is no good reason for a plaintiff to delay the assessment hearing (where interlocutory judgment had already been entered) just to make an application for interim payment. There is also the opinion of Dr Cheng that the plaintiff is recommended by him to remove the intramedullary nail and to be reassessed six months after the removal as he thinks there is a distinct possibility of further improvement. In those circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the assessment to be heard after such re-assessment. Indeed that would be of benefit to the defendant as well if such improvement can be shown.

38. Accordingly for the above reasons, I would, in the exercise of my discretion make an order for interim payment for the amount of $150,000.00. I chose this figure not only because this was the figure put forward by the plaintiff's legal representative at the hearing of this appeal, having come down on the figure of $200,000.00 as stated in the original Summons. Furthermore, this figure ensures that there is a sufficient margin to guard against any overpayment.

39. I also note that the defendants are protected by third party insurance in so far as this accident is concerned and notice of this claim has already been given to the Ming Ah Insurance Co. Ltd so that the defendants do not come within the categories listed under Order 29, rule 11 (2).

Order

40. Accordingly, I shall order that the order of Master Kwan given on 16 March be set aside and replaced by an order that the defendants do pay to the plaintiff by way of interim payment the sum of $150,000.00 such sum to be paid to the plaintiff's solicitors within 21 days from this order.

Costs

41. This application for interim payment had been opposed by the defendants both before the learned Master and in this appeal. Seemingly, costs should follow the event. There will be a costs order nisi that the costs of the application and the hearing before the learned Master as well as the costs of the appeal be to the plaintiff in any event.

 

 

(A.R. Suffiad)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

 

Representation:

Miss Alison Liu, instructed by Messrs Hobson & Ma, for the Plaintiff

Miss Anita Yip, instructed by Messrs Ip Kwan & Co., for the Defendants