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Civil Action2014

PROGETTO JEWELLERY CO LTD v. LAU CHIU YING AND ANOTHER

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Files (7)

[2022] HKCFI 1064-CH-2022-04-13

PROGETTO JEWELLERY CO LTD 對 LAU CHIU YING 及另一人

HTML content

HCA 2548/2014

[2022] HKCFI 1064

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2548 OF 2014

____________

BETWEEN

 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

LAU CHIU YING1st Defendant 
 JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant

(by original action)

____________

AND BETWEEN

JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff 

and

 FUNG PUI WA1st Defendant
 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant

(by counterclaim)

____________

主審法官 :高等法院原訟法庭法官歐陽桂如 (內庭書面處理申請)
最後提交陳詞日期 :2022年2月21日
判決書日期 :2022年4月13日

____________

判決書

____________

1.  2021年3月29日本席駁回劉女士就着聆案官的判決而提出的上訴,維持聆案官的命令(包括訟費令),即劉女士須支付原告人$28,000訟費。

2.  2021年4月12日本席發出上一段的判決理由書,及暫令劉女士支付原告人$8,000作為上訴的訟費(「訟費暫令」)。

3.  劉女士提出更改訟費暫令的申請,但本席於2021年7月16日拒絕申請,並判決劉女士支付原告人簡易評定的訟費$5,200(「16/7/2021判決」)。

4.  劉女士藉2021年7月30日發出的傳票,就16/7/2021判決申請上訴許可。原告人反對這項申請。

5.  劉女士擬提出的上訴是就訟費令的非正審上訴,須先取得許可。根據清晰確立的法律原則,要求上訴法庭推翻原訟法庭關於訟費的決定設有高門檻,上訴庭秉持的原則是:訟費在很大程度上是酌情決定的事,而上訴庭只會在原訟法庭法官的決定犯上原則上的錯誤或明顯錯誤才會作出干預,即使審理上訴的法官在行使酌情權時可能有不一樣的做法,也不是干預原訟法庭法官的酌情決定的充分理由。見Progetto Jewellery Co Ltd v Lau Chiu Ying[2021] HKCA 604, 第36段。

6.  就着本上訴許可的申請,劉女士沒有指出本席在那方面犯上原則上的錯誤,雖然本席在某些觀點上不同意聆案官原審的意見,但整體而言,2021年3月29日的上訴是敗訴的,故訟費隨結果而定,也沒有理由推翻聆案官的訟費命令,本席並沒有忽略處理聆案官的訟費命令。

7.  在作出訟費暫令和16/7/2021判決前,本席不但考慮了劉女士的陳詞,還考慮了原告人方面的訴訟行為,因而將原告人的訟費大幅削減,那是酌情的判決。劉女士沒有指出本席在運用酌情權時沒有考慮甚麼因素、或錯誤地考慮不應該考慮的因素、或偏離慷慨的範圍或有甚麼明顯的錯誤。

8.  劉女士的陳詞所提及的上訴理據不過是舊調重彈,本席已於16/7/2021判決中處理過。

9.  綜上,劉女士的申請不具可爭議的法律觀點,沒有任何機會得直,也沒有其他利於秉行公正的理由須要進行上訴:高等法院條例第14AA條。因此,本席撤銷上訴許可的申請。

10.  本申請的訟費隨訴訟結果而判予原告人。根據原告人的訟費陳述書,本席全數批准,劉女士須支付$9,841。

 (歐陽桂如)
 高等法院原訟法庭法官

原告人(原訴訟)及第二被告人(反申索):由的近律師行代表

第一被告人(原訴訟):無律師代表

[2021] HKCFI 2098-CH-2021-07-16

PROGETTO JEWELLERY CO LTD v. LAU CHIU YING AND ANOTHER

HTML content

HCA 2548/2014

[2021] HKCFI 2098

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2548 OF 2014

____________

BETWEEN

 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 LAU CHIU YING1st Defendant
 JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant

(by original action)

____________

AND BETWEEN

 JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 FUNG PUI WA1st Defendant
 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant

(by counterclaim)

____________

主審法官 :高等法院原訟法庭法官歐陽桂如
最後提交陳詞日期 :2021年6月11日
判決書日期 :2021年7月16日

____________

判決書

____________


1.  劉女士就着聆案官的命令而提出的上訴,於2021年3月29日的聆訊中遭本席駁回。本席其後於4月12日發出判決理由及訟費判決書 (「判決書」),就該上訴,暫令劉女士支付原告人該上訴的訟費$8,000。劉女士不服,逾期於5月3日藉傳票提出本申請,要求更改訟費命令,由原告人支付劉女士的訟費。原告人反對申請。

2.  本席考慮了雙方的書面陳詞。

3.  劉女士申請更改訟費暫令的日期於4月26日屆滿。劉女士於4月23日藉信件方式提出更改訟費暫令的要求。本席於下一個工作天(即4月26日)即回函提醒劉女士以傳票作出申請。劉女士於5月3日才正式發出傳票。

4.  劉女士逾期作出申請,卻沒有申請延展時限,在其誓章中也沒有解釋延誤申請的理由。作為自訴人士,她錯誤使用程序本身並不是延展期限的充分理由。

5.  此外,劉女士在她的書面陳詞中,聲稱她以爲衹需支付原告人總共$8,000的訟費,所以沒有在傳票要求處理聆案官席前的訟費。由於那是劉女士個人的誤解,本席看不出爲何要將錯就錯,把已遭駁回的上訴從新考慮。

6.  此外,劉女士在聆案官席前:

(1) 要求本案所有聆訊以中文進行,但此部份的申請無論在聆案官席前還是在上訴中均告失敗(判決書第9-11段)。

(2) 要求所有文件均提供譯本,部份也是失敗了。

7.  訟費隨判決結果而定,但在判決書第2段,本席已說明不會要求劉女士支付原告人所有訟費,而且在判決書第17-25段中解釋判決訟費的原因。

8.  劉女士倚賴星展銀行(香港)有限公司v斯旭韻 [2010] 3 HKLRD 734來嘗試説服法庭就着她的上訴而不作訟費命令。然而訟費屬法庭行使酌情權的命令,星展銀行中的當事人沒有如劉女士一樣在審訊結束後才提出要求中文譯本的上訴。

9.  本席不獨考慮了劉女士的情況,也對原告人的情況一併考慮,最後決定本來可以用彌償基準計算的訟費也因着原告人的訴訟行爲而大幅削減。劉女士的陳詞並未能指出本席在使用法律方面或考慮事實方面有何缺漏。本席看不出再度削減訟費的空間。

10.  劉女士的陳詞還提及她在其餘兩宗案件對於使用中文的情況,她説本席的判決對她在其他案件產生重大影響。但即使本席的判決在其他案件有指導性的作用,那根本與本上訴無關。

11.  由於劉女士未能說服本席更改訟費暫令,因此,本席撤銷其申請,並命令劉女士支付原告人在本申請的訴訟費,簡易評定爲$5,200。

 (歐陽桂如)
 高等法院原訟法庭法官

原告人(原訴訟)及第二被告人(反申索):由的近律師行代表呈交書面陳詞

第一被告人(原訴訟):無律師代表,呈交書面陳詞

[2021] HKCFI 936-CH-2021-04-12

PROGETTO JEWELLERY CO LTD 對 LAU CHIU YING 及另一人

HTML content

HCA 2548/2014

[2021] HKCFI 936

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2548 OF 2014

____________

BETWEEN

 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 LAU CHIU YING1st Defendant
JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant

(by original action)

____________

AND BETWEEN

 JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 FUNG PUI WA1st Defendant
 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant

(by counterclaim)

____________

主審法官 :高等法院原訟法庭法官歐陽桂如內庭聆訊
聆訊日期 :2021年3月29日
判決日期 :2021年3月29日
判決理由及訟費判決書日期 :2021年4月12日

____________

判決理由及訟費判決書

____________


1.  第一被告人劉女士發出傳票,要求(1)本案的法律程序採用中文聆訊;及(2)原告人需就本案所有法律文件提供中文譯本。聆案官將傳票申請撤銷,並且要求劉女士支付原告人的訟費$28,000。劉女士不服,提出本上訴。

2.  聆訊後,本席將上訴撤銷,並且告訴原告人的代表大律師,本席將不會要求劉女士支付原告人所有訟費。以下是判決的理由。

法律原則

3.  上訴以重新聆訊的方式進行,法庭不受聆案官的判決理由約束。

4.  根據香港法例第5章《法定語文條例》,中文和英文均為香港的法定語言,與訟人可選擇其中一種法定語言。除非具備強而有力的理由,否則法庭不會剝奪與訟人以他所選擇的法定語言來存檔文件的自由:Grant Thornton international Limited and Tang Chung Wah, HCCL 17/2012, 2013年3月11日,第23段,吳嘉輝法官。

5.  在法律程序中用何種法定語言,受制於第5C章第3(1)條:

「在根據本條例第5(1) 條決定於任何法律程序或任何法律程序的一部分中兼用兩種法定語文或採用其中一種時﹐法官須以公正而迅速地處理該法律程序或法律程序的該部分(視屬何情況而定)為首要考慮。」 (間線後加)

(1) 「公正」是指法庭需考慮申請人是否對英文法定語言有足夠的認識,而拒絕他的申請並非不公允。

(2) 「迅速地處理」是指法庭要考慮批准申請帶來的實際後果。

SFC v Mandarin Resources Corporation Limited, HCCW 348/1996, 1999年1月22日,第7-8段, Burrell J.

6.  關於申請中文譯本,香港法例第5C章《高等法院民事程序(採用語文)規則》第5(1)條的內容如下:

「如 ——

(a) 採用一種法定語文的文件送達法律程序的某一方,而該方不諳熟該種法定語文;及

(b) 該方諳熟另一種法定語文,

該方可要求該法律程序的送達該文件的一方向他提供該文件的該另一種法定語文譯本。」

7.  在星展銀行(香港)有限公司 訴 斯旭韻,HCA 1602/2009 [2010] 3 HKLRD 734,杜溎峰法官有如下的詮釋:

「6. 首項先決條件是,根據第(1)款的規定,作出要求的一方必須不諳熟該法律文件所使用的該種法定語文,而諳熟另一種法定語文。若他諳熟兩種法定語文,即他屬雙語的與訟人,他不可以要求發出該法律文件的一方提供另一種法定語文譯本。第(1)(b)款並不是規定作出要求的一方只需要對其中一種法定語文較為諳熟,便可以要求譯本。……

7. 至於「諳熟語文」的標準,本席認為僅屬一個普通的標準。諳熟某語文的人毋須精通該語文。他所須達至的語文能力標準是能以該語文與他人作日常對話及以書信溝通,以該語文清晰地表達他的意願及理解別人以該語文對他的表述。一般而言,達至初中程度的語文能力已可算諳熟該語文。諳熟語文並不等同諳熟以該語文所表達的法律觀點與原則。後者是有關理解法律能力,而非語文能力。若不能理解兩者的識別,大部份的香港人便會被視為不諳熟任何一種法定語文。

……

9. 第(3)款規定,被要求的一方須在接獲有關要求後三天內以書面通知作出要求的一方,他將會否應要求提供譯本。若他不予回應、或拒絕提供譯本,或作出要求的一方沒有在合理時間內收到譯本,作出要求的一方可根據第(4)款的規定,向法庭申請命令飭令被要求的一方向他提供譯本。這些程序是法定程序。若然作出要求的一方沒有按照法定程序向被要求的一方以書面作出要求及向法庭申請命令,他便被視為放棄要求譯本的權利,而法庭亦沒有司法權力飭令被要求的一方提供譯本或作其他指示。

10. 在審理要求譯本申請時,法庭可行使兩項司法權力。首先,根據第(5)(a)款,就該申請所涉及的法律文件,若信納有關要求是合理,法庭可命令被要求的一方在法庭認為合適的期間內提供有關譯本。在決定有關要求是否合理,法庭須以最有效及以最少的法律費用審理彼此的爭議為前題。法庭須考慮彼此爭議的性質、案中所涉及文件所採用的語文及彼此對兩種法定語文相對的諳熟程度。在考慮作出要求的一方是否符合第(1)款的先決條件時,該一方對兩種法定語文相對的諳熟程度不是一項考慮因素,但在衡量該一方的要求是否合理時,這卻具關鍵性。雖然第(5)款所賦予法庭作出命令的權力是酌情的權力,法庭行使這酌情權時必須按照法律原則。若有關要求是合理,法庭必須應作出要求的一方的申請行使這酌情權。」 (間線後加)

8.  本席雖然同意杜法官所定下的原則,仍需補充幾點:

(1) 與訟人是否諳熟某種法定語言是一個事實的問題,不是所有達致初中程度的人都有相同的語文能力。

(2) 第5C章是為民事法律程序而設的,明顯地是為那些不諳熟某種法定語言的與訟人而設的,為求減低在訴訟中因語文程度不足帶來的障礙或不公,法庭應該盡量寬大處理要求譯本的申請。

(3) 在考慮與訟人是否諳熟某種法定語文時,法庭也得考慮他申請譯本的文件性質。因為法律程序或文件許多時涉及與日常用語不慣常用的字詞, 有時理解文件從語文上的意思和理解文件的法律意義是不可分割的。例如:一個有初中英語能力的人,可能明白中文俗語所稱的「釘契」,卻未必知曉charging order nisi or absolute是甚麼意思。「第三債務人的程序」對一個諳熟中文的與訟人也可能莫名其妙,遑論要他明白英文的garnishee order nisi or absolute。這些法律詞句可能通過網上翻譯也未必能夠查得出中文的譯名。本席認為,一般而言,一個有初中英語能力的人,亦可獲得諸如禁制令、狀書、陳詞,押記令申請、第三債務人的程序這等文件的中文譯本。

要求聆訊以中文進行

9.  自從2020年1月24日,劉女士成為自訴人士後,法庭便採用中文作為聆訊的語言,雖然判詞仍以英文發出。

10.  原告人對於將來雙方在聆訊中使用中文並無異議,這也是原告人在聆案官席前所持的立場。原告人也向本席承諾往後在本宗案件的法律和通訊文件使用中文。

11.  本席認為,無需特別命令聆訊以中文進行,這會方便安排法官處理本案。法庭自會彈性使用中文,即使使用英文,亦會安排中文的傳譯員協助劉女士。這樣的做法自會達到公正和迅速地處理的原則。

提供法律文件的中文譯本

12.  根據星展銀行案,劉女士需證明她並不諳熟英文,因而要中文譯本。

13.  劉女士提供了她在香港中學會考及高級程度會考的英文科成績單,來證明她的英語僅合格。不過證書只能顯示劉女士在1990年代的英語能力,而原告人卻能提供證據證明劉女士現在是諳熟英文的:

(1) 她的證人供詞是以英語寫成的,其上沒有寫明她經由他人翻譯內容;

(2) 她能明白押記令的申請,並且能作出回應;

(3) 劉女士曾經牽涉入一宗意大利的訴訟中,她與她的意大利律師是用英語電郵溝通的。本席讀過該些電郵的內容,某些電郵篇幅不短,而劉女士均能以英文作出回應,顯示她能用英語溝通;及

(4) 當她仍為原告人的董事時,劉女士曾往外國參與展覽及以英語進行貿易。

14.  劉女士解釋,她在意大利及本宗訴訟中,曾有律師代表,沒有律師代表時,不時需要請別人替她作翻譯,但亦理解有限。而她在貿易中所說或所明白的英語,並不足以應付訴訟所要求的英文程度。

15.  本席信納劉女士的解釋。在本案中,劉女士所申請的文件包括 (a) 原告人押記令的申請、其支持性誓章及陳詞;和 (b) 一些通訊。(a) 項不是使用一般日常貿易用的英語所能夠理解的,尤其是「押記令:着令提出反對因由通知書」只有兩句,第一句是序文,佔15行;第二句是命令,佔12行。(b) 項她大致可以理解。因此,原則上,原告人應該提供(a) 項的譯本,(b) 項則不需要。

16.  不過,本案的審訊已完結,判詞亦已於2020年1月22日發出。劉女士曾經申請逾期上訴的許可及暫緩執行判決,該申請於2020年6月12日被駁回,雖然她已向上訴法庭提出同樣的逾期上訴的許可,有待聆訊。本席認為在一個月後,即2020年7月27日,她才以傳票要求原告人提供所有法律文件的中文譯本,於本訴訟中未能帶來甚麼實際效益,反會令致原告人浪費翻譯的費用。因此,本席行使酌情權拒絕申請。

結論及訟費

17.  基於以上的原因,本席駁回上訴。

18.  本席曾於2020年12月22日發出指示,將本上訴以書面方式處理。由於劉女士反對,因此上訴改為以口頭聆訊方式進行,本席亦於2021年1月14日提醒雙方,如果口頭聆訊未能在書面陳詞以外發揮任何作用,則無論上訴的結果如何,劉女士都需要支付原告人一方以彌償基準計算的訟費。

19.  本席認為本聆訊並無帶來書面陳詞以外的作用,因此,原則上劉女士必須支付本上訴的訟費,並以彌償基準計算。

20.  然而,本席跟杜法官在星展銀行案中第27段的看法相類似,劉女士作為自訴人士要求譯本是可理解的,她一直以來均在收到文件之後三天之內提出譯本的要求,只因本傳票於逾期上訴許可被拒之後才發出,才行使酌情權拒絕要求。原告人卻認為劉女士既已敗訴,又不肯支付判決債項,因此原告人情願支付遠比提供譯本昂貴的法律費用,包括本上訴超過五萬元的訴訟費,也不肯將文件的譯本給予劉女士。這本來情有可原。

21.  然而劉女士的書面陳詞幾乎是重複在聆案官席前的論點。原告人採納了本席其中一項建議,就是在本上訴中沿用在聆案官席前舊有的陳詞。但原告人在劉女士送達書面陳詞後還延聘大律師抗辯本上訴。

22.  范大律師解釋,他被延聘出席聆訊的原因是因為劉女士聲稱原告人誤導聆案官,故原告人有需要抗辯。本席難以接納這解釋,范大律師根本沒有在舊有的陳詞中加添任何論點去反駁劉女士據稱誤導聆案官的論點。

23.  本席認為原告人一方根本無需在本聆訊中聘用大律師,更無需使用兩名律師去處理這宗簡單的上訴。

24.  范大律師確認,原告人的代表律師是諳熟中文的。本席認為,期望被告人劉女士在每收到法律文件後都要在三天內提出要求中文譯本,不利原告人亦不利劉女士,更對案件管理毫無益處。

25.  基於第20-24段的原因,本席不給予原告人以彌償基準計算的訟費,只批准必須的影印費、送達費、與原告人和法庭聯絡的費用及考慮劉女士的陳詞的費用。本席暫令劉女士需支付原告人的訟費為$8,000。任何一方若一不滿訟費決定,可於14天內以傳票方式申請更改訟費暫令,否則暫令在14天後成為正式命令。

 (歐陽桂如)
 高等法院原訟法庭法官

原告人(原訴訟)及第二被告人(反申索):由的近律師行轉聘范宇嶸大律師代表

第一被告人(原訴訟):無律師代表,親自出席聆訊

[2020] HKCFI 2179-EN-2020-10-09

PROGETTO JEWELLERY CO LTD v. LAU CHIU YING AND ANOTHER

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HCA 2548/2014

[2020] HKCFI 2179

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2548 OF 2014

________________________

BETWEEN  
 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 LAU CHIU YING1st Defendant
 JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant
 (by original action) 
 ________________________ 
AND BETWEEN  
 JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 FUNG PUI WA1st Defendant
 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITED 2nd Defendant
 (by counterclaim) 

________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge MK Liu in Chambers (Paper Disposal)
Date of Written Submissions of 1st Defendant (by Original Action): 5 October 2020
Date of Decision: 9 October 2020

\

________________________

DECISION

________________________

1.  This Court has handed down the following in these proceedings:

(1)     the Main Judgment dated 22 January 2020, in which I ruled in favour of PJ and against Joy and JD on various major issues;

(2)     the Time Decision dated 12 June 2020, in which I dismissed Joy’s application for leave to appeal against the Main Judgment out of time; and

(3)     Reasons for Decision dated 6 August 2020, in which I set out the reasons for refusing a stay of execution of the Main Judgment pending the outcome of Joy’s application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the Time Decision out of time (“the Refusal Decision”).

