Case Detail

DCPI 990/2015

[2018] HKDC 940

香港特別行政區

區域法院

傷亡訴訟2015年第990號

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有關
	WEI WEI	原告人
對
	CHI CHIH TUNG	第一被告人
	WONG YIN MUI	第二被告人

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主審法官:

區域法院暫委法官龍雲彪法庭聆訊

聆訊日期:	2018年5月28至30日及6月22日
判案書日期:	2018年8月20日

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判案書

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引言

1. 這是一宗傷亡訴訟。事源於2013年11月16日，當原告人在紅磡必嘉街長樂大廈天台弄乾棉被時，被一隻狗（晶片號碼035540782，下稱「該狗隻」）咬傷她的左腳。這次意外導致原告人左腳受傷及需接受精神科治療。她索償$284,923。

2. 兩位被告人沒有爭議該次意外曾經發生。第一被告人抗辯理由是他並非該狗隻的主人，意外發生時他亦不是牽引該狗隻的人，所以他對意外沒有責任。第二被告人承認她是該狗隻的主人，法庭亦於2015年7月28日頒下中段判決（interlocutory judgment），因此就第二被告人而言，本審訊只為評定有關賠償金額。

3. 原告人的索償是基於三個訴因：疏忽、明知故犯（scienter）及違反法定責任（breach of statutory duty）。

4. 雙方均沒有律師代表進行訴訟（原告人曾經獲得法律援助但在本審訊前被撤銷）。他們沒有就法律論點作陳述。他們的陳述主要是圍繞事實的爭議。根據本席下文的分析，本審訊的主要爭議點是：第一被告人是否該狗隻的主人，或意外發生時他是否牽引該狗隻的人；若是的話，第一被告人有沒有違反作為狗主或牽引狗隻人的謹慎責任；原告人受到甚麼傷害和她應得的賠償額。

意外發生的過程和涉案的狗隻

5. 原告人為內地人，她在2012年7月左右來港修讀由香港理工大學舉辦的碩士課程，為期2年，在2013年11月15日起開始租住長樂大廈其中一個單位，但不幸地在翌日2013年11月16日遇上本意外。第一被告人和第二被告人同樣是長樂大廈的住客，第一被告人和第二被告人是同一個單位內不同劏房的住客。

6. 原告人的案情如下：在2013年11月16日晚上10時許，她在長樂大廈天台弄乾棉被時，有2隻沒有狗帶牽引的狗（其中包括該狗隻）向原告人狂吠，然後該狗隻咬傷她的左腳。在這過程之前或當中，原告人確認她沒有看到有關2隻狗（包括該狗隻）的主人。在原告人的證人陳述書中，她描述被咬之後，首先看到第二被告人拖著另外2隻有狗帶牽引的狗，原告人大喊救命，但第二被告人沒有理會並帶同全部4隻狗離開天台。原告人繼續大喊救命，過了不久第一被告人出現。其後第一被告人報警[1]及召來救護車，將原告人送院治理。

7. 該狗隻是一頭雄性的混種狗，根據漁農自然護理署2013年11月18日（意外發生後2天）發出的「狗隻體重確認書」，該狗隻的體重為19.1公斤，確認書由第二被告人以畜養人身份簽名確認。根據《香港法例》第167D章《危險狗隻規例》附表2，該狗隻不屬該規例所指的「大型狗隻」，亦沒有證據顯示該狗隻為該規例所指的「格鬥狗隻」或「已知危險狗隻」。

被傳召的證人

8. 原告人親自作供，亦透過傳召出庭令狀（subpoena）傳召長樂大廈的管理員陳先生和一位姓林警員作供。陳先生在意外發生時已經落更，因此他並不在現場，而林警員在意外後到場作出調查。

9. 第一被告人親自作供，而由於第二被告人沒有存檔證人陳述書，她並沒有就賠償金額評定的議題作供。

原告人5月31日的傳票

10. 在處理正審議題之前，本席先處理在審訊完結後但頒下本判詞之前，原告人於2018年5月31日發出的傳票（下稱「該傳票」）。該傳票申請將一份同日由九龍醫院精神科發出的醫療報告成為本審訊的證據（下稱「該醫療報告」）。本席於2018年6月22日聽取各方就該傳票的陳詞，容許該醫療報告成為本審訊的證據並保留訟費，詳細的理由如下。

11. 本審訊（結案陳詞階段）於2018年5月30日完結，原告人於2018年5月31日發出該傳票。法庭有酌情權處理有關申請，主要考慮理由包括（1）為何有關證據沒有在較早時間提出；（2）有關證據對案件的關鍵性；（3）接納和拒絕有關證據對各方的損害（prejudice）；和（4）案件的整體公平性：有關原則見Robin Colin Foster v Action Aviation Ltd [2013] EWHC 2930 (QB)。由於發出該傳票時本席仍未頒下判詞，本席的權責並未終結（functus officio），而針對在上訴階段提出新證據的Ladd v Marshall 原則並不適用。

