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Civil Action2013

LEUNG KWAI LING 及另一人 對 FAIRBAIRN CATLEY LOW & KONG (a firm) 及另一人

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101463-EN-2015-11-18

LEUNG KWAI LING AND ANOTHER v. FAIRBAIRN CATLEY LOW & KONG ( a firm) AND ANOTHER

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HCA 1471/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1471 OF 2013

________________________

BETWEEN  
 LEUNG KWAI LING & LEE YIU KEIPlaintiff
 and 
 FAIRBAIRN CATLEY LOW & KONG ( a firm)Defendant
 and KONG CHEUK HOI 

________________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 22 October 2015
Date of Judgment: 18 November 2015

_________________

J U D G M E N T

_________________

Introduction

1.  This is an appeal by the plaintiffs (“Ps”) by way of a notice of appeal dated 31 July 2015 (“Notice”) against the decision of Master Hui made on that day for the following orders (as set out in the Notice) :

(i) Refusing all orders sought in Ps’ summons of 30 July 2015;

(ii) Giving all orders + charging orders absolute requested by the defendants (“Ds”);

(iii) Fixing costs orders of HK$7,000 and $800;

And Ps sought the following orders:

(i) All orders requested by Ps in their summons of 30 July 2015;

(ii) All orders and charging orders, charging orders absolute, costs orders and the decisions of Master Hui on 31 July 2015 and Master Leong on 8 July 2015 be set aside;

(iii) Time for appealing the said order of Master Leong be extended until after the hearing of the appeal;

(iv) Costs of the appeal be paid by Ds to Ps.

2.  At the hearing on 22 October 2015 before this court, the 1st named plaintiff Madam Leung Kwai Ling (“Madam Leung”) who appeared on behalf of herself and the 2nd named plaintiff, handed up further a supplemental notice of appeal.  Leave was granted for her to do so, there being no objection from Miss Tam who appeared on behalf of Ds.

3.  In Ps’ summons of 30 July 2015 (“30.07.15 Summons”),  they were seeking an order “postponing the charging order absolute for 3 months” until :

“(i) Breakdown of the figures of the 3 costs orders;

(ii) Taxation of the D’s 3 bills and the costs orders; within 8 days, Ds to file and serve proof and records of each and all items of work stated in the 3 bills;

(iii) Ds to file the 3 bills as exhibits supported by affirmation;

(iv) Court to conduct inquiry into false and欺詐figures + duplicate + 多餘items in the 3 bills;

(v) Court to order inquiry into the 3 “wrong, unfair + fraudulent costs orders for total around HK$500,000 for total few hours hearing;

(vi) Within 7 days, Ds to submit proper bills for the 2 February hearings to replace previous error + duplicate and confusing bills and to re-do costs orders”

4.  The costs orders referred to by Ps in the Notice and the 31.07.15 Summons originated from the following orders for costs made against Ps:

(i) Orders made on 27 February 2015 and 19 March 2015 by Chung J in respect of Ps’ applications on 10 December 2014 and 23 January 2015 to, among other things, extend  time to appeal against Master K Lo’s directions on 8 October 2014 (“1st Orders”);

(ii) Orders made on 27 February 2015 and 19 March 2015 by Chung J in respect of Ps’ application on 17 February 2014  to, among other things, postpone the hearing on 4 March 2015 (for various applications including Ds’ application to strike out Ps’ statement of claim) (“2nd Orders”);

(iii) Orders made on 4 March 2015 and 23 June 2015 by M Chan J in respect of Ds’ application on 26 September 2014 to strike out Ps’ statement of claim and Ps’ various applications (“3rd Orders”);

(above collectively referred to “Orders”)

5.  On 4 March 2015, in addition to striking out Ps’ statement of claim and the present action, M Chan J had also made a “restricted application order” (“RAO”) and a “restricted proceedings order” (“RPO”) in the terms set out respectively in Attachment 1 and 2 of the Order of 4 March 2015[1].