This decision should be read together with the aforesaid judgment and decisions.

2.  On 12 August 2020, Joy took out a summons (“the 1st Summons”) for leave to appeal against the Refusal Decision and the costs order made by me in the Refusal Decision (“the 2nd Costs Order”).  By the 2nd Costs Order, I ordered that costs of the Joy’s stay application be to PJ, and summarily assessed those costs at HK$38,000.  On 14 August 2020, PJ’s solicitors wrote to the Court, setting out their preliminary view on the 1st Summons and suggesting that the 1st Summon should be determined on the papers without an oral hearing. On 17 August 2020, I directed that the 1st Summons would be determined on the papers, and Joy should provide her written submissions to the Court.

3.  On 17 August 2020, Joy issued another summons (“the 2nd Summons”).  On the face of the 2nd Summons, Joy is seeking leave to appeal against the costs order made by me in the Time Decision (“the 1st Costs Order”).  On 18 August 2020, PJ’s solicitors provided their preliminary view on the 2nd Summons and asked for paper disposal of the 2nd Summons.  On 19 August 2020, I directed that the 2nd Summons would be dealt with on the papers without an oral hearing, and Joy should provide her written submissions to the Court.

4.  After considering all the materials provided by Joy, I am of the view that the applications as per the 1st Summons and the 2nd Summons are unmeritorious and must be dismissed.  I have no need to call upon PJ’s solicitors to provide me detailed written submissions in relation to the 2 summonses.

1st Summons

5.  Joy’s application for leave to appeal against the Refusal Decision is misconceived.  A stay application, after being refused by the court below, may be made to the Court of Appeal.  No leave is required. The application to the Court of Appeal is not an appeal.  See HongKong Civil Procedure 2020, Volume 1, §59/13/7.  It is not necessary and incorrect to try to challenge the Refusal Decision by an appeal.

6.  As to the 2nd Costs Order, Joy failed in her stay application and costs should follow the event. In respect of the amount provided in the 2nd Costs Order, having considered the bill of costs dated 29 July 2020 provided by PJ’s solicitors, I took the view that the costs as per the said bill were reasonable, save that the total time spent by the handling solicitor as set out in section D of the bill should be reduced to 2 hours.  Taking a broad-brush approach, I summarily assessed the total amount of costs at HK$38,000.  I do not see any merit in Joy’s intended challenge against the 2nd Costs Order.

7.  There is no reasonable prospect of success in Joy’s intended appeal against the Refusal Decision, including the 2nd Costs Order therein.  There is also no reason that the intended appeal should be heard in the interests of justice.  The 1st Summons must be dismissed.

2nd Summons

8.  The 1st Costs Order was made on 12 June 2020, and the summary assessment was done on 24 June 2020. The 2nd Summons was only taken out on 17 August 2020. Accordingly, Joy’s application for leave to appeal against the 1st Costs Order is out of time.

9.  The application is devoid of any merit.

(1)     Joy failed in the application as per her summons dated 21 May 2020.  Costs should follow the event.

(2)     PJ’s solicitors have set out the costs incurred by PJ in that application in their bill of costs dated 19 June 2020.  Having considered the said bill, I took the view that the costs as set out therein were reasonable, save that the total time spent by the handling solicitor in section C and section D should be reduced to 1.5 hours and 2 hours respectively.  Taking a broad-brush approach, I summarily assessed the total amount of the costs at HK$39,000.

(3)     There is no merit in Joy’s intended challenge against the 1st Costs Order.

10.  As there is no merit in the 2nd Summons, the summons must be dismissed.  There is also no reason that the intended appeal against the 1st Costs Order should be heard in the interests of justice.

Disposition

11.  I dismiss both the 1st Summons and the 2nd Summons.

12.  Costs should follow the event.  There be a costs order that costs of these 2 summonses be paid by Joy to PJ forthwith.   In relation to the 1st Summons and the 2nd Summons, PJ seeks costs of HK$5,800 and HK$6,380 respectively.  In my view, these are reasonable sums.  I allow the amounts claimed by PJ in full. 

( MK Liu )
Deputy High Court Judge

  

Written submissions by the 1st Defendant (by Original Action)

[2020] HKCFI 1835-EN-2020-08-06

PROGETTO JEWELLERY CO LTD v. LAU CHIU YING AND ANOTHER

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HCA 2548/2014

[2020] HKCFI 1835

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2548 OF 2014

________________________

BETWEEN

 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 LAU CHIU YING1st Defendant
 JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant

(by original action)
________________________

AND BETWEEN

 JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 FUNG PUI WA1st Defendant
 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant

(by counterclaim)
________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge MK Liu in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 3 August 2020
Date of Decision: 3 August 2020
Date of Reasons for Decision: 6 August 2020

________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

________________________

1.  On 22 January 2020, this Court handed down a judgment in favour of PJ and against Joy and JD (“the Main Judgment”) [1]. Neither Joy nor JD lodged an appeal against the Main Judgment within the time prescribed in Order 59 rule 4(1)(c). On 21 May 2020, Joy personally sought leave to appeal the Main Judgment out of time[2]. On 12 June 2020, I heard Joy’s application for leave to appeal (“the Leave Hearing”). On the same date, I handed down a written decision, in which I dismissed Joy’s application (“the Time Decision”) [3]. On 22 June 2020, Joy made an application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the Time Decision (CAMP 61/2020). On 7 July 2020, Joy took out a summons for stay of execution of the order against her in the Main Judgment pending the determination of her application in CAMP 61/2020 (“the Stay Application”). On 3 August 2020, I heard the Stay Application. At the end of the hearing, I dismissed the application with costs to PJ, and summarily assessed those costs at HK$38,000. These are the reasons for the decision. These reasons should be read together with the Main Judgment and the Time Decision[4].

2.  The principles concerning stay of execution have been succinctly summarized by Ma J (as he then was) in StarPlay Development Ltdv BessFashion Management Co Ltd[5].  The matters to be borne in mind include the following:

(1)  The burden is on the party seeking a stay to make out a positive case to justify the indulgence, not for the successful party to justify why a stay should not be granted.

(2)  The existence of an arguable appeal (that is, one with reasonable prospects of success) is the minimum requirement before a court would even consider granting a stay.  If there is no arguable appeal, no stay would be granted, however exceptional the circumstances may be otherwise justifying a stay of execution.

(3)  Even if the court is satisfied that there is an arguable appeal, the appellant must provide additional reasons as to why a stay is justified.

(4)  If the suggested additional reason is the possibility of the appeal being rendered nugatory, it is incumbent upon the appellant to provide evidence to substantiate it.  Where it is said that the levying of execution would result in financial ruin or serious financial consequences for the appellant, the court will require good evidence to support this contention, such as the production of accounts or other documents to justify the assertion.  A bare assertion is unlikely to meet with much sympathy where more substantial evidence is available.

3.  In the Time Decision, I have given reasons as to why I refused Joy’s application for leave to appeal out of time.  In CAMP 61/2020, Joy made an affirmation dated 22 June 2020, in which she exhibited lengthy written grounds of appeal against the Main Judgment (“the Written Grounds”). It is important to bear in mind that Joy only put forward grounds of appeal against the Main Judgment on 22 June 2020, and there was no ground of appeal proposed by Joy in the Leave Hearing or at any time prior to that hearing.

4.  Having considered everything said by Joy in writing and in her oral submissions, I am not persuaded that I have erred in any aspect in the Time Decision.

5.  Further, having considered the Written Grounds, I am of the view that Joy has not shown reasonable prospects of success in her intended appeal against the Main Judgment.

(1)  In order to succeed in challenging the factual findings made by the trial judge, the appellant has to overcome a very high threshold.  The Court of Appeal would not set aside the factual findings made by the trial judge unless the findings are plainly wrong[6].

(2)  While large scale copying from counsel’s submissions is not a practice endorsed by the Court of Appeal, the crucial questions are (a) whether the trial judge had exercised his independent judgment over the matter; and (b) whether adequate reasons were given by the trial judge in the judgment for coming to his decision[7].

(3)  Whether or not interventions by a trial judge during the course of evidence is excessive depends on the circumstances of the case, the context and nature of the interventions.  Interventions made for the purpose of clarifying a party’s case and evidence are legitimate.  The trial judge may also make his concerns known so that counsel can properly deal with them[8].

(4)  An appellant cannot succeed in a civil appeal by pointing to any fault or blameworthiness on the part of the legal team representing him at the trial.  His remedy lays in proceedings in negligence against the legal representatives and not in an order for a retrial.  The court system would grind to a halt if an unsuccessful litigant could obtain an order for a retrial by relying upon the negligence of his own legal representatives, not to mention the injustice of depriving the successful party of a judgment in his favour after a full trial[9].

(5)  Unpleaded issues and points not supported by evidence cannot be pursued in the appeal.

(6)  Notwithstanding the lengthy Written Grounds put forward by Joy, I am not persuaded that I have not exercised independent judgment and have not given adequate reasons in the Main Judgment.  The Main Judgment would speak for itself.

(7)  I am also not persuaded that I have made excessive or impermissible interventions in the trial.  Counsel representing Joy at the trial did not make any complaint at any time that this Court had made excessive or impermissible interventions.

(8)  The challenges in Grounds 1-3, 6, 8-10 are challenges against the factual findings made by me as the trial judge after seeing and hearing the evidence.  I am not persuaded that Joy has demonstrated a reasonable prospect of success in overcoming the very high threshold required in those challenges.

(9)  In relation to Ground 3, Joy (legally represented at all times until 2 days after the handing down of the Main Judgment) had not suggested that any expert evidence on trade practice or trade custom was required.

(10)  Ground 4 relates to my decision not to entertain Joy’s unpleaded argument.  There is no reasonable prospect of success in this ground.

(11)  Ground 5 has no merit.  Apart from the CCTV records mentioned in the Amended Agreed Facts and the Agreed CCTV Events, I have also seen some CCTV recording during the trial.  Save and except the CCTV records mentioned in the Amended Agreed Facts, the Agreed CCTV Events and the CCTV recording viewed during the trial, counsel representing Joy at the trial did not in their final submissions suggest that some other CCTV recording or any audio recording might have a material impact on the outcome of the trial.

(12)  Ground 7 primarily relates to some case management decisions, which would rarely be overturned by the Court of Appeal. 

(13)  Ground 10 concerns the fact that no specific discovery had been pursued by Joy before the trial.  I raised my concern on this point at the final submissions stage and sought assistance from the counsel representing Joy at that time, but counsel could not offer any answer, let alone a satisfactory answer[10]. Joy now alleges that she had made an application for specific discovery, but she withdrew the application at a later time under the misguidance by her lawyers. Even if this allegation is true, that would not constitute a good ground of appeal.  See the principle in subparagraph (4) above.

6.  Even if I were of the view that Joy has an arguable appeal against the Main Judgment and has a reasonable chance of success in obtaining leave to appeal out of time from the Court of Appeal, I would only grant a stay of execution upon the condition that Joy should pay all the sums due to PJ under the Main Judgment into court within 14 days, and the stay would only take effect after the sums are paid into court. 

(1)  Joy claims that if there is no stay of execution, she may have to raise money to pay the judgment sums by selling her business and properties.  If she eventually succeeds in setting aside the Main Judgment, even if she can get back the money from PJ, she may not be able to buy back the business and the properties.  This is a real prejudice to her.  In my view, all these are bare assertions with no particular.  Joy has not disclosed her financial situation and the details of the business and the properties owned by her.  In the absence of all these particulars, I would not attach much weight to the prejudice alleged by Joy.

(2)  Joy also claims that if the judgment sums are paid to PJ, PJ may use part of the judgment sums to pay its legal fees in these proceedings.  If she eventually succeeds in setting aside the Main Judgment, she may not be able to recover all the judgment sums from PJ.  In my view, this aspect would be sufficiently taken care of if the judgment sums are paid into court. 

(3)  PJ mentions that it may potentially be prejudiced by a stay, for PJ has been relying on the Main Judgment to proceed against Joy in HCA 231/2019, in which PJ has made a claim against Joy based on s.60 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance.  Joy may use the stay as an excuse to delay HCA 231/2019.  In my view, PJ’s concern is understandable.

(4)  Taking into account all the aforesaid, if Joy has an arguable appeal, the right balance would be a stay of execution upon the condition that Joy has to pay all the judgment sums into court.

7.  I concluded that Joy had not demonstrated a reasonable chance of success in CAMP 61/2020, and hence I dismissed the Stay Application at the end of the hearing.

8.  I thank counsel for the assistance rendered to the Court.

 (MK Liu)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Tom Ng, instructed by Deacons, for the plaintiff (by Original Action)

The 1st defendant (by Original Action) appearing in person


[1]  [2020] HKCFI 209

[2]  JD has not lodged any appeal against the Main Judgment and has not made any application for leave to appeal out of time.

[3]  [2020] HKCFI 1196

[4]  For ease of reference, the abbreviations used in the Main Judgment and in the Time Decision are adopted herein.

[5]  [2007] 5 HKC 84, at [6] – [10]

[6]  TsangYu Wav LiSau Kam[2020] HKCA 308, [14] and [15]

[7]  ChanSanv HansLi, the person appointed to represent the estate of Kam Shui Man, the deceased[2020] HKCA 166, [37]

[8]  HaSau Mei Winniev NgWai Wing and Another (CACV 258/2011, 12 November 2012), [46] – [48]

[9]  CheungYiu Wingv CelestialAsia Securities Holdings Ltd (CACV 254/2005, 22 June 2006, [8]

[10]  Main Judgment, [38] and [39]

[2020] HKCFI 1196-EN-2020-06-12

PROGETTO JEWELLERY CO LD v. LAU CHIU YING AND ANOTHER

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HCA 2548/2014

[2020] HKCFI 1196

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2548 OF 2014

________________________

BETWEEN  
 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 LAU CHIU YING1st Defendant
 JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant
 (by original action) 

________________________

AND BETWEEN  
 JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 FUNG PUI WA1st Defendant
 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant
 (by counterclaim) 

________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge MK Liu in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 12 June 2020
Date of Decision: 12 June 2020

____________________

DECISION

____________________

1.  By a summons dated 21 May 2020 (“the summons”), Joy seeks leave to appeal the judgment handed down on 22 January 2020 (“the Judgment”) out of time. The summons is supported by an affirmation made by Joy on 21 May 2020 (“the affirmation”). This decision should be read together with the Judgment. For ease of reference, the abbreviations used in the Judgment are adopted herein.

The principles

2.  The principle concerning leave to appeal out of time is well established.  In Tang Chai On v Tang Sing Ki, the Court of Appeal said[1]:

“The legal principles regarding an application to extend time for an appeal are well established. In the exercise of its discretion, the court will take into account the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the chances of the appeal succeeding if an extension of time is granted, and the degree of prejudice to the other party if the application is granted. Where the delay is substantial and not wholly excusable, the applicant must show a real prospect of success on the merits, not merely a reasonable prospect of success.”

3.  Ignorance of the law on the part of a litigant acting in person is generally not an excuse for delay.[2]  After the expiration of the appeal period prescribed in the rules of the court, the successful party should be entitled to regard the legal battle as finished.  In the absence of any good reason, the court would not extend the appeal period. All litigants, including litigants acting in person, have the duty to find out the relevant appeal period and to lodge an appeal in time[3].

Substantial and inexcusable delay

4.  In the affirmation, Joy said the following:

(1)  On 22 January 2020, she received a copy of the Judgment.  At that time, she thought that the Judgment was only a draft, and the appeal period would only start to run after the sealing of the order made in the Judgment.

(2)  On 24 January 2020, she served a notice to act in person on PJ’s solicitors.  She received two letters from PJ’s solicitors on that date.  In one of these letters, PJ’s solicitors enclosed a draft order (“the draft order”) and a draft of the answers to the questions in the Scott Schedule (“the draft answers”) and asked Joy to comment on the same.

(3)  On 28 April 2020 and 4 May 2020, she received letters from PJ’s solicitors, in which PJ’s solicitors urged Joy to give comments on the draft order and the draft answers.

(4)  Since the order had not been sealed and was only a draft, she did not think that the appeal period had started to run.  She was under an impression that she might lodge an appeal against the Judgment within 28 days after the sealing of the order.

(5)  Due to the outbreak of COVID-19, the court had limited operation from late January to early May 2020.

(6)  On 15 May 2020, she received a copy of the sealed order from PJ’s solicitors.  She sought legal advice from a volunteer lawyer on 18 May 2020.  She was told that the appeal period in fact started to run from 22 January 2020 and the 28-day appeal period had already expired.  She could only lodge an appeal if leave to appeal out of time was granted.

(7)  The delay in lodging the appeal was caused by her misunderstanding of the legal procedure.  She asked for an extension of time of 28 days from the date of the order granting her leave to appeal out of time.

5.  Joy has not produced a draft notice of appeal or set out her grounds of appeal in any document.

6.  The Judgment is a final judgment given after trial.  Any appeal against the Judgment has to be lodged within 28 days from the date of the Judgment, not from the date of the sealed order[4].

7.  As a result of the outbreak of COVID-19 in the beginning of 2020, there was a General Adjourned Period from late January to early May 2020. The High Court Registry was closed from 29 January 2020 to 6 March 2020, and from 23 March 2020 to 5 May 2020.  However, the temporary closure of the High Court Registry has no impact on the calculation of the appeal period and cannot be an excuse justifying the delay in lodging an appeal against the Judgment, for an appeal is commenced by service (and not the filing) of a notice of appeal.  The notice of appeal does not have to be filed, stamped, sealed or in any way authenticated by the court prior to service.  The point has been made clear by Fok JA (as he then was) in Law Wing Kee v Person in Occupation of RP & Another[5], in which his lordship said:

“10.  An appeal to the Court of Appeal is brought by a notice of motion in writing called a “notice of appeal” (see O.59 r.3(1)).  As stated in Note 59/3/4 in Vol. 1 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2013:

‘A notice of appeal does not have to be stamped, sealed or in any way authenticated by the Court of Appeal (or any other court) prior to service.  There is no such process as ‘issue’ of a notice of appeal in the case of an appeal to the Court of Appeal.  It is thought by some members of the legal profession that a notice of appeal is not valid unless it has first been sealed or somehow authenticated by the Appeals Registry, and that absent such authentication, it is not a valid notice of appeal and service of it can be rejected.  That is not so.  The order of events is: first, service of the notice of appeal on the parties required to be served (see paras 59/3/11, 59/16/2 and 59/19/5 (below)), then secondly, setting down of the appeal in the Office of the Deputy Clerk of Court (Civil Appeals) (see paras 59/5/1 to 59/5/20 (below)). There is no need to send the notice of appeal to the Appeals Registry prior to service; indeed it is pointless to do so.’

11.    The proper way to commence an appeal is therefore by service of the notice of appeal on the intended respondent.  There is no need for issue or prior authentication of the notice of appeal by the Appeals Registry.

12.    The usual modes of service in O.65 apply to the service of a notice of appeal.  Not being a document requiring personal service, the provisions of O.65 r.5 apply and the notice of appeal may be served by various methods, including leaving it at the address of the solicitors for the intended respondent if that is the proper address for service of the respondent: see O.65 r.5(1)(a) read with r.5(2).

13.    It is only when one reaches the second or setting down stage that the rules require the appellant to lodge with the Registrar a copy of the sealed judgment or order and a copy of the reasoned decision (if any) as well as two copies of the notice of appeal, one of which shall be indorsed with the amount of the fee paid and the other indorsed with a certificate of the date of service of the notice: see O.59 r.5(1).

14.    In the present case, the plaintiff’s solicitor did not need to file the notice of appeal in the Appeals Registry before proceeding to serve the notice of appeal on the solicitors for the 2nd defendant (the intended respondent) and it would appear that the two stages of the service of the notice of appeal and the setting down of the appeal were confused.”

8.  The Judgment was handed down on 22 January 2020.  The 28-day appeal period started to run on that date and expired on 19 February 2020.  Up to the date of the summons, Joy has been out of time for more than 3 months.  The delay in lodging the appeal is substantial.

9.  Joy was legally represented at the time of the handing down of the Judgment.  She only ceased to be legally represented and began to act in person on 24 January 2020.  What Joy has not said in the affirmation is whether her previous legal advisors had explained the calculation of the appeal period to her.  In any event, ignorance of the law cannot be a satisfactory explanation justifying the substantial delay.