12. 在容許該醫療報告成為本審訊的證據時，本席考慮了以下事項：—

(1) 該醫療報告於2018年5月31日發出，原告人已經立刻發出該傳票，原告人未能在較早時間提出有關證據是有合理解釋；
(2) 該醫療報告由九龍醫院發出，表面上不存在真確性的爭議；
(3) 該醫療報告只是紀錄原告人的診斷資料，原告人並不依賴該醫療報告作為專家報告（同時根據2015年10月27日周博芬聆案官的命令，各方均選擇在本案中不呈交醫學專家證據），因此就原告人的診斷資料而言，該醫療報告內容的準確性不應該存在重大爭議；
(4) 兩位被告人分別向本席確認，在接納該醫療報告成為本審訊的證據後，並沒有需要重開案情或對原告人作補充盤問，他們也沒有補充陳詞。

13. 平衡各個因素，尤其考慮容許該醫療報告成為本審訊的證據並不會對兩位被告人構成損害，本席批准該傳票的申請。本席同時認為，雖然原告人是請求法庭允許（indulgence）在審訊完結後接納新證據，但原告人已經在最短時間發出該傳票，有關的延誤不是她的過失，該傳票訟費歸於訟案中是最公平的訟費命令。

基於明知故犯法則的索償

14. 本席先列出明知故犯法則（scienter）的法律原則。上訴庭在Chiang Ki Chun Ian, a minor suing by his mother and next friend, Chow Yuen Man Louise v Li Yin Sze [2011] 5 HKLRD 727一案中檢視上訴法庭的案例和一些英國的案例，有關原則在潘冬琼訴黃勝發（HCPI 486/2013，2015年8月28日）一案被杜溎峰法官引用，本席亦引用杜法官的分析如下。

15. 在 Li Yuk Lan v Lau Kit Ling [1989] 2 HKLR 128一案中，Cons VP 在第129頁中簡述有關明知故犯的法律原則：—

「… It is well established on the authorities that an owner of a domestic animal is liable for damages caused by the animal, either if the owner knows of some propensity to mischief particular to the animal but not common to the species in general, or if there are particular circumstances which in themselves impose upon the owner a duty to take care.」
中文譯本：
「… 根據案例，下述原則確立已久：如果某隻受飼養的動物的主人知道這隻動物有某種傾向會作出有害的行為，而這種傾向是這隻動物特有，不是該物種一般共有的，或者，如果有特殊情況，而這種情況本身把謹慎行事的責任加在該主人身上，該主人便須要為這隻動物造成的損害負上法律責任。」

16. 上述判詞的第一部分直接提述明知故犯原則，而第二部分則提述疏忽侵權行為和謹慎責任這些議題。明知故犯原則涉及嚴格法律責任 (strict liability)。狗主在無須被證明有疏忽的情況下須對狗隻的行為負責。在普通法中，嚴格法律責任的精粹在於狗主知悉有關狗隻有作出危險行為的傾向。可是，單憑證明有這種傾向是不足以向狗主追究法律責任，受害人還須證明狗主知悉或應已知悉有關狗隻曾作出一些能確立該傾向的行為，換句話說，除非有所知悉，否則狗主無須為他所畜養狗隻不可預測的行為負上法律責任。

17. 在Li Yuk Lan 一案中，被告人與兩隻體型巨大的拉布拉多犬在錦綉花園的街上散步，而該兩隻拉布拉多犬並没有繫上狗帶。原告人嘗試從其中一隻拉布拉多犬口中拯救自己的沙皮狗時，被該兩隻拉布拉多犬襲擊受傷。上訴庭裁定：—

「There was no evidence in the court below of any mischievous propensity on the part of the two Labradors, or that the defendant knew of such propensity, or that she ought to have known of such propensity. Nor for my part do I find any special circumstances. All that the defendant was doing was taking normally well behaved dogs for a walk. It is true that she would not at all times necessarily be in absolute control, but even so, that in my view was not, in the words of Lord Atkin, “putting her animals to such a use as was likely to injure her neighbour.” As far as the claim was based on negligence it should have failed.」
中文譯本：
「在下級法庭席前並無證據顯示該兩隻拉布拉多犬有任何會作出有害行為的傾向，或被告人知悉這傾向，或她應已知悉這傾向。依本席看，本席亦没有發現任何特殊情況。原告人所做的只是帶兩隻通常行為良好的狗散步。誠然，她必然不會一直也全面控制着牠們，但即使如此，本席亦認為情況並非（如Atkin勳爵所說）『將動物用作相當可能傷及鄰人的用途。』就基於疏忽而作出的申索而言，理應不能成立。」

18. 在McQuaker v. Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687一案中，Scott LJ 討論明知故犯原則時，解釋受馴化的動物和野生動物受到不同看待的背後原因如下：—