6.  Under the Orders, Ds’ costs were ordered to be summarily assessed.  Ds then lodged their Statements of Costs under the Orders for summary assessment, and in response thereto, Ps had lodged their List of Objections and stated their various objections and allegations in writing.

7.  The amounts eventually assessed were as follows:

(i) Under the 1st Orders, the amount assessed to be paid by Madam Leung was HK$63,755 and the amount assessed to be paid by Ps jointly and severally was HK$9,750;

(ii) Under the 2nd Orders, the amount assessed to be paid by Ps was HK$31,577;

(iii) Under the 3rd Orders, the amount assessed to be paid by Ps was HK$300,000.

8.  The assessed costs, together with interest at judgment rate were ordered to be paid by Ps under 2 orders dated 19 March 2015 made by Chung J, and an order dated 23 June 2015 made by M Chan J (collectively “3 Costs Orders”).

9.  Ps failed to pay the amounts in the 3 Costs Orders, and Ds, as judgment creditors, applied for a charging order against Ps (judgment debtors).

10.  The charging order nisi for the above summarily assessed costs was granted on 8 July 2015 by Master Leong (“Charging Order Nisi”), and was made absolute at a hearing on 31 July 2015 before Master Hui (“Charging Order Absolute”).

11.  The day before the hearing before Master Hui, P had issued the 30.07.15 Summons.

12.  Thus the decision of Master Hui on 31 July 2015 (“31.07.15 Decision”) was in respect of 2 applications:

(i) Ps’ 30.07.15 Summons

(ii) Ds’ application for the Charging Order Nisi to be made absolute

Grounds of Appeal

13.  The grounds set out in the Notice and in the Supplemental Notice were essentially that the 3 Costs Orders and the Charging Orders were based on 3 “false bills with false + 欺詐 figures” and that Master Leong and Master Hui had made “big and serious errors” in making the Charging Order Nisi and the Charing Order Absolute respectively.

Appeal Against the Dismissal of Ps’ 30.07.15 Summons

14.  Miss Tam, appearing for Ds, submitted that Ps’ appeal by way of the Notice was an “application” which fell within the provisions of the RAO.

15.  The relevant paragraphs of the RAO are paragraphs 1, 5 and 7, which state as follows:

“1. 未經高等法院原訟法庭法官陳美蘭 (“指定的法官”) 的許可,原告人 (即梁桂玲) (Leung Kwai Ling Loretta) 和李耀麒 (Lee Yiu Kei) (共同或各別) 不得在高等法院原訟法庭民事訴訟案件2011年第1568號 (HCA 1568/2011) 及高等法院原訟法庭民事訴訟案件2013年第1471號 (HCA 1471/2013) (“指明的法程序”) 中 (無論在判決作出之前或之後) ,向法庭提出任何進一步的申請;

5. 當原告人獲法庭批予提出實質申請的許可後,必須把批予許可的命令連同實質申請的文件一併送達;而實質申請應由一名法官 (而非聆案官) 負責進行聆訊,但如法官另有指示,則作別論;

7.   如果原告人違反本命令,在指明的法律程序中試圖把申請文件送達予任何擬針對的答辯人,卻沒有把准予發出申請的許可命令的副本一併送達予每一名擬針對的答辯人,則有關申請將會自動撤銷,而擬針對的答辯人或法庭均不須採取任何行動回應[2]。”

16.  Miss Tam referred the court to Mephistopheles Debt Collection Service (A Firm) v Lotay [1994] 1 WLR 1064 in which the plaintiff was a limited partnership firm.  One of the partners of the firm was the subject of an order made under section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, which took effect under section 42(1A) of the Act, as amended, as a “civil proceedings order”.  Section 42(1A) provides that “… ‘civil proceedings order’ means an order that … (c) no application (other than one for leave under this section) shall be made by him, in any civil proceedings instituted in any court by any person, without the leave of the High Court …”. The district judge thereupon stayed all proceedings in the action until further order.  One of the partners appealed against the stay by way of a notice of appeal without the leave of the High Court and the appeal was allowed.