10.  In my view, Joy’s delay in lodging an appeal against the Judgment is substantial and inexcusable.

Merit of the appeal not shown

11.  Joy has not put forward any proposed grounds of appeal.  That being the case, Joy has failed to show any merit, let alone a real prospect of success, in her proposed appeal

Disposition

12.  For the reasons above, the summons must be dismissed.  I dismiss the summons.

13.  Costs should follow the event.  Costs of the summons are to be paid by Joy to PJ forthwith and those costs be summarily assessed.  There be leave to PJ to file and serve a bill of costs for summary assessment within 7 days, and leave to Joy to file and serve a written reply to the said bill within 7 days thereafter.

14.  I thank counsel for the assistance rendered to the court.

 ( MK Liu )
 Deputy High Court Judge

Ms Sakinah Sat, instructed by Deacons, for the plaintiff (by Original Action) and the 2nd defendant (by Counterclaim)

The 1st and 2nd defendants (by Original Action) and the plaintiff (by Counterclaim) appearing in person



[1]Tang Chai On v Tang Sing Ki [2016] 5 HKLRD 104, [9]

[2]Chen Cheryl Deanna v Chen Pak Yin Stella (HCMP 1061/2017, 4 August 2017), [10]

[3]Ho Kwok Cheung v Yim Yee Mui (HCMP 773/2017, 19 September 2017), [10]

[4]Rules of the High Court, Order 59 rule 4(1)(c); Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2020, Volume 1, §59/4/3

[5] HCMP 672/2013, 9 March 2013

[2020] HKCFI 209-EN-2020-01-22

PROGETTO JEWELLERY CO LTD v. LAU CHIU YING AND ANOTHER

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HCA 2548/2014

[2020] HKCFI 209

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2548 OF 2014

________________________

BETWEEN

 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 LAU CHIU YING1st Defendant
 JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant

(by original action)
________________________

AND BETWEEN

 JOY DESIGN COMPANY LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 FUNG PUI WA1st Defendant
 PROGETTO JEWELLERY COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant

(by counterclaim)
________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge MK Liu in Court
Date of Hearing: 5-8, 11-15 & 18 November 2019, 16 December 2019, 7 & 10 January 2020
Date of Judgment: 22 January 2020

________________________

J U D G M E N T

________________________

A.  INTRODUCTION

1.  The disputes herein are the disputes between two businesswomen, namely Ms Fung Pui Wa Ruby (“Ruby”) and Ms Lau Chiu Ying Joy (“Joy”).  Voluminous documents are involved in these proceedings.  For the purpose of clarity and avoiding quoting the contents of some documents mentioned in this judgment extensively, the references to these documents in the trial bundles are given in the footnotes herein.  I would first set out the factual background.

B.  BACKGROUND

2.  On 17 July 2009, Progetto Jewellery Company Limited (“PJ”) was incorporated in Hong Kong by Joy and Mr Chan Kwong Yiu Jimmy (“Jimmy”).  In August 2009, Ruby joined PJ as a shareholder and a director.  From that time onwards, Joy, Jimmy and Ruby each held 1/3 of the shares in PJ, and each of them was a director of PJ.  At or about the same time, Mr Chu Man Kit Gary (“Gary”) was employed by PJ as a sales representative.

3.  In September and October 2012, there was discussion among Joy, Ruby and Jimmy.  As a result of the discussion, Jimmy agreed to leave PJ.  On 11 October 2012, Jimmy resigned from the directorship in PJ.  There was discussion concerning purchasing Jimmy’s shareholding by PJ, but no payment has been made to Jimmy.

4.  According to Ruby, the following events occurred after the departure of Jimmy from the directorship in PJ:

(1)  On 13 October 2012, Ruby was informed by Joy that the value of each shareholder’s shares was about HK$3.7 million.

(2)  In late October 2012, Ruby found that most jewellery items in the safe (“the Safe”) inside PJ’s office (“the Office”) had been taken away.  The remaining items were insufficient for the purpose of giving Jimmy the value of his shares in PJ.

(3)  After Jimmy ceased to be a director of PJ, Joy became in charge of the financial matters, including bookkeeping, of PJ.

(4)  From 6 December 2012 to 23 November 2013, Joy made unauthorized withdrawals from PJ’s bank account, the total of which being HK$568,655.53 and €12,673.75.

(5)  From 11 December 2012 to 10 May 2013, Joy on behalf of PJ purchased 7 pieces of GIA certified diamonds (“the GIA Diamonds”) at HK$180,521.65.

5.  In January 2013, there was a jewellery exhibition in Italy (“the 2013 Italy Exhibition”).  Joy, Gary and Ms Liu Yip Lam Momoko (“Momoko”, PJ’s accounting staff) took the majority of PJ’s jewellery items from Hong Kong to the exhibition.  While they were on the way to Italy, Joy took 234 jewellery items from a customer of PJ in London, and brought the 234 jewellery items to Italy.  The 234 jewellery items were PJ’s goods previously on consignment with that customer.  Joy did not declare the 234 items when she entered Italy, and as a result the 234 items (“the Undeclared Items”) were seized by the Italian customs (“the Seizure Incident”).  According to Ruby, after the Seizure Incident, customers, particularly Italian customers, became less willing to place orders with PJ as they were worried that similar incidents might occur to their items purchased with PJ.

6.  Ruby claims that from February to May 2013, Joy sent 5 of the 7 GIA Diamonds for reworking into finished jewellery items.  Joy collected the finished items but did not account for their values to PJ.  Joy sold the remaining 2 GIA Diamonds without accounting part of their value to PJ.

7.  On 18 March 2013, Joy Design Company Limited (“JD”) was incorporated in Hong Kong.  JD’s sole shareholder is Ms Lau Chiu Ling (“CL”), Joy’s younger sister.  Joy was the sole director of JD from 18 March 2013 to 16 June 2014.  On 16 June 2014, CL replaced Joy as the sole director of JD.  According to Ruby, JD was established pursuant to the suggestion made by Joy.  The idea was using JD as the agent or nominee of PJ for the sole purpose of facilitating PJ’s business by shipping out the goods in JD’s name for the benefit of PJ. The purpose of this arrangement is to minimize the impact of the Seizure Incident on the business of PJ.  According to Joy, although JD would sell items on behalf of PJ, JD has its own goods and its own business.

8.  On 11 December 2013, Ruby sent a message to Joy complaining Gary’s attitude and performance at work.  Joy replied expressing her annoyance by Ruby’s message and requested for dissolution of PJ.  On 28 December 2013, Ruby requested Joy to provide her an update on the calculation of the market value of PJ’s shares.  On 6 January 2014, Ruby was informed that her shares in PJ were worth about HK$1.7 million.  A valuation report (“the 6 Jan 2014 Valuation Report”) prepared by Momoko[1] and a Warehouse Balance Report of PJ (“the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report”) prepared by Momoko under Joy’s instruction were shown to Ruby.

9.  In January 2014, Joy and Gary attended the jewellery exhibition in Italy (“the 2014 Italy Exhibition”).  They took the finished products in the Safe and brought them to Italy.  According to Joy, after coming back to Hong Kong, she has returned all the unsold items to the Safe.

10.  According to Ruby, JD has misappropriated PJ’s finished products displayed in the 2014 Italy Exhibition by treating the same as JD’s own goods and selling the same to customers in the name of JD, thereby diverting business from PJ to JD.

11.  In March 2014, there was an exhibition held by Hong Kong Trade Development Council (“HKTDC”).  PJ had applied for a booth in that exhibition and paid a deposit of HK$93,098.60 to HKTDC.  However, eventually no one from PJ attended the exhibition.  As a result, the deposit was forfeited by HKTDC. Ruby claims that Joy was responsible for attending the exhibition on behalf of PJ, and Joy has failed to discharge her duty, causing loss to PJ.

12.  In March 2014, Ruby made a report to the police.  Ruby claims that Joy has misappropriated the jewellery items and the loose diamonds in the Safe.  According to Ruby, Joy has also taken away a lot of company records of PJ and a laptop computer belonging to PJ (“the Laptop Computer”).

13.  In mid-June 2014, Joy returned the Laptop Computer and some documents to PJ.

14.  The parties have managed to reach an agreement on some facts.  The Amended Agreed Facts and the Agreed CCTV Events are annexed hereto. 

15.  In compliance with the direction previously given by the court, the parties have prepared a Scott schedule (“the Scott Schedule”), in which the parties have set out the questions requiring adjudication by the court.

C.  THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE CASES

16.  In these proceedings, PJ has made the following claims against Joy:

(1)  Sale proceeds, receivables and assets

Joy has failed to account for PJ’s sale proceeds and receivables (“Unaccounted Sales”), and has misappropriated PJ’s assets (“Misappropriation Claim”)

(2)  HKTDC Exhibition

Joy failed to attend the 2014 HKTDC Exhibition on behalf of PJ, causing loss to PJ.

(3)  GIA Diamonds

Joy failed to account for the 5 GIA Diamonds, and the sale proceeds of the other 2.

(4)  Confidential information

Joy failed to return the documents containing confidential information to PJ.

(5)  Seizure Incident

The loss suffered by PJ in the Seizure Incident was caused by Joy’s negligence.

(6)  Unauthorized withdrawals

       From 6 December 2012 to 23 November 2013, Joy has made unauthorized withdrawals from PJ’s bank account.

17.  In response to these claims, Joy’s defence is as follows:

(1)  Unaccounted Sales and the Misappropriation Claim:

Joy denies these allegations.

(2)  HKTDC Exhibition

Joy claims that she should not be responsible for PJ’s failure in attending the HKTDC Exhibition.

(3)  GIA Diamonds

Joy denies this allegation.

(4)  Confidential information

Joy claims that all the documents and the Laptop Computer inadvertently taken away by her have already been returned to PJ.

(5)  Seizure Incident

Joy claims that there is no negligence on her part in the Seizure Incident.

(6)  Unauthorized withdrawals

Joy claims that the withdrawals are for legitimate purposes and are proper withdrawals.

18.  PJ has also made the following claims against JD:

(1)  JD was PJ’s agent or nominee, but it has breached the duties owed to PJ by failing to account for customers’ payments due to PJ.  Accordingly, JD is also liable to PJ for the Unaccounted Sales.

(2)  JD has also diverted PJ’s jewellery items (“the Diverted Jewellery Items”).

19.  JD’s defence is that JD was set up as a separate business “for the mutual benefit of Ruby and Joy”[2], and JD was not PJ’s agent or nominee.  JD has its own jewellery items and business.

20.  JD raises the following counterclaims:

(1)  Against PJ

JD counterclaims against PJ for the reimbursement of some purchases made by JD for PJ.

(2)  Against Ruby and PJ:

JD counterclaims against Ruby and PJ for the return of some jewellery items stored in the Safe (“the JD Jewellery Items”).  According to JD, these are JD’s properties.

21.  JD’s counterclaims are denied by Ruby and PJ.

22.  PJ has called Ruby and Jimmy to give evidence in support of PJ’s case.  Joy and JD (“Ds”) have arranged Joy, Gary and Momoko to give evidence in support of their case.  Ruby has given evidence in support of her own case in JD’s counterclaim.

23.  Mr Tom Ng for PJ submits that the following claims can be dealt with in one go:

(1)  PJ’s claim for the Unaccounted Sales

(2)  PJ’s claim for the Missing Jewelleries;

(3)  PJ’s claim for the Diverted Jewellery Items; and

(4)  JD’s counterclaim for the JD Jewellery Items.

24.  Mr Ng submits that the theory in PJ’s case (“the PJ’s Theory”) is as follows:

(1)  The starting point is the stock PJ had from October 2012 to December 2013. The figure can be obtained by adding (a) the value of the stock as at October 2012, and (b) the stock PJ received from October 2012 to December 2013. According to PJ’s case, the total sale price of these stock items is around HK$24.5 million.

(2)  The “closing stock” – namely the total selling price of the stock PJ had in March 2014 – is then deducted. According to the stock-taking conducted by Jimmy in March 2014, PJ had “closing stock” with a total sale price of around HK$6 million.

(3)  The above shows that stock items with a total sale price of around HK$18 million were transferred away. The question is what happened to these HK$18 million stock items.

(4)  Mr Ng’s submits that even on Ds’ own case, there was no more than HK$6.4 million stock (HK$6.4 million being the total sale price of all the stock owned by PJ and JD according to Ds’ case) on 6 January 2014, as per the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report and the 6 Jan 2014 Valuation Report.  Mr Ng submits that accordingly, even on Ds’ own case, there are still at least HK$18 million stock items to be accounted for.

(5)  The following matters are accepted by PJ:

(a)        The stock items to be accounted for include the Undeclared Items seized by the Italy customs in the Seizure Incident.  The value (ie the sale price) of the Undeclared Items is about HK$2 million.

(b)       Some of the stock items were sold and PJ has received HK$5,253,044.06.[3]

(6)  The value of the remaining stock to be accounted (“Remaining Stock to be Accounted”) is about HK$11 million.  Mr Ng’s submits that the Remaining Stock to be Accounted is the Missing Jewelleries misappropriated by Joy and the Unaccounted sales.  Details of Mr Ng’s submissions are as follows:


DescriptionSale Price (HK$)(assuming a 30% profit margin)Evidence
Jewellery items from October 2012 to 31 December 2013 $24,565,047.72 - $364,277.33[4] = $24,200,770.39 Jimmy’s October 2012 valuation[5], supported by the October 2012 warehouse reports[6] + “work orders” showing the stock from October 2012 to December 2013[7] 
Less: Closing stock as at March 2014 ($6,026,824.27) Stock-taking in the presence of the police in March 2014. Joy’s own case is that, on 6 January 2014, there were only stock items of PJ and JD with a total “marked selling price” of not more than $6,410,153.86[8].
Stock to be Accounted$18,173,946.12 
Less: Undeclared Items ($2,095,839.75) The seizure of the Undeclared Items is agreed.
Costs of the items: see 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report[9]
Less: Accounted sales ($5,253,044.06) Actual income receipts in the bank statements from October 2012 to March 2014[10], minus the receivables as at October 2012[11]. There is no change to this figure after taking all PJ’s bank statements up to May 2017 into account[12].
Remaining Stock to be Accounted$10,825,062.31 
Less: Missing Jewelleries (excluding loose diamonds) ($2,778,698.33) Items: in the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report[13], but not in the Office
Unaccounted Sales$8,046,363.98 Based on the above

According to Joy, there is a “a draft account receivables of the Plaintiff prepared by Momoko Liu”[14], showing more than HK$11 million account receivables in 2013 and 2014[15]. Historically, PJ’s yearly revenue for the 2011 and 2012 financial years exceeded HK$20 million[16].

25.  I will examine whether the PJ’s Theory suggested by Mr Ng can be proved by the evidence accepted by this court.

D.       THE PRINCIPLES

26.  Issues in a litigation is defined by pleadings. One cannot slip in an unpleaded issue by saying that there is evidence on the issue. That has been firmly stated by the Court of Final Appeal in Kwok Chin Wing v 21 Holdings Ltd [17], in which Ma CJ said:

“21. It should by now really be quite unnecessary to issue yet another reminder on the rationale behind pleadings. The basic objective is fairly and precisely to inform the other party or parties in the litigation of the stance of the pleading party (in other words, that party’s case) so that proper preparation is made possible, and to ensure that time and effort are not expended unnecessarily on other issues: Wing Hang Bank Ltd v Crystal Jet International Ltd [2005] 2 HKLRD 795, 799 [6(1)]. It is the pleadings that will define the issues in a trial and dictate the course of proceedings both before and at trial. Where witnesses are involved, it will be the pleaded issues that define the scope of the evidence, and not the other way round. In other words, it will not be acceptable for unpleaded issues to be raised out of the evidence which is to be or has been adduced. As the Court of Appeal remarked in Wing Hang Bank Ltd v Crystal Jet International Ltd at 799 [6(2)]:

(2) In a trial, particularly where evidence is given by witnesses, it becomes extremely important that each side knows exactly what are the live issues. Where issues are sought to be introduced that have not been adequately or properly pleaded, amendments must be sought unless the consent of the other party or parties has been obtained. It will simply not do for unpleaded issues to be ‘slipped in’ when evidence is being given in the hope that the other side is not sufficiently alert to object.

22.   … one does not sift through the evidence adduced in a trial in the hope that something was said that can conceivably found a cause of action. Issues, I would reiterate, must be properly pleaded unless for some reason the pleadings have assumed a less significant role in the proceedings.”       

27.  The aforesaid principle has also been mentioned by the Court of Appeal in Chan Kong v Chan Li Chai Medical Factory (Hong Kong) Ltd [18], [15] and [16].

28.  In respect of evaluating the evidence given by witnesses, a valuable guidance has been given by DHCJ Eugene Fung SC in Hui Cheung Fai and another v Daiwa Development Limited[19], in which the learned judge said:-

“77. Generally speaking, contemporaneous written documents and documents which came into existence before the problems in question emerged are of the greatest importance in assessing credibility: Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 403 at 431 (Lord Pearce) ……

78. In deciding whether to accept a witness’ account, importance should also be attached to the inherent likelihood or unlikelihood of an event having happened, or the apparent logic of events: e.g. Lam Rogerio Sou Fung v Tan Soon Gin George (unreported, HCA 2576/2005, 5 May 2011) §39 (Chu J).

79. In determining a witness’ credibility, I have also attached importance to the consistency of the witness’ evidence with undisputed or indisputable evidence, and the internal consistency of the witness’ evidence. The latter type of consistency is often tested by a comparison between the witness’ oral testimony and his or her witness statement.

80.    I have cautioned myself against the dangers of too readily drawing conclusions about truthfulness and reliability solely or mainly from the appearance of witnesses (Ting Kwok Keung v Tam Dick Yuen (2002) 5 HKCFAR 336 at §§36-37 (Bokhary PJ)), or from the assessment of the witnesses’ character (Esquire (Electronics) Ltd v HSBC [2007] 3 HKLRD 439 at §135 (Stock JA)).”

29.  Similar guidelines can also be found in Lee Fu Wing v Yau Po Ting Paul [2009] 5 HKLRD 513, in which DHCJ Au (as he then was) said:-

“53. In assessing the credibility of a party’s case on a particular issue, I accept the submissions of [counsel] that the Court should take into considerations the following:-

(1) Whether the party’s case is inherently plausible or implausible.

(2) Whether the party’s case is, in a material way, contradicted by other evidence (documentary or otherwise) which is undisputed or indisputable.

(3) Where it is shown that a witness has been discredited over one or more matters to which he has given evidence using the above tests. This is relevant to the assessment of his overall credibility.

(4) The demeanour of the witnesses.”

30.  If a witness has told lies on a central issue, that may have a significant adverse impact on the credibility of his or her evidence as a whole.  As said by Sir John Dyson in MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[20]:

“31. ....... where a claimant tells lies on a central issue, his or her case will not be saved by general evidence unless that evidence is extremely strong. It is only evidence of that kind which will be sufficient to counteract the negative pull of the lie. But much depends on the bearing that the lie has on the case……

32. Where the appellant has given a totally incredible account of the relevant facts, the tribunal must decide what weight to give to the lie, as well as to all the other evidence in the case, including the general evidence……

33.   ...... where the appellant tells lies on a central issue in the case, the [tribunal] may conclude that they are of great significance……It will be a matter for the [tribunal] to decide whether the general evidence is sufficiently strong to counteract what we have called the negative pull of the appellant’s lies.”

31.  In a civil litigation in which a serious allegation such as fraud is made, evidence proving the allegation must show a preponderance of probability.  The degree of probability must be commensurate with the occasion. However, that does not mean that the court is looking for a degree of probability higher than the civil standard. Rather, it means that the more inherently improbable the act in question, the more compelling would be the evidence needed to satisfy the court on a preponderance of probability[21].

E.  EVIDENCE FROM THE WITNESSES

32.  In PJ, Joy was responsible for, inter alia, finances and bookkeeping, dealing with customers, promotion and marketing, arranging and making payment of expenses, dealing with tax issues, and purchasing insurance coverage for PJ.  Joy was also responsible for attending and arranging goods to be displayed in overseas exhibitions on behalf of PJ, including the 2013 Italy Exhibition and the 2014 Italy Exhibition, and attending and arranging goods to be displayed in local exhibitions on behalf of PJ, including the exhibition organized by the HKTDC in March 2014 (“the HKTDC Exhibition”).  After Jimmy ceased to be a director of PJ, Joy was in sole charge of PJ’s finances and bookkeeping and payment of PJ’s expenses including suppliers’ invoices.