「On the question of law, it is important to bear in mind that, in the common law of England, a rule was laid down long ago that domestic animals are to be regarded in quite a different light from wild animals. Wild animals are assumed to be dangerous to human beings because they have not been domesticated. Domestic animals are assumed not to be dangerous. That is why, in English law, the keeper of a wild animal must keep it in at his peril: so that if he lets it out and it causes injury to the person or property of any human being, the keeper or owner of the animal, as the case may be, is liable in damages for the injury so caused; and why in the case of domestic animals, the presumption of law is to the opposite effect. There the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant was aware of the particular propensity to hurt human beings which was evinced in the case where, ex hypothesi, the plaintiff suffered; unless he proves that knowledge, there is at common law no liability upon the defendant. That liability has, in the case of dogs worrying sheep and certain other animals, been altered by legislation. But, apart from that exceptional statutory case, there is no liability without proof of knowledge of the defendant; the scienter, as it is called in law. 」
中文譯本：
「在法律問題上，重要的是，要緊記英國的普通法在很久以前已訂下一條法則，那便是受馴化的動物受到的看待與野生動物很不同。野生動物由於未被馴化，因此被假設對人類構成危險，而受馴化的動物則被假設不會構成危險。所以根據英國法律，野生動物飼養者必須在室内飼養這種動物，而且還須承擔風險：因此，如果他容許這動物外出，而這動物又導致他人損傷或損毁任何人的財物，有關動物的畜養者或主人（視屬何情況而定）便須對如此導致的損傷或損毁的損害賠償負上法律責任，但受馴化的動物在法律上的假設卻造成相反效果。在受馴化的動物方面，原告人須證明被告人知悉，該動物有在假設原告人受到傷害的案件中所顯露特有的傷害人類傾向。除非他能證明被告人對這方面有所知悉，否則被告人在普通法上無須負上法律責任。這法律責任在騷擾羊隻的狗隻和某些其他動物方面曾被法例更改。然而，除了該特殊的與法例有關的案例外，如没有證據證明被告人有所知悉，被告人便無須負上法律責任。在法律上，這稱之為明知故犯法則。」

Scott LJ 亦裁定，一隻動物屬於受馴化的動物還是野生動物類别是法律問題，須由法官根據該動物所屬的種類作出決定。

19. 該狗隻在法律上明顯是受馴化的動物，牠與其他受飼養的狗隻無異，原告人沒有提出該狗隻是屬於野生動物類别，本席也看不到任何證據基礎顯示該狗隻是屬於野生動物類别。因此，原告人有責任證明該狗隻有暴力傾向，和第一被告人對此有所知悉。

20. 根據以上原則，本席認為原告人未能確立明知故犯所需的元素，因為就算假定第一被告人是該狗隻的主人（本席下文的分析對此作出否定），原告人沒有提出充分證據顯示該狗隻有危險行為傾向，和第一被告人對此有所知悉。管理員陳先生的證供表示大廈之前曾經發生狗咬人事件，但他不能確認肇事狗隻就是該狗隻。原告人亦沒有提出文件證據證明該狗隻之前曾經咬人。

21. 本席因此裁定，原告人針對第一被告人明知故犯的訴因並不成立。

畜養狗隻與牽引狗隻人的謹慎責任

22. 原告人在侵權法的疏忽索償，是基於被告人違反謹慎責任，而導致原告人受傷。這正是上訴庭在Li Yuk Lan所指的「特別情況」。明知故犯法則與侵權法的疏忽責任有以下的區別。明知故犯法則定下嚴格法律責任，畜養狗隻人須就其狗隻不可能預見的行為負上責任，除非他不知悉該狗隻有該等危險行為的傾向。該狗隻的行為是否屬於可能預見的行為，對畜養狗隻人的法律責任沒有關連。但根據侵權法的疏忽法律原則，畜養狗隻人和牽引狗隻人對他的鄰人負上謹慎責任。這責任基於畜養狗隻人及牽引狗隻人能否預見他的作為（或不作為）會引致他的鄰人蒙受真正的危險或損害。這預見性對畜養狗隻人及牽引狗隻人的法律責任極具關鍵性。

23. 就畜養狗隻人及牽引狗隻人的責任與履行這責任的標準，上訴庭在Chiang Ki Chun Ian 說:—

「18.…The common thread which runs through the law of negligence, and in its application to various and diverse factual situations, is that a neighbour must refrain from an act or omission (in those cases where he is charged with a positive duty to act) if he reasonably foresees a real, as opposed to a fanciful, risk of harm to his neighbour from his act or omission. The court must assess whether the risk of harm was real or whether it was fanciful and the court must do so by assessing the likelihood of the risk materialising on the specific facts and circumstances of the case before it, and by balancing the likelihood of the risk materialising against the severity of harm, were it to materialise, the cost and practicality of precautions, and the utility of the activity in question.」
中文譯本：
「18. …有一個普遍通行的原則貫穿關於疏忽的法律，也適用於各種各樣，五花八門的案情，這就是如某人合理地預見如果他作出某行為，或不作出某行為，便會引致他的鄰人有真正的危險 —不是憑空想像出來的危險 — 會受傷害，那麼他就必須不作出該行為，或必須作出該行為（如果他承擔作出該行為的積極責任）。法庭必須評定會受傷害的危險是否真正存在，抑或是憑空想像出來。法庭作出這種評定時必須用下述方法：法庭必須根據它正在審理的案件的特有案情和情況去評定有危險可能發生的事成為事實的可能性，及必須對這可能發生的事成為事實的可能性及傷害（如果當真受到傷害）的嚴重程度、採取預防措施的費用和可行性、有關的活動的功用各因素權衡輕重。」