17.  On further appeal, Nourse LJ dealt with the construction on the definition of paragraph (c) of the “civil proceedings order” and held that:

“Secondly, any step taken in civil proceedings which amounts to a request to the court for some form of relief, interlocutory or final, is an “application” in those proceedings for the purposes of paragraph (c) of section 42(1A) of the Act of 1981.  Thus the appeal to the judge against the district judge’s order staying the proceedings was an application for this purpose.”

18.  The Notice specifically states that it is “… an application by the said Plaintiff(s) … for an Order that …”.  Miss Tam submitted that this is similar to Mephistopheles case, and that the Ps’ appeal is an “application” and a step taken in this action which amounts to a request to the court for some form of relief as specified in the Notice.  This appeal is therefore an “application” or a “further application” made by the Plaintiffs that falls within paragraph 1 of the RAOs.

19.  In fact, Ds’ solicitors had written to M Chan J’s clerk on 24 August 2015 to enquire whether any leave had been granted for Ps to file the Notice. Her Ladyship had confirmed on 28 August 2015 that no such leave was granted and that it was for Ds to make appropriate submissions/application at the hearing of the Notice[3].

20.  It is clear from the wording of paragraph 1 that Ps have been prohibited from making “any further application” in these proceedings, whether before or after judgment, without leave of M Chan J being first obtained.  Further, under paragraph 5 of the RAO, if Ps issued an application in these proceedings without prior leave of the court, such application should forthwith be referred by the Registry to a Master for such application to be dismissed in accordance with the RAO.

21.  I agree with Miss Tam’s submission that Ps’ appeal by way of the Notice was a “further application” which fell within paragraph 1 of the RAO, and should be dismissed.

22.  Further, an appeal from the master to the judge in chambers is dealt with by way of an actual rehearing of the application which led to the order under appeal, and the judge treats the matter as though it came before him for the first time[4].

23.  So far as Ps 31.07.15 Summons was concerned, there is no doubt that the summons was an “application” or “further application” which fell within paragraph 1 of the RAO, and thus, the 31.07.15 Summons should have automatically stood dismissed and should not have been heard before Master Hui on 31 July 2015.  For this reason alone, I will order that the 31.07.15 Summons be dismissed, and Ps’ appeal in respect of this summons must fail.

Appeal against the Charging Order Nisi and Charging Order Absolute

24.  The summary assessment of costs in the Orders were not orders for provisional summary assessment.  The assessments were made by Chung J and M Chan J respectively after consideration of Ps’ List of Objections and Other Objections, and in any event, there had been no appeals against the Orders, nor the 3 Costs Orders.  The relevant rules and procedures for obtaining and serving a charging order nisi are set out in sections 20 and 20A of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) and Order 50 rules 1 and 2 of the RHC.  Miss Tam referred to the affirmation in support of the charging order application filed on 3 July 2015 by Ds and submitted that all the relevant requirements in the above sections / rules had been satisfied / complied with, and the Charging Order Nisi was properly granted by Master Leong.

25.  The relevant rules governing the making of a charging order absolute are set out in section 20(B)(1) of the High Court Ordinance and Order 50, rule 3 of the RHC.  Amongst other things, Order 50 rule 3(1) provides that “[o]n the further consideration of the matter the Court shall either make the order absolute, with or without modifications, or discharge it.”

26.  At the hearing before Master Hui for further consideration of the charging order application, both parties made their respective submissions and there were various documents before the learned Master, namely the Charging Order Nisi, 2 affirmations in support of the charging order applications filed by the Ds, 3 affidavits in opposition filed by the Ps and the Notice of Objections to Charging Order Nisi and Charging Order Absolute were also filed by the Ps.