33.  Ruby was responsible for dealing with PJ’s suppliers in Mainland China and Hong Kong, purchasing materials, quality control (for both loose diamonds and finished items), controlling material inventory and matching material colours.

34.  Jimmy has a bachelor degree in accounting and statistics. When he was a director of PJ, he was responsible for sales and dealing with financial matters of PJ.  

35.  After Jimmy ceased to be a director of PJ, Gary worked under the supervision and direction of Joy, and was responsible for, inter alia, calculating the cost of finished items, stock control and compilation of PJ’s inventory in PJ’s computer system, and assumed the responsibility of administering PJ’s computer security measures, including updating the password in PJ’s computer system from time to time, and preparing carnet documentation.

36.  Momoko dealt with the bookkeeping and accounting aspect, and reported to Joy.

37.  Having seen and heard the evidence given by the witnesses, I am of the view that Ruby and Jimmy are honest and reliable witnesses.  Their evidence is broadly consistent with the documents.  On the other hand, I am of the view that Joy is an untruthful and unreliable witness. Her evidence is contradicted by documents and the CCTV evidence on various material aspects and cannot be true.  Likewise, Gary’s evidence and Momoko’s evidence are contradicted by documents and the CCTV evidence on material aspects.  I do not regard their evidence as truthful and reliable.  In respect of any conflict between the evidence given by Ruby and Jimmy on the one hand and the evidence given by Ds’ witnesses on the other hand, I prefer the former.

F.  NO SPECIFIC DISCOVERY APPLICATION BY Ds

38.  I would first deal with an allegation made by Joy throughout the trial.  In this case, from time to time Joy claimed that she was unable to tell the details of some matters, for she had no access to the documents now in PJ’s or Ruby’s possession.  This is an allegation against PJ and Ruby, accusing them of failing to disclose documents relevant to the issues in these proceedings.

39.  In my judgment, this allegation must be rejected.  As a matter of fact, Ds have never made an application for specific discovery against PJ and/or Ruby in these proceedings.  Bearing in mind that Ds are legally represented at all times in these proceedings, if there is any truth in this allegation, no doubt Ds would have made an application for specific discovery against PJ and Ruby.  During the final submission stage, I have put this question to Mr Michael Lee for Ds, and Mr Lee was unable to offer an answer on the question.  Obviously, there is no truth in the allegation at all.

40.  A related point is the assertion made by Momoko in her evidence, ie Joy was excluded from the Office in February 2014. The purpose of this assertion is trying to lend support to Joy’s allegation that Joy had no access to the documents in PJ’s possession.  Momoko’s assertion is obviously untrue.  As shown in the Agreed CCTV Events, Joy and Momoko entered the office on 17, 19 and 27 February 2014. 

G.       PJ’s THEORY

41.  As set out in the above, the PJ’s Theory covers PJ’s claim for the Unaccounted Sales, the Missing Jewelleries, and the Diverted Jewellery Items, and JD’s counterclaim for the JD Jewellery Items.  I would now examine whether PJ has proved this theory.

42.  The starting point of the PJ’s theory is the finished goods PJ had by December 2013. PJ obtained the figure by adding (a) the value of the stock as at October 2012 as shown in the Warehouse Balance Report at that time; and (b) the stock PJ received from October 2012 to December 2013, as shown in the work orders from one of the workshops used by PJ[22]. Based upon these documents, PJ claims that the total sale price of the stock items in PJ’s possession as at December 2013 should be about HK$24 million, with the assumption that PJ would make a profit of 30% in selling these items.  For the reasons given in [85] to [88] below, I accept the 30% profit margin proposed by PJ.  I accept the calculation as suggested by PJ, as the calculation is based upon figures in the documents which are not disputed. 

43.  In March 2014, Ruby made a report to the police.  It is an agreed fact that on 13 March 2014, police were called to the Office and there was a stock-taking in the presence of the police. According to PJ, 874 finished items were found in the Safe.  This figure was far less than the figure of 1,100 as shown on the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report.  According to Jimmy, the total of the sale price of the items remaining in the Safe on 13 March 2014 would be about HK$6 million.

44.  According to Ds’ case, as shown in the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report and in the 6 Jan 2014 Valuation Report, the total of the selling price of the stock items in PJ’s possession at that time was about HK$6.4 million.

45.  As said before, I prefer the evidence given by Ruby and Jimmy.  In any event, Mr Ng is correct in saying that there are Remaining Stock to be Accounted.  Taking into the account the aforesaid and the undisputed matters as set out in [24(5)] above, I agree that the total value of the Remaining Stock to be Accounted should be about HK$11 million.

46.  It is PJ’s case that the Remaining Stock to be Accounted is divided into 2 categories:

(1)  Misappropriated Claim – the items under this head are the finished products allegedly misappropriated by Joy, the 117 items sold in the 2014 Italy Exhibition, and some loose diamonds allegedly misappropriated by Joy;

(2)  Unaccounted Sales - stock items sold by Joy or JD on behalf of PJ, but they have failed to account for the sale proceeds.

G1. The Misappropriation Claim

47.  There is no direct evidence proving the Misappropriation Claim made by PJ.  Mr Ng does not dispute this.  However, Mr Ng submits that there are some facts proved by solid evidence, and in the light of those facts, the preponderance of probability is that the matters in the Misappropriation Claim suggested by PJ did occur. 

48.  Mr Ng submits that some of PJ’s finished products indeed have been misappropriated.  Mr Ng’s submission is that by comparing the number of finished products on the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report prepared by Joy with the number of finished products in the Safe as found in the stock-taking done in the presence of the police on 13 March 2014, it is clear that some of the finished products have been misappropriated between 6 January 2014 and 13 March 2014.

(1)  PJ’s case is that the number of finished products as shown on the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report is 1161, and 316 items shown in the report were not found in the stock-taking exercise conducted on 13 March 2014.  The number of finished products as found in the stock-taking exercise done on 13 March 2014 is 874, among which 29 items are not on the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report but are found in the Office.

(2)  Joy in her evidence said that there should be 1022 items of finished products after the 2014 Italy Exhibition, and she said during cross-examination that she believed that the figure provided by the police in March or April 2014 (around 800 items) should be reliable.

(3)  Mr Ng submits that, either way, some of PJ’s finished products have been misappropriated.

49.  I accept Mr Ng’s submissions.  To use a more neutral term, I would say that some of the PJ’s finished products must have been taken away between 6 January 2014 and 13 March 2014.  On the basis of the evidence accepted by this court (including the evidence given by Ruby and Jimmy), I find that the number of finished products which have been taken away is 316.  Based on the costs as set out in the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report, the sale price of these 316 items would be HK$2,137,460.25 x 130%=HK$2,778,698.33.

50.  The 316 items include the 117 items sold in the 2014 Italy Exhibition.  As to the remaining 199 items, the question is who has taken away these items, at what time and by what means.

51.  In her evidence, Joy said that she took away almost all the finished products in the Safe on 15 January 2014 for the purpose of brining the same to the 2014 Italy Exhibition.  Joy claimed that in the 2014 Italy exhibition, 117 items were sold.  In her first witness statement dated 7 July 2016, she said at [50]:

“After I returned from Italy, the 117 items were shipped to the customers as it was prohibited to sell items directly at the exhibition. The remaining items were returned to the Office on about 27 January 2014 in the presence of Ruby. Accordingly, there should be about 807 pieces in the Safe. This is consistent with what I was told by the police after the alleged theft that there were about 800 pieces remaining in the Safe.” (Emphasis added)

52.  Ruby in her evidence said that she went back to the Office to have a check on 1 February 2014.  At that time, she found that the Laptop Computer, a table and 4 chairs were missing.  Ruby went to see the Safe and found a handwritten note left by Joy, in which Joy said that the Safe should be opened by using the new key attached to that note.  Ruby opened the Safe and found that many finished products and loose diamonds were not in the Safe.  The Safe had not been damaged at all.  Looking at the environment, Ruby believed that no one had broken into the Office and stole the valuables in the Safe.  At the time, Ruby thought that probably Joy had taken the good to the exhibition and had not yet returned the same to the Safe.  Ruby was also under the impression that Joy had lost the key to the Safe, and so Joy had changed the lock to the Safe.  Thereafter, Ruby tried to contact Joy by phone several times, but Joy did not pick up the phone each and every time.

53.  PJ’s case is that (a) Joy did not return all the unsold finished products (“the unsold items”) to the Safe after the 2014 Italy Exhibition; and/or (b) Joy took away some unsold items and some loose diamonds on or after 27 January 2014.

54.  In respect of returning the unsold items to the Safe after the 2014 Italy Exhibition, Joy and Gary have given the following evidence:

(1)  Joy’s evidence as per her first witness statement dated 7 July 2016:

“51. After we returned from the 2nd Italian Exhibition, Gary and I were performing a stock take on or about 27 Jan 2014 with all the items we took for the exhibitions. However, we were unable to finish the report as Ruby had shouted at Gary.

52. On or about 15 January 2014, I lost my keys which included the key to the Safe. After I returned from the 2nd Italian Exhibition, I asked Safelock Limited (the “Locksmith”) to replace the lock on the Safe. A master key and a key blade must be used together in order to access the Safe. A new master key and two new key blades were provided by the Locksmith. I kept one of the key blades and in order to make sure that Ruby also had access to the Safe, I left the master key in the room where the Safe is located and placed the other key blade on the Safe with a note to Ruby telling her that I had replaced the lock. There is now shown to me marked “LCY-19” copies of photographs of the note and the key blade and an invoice issued by the Locksmith for replacing the lock.

…………

54.   On or about 28th January 2014, Gary was dismissed by Progetto and he decided to work for Joy Design (which shared the same office as Progetto as mentioned hereinabove). Because of the deteriorated relationship between himself and Ruby, he no longer could work together with Ruby at the Office. Therefore, I was urgently and desperately looking for a place in order to allow me to move in immediately to continue to conduct my business with minimal disruption and so that Gary could carry on his work effectively for Joy Design. Fortunately, the landlord of the Office knew about my situation and kindly offered to let a vacant unit close to the Office which was also owned by the same landlord. Therefore I accepted the landlord’s offer. I subsequently moved to another unit which was owned by the same landlord in the same building.”

(2)  Gary’s evidence as per his witness statement dated 8 July 2016:

“25. After I returned from the Business Trip in January 2014, I recall going back to the Office on or about 27th January 2014 to return the Finished Items to the Safe and to tidy up the paperwork and prepared the shipping invoices i.e. SI000708-SI000713. Joy was working with me in Office.

26. However, Ruby shouted at me when she came to the Office when she saw me working there. She used her mobile phone to take photos of me without any reason and told me not to show up in the Office anymore. I told Joy that I did not want to stay in the office with Ruby anymore. After that, Joy had asked the landlord's help and rented a unit next to the Office for a month till end of February 2014.

27.   After the termination of my employment with Progetto, I worked for Joy Design until 31st July 2015, also as a salesman.”

55.  In the light of the CCTV evidence, it is indisputable that Joy and Gary did not return the unsold items to the Safe on 27 January 2014.  As shown in the CCTV recording, on 27 January 2014, Gary and Joy entered the Office at 12:34:50 and 14:28:15 respectively. They did not open the Safe and no stock-taking was done. Ruby did not come back to the Office on 27 January 2014 at all.  Accordingly, it would not be possible to return the goods to the Safe in the presence of Ruby on that date.  At the final submission stage, Mr Lee for Ds has accepted that there was no return of the goods to the Safe on 27 January 2014.

56.  Further, as shown in the CCTV evidence, on 28 January 2014, Joy did not return the unsold items to the Safe in the presence of Ruby. On that date, Ruby entered the Office at 11:57:15 and opened the Safe at 11:59:04.  Joy came back at 12:06:18. Ruby left at 12:12:56, and returned at 12:14:25, and then left at 12:15:03.  During the period from 11:57:15 to 12:15:03, Joy or Gary did not enter the room in which the Safe was located.  Joy claimed that the true meaning of the words “in the presence of Ruby” in [50] of her witness statement dated 7 July 2016 was that when she returned the finished products to the Safe, Ruby was at a place inside the Office, but Ruby did not witness the return of the goods to the Safe.  In my judgment, this is a recent invention made up by Joy and is untrue.  Realizing that her evidence in the witness statement is contradicted by the CCTV evidence, Joy made up this excuse to try to save her case.  Joy was unable to tell when she was returning the unsold items to the Safe, Ruby was at which place inside the Office, and why Joy knew that Ruby was at that place at that time.  The plain meaning of the words “in the presence of Ruby” must be being witnessed by Ruby. The excuse told by Joy in the witness box is contrived and cannot be true.

57.  It is most unfortunate that the CCTV did not function in the afternoon on 24 January 2014.  There is no CCTV recording on 28 January 2014 from 13:21:35 to 19:30:20. Joy was the last person who appeared on the screen before the CCTV went off at 13:19:58, and was the first person who appeared on the screen after the CCTV came back at 19:33:45.  As to why the CCTV did not operate in that afternoon, I refrain from making any speculation.  On that date, eventually, Joy and a woman left the Office at 19:45:59.  According to Ds, that woman is Momoko.

58.  I refuse to accept Joy’s and Gary’s evidence in respect of the events on 27 and 28 January 2014 for the following reasons.

59.  First, Joy said that that she should have prepared a list of the unsold items, and Gary also said that that he was trying to complete the “return goods” procedure. They alleged that they were however unable or unwilling to do so because of the conduct of the “emotionally unstable” Ruby. In my view, this allegation is not true.

(1)  As said before, as shown in the CCTV evidence, Ruby did not come back to the Office at all on 27 January 2014.  Hence, there could not be any confrontation between Joy and Gary on the one hand and Ruby on the other hand on that date.

(2)  As shown in the CCTV evidence, the confrontation alleged by Gary in his evidence occurred on 28 January 2014 at about 12:00:08, which lasted for only 34 seconds. During that short period, Gary was working at his desk, and Ruby took out her mobile phone to take photos of Gary.  No sound has been recorded in the CCTV recording, and hence the exchanges between Ruby and Gary during this short period are not known. However, as shown in the CCTV recording, there was no big quarrel between Ruby and Gary. Gary stayed in the Office for at least another hour after the alleged confrontation. Gary remained calm despite being allegedly fired by Ruby. According to Gary, he did not even ask about the details of the dismissal, for example, whether notice period or payment in lieu of notice was to be given. Gary could not be affected by the so-called confrontation.

(3)  Joy mentioned that there was a confrontation between her and Ruby, and as a result, Joy had to leave the Office urgently. The alleged confrontation must have taken place on 28 January 2014, at a time between 12:06:18 and 12:12;56, or at a time between 12:14:25 and 12:15:03.  Ruby and Joy were both in the Office during the aforesaid timeslots. Gary however had no recollection of the alleged confrontation.

(4)  While she was giving evidence in the witness box, Joy claimed that there might be another confrontation concerning firing Gary between her and Ruby in the afternoon on 28 January 2014.  In my judgment, this was a recent invention made up by Joy while she was giving evidence in the witness box.  Joy has never mentioned that there was another confrontation between her and Ruby in the afternoon on 28 January 2014 in all her witness statements. It is inherently improbable that Joy would have failed to mention this “afternoon confrontation” in all her witness statements if there is any truth therein.  According to her, as a result of the confrontation, she had to leave the Office immediately.  So she must have a clear memory of the confrontation, including the time and the persons involved in the confrontation (ie whether the confrontation took place in the presence of Gary and/or some other persons).  There is not a word on this alleged “afternoon confrontation” in all the witness statements made by Joy.

(5)  During the final submission stage, Mr Lee has agreed that that the return of the goods to the Safe did not take place on 27 January 2014, or at any time on 28 January 2014 while the CCTV was functioning.  However, Mr Lee submits that the return of the goods to the Safe occurred in the afternoon on 28 January 2014.  With respect, there is not a word in any of the witness statement of Joy saying that Joy returned the good to the Safe in the afternoon on 28 January 2014, and at that time Ruby was in the Office.

(6)  Joy and Gary in fact had sufficient time to complete “return goods” process on 27 and 28 January 2014.  According to Gary, the entire process could have been completed within 1 to 1.5 days by 2 persons.

60.  Second, there is no reason why Joy did not return all the goods to PJ on 27 January 2014.  Obviously, the goods taken to Italy are valuable assets.  Joy claimed that it was perfectly alright for the stock to be possessed by her personally. She said that, because the stock was possessed by her personally during an exhibition, it was perfectly alright for her to possess the stock after she came back to Hong Kong.  I must say that this is an answer defying common sense.  Given that the goods are valuable assets, the same must be kept in a safe place at all times. Joy in fact went back to the Office on 27 January 2014.  There is no reason why she did not bring back all the goods to the Office at the same time, given that the Office was secured by various security measures. Further, while Joy allegedly lost her key to the Safe, Joy could have called Ruby to open the Safe at any time.

61.  Third, in respect of the allegation made by Joy in her witness statement dated 7 July 2016 that the unsold items were returned to the Safe “in the presence of Ruby”, I have concluded that this is not true, and the explanation given by Joy while she was giving evidence is contrived and untrue.

62.  Ms Catherine Wong and Mr Michael Lee for Ds in their written submissions say that:

(1)  The CCTV evidence shows that after 28 January 2014, Joy had not opened the Safe.  On the contrary, Ruby had opened the Safe and took out the items on numerous occasions after 1 February 2014. On some occasions, Ruby opened the Safe with Jimmy and other non-PJ staff members being present and took items out from the Safe.

(2)  In the circumstances, it would not be fair to hold Joy accountable for the missing finished products, if any.

(3)  Ruby said that on 1 February 2014, she felt that some of the finished products were gone but she made no complaint.  Ruby’s explanation was that she thought Joy took away the finished products for the HKTDC Exhibition. This explanation is not believable, for the HKTDC Exhibition was scheduled to take place in Hong Kong between 5 to 9 March 2014. It would be absurd for Ruby to think that Joy had taken the finished products out of the Safe for the whole of February.  Further, it would be absurd for Ruby to believe that Joy would only take away 316 items to attend the HKTDC Exhibition, leaving 800 odd finished items in the Safe.

(4)  Further, since 1 February 2014, Ruby placed the master key to the Safe at a place other than the usual place so that Joy could not have access to the Safe, so Joy could not have misappropriated the finished items.

(5)  It is also illogical to suggest that Joy misappropriated the finished products, for had Joy intended to misappropriate the finished products after the 2014 Italy Exhibition, Joy would not have come back to place the finished products in the Safe, changed the lock to the Safe and left the new key to Ruby. These acts would be to enable Ruby to access these products rather than to be of any evil purpose.

63.  With respect to Ms Wong and Mr Lee, I am of the view that Joy is not able to derive any assistance from these points.

(1)  As a result of my rejection of Joy’s evidence and Gary’s evidence in respect of the events on 27 and 28 January 2014, there is no evidence before this court showing that Joy indeed has returned all the unsold items to PJ.  Bearing in mind that (a) there were more than 1,100 finished products in the Safe as at 6 January 2014[23]; (b) Joy has taken almost all of the finished products in the Safe to the 2014 Italy Exhibition[24]; (c) 117 items were sold in the 2014 Italy Exhibition[25]; (d) in March 2014, only about 800 finished items were found in the Safe; and (e) no evidence showing that Joy has returned all the unsold items to the Safe, the inevitable conclusion is that Joy must have taken away some of the unsold items.

(2)  Although the CCTV evidence shows that Ruby opened the Safe on several occasions after 1 February 2014, there is no CCTV evidence showing Ruby or anyone together with her has taken away anything from the Office.

(3)  In my view, Ruby did not say that she thought that Joy had taken away the finished products for the HKTDC Exhibition.  Ruby’s evidence is that on 1 February 2014, when she found that many finished products and loose diamonds were missing, she thought that Joy had taken away these items for the exhibition.  In context, the exhibition should be the 2014 Italy Exhibition[26].