24. 但處理謹慎責任的法律議題之前，必須先處理一個事實問題，即第一被告人是否該狗隻的狗主（即上文所述的畜養狗隻人）或在意外時牽引該狗隻的人。假若第一被告人並非該狗隻的狗主，而他在意外時也不是牽引該狗隻的人，原告人便沒有任何基礎指控第一被告人違反謹慎責任。

25. 就第一被告人是否該狗隻的狗主，本席考慮以下文件證據： —

(1) 根據漁農自然護理署的「轉換犬隻畜養人申請表」，記錄在2013年5月1日，一位曾志豪先生將該狗隻轉讓予第二被告人。雖然該申請表的填表 / 遞交日期為意外後2天（即2013年11月18日），但本席不認為這日期會影響申請表內容的可靠性。不容否認的是，文件上，第一被告人從來不是該狗隻的狗主。
(2) 根據2013年11月18日漁農自然護理署的「領回涉嫌咬人犬隻申請表」，第二被告人確認她是事發時候該狗隻的狗主。本席特別留意到表格清楚表明，犬隻畜養人有機會被檢控，但第二被告人仍然作出有關確認。
(3) 漁農自然護理署在2014年2月10日向法律援助署提供有關意外的資料，當中包括第二被告人為該狗隻的狗主，而第一被告人只被形容為在場人士（“present at the scene”），而並非該狗隻的狗主。
(4) 漁農自然護理署2014年8月6日發給法律援助署的信件，記錄漁農自然護理署對意外作出的調查。根據第二被告人向漁農自然護理署提供的文件資料，漁農自然護理署證實第二被告人為事發時候該狗隻的狗主。
(5) 漁農自然護理署在2016年3月4日發給法律援助署的備忘，再次表示從2013年5月1日起，第二被告人為該狗隻的狗主，而有關事實得到前狗主（應該是指曾志豪先生）和第二被告人確認。同時，根據漁農自然護理署作出的刑事調查，第二被告人承認在意外時為該狗隻的狗主。
(6) 本席認為，漁農自然護理署的文件證據獨立和可靠，看不到質疑漁農自然護理署資料和調查結果的基礎，因此對有關文件證據給予比重。

26. 本席亦考慮林警員的筆記簿，當中紀錄第一被告人才是意外時該狗隻的狗主。林警員在法庭作供，指出當時第一被告人向他承認是該狗隻的狗主。第一被告人在他的書面證人供詞解釋，意外後是由他報警（林警員也同意這說法），因此到場警員首先向他作出調查，他已經向林警員指出他並非該狗隻的狗主，但林警員仍然作出他是該狗隻狗主的紀錄並拒絕作出更改；林警員並說如有需要警方會再向第一被告人錄取一份正式口供。

27. 漁農自然護理署的資料和調查結果，與林警員的筆記簿紀錄和證供，都是獨立人士的證據，但偏偏兩者互相矛盾，法庭只能在兩者選擇其中之一作為可靠的證據。本席認為，在相對可能性下（balance of probabilities），漁農自然護理署的資料和調查結果較林警員的紀錄和證供可靠。本席認為相對可能是林警員當時誤會第一被告人的陳述，錯誤理解第一被告人為該狗隻的狗主，因此作出有關紀錄。但同時本席不接納第一被告人聲稱曾向林警員指出有關紀錄不正確，本席相信，林警員作為專業和獨立的警務人員，假若第一被告人向林警員指出有關紀錄不正確，他定必會作出修正。事實上，在第一被告人對林警員盤問時，林警員確認第一被告人沒有閱讀過他的筆記簿紀錄，這亦解釋為何林警員的誤會沒有得到修正。本席亦留意到，林警員的筆記簿紀錄並沒有第一被告人的簽名確認內容，與第一被告人沒有閱讀過林警員筆記簿紀錄的說法吻合。

28. 本席另外留意到警方在2014年8月6日向法律援助署發出的信件，指出第一被告人才是該狗隻的狗主。這指稱明顯與漁農自然護理署的紀錄不符，特別是漁農自然護理署在同一日亦向法律援助署發出信件，證實第二被告人為事發時候該狗隻的狗主（見上文）。警方的信件沒有列出指稱第一被告人是該狗隻的狗主的資料來源或基礎，本席相信警方只是依賴林警員的筆記簿紀錄作出有關陳述，因此信件不是獨立支持第一被告人是該狗隻的狗主的證據（見警方在2016年8月8日向法律援助署發出的備忘）。況且，根據上述原因，本席已經裁定林警員筆記簿內有關第一被告人是該狗隻狗主的紀錄並不準確。同樣，警方在2015年4月15日和2016年3月11日分別向法律援助署發出備忘，指出根據警方紀錄第一被告人是該狗隻的狗主，本席相信警方只是依賴林警員的筆記簿紀錄作出有關備忘（見警方在2016年8月8日向法律援助署發出的備忘），因此不對警方有關文件給予比重。

29. 再者，第二被告人已經承認她是該狗隻的狗主，有關的說法得到漁農自然護理署文件的支持。第一被告人和第二被告人是同一個單位內不同劏房的住客，實際上是鄰居關係，就隱含可能性（inherent probabilities）而言，假若第一被告人是該狗隻的狗主，本席看不到第二被告人有任何誘因去為第一被告人隱瞞和承擔法律（包括潛在刑事）和賠償責任。