27.  According to the 3 affidavits in opposition and the Notice of Objections, Ps requested court to set aside the Charging Order Nisi and opposed the Charging Order Absolute to be made against them on the following grounds:

(a) They alleged that the figures in the Statement of Costs and the 3 Costs Orders were “fraudulent” and “false” and many items in the Statement of Costs were “duplicate +多餘”,

(b) They alleged that there were “fraud”, “bias”, “injustice” and “unfairness” on the part of the court and the 2 judges making the Orders and the 3 Costs Orders; and

(c) They had requested the Court to make inquires as to the above matters by way of Ps’ 31.7.15 Summons.

28.  As I have said, there had been no appeal against the 3 Costs Order.  Ps’ allegations were made without any factual basis and the 30.07.15 Summons should have been dismissed in any event.  Ps had not paid any of the costs due under the 3 Costs Orders at the time of the hearing on 31 July 2015.  Therefore, on further consideration of the matter, and pursuant to Order 50, rule 3(1) of the RHC, Master Hui made the Charging Order Absolute.  There was no reason for the Master Hui to “postpone” the Charging Order Absolute as sought in the Ps’ 31.07.15 Summons or to set aside the Charging Order Nisi as requested in the Notice of Objection.

29.  There was no sufficient evidence to support Ps’ allegations that Ds figures in the Statements of Costs were fraudulent and false.  Having considered the above, even if Ds were not restricted under the RAO file the 30.07.15 Summons or to lodge the Notice, I see no merits in Ps’ 30.07.15 Summons to set aside the Charging Order Nisi and the Charging Order Absolute, or the Orders or the 3 Costs Orders.

30.  Ps are also appealing against the costs order in the Charging Order Absolute.  As costs should follow the event, HK$7,000 is in my view just and proper for the charging order application.

31.  There is also no reason to extend time to appeal against the decision of Master Leong.

Conclusion

32.  In light of the above, I dismiss the Ps appeal by way of the Notice filed on 31 July 2015.

33.  As for costs, Ds sought costs on indemnity basis.  In view of Ps’ conduct in continuing to issue applications notwithstanding the prohibitions in the RAO, I find it appropriate to order costs on indemnity basis against Ps.  Such costs to be summarily assessed.  Ds shall file Statement of Costs within 7 days.  Ps may lodge List of Objections within 7 days thereafter.

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

The 1st named plaintiff appeared in person

The 2nd named plaintiff appeared in person

Ms Rachel Tam of Wilkinson & Grist, for the defendant


[1] B:10-14

[2] A/3/12

[3] C:161

[4] See para 58/1/2, Hong Kong Civil Procedure Vol 1 , 2016

97566-CH-2015-03-04

LEUNG KWAI LING 及另一人 對 FAIRBAIRN CATLEY LOW & KONG (a firm) 及另一人

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HCA 1471/2013

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2013年第1471號

____________

原告人LEUNG KWAI LING and LEE YIU KEI 
對 
被告人FAIRBAIRN CATLEY LOW & KONG (a firm) and
 KONG CHEUK HOI
 

____________

主審法官: 高等法院原訟法庭法官陳美蘭內庭聆訊(公開)
聆訊日期: 2015年3月4日
判決書日期: 2015年3月4日

判決書

 

1.  原告人未有就其在HCA 1568/2011及HCA 1471/2013案件中提出的指控作出關鍵的詳情,但從僅有的要項與及原告人列出的申索,可見原告人所倚賴的有關交易同屬大坑道13至15 號麗星樓的發展,及他們因共同擁有麗星樓13樓B座物業及57號車位而應有的利益。原告人的申索是基於被告人作為他們律師所犯他們聲稱為疏忽及其他失當行為。

2.  原告人在HCA 1568/2011對被告作出有關此物業及其發展的指控已經被法院撤銷,並經過上訴之後獲得最終的判決。本案排名第二原告人並非HCA 1568/2011的原告人,但作為該有關物業的共同擁有者,他可以亦應當參與HCA 1568/2011案件中,原告一方未能圓滿解釋排名第二原告人為何沒有作為HCA 1568/2011其中一名原告。