(4)  Ruby’s evidence is that she did not hide the master key to the Safe from Joy at any time.  In any event, by the reason stated in subparagraph (1) above, whether Joy could have any access to the Safe would not change the conclusion that she had not returned some of the unsold items to PJ after the 2014 Italy Exhibition.

(5)  Realistically, Joy could not refuse to give the new key to the Safe to Ruby, as Ruby was still a director and a shareholder of PJ.  One may also ask, if Joy has nothing to hide, she could in fact ask Ruby to witness the return of all the unsold items to the Safe, ie to return the goods really in the presence of Ruby.  But Joy did not do so.

64.  In my judgment, based upon the evidence accepted by this court, Joy has misappropriated the 199 unsold items mentioned in the above.

65.  Mr Ng also submits that in respect of loose diamonds, some of these items have also been misappropriated between 6 January 2014 and 13 March 2014.  Mr Ng has prepared the table below showing the quantity of the loose diamonds in PJ’s possession as at 6 January 2014 (the documents mentioned in the table are the relevant invoices, which are the basis of the 6 Jan 2014 Valuation Report) and the quantity found in March 2014 and reported to the police by Ruby:

Stone Cts 
Bundle C2 /442 442-6/7 442-8 442-9/10 442-11 Total Cts Reported (474) Difference
Ruby Round 344.54   0.60   345.14 341.42 -3.72
Princess 17.99   2.08   20.07 17.99 -2.08
Sapphire Round 406.62   0.09
1.39
  408.1 401.67 -6.43
Princess 3.93   1.94   5.87 3.93 -1.94
Pink 2.67       2.67 2.67 0.00
Emerald Round 183.56   0.30   183.86 183.15 -0.71
Princess 2.71   0.49   3.20 2.70 -0.50
          968.91 953.53 -15.38
    Reported loss to police: 15.37 (475)
     
White Dia Princess 4.95 0.85
0.52
0.63   6.95 4.40 -2.55
Round -2 10.85 0.63 3.54 7.54 22.56 35.6 -48.91
Round 2-6   3.76 8.84 18.86 31.46    
Round 6-11   8.69 2.48 5.01 16.18    
Round 11-14   2.24   1.81 4.05    
Round +14     2.19 3.25 5.44    
Round +20       1.58 1.58    
Round +25     1.20 2.04 3.24    
          91.46 40.00 -51.46
              Reported loss to police: 48.43 (475)

66.  In respect of the missing loose diamonds, originally PJ included a claim for some missing black diamonds under this head, but the claim was abandoned in the middle of the trial.  The claim was abandoned because according to the 6 Jan 2014 Valuation Report, the quantity of black diamonds in PJ’s possession should be 109.54 ct.  In the stock-taking exercise conducted on 13 March 2014, the quantity found was 130.97 ct.  In other words, there was an increase in quantity of +21.43 ct.

67.  The quantities of the loose diamonds in PJ’s possession as stated in the 6 Jan 2014 Valuation Report in fact were copied from the information in the documents kept by Ruby.  The example concerning the black diamonds as set out in the paragraph above casts doubt on the accuracy of those documents.  In the premises, I am not satisfied that there is solid evidence proving the claim of misappropriation of the loose diamonds. 

G2. Diverted Jewellery Items and the JD Jewellery Items

68.  The “Diverted Jewellery Items” are the 117 items sold in the 2014 Italy Exhibition.  The difference between the parties is that these items belonging to PJ or JD.  Another issue is whether there are some other jewellery items belonging to JD, ie the alleged JD Jewellery Items.

69.  In my judgment, the Diverted Jewellery Items are PJ’s properties, and JD does not have its own jewellery items.

(1)  According to the Re-Amended Defence of Ds:

“7. [JD] was set up after and because of the Seizure Incident to share the same lines of business as [PJ]. This was in case the Seizure Incident might have any impact on [PJ] and activities in its name. It was agreed between and for the mutual benefit ofRuby and Joy.” (Emphasis added)

During the final submission stage, I have asked Mr Lee the true meaning of this paragraph in the Re-Amended Defence, in particular the meaning of the phrase “for the mutual benefit of Ruby and Joy”. Having taken instructions and having considered the question for some time, Mr Lee told me that he could not answer the question.  In my view, this plea in the Re-Amended Defence clearly supports PJ’s case, ie JD was set up for the purpose of minimizing the impact of the Seizure Incident on PJ, and JD is the agent or nominee of PJ, doing the job of facilitating PJ’s business by shipping out goods in JD’s name for the benefit of PJ.  Bearing in mind that Ruby has no interest in JD at all[27], the plea in the Re-Amended Defence as set out in the above, ie JD is for the mutual benefit of Ruby and Joy, must mean that JD is doing everything for the benefit of PJ.

(2)  In a letter written by Joy’s former solicitors and dated 8 April 2014 (“the 8 Apr 2014 Letter”), the solicitors said:

“2. [JD]

(a) Our client denies that any of [PJ]’s business, employees and business opportunities has been directed to [JD]. As mutually agreed between [Ruby] and [Joy], [JD] has been set up merely to deal with customers and maintain [PJ]’s business solely for the benefit of [PJ].

(b) ……

(c) For the purpose of continuing business with [PJ]’s Italian customers, [Ruby] and [Joy] agreed to set up [JD] to deal with [PJ]’s Italian customers and that all revenue made by [JD] would be diverted back to [PJ].

(d) In addition, the main assets of [PJ] are the jewellery items in [the Safe] (which is now only accessible by [Ruby]) and [JD] does not hold any jewellery items in stock. It is denied that [PJ] has suffered any loss and damage in any event.” (Emphasis added)

What has been stated in this letter clearly supports PJ’s case, ie JD is a mere agent or nominee of PJ, and is doing business solely for the benefit of PJ.

(3)  In response to the question from the court, Joy agreed that the statement in [2(c)] of the 8 Apr 2014 Letter was true as at the date of that letter.

(4)  Gary in his evidence confirmed that the items set out in the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report were PJ’s properties.

(5)  Ds’ case that the Diverted Jewellery Items and JD Jewellery Items are owned by JD cannot be true. This is contradicted by:

(a)  the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report of PJ prepared by Momoko under Joy’s instruction, which includes the Diverted Jewellery Items and the alleged JD Jewellery Items; and

(b)    on 11 April 2014, PJ’s solicitors wrote to Joy’s solicitors and requested for, inter alia, an account for the sale proceeds of the goods sold in the 2014 Italy Exhibition.  On 2 May 2014, Joy’s solicitors replied and said (“the 2 May 2014 Letter”):-

“8. The enclosed invoices have not been settled yet. As your client and [Ruby] are aware, [PJ]’s customers are usually given 3 to 6 months’ time to settle the invoice. Our client will be perfectly ready to account for the sale proceeds once the payment comes in.” (Emphasis added)

The reply is a clear admission that the goods sold in the 2014 Italy Exhibition are PJ’s goods.

(6)  The suggestion that JD owned the items sold in the 2014 Italy Exhibition is contradicted by Gary’s evidence - that the exhibition was “a Business Trip for Progetto”[28].

(7)  Joy’s assertion that the various business trips were undertaken “on behalf of Progetto/Joy Design” was contradicted by Ds’ own evidence:-

(a)  Gary’s own evidence is that those trips were “undertaken on behalf of Progetto”[29].

(b)  The summary produced as “LCY-10” in Joy’s witness statement dated 7 July 2016 is entitled “Progetto: Business Trip and Exhibitions 1/12/2011-30/1/2014”[30].

(c)  Further, as shown in the declaration forms produced by Joy in “LCY-10”, in respect of each and every business trip, the assured covered by the insurance police is PJ and not any other company[31].

70.  I am also of the view that JD is merely PJ’s agent or nominee.  Apart from the evidence as set out in the above, there is further evidence in support of this point:

(1)  From the WhatsApp exchanges between Momoko and Ruby, it is clear that the only asset in the 6 Jan 2014 Valuation Report (said by Joy and Momoko to be the valuation report of both PJ and JD) which is claimed (by Ds) to be JD’s asset is the money in the SCB bank account.  Momoko expressly stated in the Whatsapp exchanges that “不過因為joy話計埋joy d的錢,所以我拎左個結餘”[32].  The purpose of the 6 Jan 2014 Valuation Report is to show the value of Ruby’s 1/3 shareholding in PJ.  There is no reason to include the money in JD’s bank account in the valuation report, unless JD has an accounting obligation to PJ and all the money in JD’s bank account in fact should be given to PJ.

(2)  Some of JD’s invoices were “issued” before its incorporation[33]. All the invoices (not only the pre-incorporation invoices but also the post-incorporation invoices) contain the email address of PJ (and not JD’s email’s address).

(3)  On Ds’ own case, JD would use the Safe in the Office. It is inherently improbable for PJ to allow a competitor such as JD to use PJ’s resources, and it is inherently improbable for Ruby and/or Jimmy to allow this to happen under their noses.  Further, it is inherently improbable that PJ would allow the other competitors to sell their own products in all the business trips paid by PJ, including the 2014 Italy Exhibition.

71.  Ds put forward the following points in their written final submissions:

(1)  the finished goods with numbers starting with the prefix “3-” belonged to JD, and the goods with the prefix “2-” belonged to PJ;

(2)  in the draft list of account receivables prepared by Momoko[34], the entries with “J” belonged to JD.

72.  These points must fail.

(1)  All these points are unpleaded.  Ds are not entitled to take these points in their final submissions.

(2)  Among the Undeclared Items, there are items with prefix “3-”.  The Undeclared Items occurred prior to the incorporation of JD. It would not be possible for any of the Undeclared Item being JD’s property.

(3)  The claim that a product with prefix “2-” belonging to PJ is contradicted by Ds’ own case.  In item 3.24 of the Scott Schedule, in respect of a product with prefix “2-”, Ds assert that the product is JD’s property.

(4)  There are goods with prefix “3-” on the invoices which pre-dated the incorporation of Joy Design[35].

(5)  When the 2 May 2014 Letter was shown to Joy during cross-examination (in which Joy’s solicitors said that JD was “perfectly ready” to account for the sale of the Diverted Jewellery Items), Joy disowned the letter by saying that, at that time, she did not have sufficient documentary evidence to ascertain whether the Diverted Jewellery Items belonged to JD. However, the corresponding invoices were attached to the letter, in which some products with the prefix “3-” were set out.  Joy in fact could notice that some of the “3-” items (allegedly owned by JD) were among the Diverted Jewellery Items.

(6)  Momoko in her evidence claimed that the “3-” items with 6 digits belonged to JD, and the “3-” items with 8 digits might or might not belong to JD. There is however no “3-” items with 6 digits in the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report.

(7)  As regards the draft list of account receivables[36], Joy in fact in her 3rd affirmation admitted that that was a draft list of receivables of PJ[37]. The “J” point must be false, as (a) some of the pre-invoices issued before the incorporation of JD also have the “J” remark[38]; and (b) some of the invoices relating to the Diverted Jewellery Items sold during the 2014 Italy Exhibition (owned by JD according to Ds’ case) do not have the “J” remark[39].

73.  In their written opening submissions and written final submissions, counsel for Ds argue that even if JD is PJ’s agent or nominee, JD and Joy should not be liable to PJ in respect of the 117 Diverted Jewellery Items by reason of the principle set out in Re Duomatic Ltd[40] (“the Duomatic principle”).  The law in relation to the Duomatic principle has been summarized by Harris J in Tam Po Kei v Tam Bo Kin (No 1)[41], in which the learned judge said:

“67. ………… An act that would have been authorised if directors and shareholders had been alive to the need for formal approval by the board or the company, but was not, can be treated as approved and therefore lawful by virtue of the Duomatic principle. It was explained by Neuberger J (as he then was) in EIC Services Ltd v Phipps [2003] BCC 931 at paragraph 121 and 122 in the following way:

“121. This principle, on which the first and second defendants rely, is named after Re Duomatic Ltd [1969] 2 Ch 365, and it has been expressed in slightly different ways in different cases. In Duomatic itself, Buckley J said at p.373:

‘[W]here it can be shown that all shareholders who have a right to attend and vote at a general meeting of the company assent to some matter which a general meeting of the company could carry into effect, that assent is as binding as a resolution in general meeting would be.’

In Parker & Cooper Ltd v Reading [1926] Ch 975, the principle was expressed in these terms by Astbury J at p.984:

‘[W]here the transaction is intra vires and honest … it cannot be upset if the assent of all the corporators is given to it. I do not think it matters in the least whether that assent is given at different times or simultaneously.’

More recently Meagher JA in Herman v Simon (1990) 8 ACLC 1094 at p.1096 described the principle as:

‘a doctrine that formalities may be disregarded if they have been waived by all shareholders acting in concert who want the same substantial result.’

122. Although the principle has been characterised in somewhat different ways in different cases, I do not consider that that is because its nature or extent is in doubt or the subject of debate. The difference in language is attributable of the fact that the principle will have been expressed by reference to the particular facts of the case. The essence of the Duomatic principle, as I see it, is that, where the articles of a company require a course to be approved by a group of shareholders at a general meeting, that requirement can be avoided if all members of the group, being aware of the relevant facts, either give their approval to that course, or so conduct themselves as to make it inequitable for them to deny that they have given their approval. Whether the approval is given in advance or after the event, whether it is characterised as agreement, ratification, waiver, or estoppel, and whether members of the group give their consent in different ways at different times, does not matter.” (Emphasis added)

74.  With respect to Ms Wong and Mr Lee, I am of the view that Ds cannot derive any assistance from the Duomatic principle.  The basis of the Duomatic principle is the informed consent of all the shareholders of the company.  The Duomatic principle has never been raised in the pleadings. There has been no filing of evidence and no discovery in relation to the factual matters relevant to the operation of the Duomatic principle.  In these circumstances, JD is not allowed to rely upon the Duomatic principle in these proceedings.

75.  Further, as a matter of fact, there was no unanimous consent from PJ’s shareholders.  No one has ever paid anything to Jimmy to buy out Jimmy’s shareholding in PJ.  At all times, Jimmy is a shareholder of PJ, and he has never consented to the diversion.  Clearly, there is no room for the operation of the Duomatic principle.

G3. JD’s counterclaim

76.  As to JD’s counterclaim for reimbursements of some purchases made by it for PJ[42], JD’s claims that the invoices produced by Joy in “LCY-3” in her witness statement dated 7 July 2016 are evidence in support of this claim.  However, for the reasons set out in the above, I am of the view that JD is merely PJ’s agent and nominee, and JD in fact does not have its own business or asset.  In the premises, any money paid by JD to the suppliers must be funds belonging to PJ.  In my judgment, this counterclaim must fail.

77.  JD has also made a counterclaim for some jewellery items, loose diamonds, gold and white alloy allegedly owned by JD[43].  I have found that the JD Jewellery Items are not JD’s properties but are PJ’s properties.  In respect of the loose diamonds, gold and white alloy claimed by JD, even if these items are purchased by JD, since JD is merely PJ’s agent and nominee and does not have its own business or asset, the purchase money in fact is from the funds belonging to PJ.  Accordingly, PJ is the beneficial owner of these items.  This counterclaim must also fail.

G4. Unaccounted Sales

78.  Ms Wong and Mr Lee in their written final submissions argue that there are several problems in the PJ’s theory.

79.  First, they submit that there is double counting in Jimmy’s valuation done in October 2012.  They submit that Jimmy used the Warehouse Balance Report as at 11 October 2012 as a starting point. However, Jimmy also added all production orders of October 2012 without distinguishing between those that were already included in the said Warehouse Balance Report and those that were not. Thus, there is double-counting. Further, some production orders have been double counted[44].  They also submit that some jewellery items were for repair works and not for production.  These should not be included in the valuation exercise[45].

80.  With respect to counsel, I am of the view that they are not entitled to take the double counting point in their final submissions.  It is trite that if a party wishes to suggest the evidence of a witness is wrong for some reason, procedural fairness requires that the witness’s attention should have been directed to it by questions put in cross-examination and the witness be given a chance to explain[46].  In any event, prior notice must be given to that witness, so that he would have an opportunity to respond to the criticism made against him.  The double counting point has not been raised in the pleadings, and that point has not been put to Jimmy during cross-examination.  No prior notice of that point has been given to Jimmy, and Jimmy does not have an opportunity to reply to that point.  It would not be fair for Ds to take the point in the final submission stage.

81.  Further, I agree with Mr Ng and accept his submissions that the calculation as shown in the PJ’s theory is correct.  In fact, generous assumptions have been made in favour of Joy and JD in the calculation.

(1)  In relation to the work orders, these came from one of the workshops only. However, Joy had requested PJ not to work with this workshop since September 2013, and had arranged PJ to work with other workshops. The fact that PJ only relied on the work orders arising out of this one workshop means that the claimed sum total is probably less than the actual amount of finished items.

(2)  PJ added up the income figures in the monthly bank statements from October 2012 to March 2014.  In doing so, to give Joy and JD the benefit of the doubt, PJ treated any unidentified or unidentifiable payments into the bank account as income arising from sales.

(3)  Historically, PJ’s yearly revenue in 2010-2011 and in 2011-2012 exceeded HK$20 million in each financial year.  Following the calculation as set out in subparagraph (2) above, the received proceeds from October 2012 to March 2014 were in the sum of around HK$5.25 million only.

(4)  According to the draft list of PJ’s account receivables prepared by Momoko[47] and mentioned in Joy’s evidence, PJ’s account receivables in 2013 exceeded HK$11 million.

(5)  All these lend support to the Unaccounted Sales in PJ’s claim.

82.  Second, counsel for Ds submit that Jimmy has wrongly assumed that all of PJ’s income would be revealed in the bank statements.  In their submissions, PJ’s customers would often pay cash to PJ, and the amount of cash income is substantial.  Ms Wong and Mr Lee rely upon the reduction in the accounts payable between 31 August 2012 and 11 October 2012, ie from HK$7,238,106 to HK$3,899,396.61 in Jimmy’s calculation to support their point.  Ms Wong and Mr Lee submit that this large reduction must be due to the fact that PJ has used the cash received from the customers to pay off the receivables.

83.  I am unable to accept these submissions.

(1)  The cash receipt point has not been raised in the pleadings and in the witness statements filed by Ds.  As a result, there has not been any discovery on this issue, and PJ did not have any opportunity to prepare evidence to meet this point before the commencement of the trial. As a matter of procedural fairness, Ds are not entitled to take this point at the final submission stage.

(2)  As said before, while there is any conflict between the evidence given by Ruby and Jimmy on the one hand and the evidence given by Ds’ witnesses, I prefer the former.  According to Jimmy’s evidence, 50% of the proceeds were received directly via PJ’s bank account, 45% of the proceeds were received via overseas wire transfer (cash receipt overseas but wired to PJ’s bank in Hong Kong due to foreign exchange control; this way of receipt was confirmed by Gary); only 5% was received directly by way of cash.

(3)  In accordance with common and commercial sense, any substantial amount in cash received by PJ would be deposited into PJ’s bank account as soon as practicable. It would be inherently improbable for PJ not to do so, given that there is always a risk of theft.

(4)  Joy claimed that even US$300,000, ie more than HK$2 million, would be stored in the Safe. In my view, this is inherently improbable. Joy’s reasons for not depositing huge sum into the bank and keeping the same in the Safe are unsound:

(a)  Joy claimed that there was a limit (presumably daily limit) in relation to cash deposit. This is a bare assertion not supported by any other evidence.  Further, there is evidence showing that it was possible to deposit HK$370,000 into the bank in a day in December 2013[48].  As a matter of arithmetic, PJ could deposit at least HK$1.85 million into the bank account in a week (5 working days).

(b)  Joy claimed that it took a lot of time to queue up in banks in Hung Hom. Given the amount of cash involved, this excuse is incapable of being believed.

(5)  Gary did not say he had ever witnessed piles of cash notes in the Safe.  He merely said that at one time, he saw a brown envelope inside the Safe.  He could not tell what was inside the envelope.

(6)  Momoko’s petty cash record[49] undermines Joy’s case. There was only 1 cash receipt apparently from a customer, namely HK$5,287 on 30 September 2012. The 2 other “cash” injections on 31 October and 20 November 2012 (in respect of these 2 entries, in each entry, the description is “Cash”, and the amount is HK$10,000) cannot be cash receipt from a customer given the way the items were described.