30. 基於以上原因，在相對可能性下，本席裁定第一被告人並非該狗隻的狗主，真正的狗主為第二被告人。

31. 就第一被告人是否在意外時該狗隻的牽引狗隻人，本席留意到，原告人和第一被告人的共同說法，是在意外發生後，第二被告人首先出現在意外現場，第一被告人在稍後才到達。基於這個說法，加上本席之前裁定第一被告人並非該狗隻的狗主，本席認為意外時，第一被告人並非該狗隻的牽引狗隻人，當時該狗隻由第二被告人牽引。

32. 基於以上事實裁斷，第一被告人並沒有對原告人有任何謹慎責任，因此也談不上違反任何謹慎責任。

基於違反法定責任的索償

33. 原告人依賴的法定責任是《香港法例》第167D章《危險狗隻規例》。但如以上所述，根據該規例附表2，該狗隻不屬該規例所指的「大型狗隻」，亦沒有證據顯示該狗隻為該規例所指的「格鬥狗隻」或「已知危險狗隻」，因此該狗隻並不受該規例規管，原告人因此沒有基礎指控第一被告人違反該規例下的法定責任。

34. 無論如何，就算該狗隻受該規例規管，原告人控告第一被告人違反法定責任的基礎在於他是該狗隻的畜養人或牽引人。基於以上原因，本席裁定第一被告人並非該狗隻的畜養人或牽引人，因此違反法定責任的申訴注定失敗。

原告人對第一被告人的責任問題總結

35. 基於以上原因，本席裁定，原告人針對第一被告人的申索，當中的3個訴因全部不成立，原告人對第一被告人的申索應被撤銷，因此以下賠償金額的評定只針對第二被告人（當然，假若本席對第一被告人責任問題的裁決被推翻，第一被告人和第二被告人應共同和個別承擔有關賠償（joint and several liability），以下賠償金額的評定亦將適用於第一被告人身上）。

原告人所受到的傷害

36. 如上述，本案中雙方不呈交醫學專家證據，因此本席沒有任何基礎釐定原告人的實際受傷程度和她所接受的治療是否恰當，也沒有基礎評定她的病假長度是否合理。當然，原告人有舉證責任證明她受傷的程度。本席只會依賴呈堂的醫療報告作為原告人的診斷資料報告。

37. 根據香港理工大學醫療保健處朱醫生（Dr Vivian Chu Wan Wing）於2014年1月27日發出的醫療報告，朱醫生在2013年11月19日（即意外後3天）替原告人檢查，發現原告人的左腿位置有兩個分別為0.2cm x 0.2cm 和1cm x 0.2cm 的傷口，傷口附近有瘀傷，但原告人步姿正常。

38. 根據屯門社會衛生科診所2014年7月8日的醫療報告，在2014年6月11日的檢查中，原告人左腿位置有兩個0.3cm長的疤痕，和一個約0.5cm直徑的黑色素沈澱（hyperpigmentation）。有關的疤痕和黑色素沈澱應該會隨時間褪去，但也有機會留下永久痕跡。

39. 此外，原告人亦聲稱因該意外患上精神創傷和產生對狗隻的恐懼。她在意外後接受精神科治療，有關的醫療紀錄如下：—

(1) 九龍醫院精神科2014年6月6日的紀錄，顯示在2014年1月3日至同年7月3日，原告人共接受7次單獨療程，當中首3次，原告人表示來港生活未能適應，因而產生焦慮、日間過度疲累和情緒低落等問題。報告記錄原告人當時治療的目標不包括對狗隻恐懼的問題，原告人表示希望處理日間過度疲累的症狀，因為這影響她的校園和學習生活。
(2) 在第三次治療（2014年1月21日）後，原告人無故暫停治療，直至2014年5月27日才恢復治療。當時她向治療人員表示有人際關係的問題，也繼續有對狗隻的恐懼和間中發噩夢被狗隻咬（但問題並不嚴重），當時原告人同意治療的目標不會包括處理對狗隻恐懼而是集中處理人際關係問題。報告亦表示不能預測有關意外會否為原告人帶來永久精神創傷。
(3) 九龍醫院精神科2014年8月28日的紀錄，表示原告人對狗隻恐懼已經減退而且該恐懼沒有對原告人造成重要傷害。原告人及後所面對的日間過度疲累部分由此意外引起，原告人校園及學習生活亦可能因而受影響。但報告表明，原告人的人際關係問題與該意外無關。本席留意到，這報告用詞包含「部分導致」（partially contributed）和「可能」（may）等字眼，但有關事件發生的可能性或機率並沒有列出。
(4) 另外，九龍醫院精神科2014年8月11日由李醫生（Dr Kevin Li Yat Tuen）發出的紀錄顯示早於2012年原告人已經向大學醫療保健處就情緒低落和未能處理壓力等問題尋求協助，原告人在2013年8月6日獲得大學醫療保健處轉介到九龍醫院精神科求診，並在2013年11月18日（即意外後2日）首次到九龍醫院精神科應診。在2013年11和12月間李醫生多次接見原告人，但原告人的投訴圍繞她的學習壓力和來港住宿問題，直至2014年2月14日才首次向李醫生提及該意外。李醫生認為該意外與其他誘發原告人精神問題的原因無關（“the alleged incident was considered as separate precipitating factors from her other life stressors”）。
(5) 本席亦考慮該醫療報告（即2018年5月31日由九龍醫院精神科發出的醫療報告）的內容，當中記錄原告人患有焦慮症和創傷後遺症（anxiety depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder），但該醫療報告表面上沒有考慮到其他醫療報告的內容，也沒有任何分析，全面性成疑，本席不能單單依賴該醫療報告便斷定原告人患有焦慮症和創傷後遺症。況且，該醫療報告也沒有指出原告人的焦慮症和創傷後遺症由該意外引起或導致。