3.  基於「既決事項」或「既判案件」的原則,兩位原告人欲向被告人提出的申索已經被法院撤銷,原告試圖以本訴訟提出相同、或有關連、或一樣的事宜,要求法院重新處理,實屬濫用司法程序。本席認為被告人有理由及基礎要求本席撤銷申索陳述書及此訴訟,本席故頒下被告人要求的各項撤銷命令。

4.  再者,申索陳述書並未能顯示任何合理的訴訟因由。原告人的修訂申索陳述書並無提出任何未經法院在所有有關訴訟已作出判定的訴訟因由,更沒有披露任何有關鍵性的新證據。

5.  鑒於原告人興訴HCA 1568/2011及HCA 1471/2013的歷史,本席同意原告人濫用程序,並存在實在風險原告人會繼續提出沒有理據及不必要的訴訟及申請,故同意頒下有關的限制提出申請令、與限制展開法律程序令。

6.  原告人的傳票申請全部被撤銷。

7.  本訴訟(包括被告人之申請及原告人的各申請)的訟費及附帶的費用由原告人支付被告人。在頒下命令七日之內,被告人提出簡易程序評估訟費的細目分類並派發予原告人,供原告人作出評論。之後法庭會作出評估。

(陳美蘭)
高等法院原訟法庭法官

排名第一原告人:無律師代表,親自應訊

排名第二原告人:無律師代表,親自應訊

被告人:由高露雲律師行譚詠聰律師代表

97290-CH-2015-02-27

LEUNG KWAI LING 及另一人 對 FAIRBAIRN CATLEY LOW & KONG (a firm) 及另一人

HTML content

HCA 1471/2013

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事訴訟案件2013年第1471號

____________

原告人LEUNG KWAI LING and
LEE YIU KEI
 
 對 
被告人FAIRBAIRN CATLEY LOW & KONG (a firm)
and KONG CHEUK HOI
 

____________

主審法官: 高等法院原訟法庭法官鍾安德內庭聆訊
聆訊日期: 2015年2月25日
判決書日期: 2015年2月27日

判決書

 

1. 排名第一原告人在2015年1月23日提出本申請,要求法庭延展上訴時限、就聆案官在2014年10月8日發出的指示,提出上訴。排名第二原告人在本申請聆訊以書面表示,加入為本申請作為另一申請人,並採納排名第一原告人在本申請提交的書面陳述。

2. 2014年10月8日的指示,是因應下述兩項傳票申請而發出:

(a) 被告人在2014年9月26日提出,要求撤銷本訴訟 (及其他相關的申請);

(b) 排名第一原告人在2014年10月3日提出,要求拒絕前第 (a) 分段的申請 (及其他相關的申請)。

3. 前第2段所述的申請,在2014年10月8日被編排在當日的「三分鐘內庭聆訊表」進行初步聆訊。2014年10月8日的指示是聆案官在此情況下發出。

4. 原告人前曾針對被告人展開多宗訴訟,亦多次被裁定敗訴。被告人在已存檔的誓章中,覆述了該等訴訟及判決 (及其他事項,尤其導致本訴訟的背景歷史),並表示擬在已排定在2015年3 月4日進行的聆訊時,倚仗前述誓章作出陳述。

5. 本席同意被告人指,基於前第4段所述的理由,上述兩項申請所需的聆訊時間,遠超於「三分鐘內庭聆訊表」所能給予前述兩項申請所需的聆訊時間。

6. 此外,本席亦同意被告人指:

(1) 本申請所涉的延誤,約為三個月;