(7)  As to the reduction of PJ’s account payables from HK$7.23 million on 31 August 2012 to HK$3.89 million on 11 October 2012, Ds are not entitled to rely upon this to support the cash receipt point. As said before, the cash receipt point is unpleaded.  There is no plea in Ds’ pleadings suggesting that the reduction of account payables is due to settlement by cash.  Ds are not entitled to raise this allegation at the trial. Further, there is no evidence showing that the reduction in account payables is due to settlement by cash.  There are other possibilities, for example, the suppliers might have waived or discounted some of the outstanding bills due to PJ’s subsequent bulk purchases.  In the absence of any relevant evidence, one cannot definitely tell the reason of the reduction in the account payables.

84.  Third, counsel for Ds submit that Jimmy’s calculation did not take into account any account receivables as at March 2014, which would reduce the alleged unaccounted receivables.  In my view, Ds cannot derive much assistance from this point.  In the 2 May 2014 Letter, Ds’ solicitors stated that PJ would have a credit period of 3 to 6 months to settle the invoices.  Gary in his evidence mentioned that PJ would stop doing business with non-paying customers.  Further, as shown in PJ’s audited accounts, PJ only had a bad debt of HK$636 in the financial year ending on 31 August 2011, and had no bad debt in the financial year ending on 31 August 2012. Taking into account all these, nearly all account receivables as at March 2014 should become actual income received by PJ by about September 2014.  However, the evidence shows that after checking all PJ’s bank statements up to May 2017, the figure of the accounts sales is still HK$5,253,044.06 as suggested in the PJ theory.  Thus, the unaccounted receivables suggested in the PJ’s theory cannot be explained or reduced by the point taken by Ms Wong and Mr Lee.

85.  Fourth, Ms Wong and Mr Lee submit that the profit margin of 30% adopted by Jimmy is inflated.  Jimmy explained the 30% profit margin in his supplemental witness statement and said:

“14. Returning now to explain how I arrived at an average profit margin of 30%, I should start by highlighting that there is no simple or standard profit margin, whether within this industry or within Progetto itself. This is because in this industry, we purchase precious stones and divide them into different grades. The best quality stones will be sold to important clients and the remaining ones will be sold to general clients. The profit margin of each item sold however does not solely depend on the quality of the stones, but also depends more on who the client is. Therefore, wholesale clients who purchase in bulk would get a greater discount, whereas retail or first-time clients will get a smaller or even no discount for the purchase. Hence, there is no standard profit margin for the sale of a particular type of jewellery item and it is difficult to calculate the profit for each individual item. Therefore, it is more fair and reasonable to use an overall average profit to calculate Progetto’s loss of profit suffered. Moreover, in calculating such an overall average profit, there can be no general expert to calculate such figure, and one can only on a mix of business commercial sense as well as past historic figures.

15. Joy and I were responsible for the finance of Progetto since the company’s incorporation in August 2009 until I ceased to be a director in October 2012. After I ceased to be a director of Progetto, I verily believe that Joy was solely in charge of the finance of Progetto (see paragraph 7(3) of the Re-ASOC and paragraphs 29 and 30 of my Witness Statement).

16. Based on the figures in the Income Statements in Progetto’s Audited Financial Reports for the year 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 prepared by Sharon Cheung & Co. and the Income Statement in Progetto’s Audited Financial Report for the year 2011-2012 prepared by Adams Miller CPA Limited (see Item 84 of Progetto’s List of Documents filed on 12 February 2016), I have worked out Progetto’s gross profit margin percentage for sale of jewellery items and the details are set out in the table below:

Financial Year Total Revenue Gross Profit Gross Profit Margin %

(Gross Profit/Total Revenue x 100%)
29.07.2009 to 31.08.2010 $13,188,959 $2,322,719 17.61%
($2,322,719/$13,188,959 x 100%)
01.09.2010 to 31.08.2011 $25,891,713.40 $3,033,679.68 11.72%
($25,891,713.40/$3,033,679.68 x 100%)
01.09.2011 to 31.08.2012 $23,551,516 $5,998,393 25.47%
($23,551,516/$5,998,393 x 100%)

17.  There are now produced and shown to me marked “CKYJ-3” copies of Income Statements extracted from the Audited Financial Reports of Progetto for the years 2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012, which are dated 30 September 2011, 2 May 2012 and 31 December 2012 respectively.

18.  In the first year of business of Progetto, the directors took a more conservative approach with the company’s expenses as we were uncertain how the business would perform. As shown in the table above, Progetto achieved a gross profit margin of 17.61% in its first year of business. 

19.  In the second year of operation, the directors were more confident with the company’s revenue and how to manage the business, and so we increased the expenditure in marketing and promotion (including expenses for attending local and overseas jewellery exhibitions). In anticipation of an increase in jewellery orders, Progetto had also made more purchases of loose stones for production. Due to the increase in the overall business expenses, the profit margin in the second year had dropped slightly to 11.72%, but the turnover had substantially been increased by almost 100%.

20.  In the third year of business, Progetto’s marketing expenses and costs for purchasing loose stones had become stable. Moreover, Progetto has already developed its client base and was getting regular orders from its clients. For these reasons, the profit margin has gone up to 25.47% in the third year where the turnover figure has remained stable. I consider that Progetto was still in the development stage in the first 2 years of its business and its business has started running smoothly and is strengthening in the third year.

21.  Accordingly, I anticipate that Progetto would be able to achieve a profit margin of least 25% in the following years and continue to increase but for the Seizure Incident, Joy’s Misappropriation of Assets and Diversion of Business. Based on the profit margin of sales in the financial years 2010, 2011 and 2012, I verily believe that the profit margin for sales in 2013 and 2014 would not be less than 30%.”

86.  Counsel for Ds submits that Jimmy has no actual understanding of the term “B Costs” on the Warehouse Balance Reports, and has no qualification to give an opinion of the profit margin. Jimmy also accepted that different products should have different profit margins.  Counsel for Ds submit that Jimmy’s evidence on the profit margin is unreliable.  Further, Jimmy ignored the fact that after his leaving from the directorship in PJ, he took away the Australian customers of PJ and that had a negative impact on PJ’s business development.

87.  I note that the evidence shows that after Jimmy leaving his directorship in PJ, PJ in fact maintained to have Australian customers.  There is no reliable evidence before me showing whether Jimmy’s departure from PJ actually has an adverse impact on PJ’s business, and if yes, to what extent.  Further, I note that in JD’s counterclaim for the value of the JD Jewellery Items, JD has adopted 50% as the profit margin of those items[50].  Joy in her evidence confirmed that a profit margin of 50% could be used in calculation.  Obviously, Ds must be bound by Joy’s evidence.  In these circumstances, I am of the view that Ds cannot criticize the 30% profit margin adopted by Jimmy in his evidence.  In my view, Jimmy’s evidence on the profit margin is based unable a reasonable and sound analysis.  I accept Jimmy’s evidence on the issue of profit margin.

88.  After hearing Joy’s evidence, PJ has applied for leave to amend its statement of claim to adopt 50% as the profit margin as an alternative case, and leave was granted.  Joy has not explained why she would adopt a profit margin of 50% in calculating the selling prices of the jewellery items.  In my view, it would be prudent and safe to adopt the 30% profit margin mentioned by Jimmy in his evidence, which is based upon a reasoned analysis.

89.  I accept the Unaccounted Sales as set out in the PJ’s Theory.

G5. Conclusion on the PJ’s theory

90.  Having examined the evidence, I find that the PJ’s theory is proved.  However, for the reasons set out in Part I in this judgment, the figures in the PJ’s theory should be those set out in the table in [101] below.

H.   HKTDC EXHIBITION

91.  The HKTDC Exhibition was held on 5 to 9 March 2020.

92.  PJ’s claim against Joy is this:

(1)  Before 2014, PJ had been attending the HKTDC Exhibition for 3 or 4 consecutive years. As a result of its continuous participation, PJ earned from the HKTDC priority placing in booth allocation for the 2014 HKTDC Exhibition.

(2)  Joy was responsible for representing PJ in attending and preparing the 2014 HKTDC Exhibition.

(3)  PJ paid a sum of HK$93,098.60 as deposit to the HKTDC for the 2014 HKTDC Exhibition.

(4)  PJ failed to attend the HKTDC Exhibition from 5 March 2014 to 9 March 2014.  As a result, the deposit paid was forfeited by HKTDC.

(5)  PJ’s failure in attending the 2014 HKTDC Exhibition is solely due to the fault of Joy.  Accordingly, Joy is liable to PJ in respect of the loss and damage suffered by PJ in failing to attend the 2014 HKTDC Exhibition.

93.  Joy’s defence is that she did not attend the 2014 HKTDC exhibition because she did not have the jewellery items at the material time.  As a result of the “Access Procedure”[51] adopted by Ruby and the taking away of the master key to the Safe by Ruby, Joy was preventing from entering the Office and could not get the jewellery items in the Safe, and hence, she could not on behalf of PJ attended the 2014 HKTDC Exhibition.  Joy said that Ruby should attend the 2014 HKTDC Exhibition on behalf of PJ.

94.  I refuse to accept Joy’s case on this issue.

(1)  First, Ruby is not the person handling exhibitions in PJ.  In fact, Joy knew that Ruby would not be able to attend the exhibition on behalf of PJ before the opening of the exhibition, as evidenced by the 2 May 2014 Letter written by Joy’s solicitors.  In that letter, Joy’s solicitors said

“13.  …… As a matter of fact, our client did inform the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (“HKTDC”) that the Company was unable to attend prior to the show ……” (Emphasis added)

(2)  Second, as to the alleged exclusion, Ruby’s evidence shows that the “Access Procedure” was implemented on 19 March 2014 or at a time shortly thereafter[52]. There is no evidence from Joy disputing this.  As a matter of fact, the “Access Procedure” was only in place after the conclusion of the HKTDC Exhibition.  Joy was able to enter the Office at any time before the conclusion of the exhibition.

(3)  Even under the “Access Procedure”, Joy may enter the Office if she is accompanied by either Ruby or Jimmy.  The averment of exclusion of Joy from the Office is inconsistent with Joy’s admission in her solicitors’ letter dated 2 May 2014 that Joy did not “want to” go back to the Office[53].

(4)  As regards the assertion that Ruby took away the “master key” in February 2014, Ruby’s evidence is that the master key was placed on her desk[54].  In any event, Joy accepted that she could have (but did not) called Ruby to ask for the master key.

95.  Counsel for Ds submit that according to Ruby’s evidence, Ruby learned about Joy’s absence on the first date of the 2014 HKTDC Exhibition.  Ruby could have contacted Joy or made any other arrangements, but Ruby did not do so.  However, no plea of contributory negligence has been made, and it has not been explored during the trial whether realistically Ruby could do anything to salvage the situation after knowing PJ’s absence in the exhibition.

96.  I hold that Joy is liable to PJ under this head.  Mr Ng submits that PJ’s loss can be quantified by adopting the “reliance measure”[55]. I agree.  As a result of Joy’s fault, HKTDC has forfeited the deposit. In my judgment, Joy shall repay the deposit plus interest thereon to PJ.

97.  PJ also claims that as a result of Joy’s fault, PJ has suffered loss of goodwill and reputation generally, and loss of the right to claim for priority placing in booth allocation for future HKTDC jewellery exhibitions.  However, in respect of these losses, there is no evidence showing the relevant quantum of damages.  I am unable to award a sum to PJ as damages in respect of these losses.

I.  THE GIA DIAMONDS

98.  PJ claims that during the period from 11 December 2012 to 10 May 2013, Joy on behalf of PJ purchased 7 pieces of GIA certified diamonds, which were all paid for by PJ at the sum of HK$180,521.65. Among these 7 GIA diamonds, 5 of them became finished items and went missing.  The remaining 2 were sold to Gary’s father for around HK$113,191.61, and Joy has failed to account for the proceeds.

99.  Joy’s case is that in respect of the finished items with 3 of the GIA Certified Diamonds (Nos: 2146732269. 1149739999 and 5146418026), the sale proceeds in the sum of HK$109,370 have been paid into PJ’s bank account, as evidenced by the note written down by Joy on PJ’s bank statement for May 2013[56]. As to the remaining 5 GIA diamonds, Joy denies that she has misappropriated these items or the corresponding sale proceeds.  Joy claims that she is unable to produce documents in support as she has been excluded from PJ.

100.  In the light of the note on PJ’s bank statement for May 2013, I am prepared to accept that part of the sale proceeds of the 7 GIA Diamonds, ie HK$109,370, has been paid into PJ’s bank account.  However, there is no evidence showing that apart from this sum, the other sale proceeds concerning the 7 GIA Diamonds have been given to PJ.  In the light of the note made by Joy on PJ’s bank statement for May 2013, if the remaining sale proceeds have been returned to PJ, there must be some other documents containing Joy’s handwritten notes recording the said return of funds.  Joy must know that she has written down the relevant records on what documents.  If PJ has not disclosed those documents in these proceedings, Joy should have made an application for specific discovery.  However, as a matter of fact, no application for specific discovery has ever been made by Joy.  I refuse to accept Joy’s evidence in relation to the return of the remaining sale proceeds to PJ.  In my judgment, Joy is liable to PJ in relation to these sale proceeds.

101.  In relation to the HK$109,370, I agree with Mr Ng that the fact that this sum has been returned to PJ does not affect PJ’s overall claim.  This only means that out of the HK$5,253,044.06 accounted sales, HK$109,370 has to be deducted, and PJ’s claim for the Unaccounted Sales would increase accordingly.

Description Sale Price (HK$)
Jewellery items from October 2012 to 31 December 2013 $24,200,770.39
Less: Closing stock as at March 2014 ($6,026,824.27)
Stock to be Accounted$18,173,946.12
Less: Seized items ($2,095,839.75)
Less: Accounted sales ($5,253,044.06
-$109,370)
Remaining Stock to be Accounted$10,825,062.31
+ $109,370
Less: Missing Jewelleries (excluding loose diamonds) ($2,778,698.33)
Unaccounted sales $8,046,363.98
+ $109,370

J.  CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

102.  PJ’s case under this head is that Joy has wrongfully taken away the Laptop Computer and PJ’s documents.  PJ says that this is an indisputable fact.: see Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim, [45A]; the 2 May 2014 Letter[57] and the 8 Apr 2014 Letter[58].

103.  PJ is the owner of these documents and information, which include customer contact information stored in hard drives, sales invoices, supplier invoices, consignment invoices, jewellery designs and photographs, quotations to customers, price list, PIN device for PJ’s bank account, cheque book, bank statements and vouchers, production order record, PJ’s notebook computer with confidential financial and sales data and passwords to the same, and the key blade to PJ’s safe.  All these are confidential information[59].

104.  Following repeated demands, Joy only returned the notebook computer (locked with a password unknown to PJ), a blank invoice book, a blank cheque book and a few pages of production order sheets to PJ’s accountant, Adams Miller CPA Ltd (“Adams Miller”). Joy failed to account for or return the other missing items.

105.  Joy’s case is that on 11 June 2014, she returned to PJ (through Adams Miller) the Laptop Computer and various documents, including originals of ledgers, sales and purchase invoices, account receivables/payables records and bank statements.

106.  Both Joy and Gary alleged that everyone in PJ knew that the password was “1234”, and Ruby should have no problem in accessing the information in the Laptop Computer.  This must be untrue.  As a matter of fact, for the purpose of complying an order for specific discovery made against Ds by the court on 7 February 2017, Ds and P attended a meeting in the office of FTI Consulting on 10 February 2017.  Only with the assistance of FTI Consulting, some documents in the Laptop Computer were retrieved[60].  If the documents in the Laptop Computer could easily be accessed by inputting the password “1234”, the parties would have no need to engage a professional company to get the documents stored in the computer.  Further, only some documents in the Laptop Computer could be retrieved even with the assistance of a professional company.  The remaining documents in the computer are inaccessible.

107.  Further, it is clear that Joy did not return the originals of ledgers, sales and purchase invoices, records of account receivable/payables and bank statements to PJ through Adam Miller, who only received “documents of ‘Progetto’ and a notebook computer”, but there was not any ledger, books and records, and sales and purchases invoices among the PJ’s documents.  This is shown in the email from Adams Miller to PJ dated 17 June 2014.

108.  As a result of the non-return of the originals of ledgers, sales and purchase invoices, records of account receivables/payables and bank statements to PJ, PJ has been unable to complete and file its tax return to the Inland Revenue Department (“IRD”).  As a result, the IRD has imposed a penalty on PJ for being unable to file its tax return and for late payment of the assessed tax since 2013.  The penalty for the year 2013-2014 was HK$16,602 and the penalty for 2014-2015 was HK$237.  The total amount of penalty that PJ has paid is HK$16,839.  PJ has made payment of tax and penalty for year 2014-15 in the amount of HK$4,987 on 28 October 2016.

109.  On 1 March 2017 and 14 August 2017, the IRD has issued notices to Hang Seng Bank to request payment of the outstanding tax and penalties from PJ’s bank account. A total amount of HK$38,967.1 was deducted.

110.  In my judgment, Joy is liable to reimburse PJ all these with interest.

K.  THE SEIZURE INCIDENT

111.  The occurrence of the Seizure Incident itself is not in dispute.  The difference between the parties is whether Joy should be liable to PJ in this incident.  Details of the Seizure Incident are as follows:

(1)  In around January 2013, Joy attended the 2013 Italy Exhibition on behalf of PJ. Joy brought along 1080 jewellery items of PJ (“Cleared Items”) from Hong Kong to display in the 2013 Italy Exhibition.

(2)  On or about 15 January 2013, Joy and Gary arrived at London Heathrow airport and declared the Cleared Items at the UK Custom.

(3)  On the same day, ie 15 January 2013, Joy and Gary arranged to meet up a South American customer outside the London Heathrow airport, namely Edmar Jewelry, to collect 243 units of jewelleries (ie the Undeclared Items). The Undeclared Items were previously on consignment with Edmar Jewelry.

(4)  After collecting the Undeclared Items, Joy and Gary travelled to Italy by connecting flights from London. On arrival at Vicenza on 15 January 2013, Joy and Gary failed to declare the Undeclared Items at the Vicenza Customs in Italy.

(5)  Further, on or before 22 January 2013, Joy and Gary mixed up the Undeclared Items with the Cleared Items and displayed both sets of items in the 2013 Italy Exhibition.

(6)  On 22 January 2013, the Vicenza Customs visited PJ’s in the exhibition and seized the Undeclared Items, on the basis that these items were imported to Italy contrary to the Italian law.

112.  PJ claims that Joy is liable to PJ in respect of the loss and damage suffered by PJ in the Seizure Incident.  According to PJ’s case, Joy has breached the duties owed by her as a PJ’s director to PJ by:

(1)  failing to check and comply with the local customs requirements when bringing the Undeclared Items to Italy;

(2)  mixing up the Undeclared Items and the Cleared Items and displaying both at the exhibition;

(3)  failing to effect adequate insurance cover in respect of the loss or seizure of the Undeclared Items; and

(4)  failing to take prompt and reasonable steps to recover the Undeclared Items from the Italian authorities;

(5)  failing to diligently follow up with the Italian lawyers for the recovery of the Undeclared Items; and

(6)  failing to diligently report to PJ’s board of directors on the progress of the work of the Italian lawyers.

113.  Mr Ng submits:-

(1)  Joy should have declared the Undeclared Items upon arrival in Italy. It does not make sense that the “consigned” items collected in London does not need to be declared when Joy is travelling from London to Italy, as Joy would need to bring them back to Hong Kong, the items she was bringing back must match the exact number of items on the Carnet (which only includes the 1080 items she brought to London then Italy).

(2)  Joy should not have displayed the Undeclared Items in the exhibition.  As explained in a letter from PJ to the customs dated 23 January 2013 (which is prepared by Joy):

“We sincerely apologize that the sale team were in a hurry to get their connecting flights to Italy on the same day morning, they were completely forgot to declare these 243 items to the custom and even worst, they had mixed up these 243 items in the proper items of the carnet during the show.”

(3)  What has been done by Joy is contrary to the Italian law, and this is confirmed by the decision of the judicial authority in Italy.  In fact, Joy admitted in her evidence that she had not taken any Italian legal prior to the seizure of those items.

(4)  Joy was responsible for taking out insurance. The 1080 Cleared Items were insured, but the Undeclared Items were not. Looking at the relevant insurance document from Canny Insurance Brokers Limited (“Canny”)[61], the insurance only covered the 1080 Declared Items and not the Undeclared Items.