40. 基於上述的醫療報告，本席接納意外導致原告人左腿位置有兩個0.3 cm長的疤痕和一個約0.5 cm直徑的黑色素沈澱，有關的疤痕和黑色素沈澱有機會留下永久痕跡。但本席認為，原告人在意外發生前已經尋求精神科協助，除了短暫對狗隻恐懼之外（而該恐懼沒有對原告人造成重要傷害），原告人未能證明意外導致她有任何其他精神創傷。

賠償金額：疼痛、痛苦與喪失生活樂趣

41. 在Tsang Ka Hung Barry v鄧玉玲（unreported, DCPI 525/2007，20.1.2009）一案中，原告人被狗咬導致左手有5 mm的傷口，但沒有永久痕跡或損害，獲法庭判予賠償$50,000。

42. 在Mujiati v Chong Wai Kwan （unreported，DCPI 424/2003，21.10.2004）一案中，原告人被狗咬導致有多個傷口並留有3個頗大的疤痕（1 cm x 0.5 cm, 1 cm x 1 cm, 1 cm x 6 cm），疤痕附近有色素沈澱問題，獲法庭判予賠償$70,000。

43. 在Mak Sze Ying Felix v Chui Chak Yung t/a Silver Spirit Car Services Centre（unreported，DCPI 2151/2009，8.2.2012）一案中，原告人被狗咬導致左手有長期疼痛和痲痹，同時亦有失眠和對狗隻恐懼的情況（當時原告人的婚姻狀況亦部份導致精神問題），獲法庭判予賠償$80,000。

44. 在本案中，原告人的傷勢與Mak Sze Ying和Tsang Ka Hung Barry類似，考慮到通脹，本席認爲，就疼痛、痛苦與喪失生活樂趣的損害，$80,000是合適的賠償。

賠償金額：審訊前醫療開支

45. 原告人索償審訊前醫療開支共$2,439，大部分有收據支持。本席全數批准她的醫療費用索償。

賠償金額：審訊前交通費開支

46. 原告人索償審訊前交通費開支共$1,200，包括24次的士來回以處理傷勢和病情，但當中只有約$100有單據支持。本席認為，原告人因該意外受到的傷害基本上不影響她的行動能力，原告人沒有必要乘坐的士來回，因此只酌情批准$500作為審訊前交通費開支。

賠償金額：額外租金和大學延期收費

47. 原告人聲稱，意外後她需要時間休養，導致她延遲提交功課和畢業論文，令她無法如期畢業。根據她的損害賠償陳述書（statement of damages），她索償$18,000作為向大學申請延期的收費（extension fee）和$79,200作為她在香港需逗留多18個月的租金（每月$4,400）。

48. 基於本席已經裁定，原告人除了短暫對狗隻的恐懼之外（而該恐懼沒有對原告人造成重要傷害），未能證明該意外導致她有任何其他精神創傷，因此原告人這項索償並不成立。再者，在沒有專家證據協助下，本席沒有證據基礎釐定合適的病假長度，從而判斷有關索償金額是否合理（而有關舉證責任在原告人身上）。

賠償金額：審訊前補品和其他醫療用品開支

49. 原告人索償審訊前補品和其他醫療用品（藥膏，紗布等）開支共$10,000，但原告人沒有出示收據，加上有關補品和醫療用品的藥用效力存疑，證據中也沒有醫護人員提及有關補品和醫療用品的必要性，所以只酌情准予原告人索取$2,000。

賠償金額：將來醫療費開支

50. 原告人索償將來醫療費開支，包括為疤痕做激光療程。由於醫療報告並沒有斷定意外會留下永久痕跡，而且有關的疤痕偏小，本席認為原告人未能證明將來醫療費的必要性或有關療程的成效，所以不批准有關申索。

總結

51. 總結而言，本席評估原告人的損失為$84,939，計算如下： —

（一）疼痛、痛苦及喪失生活樂趣賠償 $80,000
（二）審訊前的特別損失：
醫療開支 $2,439
交通費用開支 $500
補健食品開支 $2,000 $4,939
合共： $84,939

52. 原告人亦可以取得以下的利息補償：—

（一）疼痛、痛苦及喪失生活樂趣的賠償以年息2%計算，日期由傳訊令狀日期（2015年5月7日）開始至本裁決日為止，期後以判定債項利率計算至繳付為止；及
（二）審訊前的特別損失以年利率4%（裁決利率的一半）計算，日期由意外當日（2013年11月16日）開始至本裁決日為止，期後以判定債項利率計算至繳付為止。