(2) 原告人聲稱的延誤理由 (例如,無律師代表應訊,未及時收到已完備命令、未能理解2014年10月8日的指示的所有內容),均非合理的延展時限理由。

7. 故此,本席拒絕本申請。

8. 被告人要求原告人支付本申請所涉訟費,並以彌償基準評定。

9. 本席同意被告人指,原告人前曾在HCA1568/2011訴訟中提出類似的申請,該申請亦被法庭撤銷 (詳見2012年1月20日宣布的判決)。

10. 在此情況下,本席同意,本申請全無理據或實際意義或效益,屬濫用法律程序,所涉訟費亦因此應依彌償基準評定。

11. 原告人在本申請聆訊完結後,在登記處取得所謂 “補充上訴通知書”,該文件並未送達被告人。本席必須指出,原告人的作為完全漠視民事訴訟中的其中一項基本原則,即是,除例外情況 (不適用於本申請),所有申請必須給予另一與訟人適當的預早通知 (例如,《高等法院規則》第32號命令第3條規則或第 58 號命令第 1(3) 條規則)。

12. 就本申請所涉訟費,本席作出以下命令:

(a) 由排名第一原告人付予被告人 (包括後第 (b) 分段所述的訟費);

(b) 原告人共同及分別付予被告人2015年2月25 日聆訊的訟費;

(c) 以上訟費,依彌償基準評定。

13. 本席亦判定,訟費數額應以簡易程序評估。為此:

(1) 被告人可於今日起計 7 天內,將簡明訟費清單呈交法庭及送達原告人;

(2) 原告人可於其後 7 天內,將簡明反對清單呈交法庭及送達被告人。

(鍾安德)
高等法院原訟法庭法官

排名第一原告人:無律師代表,自行應訊

排名第二原告人:無律師代表,自行應訊

被告人:由高露雲律師行委派譚詠聰律師代表

97289-CH-2015-02-27

LEUNG KWAI LING 及另一人 對 FAIRBAIRN CATLEY LOW & KONG (a firm) 及另一人

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HCA 1471/2013

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事訴訟案件2013年第1471號

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原告人LEUNG KWAI LING and
LEE YIU KEI
 
 對 
被告人FAIRBAIRN CATLEY LOW & KONG (a firm)
and KONG CHEUK HOI
 

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主審法官: 高等法院原訟法庭法官鍾安德內庭聆訊
聆訊日期: 2015年2月26日
判決書日期: 2015年2月27日

判決書

 

1. 原告人在2015年2月17日取得傳票。該傳票源起於被告人在2014年9月26日提出,要求撤銷本訴訟 (及其他相關濟助) 的申請。原告人亦在2014年10月3日提出,要求撤銷被告人的申請 (及其他相關濟助) 的申請。上述兩項申請已排期在2015 年3 月4日進行聆訊。

2. 其實本申請所涉的傳票要求頒布的濟助,與原告人在2015年1月23日提出的申請所要求的,部份類同。該申請已於2015 年2 月25日在本席席前進行聆訊,相關判決,定於2015 年2 月27 日宣布。

3. 基於以上各點,本席同意被告人指,本申請涉及:

(1) 前第1及2段所述的申請的部份 (無論原告人在本申請將之稱為就本訴訟的問題或爭論點進行審訊、依《高等法院規則》第14A號命令審理、應否限制可提出的論據,或應否剔除被告人存檔的誓章的部份或全部等等),均應在2015年3月4日進行聆訊時處理,而非以另申請處理。

(2) 將2015年3月4日的聆訊押後至當日下午的部份,並無合理理據支持。

4. 故此,本席決定撤銷本申請。

5. 在此情況下,本席同意,本申請全無實際意義或效益。就本申請所涉訟費,本席作出以下命令:

(a) 由原告人付予被告人;

(b) 上述訟費數額以簡易程序評估;

(c) 依彌償基準評定。

6. 被告人已在本申請聆訊完結時,呈交及送達了簡明訟費清單。原告人可於今日起計7天內,將簡明反對清單呈交法庭及送達被告人。

(鍾安德)
高等法院原訟法庭法官

排名第一原告人:無律師代表,自行應訊

排名第二原告人:無律師代表,自行應訊

被告人:由高露雲律師行委派李安賢律師代表