(5)  The seizure cannot be “unpredictable” as pleaded by Joy. As confirmed by the decision made by the judicial authority in Italy, bringing those items into Italy without any declaration to the customs is contrary to the Italian law.

(6)  The email correspondence between Joy and the Italian lawyers retained by her shows that Joy was not acting expediently and carefully in assisting the lawyers to recover the Seized Items.  On 11 February 2013, the lawyers asked Joy to provide “additional documents concerning the relationship between your company and the Mexican client”[62].  However, in the email dated 2 March 2013, the lawyers told Joy that the Court of Vicenza “decided not to give the goods back”, because (among other grounds) “the “Mexican client” issue was not detailed enough in order to be considered as “decisive” for the judgment”[63].

114.  Having read the email exchanges between Joy and the Italian lawyers and the documents from the Office of Customs of Vicenza to PJ, it is clear that bringing the Undeclared Items into Italy without declaring them to the customs is regarded by the judicial authority in Italy, ie the Court of Vicenza, as a matter contrary to the Italian law.  I have to give considerable weight to this finding made by the Italian judicial authority[64].  Joy is negligent in bringing those items into Italy without declaring them to the customs in Italy.  Further, Joy is negligent in failing to obtain any Italian legal advice before bringing those items to Italy without declaration.

115.  Joy claimed that the insurance issued by Canny[65] covered the Undeclared Items.  I do not accept this claim.  Looking at the insurance document, the insurance covers the voyage from Hong Kong to Italy via Spain from 14 January 2013 to 18 January 2013, and the voyage from Italy to Hong Kong from 25 January 2013 to 26 January 2013.  No voyage via London is mentioned in the insurance document.  In my judgment, Joy is also negligent in failing to purchase an insurance policy concerning the Undeclared Items.

116.  As to the assistance given by Joy to the Italian lawyers, I accept Mr Ng’s submission that Joy has failed to act expediently. However, there is no evidence before me showing that had Joy acted expediently in assisting the Italian lawyers, there would have had been a material change in the Seizure Incident.

117.  Notwithstanding what I have said in [116] above, by reason of the matters set out in [114] and [115], I am satisfied that the loss and damage suffered by PJ in the Seizure Incident is caused by the negligence of Joy, and Joy is liable to pay damages to PJ as a result.

118.  I note that the Office of Customs of Vicenza, by their letter dated 9 November 2018, informed PJ that PJ might redeem the Undeclared Items by paying the value of those goods assessed at €78,149.97 and customs duties of €18,775.52.  Ds have not pleaded in their pleadings that PJ should redeem these items to minimize the loss.  In any event, Ruby in her evidence said that PJ decided not to redeem the Undeclared Items, because the market value of the Undeclared Items had depreciated since the seizure, for those items were no longer fashionable in November 2018. In November 2018, those goods were worth less than the penalty imposed by the Italian customs.  I have no reason to doubt Ruby’s explanation.

119.  Had the Undeclared Items been properly declared when they were brought to Italy, those items would have had been sold in the 2014 Italy Exhibition or shortly thereafter.  There is no reason for PJ keeping them and not put them to sale.  Accordingly, the loss and damage suffered by PJ in the Seizure Incident would be the sale price of the Undeclared Items, which should be costs plus a profit margin of 30%.

120.  PJ also claims that they have lost goodwill in the Seizure Incident, and some customers have ceased to purchase goods from PJ after the Seizure Incident.  As to these losses, there is no evidence proving the quantum of the corresponding damages.  I would not make an award for these losses.

L.   UNAUTHORIZED WITHDRAWALS

121.  The parties’ respective cases under this head are set out in the first section of the Scott Schedule.  During the trial, PJ decided not to pursue some of the items under this head.  The remaining items in dispute and the parties’ respective positions on these items are as follows:


 
IssuePJ’s positionJoy’s position
Unauthorised Withdrawals
 
1 Whether or not Joy made unauthorised withdrawals from the bank account of PJ as follows:  
1.1 Cheque 891857 Not pursued 
1.2 Cheque 891860 Not pursued 
1.3 Cheque 891859Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$5,363.80 withdrawn on or about 5.12.2012 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 891859 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$5,363.80
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 891859. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to Joy for the reimbursement of the PJ’s sundry expenses.

Quantum: n/a
1.4 Cheque 891856Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$1,296 withdrawn on or about 6.12.2012 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 891856 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$1,296
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 891856. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to Prudential Hong  Kong Limited for the PJ’s traveling insurance reference no. 900009552231).

Quantum: n/a
1.5 Cheque 121066Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$5,809 withdrawn on or about 18.12.2012 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 121066 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$5,809
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 121066. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to Ruby.

Quantum: n/a
1.6 Cheque 121073Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$32,094.66 withdrawn on or about 19.12.2012 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 121073 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$32,094.66
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 121073. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses of the PJ (car rental expenses for business trips).

Quantum: n/a
1.7 Cheque 121088Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$4,418.04 withdrawn on or about 21.1.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 121088 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$4,418.04
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 121088. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses of the PJ (air tickets, train tickets and postages for business trips).

Quantum: n/a
1.8 Cheque 193959Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$22,521.66 withdrawn on or about 18.2.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 193959 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$22,521.66
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 193959. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses of the PJ (hotel fees and other expenses for business trips).

Quantum: n/a
1.9 PJ’s company visa Not pursued 
1.10 Cheque 193972 Not pursued 
1.11 PJ’s company visaLiability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$1,034.11 withdrawn on or about 28.3.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of PJ’s company visa for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$1,034.11
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$1,034.11. According to the recollection of Joy, the withdrawal was made for dinners/lunches with the customers of the PJ.

Quantum: n/a
1.12 Cheque 193992Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$100 withdrawn on or about 19.4.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 193992 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$100
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 193992. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses of the PJ (bill of Joy’s office mobile phone with the PJ).

Quantum: n/a
1.13 PJ’s company visaLiability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$1,842.90 withdrawn on or about 30.4.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of PJ’s company visa for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$1,842.90
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$1,842.90. According to the recollection of Joy, the withdrawal was made for dinners/lunches with the customers of the PJ.

Quantum: n/a
1.14 Cheque 472397Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$2,372.10 withdrawn on or about 8.5.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 472397 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$2,372.10
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 472397. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express regarding the telephone bill of Joy’s office mobile phone and other reasonable office expenses.

Quantum: n/a
1.15 Cheque 472703 Not pursued 
1.16 Cheque 472407Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$15,283.53 withdrawn on or about 20.6.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 472407 for JOY’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$15,283.53
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 472407. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses of the PJ (mobile phone, air tickets and hotel fees/expenses for business trips).

Quantum: n/a
1.17 Cheque 472426Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$201 withdrawn on or about 19.7.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 472726 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$201
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 472407. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses of the PJ (Joy’s office mobile phone with the PJ).

Quantum: n/a
1.18 Cheque 712623Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$17,578.63 withdrawn on or about 2.9.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 712623 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$17,578.63
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 712623. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses of the PJ (Joy’s office mobile phone with the PJ).

Quantum: n/a
1.19 Cheque 712612Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$5,489.50 withdrawn on or about 27.9.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 712612 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$5,489.50
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 712612. Joy has no record and therefore no recollection of whether such sum was withdrawn by her but in any event, if such sum was withdrawn by Joy, the same should have been withdrawn solely for payment of or reimbursement for legitimate business expenses incurred by Joy and or other staff on behalf of PJ as set out under Joy’s witness statement dated 7  July 2016, [23][66]

Quantum: n/a
1.20 Cheque 712639Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$3,945.55 withdrawn on or about 23.10.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 712639 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$3,945.55
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 712639. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses of the PJ (hotel fees/expenses and toll fees for business trips).

Quantum: n/a
1.21 Cheque 948062Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$180 withdrawn on or about 19.11.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 948062 for JOY’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$180
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 948062. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses of the PJ (bill of Joy’s office mobile phone with the PJ).

Quantum: n/a
1.22 Cheque 948075Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$13,559.74 withdrawn on or about 23.12.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 948075 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$13,559.74
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 948075. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses of the PJ (bill of Joy’s office mobile phone with the PJ, air tickets, hotel fees/expenses for business trips).

Quantum: n/a
1.23 Cheque 948089Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$8,419.41 withdrawn on or about 6.1.2014 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 948089 for Joy’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$8,419.41
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 948089. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses of the PJ (bill of Joy’s office mobile phone with the PJ, air tickets, hotel fees/expenses for business trips).

Quantum: n/a
1.24 Cheque 891858Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$15,495.70 withdrawn on or about 30.11.2012 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 891858 for Gary’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$15,495.70
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 891858. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to Gary for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred by him during business trips.

Quantum: n/a
1.25 Cheque 121079Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$5,970.53 withdrawn on or about 3.1.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 121079 for Gary’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$5,970.53
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 121079. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to Gary for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred by him during business trips.

Quantum: n/a
1.26 Cheque 193969Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$41,141.02 withdrawn on or about 2.3.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 193969 for Gary’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$41,141.02
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 193969. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to Gary for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred by him during business trips.

Quantum: n/a
1.27 Cheque 712627Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$37,148 withdrawn on or about 26.9.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 712627 for Gary’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$37,148
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 712627. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to Gary for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred by him during business trips.

Quantum: n/a
1.28 Cheque 948096Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$42,800 withdrawn on or about 19.2.2014 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 948096 for Gary’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$42,800
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 948096. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to Gary as his salary and severance payment.

Quantum: n/a
1.29 Cheque 193983Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$9,331 withdrawn on or about 8.4.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 193983 for Momoko’s own benefit.

Quantum: HK$31,999
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 193983. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to Longchamp Travel Ltd for air tickets for business trip to the Vicenza exhibition from 18th to 25th January 2013.

Quantum: n/a
1.30 Cheque 891843Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$10,000 withdrawn on or about 31.10.2012 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque  891843 without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: HK$10,000
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 891843. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was withdrawn for the PJ’s petty cash.

Quantum: n/a
1.31 Debit at adviceLiability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$13,965 withdrawn on or about 20.11.2012 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of debit at advice without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: HK$13,965
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$13,965. Joy has no record and therefore no recollection of whether such sum was withdrawn by her but in any event, if such sum was withdrawn by Joy, the same should have been withdrawn solely for payment of or reimbursement for legitimate business expenses incurred by Joy and or other staff on behalf of PJ as set out under Joy’s witness statement dated 7  July 2016, [23]

Quantum: n/a
1.32 Cash withdrawalLiability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$10,000 withdrawn on or about 20.11.2012 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cash withdrawal without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: HK$10,000
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$10,000. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was withdrawn for the PJ’s petty cash.

Quantum: n/a
1.33 Cheque 193953Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$15,000 withdrawn on or about 5.2.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque  193953 without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: HK$15,000
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque  193953. Joy has no record and therefore no recollection of whether such sum was withdrawn by her but in any event, if such sum was withdrawn by Joy, the same should have been withdrawn solely for payment of or reimbursement for legitimate business expenses incurred by Joy and or other staff on behalf of PJ as set out under Joy’s witness statement dated 7  July 2016, [23]

Quantum: n/a
1.34 Cheque 193955 Not pursued 
1.35 Bank withdrawalLiability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of €5,800.98 withdrawn on or about 24.10.2012 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of bank withdrawal without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: €5,800.98
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of €5,800.98.  Joy has no record and therefore no recollection of whether such sum was withdrawn by her but in any event, if such sum was withdrawn by Joy, the same should have been withdrawn solely for the payment of Vicenza Exhibition.

Quantum: n/a
1.36 Cheque 193975Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$3,801.40 withdrawn on or about 2.4.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque  193975 without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: HK$3,801.40
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque  193959. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to American Express for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses of the PJ (hotel fees and other expenses for business trips).

Quantum: n/a
1.37 Bank withdrawalLiability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of €3,727.10 withdrawn on or about 29.5.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of bank withdrawal without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: €3,727.10
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of €3,727.10  According to copy of the stub of the said   Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein  was paid to R&P Legal for the legal fees to Italian lawyers regarding the Seizure Incident.

Quantum: n/a
1.38 Cheque 193999 Not pursued 
1.39 Cheque 472432Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$12,844 withdrawn on or about 2.8.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque  472432 without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: HK$12,844
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque  472432. Joy has no record and therefore no recollection of whether such sum was withdrawn by her but in any event, if such sum was withdrawn by Joy, the same should have been withdrawn solely for payment of or reimbursement for legitimate business expenses incurred by Joy and or other staff on behalf of PJ as set out under Joy’s witness statement dated 7  July 2016, [23]

Quantum: n/a
1.40 Cheque 712611Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$10,000 withdrawn on or about 27.9.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque  712611 without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: HK$10,000
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 712611. Joy has no record and therefore no recollection of whether such sum was withdrawn by her but in any event, if such sum was withdrawn by Joy, the same should have been withdrawn solely for payment of or reimbursement for legitimate business expenses incurred by Joy and or other staff on behalf of PJ as set out under Joy’s witness statement dated 7 July 2016, [23]

Quantum: n/a
1.41 Cheque 712617Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$10,000 withdrawn on or about 27.9.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque 712617 without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: HK$10,000
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 712617. Joy has no record and therefore no recollection of whether such sum was withdrawn by her but in any event, if such sum was withdrawn by Joy, the same should have been withdrawn solely for payment of or reimbursement for legitimate business expenses incurred by Joy and or other staff on behalf of PJ as set out under Joy’s witness statement dated 7  July 2016, [23]

Quantum: n/a
1.42 Bank withdrawal Not pursued 
1.43 Bank withdrawalLiability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of €832.80 withdrawn on or about 23.11.2013 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of bank withdrawal without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: €832.80
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of€832.80. According to copy of the stub of the said cheque and/or the recollection of Joy and/or the relevant documents possessed by Joy, the sum incurred therein was paid to R&P Legal for the legal fees to Italian lawyers regarding the Seizure Incident.

Quantum: n/a
1.44 Cheque 948111 Not pursued 
1.45 Cheque 948113 Not pursued 
1.46 Cheque 891811Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$10,293.62 withdrawn on or about 18.09.2012 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque  891811 without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: HK$10,293.62
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 891811. Joy has no record and therefore no recollection of whether such sum was withdrawn by her but in any event, if such sum was withdrawn by Joy, the same should have been withdrawn solely for payment of or reimbursement for legitimate business expenses incurred by JOY and or other staff on behalf of PJ as set out
under Joy’s witness statement dated 7 July 2016, [23]

Quantum: n/a
1.47 Cheque 891822Liability: Joy is liable to compensate PJ for the sum of HK$4,700.04 withdrawn on or about 10.10.2012 from PJ’s bank account without PJ’s authority by way of cheque   891822 without reasonable supporting documents for approval.

Quantum: HK$4,700.04
Liability: Joy is not liable to compensate PJ for the sum of Cheque 891822. Joy has no record and therefore no recollection of whether such sum was withdrawn by her but in any event, if such sum was withdrawn by Joy, the same should have been withdrawn solely for payment of or reimbursement for legitimate business expenses incurred by Joy and or other staff on behalf of PJ as set out under Joy’s witness statement dated 7  July 2016, [23]

Quantum: n/a

122.  From the Scott Schedule, it is clear that the withdrawals are not disputed. The question is whether the withdrawals were made for legitimate purposes.

123.  Mr Ng has made the following points under this head:

(1)  Some of the items are not substantiated by any documentary evidence.

(2)  Item 1.3: It would be absurd that a staff of a company is entitled to claim sundry expenses exceeding HK$8,000 without the need to provide any supporting receipts or invoices.

(3)  Item 1.4: Joy had provided an invoice issued by Prudential Assurance Company Limited. However, travel insurance for PJ’s staff were purchased from Canny and such insurance policy would always cover the entire year and all destinations. There is no basis for Joy to purchase additional travel insurance for her business trips, unless the Prudential travel insurance was for her personal trips not related to PJ.

(4)  Item 1.8 (exceeding HK$22,000): No supporting document has been produced.

(5)  Items 1.24 to 1.27 – purported reimbursements to Gary (exceeding HK$100,000): According to PJ’s records, no supporting sales receipt or invoices were provided for the alleged expenses of Gary under these items. It is contrary to commercial sense for a staff of a company to claim hotel and travel expenses without any supporting receipts.

(6)  Items 1.37, 1.43: These were payments to the Italian law firm R&P Legal for the legal costs to recover the jewellery items detained by the Italian authority in the Seizure Incident. As the Seizure Incident was caused by Joy’s negligence or breaches, Joy should be liable to reimburse PJ for these expenses.

(7)  As regards item 1.29 (Momoko’s expense in relation to the 2013 Italy Exhibition), Ruby agreed in her evidence that she allowed paying reimbursement to Momoko.  However, this fact does not necessarily mean that PJ also exonerated Joy from liabilities for breach of duties. As a matter of law, a principal may ratify a transaction (between the principal and a third party) without also pardoning the agent[67].  In fact, in the present case, the suggestion that the payment was authorized or ratified by PJ has not been pleaded in the first place.

(8)  Joy committed a breach of duty by bringing Momoko to Italy (and paying for her expenses): Momoko was not a sale staff, and there was no need to send 3 staff members to the exhibition (Joy and Gary (2 persons) went to two other exhibitions in Vicenza in May and September 2013). Momoko cannot be delivering any finished good to any customer in Italy, as the evidence shows that every item brought to Italy had to be brought back to Hong Kong and then the sold items would be sent to overseas customers from Hong Kong. There is no truth in Momoko’s evidence that it required 3 staff members to attend the 2013 Italy Exhibition.

124.  I agree with Mr Ng and accept his submissions. Further, in assessing Joy’s evidence in relation to these withdrawals, I bear in mind that:

(1)  Joy is not a truthful witness and her evidence is unreliable.

(2)  As to her excuse that she has difficulties in explaining the details of some matters because she does not have the necessary documents kept by PJ, for the reasons set out in Part F above, there is no merit in this excuse at all.

(3)  Items 1.30 to 1.47 are not supported by any documents.

(4)  As to items 1.3, 1.6 to 1.8, 1.19, 1.23 to 1.25, the supporting documents of these items are the corresponding cheque stubs.  However, the cheque stubs are merely evidence showing that these withdrawals were made by cheques.  There is no document showing that Joy’s explanations in relation to these items are true.

125.  Having considered all the evidence, I would not require Joy to reimburse PJ the following items:

(1)  Joy’s responsibilities in PJ include dealing with customers and promoting PJ’s business overseas.  In these circumstances, it would be reasonable for PJ to provide a mobile phone to Joy and pay the mobile phone fees.  Further, it would also be reasonable for PJ to pay the expenses for business lunch or dinner attended by Joy, and the expenses of Joy’s business trips.  Having seen the evidence, I am of the view that the items 1.6 to 1.8, 1.11 to 1.18, 1.20 to 1.22 fall within this category and are supported by satisfactory documents.

(2)  In respect of item 1.5, according to Ruby, the sum was paid to her for the purchase of Joy’s mobile phone.  As said in the above, I am of the view that it would be reasonable for PJ providing a mobile phone to Joy.

(3)  As to item 1.28, as a matter of fact, Gary has left PJ.  To err on the safe side, I am prepared to accept that item 1.28 is a legitimate withdrawal.

126.  Save and except the aforesaid, I am of the view that there is no satisfactory evidence showing that other withdrawals are legitimate withdrawals.  In my judgment, Joy shall reimburse PJ these sums.

M.  DISCREPANCY ISSUE

127.  After the evidence stage and before hearing final submissions from the parties, on 27 November 2019, PJ’s solicitors wrote to the court and informed me that in respect of some of the documents in Exhibit “LCY-18” in Joy’s witness statement dated 7 July 2016, the copies in the trial bundles[68] are different from the copies filed in court.  I was surprised by this finding.  In the hearing on 16 December 2019, I directed that there should be a witness statement from Joy explaining the said discrepancies and there should be discovery on this matter.  Oral evidence from Joy was heard in the hearing on 7 January 2020.  In essence, Joy’s explanation is that she has provided incorrect documents to her solicitors, and without realizing the mistake, her solicitors have put the incorrect documents into the trial bundles.  Joy claims that the mistake is her innocent mistake.  The parties have provided me submissions on this discrepancy issue.