終結

53. 本席裁定原告人針對第一被告人的申索敗訴，原告人須付第一被告人的訟費。若雙方不能就訟費額達成協議，則交由訟費評定官評定。

54. 就第二被告人對原告人的賠償金額評定為$84,939，另加按上述方式計算的利息。第二被告人須付原告人的訟費。若雙方不能就訟費額達成協議，則交由訟費評定官評定。

55. 原告人一方在有法律援助時引伸的訟費，根據《法律援助規例》評定。

56. 以上的全部訟費命令為暫准命令（costs order nisi），各方均有權在本判案書頒下之日起計的14天內向法庭以傳票申請變更有關的暫准命令，假若14天內各方並無有關申請，訟費暫准命令將自動成為絕對命令。

	( 龍雲彪 )
	區域法院委暫法官

原告人：沒有律師代表，並親自應訊

第一被告人：沒有律師代表，並親自應訊

第二被告人：沒有律師代表，並親自應訊

[1] 根據林警員口供，見下文。

DCPI 990/2015

[2018] HKDC 55

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 990 OF 2015

--------------------------

BETWEEN
	WEI WEI	Plaintiff
and
	CHI CHIH TONG	1^st Defendant
	WONG YIN MUI	2^nd Defendant
	TSANG CHI HO	Intended 3^rd Defendant

--------------------------

Before: Deputy District Judge C. Chow in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 15 January 2018

Date of Decision: 15 January 2018

---------------------

DECISION

---------------------

Background

1. The plaintiff commenced this action in 2015 against two individuals, the 1^st and the 2^nd defendants, for damages she sustained as a result of being bit by a dog with Microchip Code no. 035540782 (“the Dog”) on 16 November 2013 (“Accident”). It was pleaded in the Statement of Claim that the 1^st defendant was the owner and/or keeper of the Dog and the 2^nd defendant was the co-owner and/or keeper of the Dog at all material times. It was also alleged that the plaintiff was bit by the Dog when she went on the roof of Cheong Lok Mansion, No 1G Baker Street, Kowloon (“Building”) to collect a blanket.

2. The plaintiff was represented by the Director of Legal Aid (“DLA”) up till 18 May 2017 when her legal aid certificate was discharged. By the Order of Master SH Lee dated 25 August 2017, the pre-trial review (“PTR”) was set to be heard on 1 December 2017, and the date of the trial set to commence on 2 February 2018 with 3 days reserved.

3. On 3 November 2017, the plaintiff filed a summons seeking an order for (1) the addition of Tsang Chi Ho (“Tsang”) as the third defendant; (2) abrogation of right of the 2^nd defendant to defence during trial; and (3) for disclosure of the fact that the 1^st defendant has been raising dogs all the time by the Incorporated Owners of Cheong Lok Mansion (“IO”) via CCTV or the guard (“First Summons”). An affirmation in support (“P First Affirmation”) was filed by the plaintiff at the same time.

4. The First Summons was first heard on 1 December 2017. The fact that interlocutory judgment had already been entered against the 2^nd defendant was not drawn to the court’s attention at that hearing. Directions were given for filing and service of affirmation in opposition by the 1^st defendant, the 2^nd defendant and Tsang (“Other Parties”) and for filing and service of affirmation in reply by the plaintiff. The directions given by the court were as follows:-

Directions given on 1 December 2017:

“1. 批准第一被告人及擬加入之一方於2017年12月22日或之前，就原告人之傳票存檔及送達其反對誓章；
2. 第二被告人須於2017年12月6日或之前，以書面通知法庭其就原告人之傳票是否提出反對及提出有關其反對誓章之建議。法庭其後將通知訴訟各方聆訊押後之日期；
3. 批准原告人於2018年1月5日或之前，存檔及送達就上述第1及第2段所提及之反對誓章所作之回應誓章；
4. 各方可自由提出申請；及
5. 今天的訟費保留待決。”

Directions given on 8 December 2017:

“1. 批准第二被告人於2017年12月22日下午4時或之前，存檔就原告人2017年11月3日傳票之反對誓章，如有的話；
2. 批准原告人於2018年1月5日下午4時或之前存檔其回應誓章，如有的話；
3. 法庭於2017年12月1日指示存檔的各誓章須於相關限期當天下午4時或之前存檔；
4. 為送達上述第1、第2及第3段提及之各誓章，作出誓章一方須於存檔誓章限期當日4時30分前另送達3份副本於本法庭書記（到達區域法院3樓後至電2582 4011聯絡職員收取），各與訟他方可在限期當天下午4時30分後向本法庭書記領取有關誓章副本。不論任何一方是否依時到法庭領取副本，只要各份副本如前所述送達予本法庭書記便會視為已妥善送達至有關各方；
5. 原告人於2017年11月3日存檔的傳票聆訊押後至2018年1月15日上午10時正於區域法院第11庭進行辯論，預留2小時；
6. 本案之審前覆核聆訊及原告人之證人傳票申請將於上述押後聆訊日期一併處理。”

5. The Other Parties filed and served their affirmations in opposition pursuant to the above directions on 22 December 2017. I will refer to the affirmations from the 1^st defendant, the 2^nd defendant and Tsang as “D1 Affirmation”, “D2 Affirmation” and “Tsang Affirmation” respectively. The plaintiff did not pick up such affirmations in opposition until 5 January 2018, the due date for her to file and serve her own affirmation in reply.