128.  Having considered the matter, I am of the view that it would not be appropriate for me to make a finding in this judgment as to whether Joy has deliberately tried to mislead this court by providing incorrect documents in the trial bundles.  The issues in this trial should be those defined in the pleadings.  At the end, I have all the documents before me, and this judgment is based upon all the evidence before the court.  As to whether Joy has tried to mislead the court, if PJ and/or Ruby wish to pursue this matter, they have to do so by commencing separate proceedings.

N.  DISPOSITION

129.  PJ’s claim is allowed to the extent as set out in the above.  JD’s counterclaim is dismissed.  I direct PJ’s legal representatives to prepare a draft order and the draft answers to the questions in the Scott Schedule in accordance with this judgment and, after seeking other parties’ comments on the same, submit the draft order and the draft answers to the court for my approval.

130.  In respect of the sums to be paid by Ds to PJ pursuant to this judgment, counsel have agreed that there be pre-judgment interest on those sums at 1% above the best lending rate of HSBC.  The only difference between counsel is from when there should be pre-judgment interest.  Mr Lee submits that as a matter of convenience, pre-judgment interest on all the sums awarded to PJ should start to accrue on the date of the writ of summons. Mr Ng submits that in respect of 3 sums, pre-judgment interest should start to accrue on the date of commission of the wrong or at a time close to that date, for these 3 sums are substantial sums.  The 3 sums mentioned in Mr Ng’s submissions are (a) damages in relation to the Undeclared Items; (b) damages in relation to the misappropriated finished products (including the Diverted Jewellery Items); and (c) the proceeds of the Unaccounted Sales.  In respect of other sums, Mr Ng has no object that pre-judgment interest on these sums be calculated from the date of the writ of summons.  I accept Mr Ng’s submissions and order that:

(1)  There be pre-judgment interest on the damages in relation to the Undeclared Items from 22 January 2013 to the date of this judgment. On 22 January 2013, the Undeclared Items were seized by the Vicenza Custom and PJ lost possession of the same.

(2)  There be pre-judgment interest in relation to the misappropriated finished products (including the Diverted Jewellery Items) and the proceeds of the Unaccounted Sales from 1 April 2014 to the date of this judgment.  The misappropriation was discovered in March 2014, and the basis of the Unaccounted Sales is the closing stock of PJ in March 2014. With all these in mind, I am of the view that it would be appropriate for the pre-judgment interest on the awards in relation to these items to start to run on 1 April 2014.

(3)  There be pre-judgment interest on other sums awarded to PJ from the date of the writ of summons to the date of this judgment.

131.  There is no dispute that there shall be post-judgment interest on the sums payable by Ds to PJ at the judgment rate until full payment.

132.  There be liberty to apply.

133.  Costs should follow the event.  PJ have succeeded on all the issues[69] save and except the misappropriation claim in relation to the loose diamonds and some items in the unauthorized withdrawals claim.  In my view, the time spent on the issues on which PJ is not successful is minimal.  Taking a broad brush approach, I am of the view that PJ should be entitled to have 98% of the costs of these proceedings.  There be a costs order nisi that 98% of the costs of these proceedings (including all costs reserved) be paid by Ds to PJ, to be taxed if not agreed.

134.  Lastly, it remains for me to thank counsel for the helpful assistance rendered to the court.

 (MK Liu)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Tom Ng, instructed by Deacons, for the plaintiff by original action and the 2nd defendant by counterclaim

Ms Catherine Wong & Mr Michael Lee, instructed by S.K. Lam, Alfred Chan & Co., for the 1st & 2nd defendants by original action and the plaintiff by counterclaim (on 5-8, 11-15 & 18 November 2019, 16 December 2019)

Mr Michael Lee, instructed by S.K. Lam, Alfred Chan & Co., for the 1st & 2nd defendants by original action and the plaintiff by counterclaim (on 7 & 10 January 2020)

The 1st defendant by counterclaim appeared in person




HCA 2548/2014

Progetto Jewellery Company Ltd v
Lau Chiu Ying & Joy Design Company Limited
Amended Agreed facts

A.  The accounting and valuation evidence

1.  Progetto’s financial year ends on 31 August.

2.  Progetto’s yearly revenue, cost of sales, account receivables and accounts payables for the 2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 financial years as set out in Progetto’s audited financial statements [C3/666-725] are tabulated as follows:-

 2011-20122010-20112009-2010
Revenue HK$23,551,516
[C3/704]
HK$25,891,713.40
[C3/687]
HK$13,188,959.16
[C3/671]
Cost of Sales HK$17,553,123
[C3/704]
HK$22,858,033.72
[C3/687]
HK$10,866,248.78
[C3/671]
Gross Profit HK$5,998,393
[C3/704]
HK$3,033,679.68
[C3/687]
HK$2,322,710.38
[C3/671]
Account Receivables HK$1,103,697
[C3/705]
HK$2,024,015.21
[C3/688]
HK$1,480,516.11
[C3/672]
Account Payables HK$7,238,106
[C3/705]
HK$10,532,013.57
[C3/688]
HK$5,842,415.38
[C3/672]
Inventories HK$8,865,175
[C3/705]
HK$8,195,673.30
[C3/688]
HK$5,216,059.88
[C3/672]

3.  According to the Warehouse Balance Report printed on 6 January 2014, there were more than 1,100 finished good items (leaving aside the seized items) [C2/443-463].

4.  From 15 to 24 January 2014, Joy and Gary attended the 2nd Italian Exhibition. 117 jewellery items were sold.

B.  CCTV and police evidence

5.  On 27 January 2014, Gary Chu came back to Progetto’s office at 12:34:50, and Joy came back at 14:28:15. They left at 18:26:25.

6.  There is no CCTV record on 28 January 2014 from 13:21:35 to 19:30:20.

7.  On 13 March 2014, the police were called to Progetto’s office, and there was a stock-taking in the presence of the police: 18:23, 18:33, 19:37, 20:46-21:28.

8.  On 2 April 2014, Joy made a police statement saying that Progetto had a shareholders’ dispute [C13/3034].

9.  A schedule of CCTV records concerning Ms. Fung Pui Wa is enclosed as “Schedule 1” and the parties will treat its contents as agreed facts.

C.  HKTDC exhibition

10.  Between 2010 and 2013 (the Defence’s case: 2011 to 2013), Progetto attended the HKTDC Exhibition for 4 (the Defence’s case: 3) consecutive years. As a result of its continuous participation, Progetto has earned from the HKTDC priority placing in booth allocation for the HKTDC Exhibition.

11.  The deposit of HK$93,098.60 for the HKTDC Exhibition 2014 was paid in the following manner:

(a)  HK$48,320 was paid by Progetto by way of cheque on 27 June 2013. [C2/397]

(b)  HK$32,212 was paid by Progetto by way of cheque on 27 September 2013. [C2/397]

(c)  HK$4,026.60 was paid by Progetto by way of cheque on 10 December 2013. [C2/397]

(d)  HK$8,540 was paid by way of cash on 10 February 2014. [C12/2828] (The Defence’s case is that this was paid by Joy Design.)

12.  Progetto did not attend the HKTDC Exhibition from 5 March 2014 to 9 March 2014.

13.  As a result, HKTDC forfeited the deposit.

D.  Tax Return

14.  Progetto did not complete and file its tax return to the Inland Revenue Department since 2012-2013 year of assessment.

15.  As a result, the IRD has imposed a penalty on Progetto for failing to file its tax return and for late payment of the assessed tax since 2013.

16.  On 1 March 2017 and 14 August 2017, the IRD has issued notices to Hang Seng Bank to request payment of the outstanding tax and penalties from Progetto’s Hang Seng Bank saving account and current account.

E.  Seizure in Italy

17.  In around January 2013, Joy attended the 1st Italian Exhibition on behalf of Progetto. Joy brought along Progetto’s 1,080 jewellery items (“Carnet Items”) from Hong Kong to display at the 1st Italian Exhibition.

18.  On or about 15 January 2013, Joy and Gary arrived at London Heathrow airport and declared the Carnet Items at the UK Custom.

19.  On the same day, i.e. 15 January 2013, Joy and Gary arranged to meet up a South American customer outside the London Heathrow airport, namely Edmar Jewelry, to collect around 234 units of jewelleries (i.e. the items in Schedule B to the Re-Amended Statement of Claim) (“Seized Items”). The Seized Items were previously on consignment with Edmar Jewelry.

20.  After collecting the Seized Items, Joy and Gary travelled to Italy by connecting flights from London.

21.  Further, on or before 22 January 2013, the Seized Items and the Carnet Items were displayed at the 1st Italian Exhibition.

22.  On 22 January 2013, the Vicenza Custom visited Progetto’s booth at the 1st Italian Exhibition. The Seized Items were then seized by the Vicenza Custom.

23.  Subsequently, Joy on behalf of Progetto instructed lawyers in Italy for the recovery of the Seized Items.

24.  Progetto’s solicitors Deacons received a letter from S.K. Lam, Alfred Chan & Co. dated 31 December 2018 informing them that the Italian Customs Authority has issued a Confiscation No.135100-7-2018 and Order of Imposition No.135100-UNO-2018 both dated 9 November 2018 regarding the Seized Items.

Dated the 10th day of January 2020

We, the undersigned, agree to the items stated this document.

(signed)(signed)
__________________________________________
Messrs. DeaconsMessrs. S.K. Lam, Alfred Chan & Co.
Solicitors for the Plaintiff
(by original action)
Solicitors for the Defendants
(by original action)

(signed) 
_____________________ 
Madam Fung Pui Wa 
1st Defendant (by counterclaim) 

Schedule 1

 

Schedule of CCTV Records

Date
Time
Description
01.02.2014
12:34-12:36
Ruby opened and closed the safe
05.02.2014
12:31
Ruby opened the safe and closed it
11.02.2014
18:11
Ruby opened and closed the safe
19.02.2014
12:50
Ruby opened and closed the safe
20.02.2014
11:57
Ruby entered the room where the safe was located
24.02.2014
15:37
Ruby opened and closed the safe
25.02.2014
13:18
Ruby opened and closed the safe
26.02.2014
15:17
Ruby opened and closed the safe
28.02.2014
12:08
Ruby opened and closed the safe
03.03.2014
15:26 -15:27
Ruby opened and closed the safe.
22:50
Ruby and an unknown person entered the office
04.03.2014
19:51
Ruby opened and closed the safe
05.03.2014
13:01
Ruby opened and closed the safe
06.03.2014
14:53
Ruby opened and closed the safe
10.03.2014
11:52-11:53
Ruby opened and closed the safe
11.03.2014
13:14
Ruby opened and closed the safe
12.03.2014
12:56
Ruby opened and closed the safe
13:29-13:31
Ruby opened and closed the safe


Agreed CCTV Events

27 January 2014

1.  On 27 January 2014, Gary Chu and Joy Lau entered the office at 12:34:50 and 14:28:15 respectively.  They did not open the safe.  They left together at 18:26:25.  No stock-taking was done.  Ruby did not come back to the office on 27 January 2014.

28 January 2014

2.  On 28 January 2014, Ruby Fung entered the office at 11:57:15 and opened the safe at 11:59:04; and Joy came back at 12:06:18.  Ruby left at 12:12:56, and returned at 12:14:25. She left at 12:15:03.  During the period from 11:57:15 to 12:15:03, Joy or Gary did not enter the room in which the safe was located.

3.  Joy and Gary had physical contact with the stock items on 28 January 2014: see CCTV from 13:10:40 to 13:17:50.  

4.  On 28 January 2014, Joy and an unknown woman (Defence’s case: Momoko) left at 19:45:59.

February and March 2014

5.  On 4 (11:40:18 to 21:11:26), 5 (19:04:11 to 19:23:28) and 6 (11:44:35 to 12:43:58) February 2014, and 7 (11:12:39 to 11:14:36) and 19 (11:00:21 to 11:01:25; 14:22:14 to 16:34:22) March 2014, Joy entered the office of Progetto. 

6.  On 17 (17:59:49 to 20:48:09), 19 (17:57:18 to 20:50:17) and 27 (18:04:30 to 21:39:59) February 2014, Joy came in Progetto’s office and left together with Momoko.  

7.  On 5 (12:14:26 to 17:07:53), 6 (12:21:23 to 16:56:15) 19 (12:24:20 to 12:55:00 and 17:38:53 to 17:45:30) February 2014, and 7 (15:25:53 to 16:41:37) and 19 (01:02:32 to 01:40:59 and 17:52:45 to 23:59:59) and 20 (00:00:00 to 07:52:50) March 2014, Ruby entered the office of Progetto.

Unavailable CCTV

8.  The following CCTV footage is unavailable:-

Date (Time)
28 January 2014 (13:21:37 - 19:30:21)

Dated the 18th day of November 2019

We, the undersigned, agree to the items stated this document.

(signed)(signed)
__________________________________________
Messrs. DeaconsMessrs. S.K. Lam, Alfred Chan & Co.
Solicitors for the Plaintiff
(by original action)
Solicitors for the Defendants
(by original action)

(signed) 
_____________________ 
Madam Fung Pui Wa 
1st Defendant (by counterclaim) 




[1]  The 6 Jan 2014 Valuation Report disclosed by PJ [C4/859] is different from the one disclosed by JD and Joy [B2/258, 407]; [C12/2986].  There is no dispute that the version disclosed by PJ is the version given to Ruby by Momoko, which contains Momoko’s handwriting.

[2] Re-Amended Defence, [7]

[3]  In Mr Ng’s submissions, the total of the payments received arising out of sales which took place after 11 October 2012 is calculated by adding up the income figures in the monthly bank statements from October 2012 to December 2013. To give Ds the benefit of the doubt, PJ treated any unidentified or unidentifiable payments into the bank account as income arising from sales. Further, to take into account the sums received after October 2012 but which resulted from sales which took place before October 2012, PJ then subtracted from the income sum the total amount of verified receivables as at October 2012.

[4]  Some of the work orders as shown in the “Factory List” submitted by PJ on 7 January 2020 are not in evidence and should not be considered.  As a result, the items as shown on these work orders should be excluded.  Adopting a 30% profit margin, the total sale price of these items should be HK$364,277.33.

[5]  C4/865

[6] C2/401 – 442-5

[7]  C6/1302 – C11/2612; details of the calculation are shown on the “Factory List” submitted by PJ on 7 January 2020 

[8]  B1/8/39(a)

[9]  C2/443-447

[10] B2/471/68; B3/595

[11] C4/865

[12]  C3/737 – C4/839-27

[13]  C2/443

[14]  A3/382

[15]  A3/471-474

[16]  C3/687, 704

[17]  (2013) 16 HKCFAR 663

[18]  [2009] 2 HKLRD 455

[19]  HCA 1734/2009, 8 April 2014

[20]  [2011] 2 All ER 65

[21]  ADS v Brothers and Others (2000) 3 HKCFAR 70, 77J-78D

[22] According to Jimmy (whose evidence is accepted by this court), Joy has requested not to use this workshop since September 2013, and has arranged PJ to use other workshops.  The work orders would reflect the amount of finished items.  The fact that PJ is only relying on the work orders from one workshop means that the total sum as reflected in these work orders may well be less than the actual amount of the finished items received by PJ from October 2012 to December 2013.  Nevertheless, PJ is prepared to proceed on this basis.  See also footnote no.3.

[23]  Agreed Facts, [3]

[24]  Joy’s witness statement, [47]

[25]  Agreed Facts, [4]

[26]  Ruby’s witness statement, [58] and [64]

[27]  This is Joy’s position, as shown in her solicitors’ letter dated 14 March 2014 in [C3/604].

[28]  Gary’s witness statement, [24]

[29]  Gary’s witness statement, [18]

[30]  B1/162

[31]  B1/163-199

[32]  C4/879

[33]  C11/2627-2646

[34]  A3/471 – 474

[35]  C11/2637-2639

[36]  A3/471-474

[37]  A3/382/5(iii)

[38]  A3/471

[39]  A3/474

[40]  [1969] 2 Ch 365

[41]  [2011] 1 HKLRD 537, [67]

[42]  Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim, Schedule 3

[43]  Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim, Schedules 4 to 7

[44]  Ds’ Written Final Submissions dated 11 December 2019, [96(b)]

[45]  Ditto, [96(c)]

[46]  Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67; Tin Lik v Deutche Bank AG and Others (CACV 45/2016), 23 June 2017, [107]

[47]  A3/471 – 474

[48]  C4/772

[49]  B2/405

[50]  By comparing the price of the JD Jewellery Items set out in schedule 4 to the counterclaim and the B costs of the same items as set out in the 6 Jan 2014 Warehouse Balance Report, it can be seen that the prices in the said schedule 4 are 150% of the corresponding B costs in the said report.  According to Gary’s evidence, “B costs” in the said warehouse balance report is the actual costs of the manual work and the raw materials.

[51] The “Access Procedure” was the new security measures mentioned by Ruby in her letter to Joy’s solicitors and dated 23 March 2014 [C3/608].  The Access Procedure was that any person could only enter the Office if he or she was accompanied by 2 directors or registered members of PJ.  The “Access Procedure” applied to everyone, including Ruby herself. 

[52]  Ruby’s witness statement, [76]–[77]

[53]  C4/635-636

[54]  C3/631

[55]Anglia TV Ltd v Reed [1972] 1 QB 60; Omak Maritime Ltd v Mamola Challenger Shipping Co [2010] EWHC 2026

[56]  B2/256-257

[57] “Our client repeats that whilst our client may have in the process of clearing her desk on or around 27 January 2014 taken away some documents and records relating to the Company, our client is all along willing to return them to the Company but our client has since been denied access to the Company’s office by Ms Fung (and more importantly our client did not want to go back to the office for fear of her personal safety) and there is no way it could amount to theft of any kind.”

[58] “Whilst our client may have in the process taken away some documents and records relating to the Company, our client is all along willing to return them to the Company but our client has since been denied access to the Company’s office by Ms Fung (and more importantly our client did not want to go back to the office for fear of her personal safety).”

[59]  Faccenda Chicken v Fowler [1986] Ch 117 at 137B-138H; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 WLR 251 at 260B-D; Axa China Region Insurance Co Ltd v Pacific Century Insurance Co Ltd [2003] 3 HKC 1 at 19I-20G, 27C.

[60]  Joy in her 3rd affirmation dated 27 March 2017 claimed that for reasons unknown to her, some of the documents in the Laptop Computer were not accessible.

[61]  B1/179

[62]  C1/96

[63]  C1/102

[64]  China Citic Bank Corporation Ltd (Quanzhou Branch) v Li Kwai Chun and Others[2019] HKCFI 2540, [41] – [45]

[65]  B1/179

[66]  Joy said the following in her witness statement dated 7 July 2016:

“23.  Between November 2012 and February 2014, I, as a director of Progetto, authorised a number of withdrawals from Progetto’s bank account (account no. 773-874664-883) solely for payment of or reimbursement for legitimate business expenses incurred by me or other staff on behalf of Progetto which include:-

(a)  expenses incurred in business trips (e.g. hotel, car –hire, airfare and train tickets);

(b)  booth-booking costs for overseas trade shows and exhibitions;

(c)  replenishment of petty cash used for miscellaneous office expenses;

(d)  salary and severance payment to Gary when his employment was terminated;

(e)  salary and double pay to myself for January 2014;

(f)  legal fees paid to the Italian lawyers in respect of the Seizure Incident;

(g)  rent paid to Universal Electronics Ind. Ltd (the “Landlord”) which is the landlord of the Office; and

(h)  bills for my office mobile phone.”

[67]  Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (21st edition), at [2-096], it is necessary “to consider the matter in two stages. First, is there ratification of the contract which the agent purported to make. Secondly, has the principal waived the breach of duty if any vis-à-vis the agent. Often the facts will lead to ratification and exoneration, but not always”; see also Re Styland Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2012] 2 HKLRD 325, at [118] – [119]

[68]  The pre-trial review was held on 27 June 2019.  At that time, PJ was not represented by anyone and Ruby was acting in person, while Ds were legally represented.  Accordingly, I directed Ds’ solicitors to prepare the trial bundles.  In accordance with the order made in the pre-trial review, the trial bundles were prepared by Ds’ solicitors.

[69]  In the claim concerning the GIA diamonds, at the end PJ has succeeded in obtaining all the amounts claimed under this head.  Accordingly, PJ should be regarded as successful in this claim.