6. On 8 January 2018, without leave of the court, the plaintiff filed two affirmations. In one of the affirmations that was written out in English, the plaintiff complained about the directions I made at the hearing on 1 December 2017 and the prejudice that she perceived to be held by me against her at that hearing (“P Second Affirmation”). In the other affirmation filed on 8 January 2018 that was written out in Chinese (“P Third Affirmation”), the plaintiff referred to further matters in support of the First Summons.

7. On 12 January 2018, the plaintiff filed a summons (“Second Summons”) seeking for a response from the court to P Second Affirmation and leave to file P Third Affirmation. As the Other Parties have not been in receipt of P Second Affirmation and P Third Affirmation prior to the hearing today, copies have been provided to them for review before proceeding further.

8. One thing I need to deal with at the outset and that is D2 Affirmation. I have since found out that as a result of the default of the 2^nd defendant in filing any notice of intention to defend, interlocutory judgment was entered against her on 28 July 2015, with damages to be assessed. That being the case, the 2^nd defendant cannot now raise any matter for her defence. I will therefore expunge the D2 Affirmation.

SECOND SUMMONS

9. I need to consider first whether to allow an extension of time for the plaintiff to file P Third Affirmation. Matters to be taken into account include the length of the delay and the reason for the delay.

10. The original deadline for the plaintiff to file her affirmation in reply was 5 January 2018. She filed it on 8 January 2018 and so the delay was three days. The delay is not substantial.

11. In the Second Summons, the plaintiff refers to the reasons for the delay set out in P Second Affirmation. The plaintiff regards P Second Affirmation as a letter to me. It is important for the plaintiff to bear in mind that the litigation in hand is a dispute between herself and the Other Parties and all her applications have to be made under the relevant rules of procedure applicable. The plaintiff has not indicated the rules of procedure under which her request for a reply from me was made. Further, it is open to the parties, including the plaintiff, to appeal against the orders made by the court, including the order I made on 1 December 2017, if he or she so wishes. For these reasons, I will not be replying to P Second Affirmation, but I will take into account the matters deposed therein only for the purpose of deciding whether they can be accepted as reasons justifying the delay in the filing of P Third Affirmation.

12. In P Second Affirmation, the plaintiff stated that it was unfair to direct the filing and service of her affirmation in reply by 5 January 2018. She referred to her being granted 13 days to reply whereas the Other Parties were given “extra 21 days” after the hearing on 1 December 2017 to file and serve their affirmations in opposition. She pointed out that she had to read three statements from the Other Parties while they each had to read one statement from her. What is worse, according to the plaintiff, was the counting of 22 December 2017 as one day when the plaintiff could only get the statements from the court by 4:30pm on that day. She also said I did not count from the date of the hearing of 1 December 2017 for the Other Parties.

13. According to the last paragraph of P Second Affirmation, the delay in the submission of the plaintiff’s statement against Tsang was because the plaintiff had to get some letters from the Legal Aid Department (“LAD”) to prove what they had done after they had notice of the identity of the registered owner of the Dog at the time of the Accident. The plaintiff also referred to her inability to get all the documents before 5 January 2018 owing to the Christmas and New Year break.

14. That the plaintiff considers the directions I gave for the filing of evidence in respect of the Summons to be unfair is not an acceptable reason for the late filing of the affirmation in reply by the plaintiff. In exercising any of its powers under the Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336H) (“Rules”), the court shall seek to give effect to the underlying objectives set out in Order 1A, rule 1 of the Rules, including to increase the cost-effectiveness of any practice and procedure to be followed in relation to proceedings before the court, to ensure that a case is dealt with as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable, to promote a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy in the conduct of proceedings, to ensure fairness between the parties, and to facilitate settlement between the parties. It is also stipulated in Order 1A, rule 3 that the parties to any proceedings and their legal representatives shall assist the court to further such underlying objectives.

15. Leaving aside the other reason about getting documents from the LAD and simply looking at the state of affairs as they have occurred, the plaintiff did not need more than 4 days to get her affirmation in place. She only picked up the affirmations of the Other Parties on 5 January 2018 and she filed P Second Affirmation and P Third Affirmation on 8 January 2018. There is no explanation from the plaintiff as to why she did not pick up the affirmations of the Other Parties earlier, and wasting 14 days’ time unused for the preparation of her affirmation in reply. She has not fulfilled her duty to assist the court to further the aforesaid underlying objectives. In view of such duty, she should also not be asking for more time than would be necessary simply because the Other Parties were given more time than she was.

16. At the hearing on 1 December 2017, the directions for filing evidence were given after hearing the submissions of the plaintiff about the time she would require for the filing and serving of the affirmation in reply. The parties were told that they could apply to the court if they would need more time and “liberty to apply (各方可自由提出申請)” was specifically stipulated in one of the paragraphs of the Order made that day. The plaintiff did not so apply before the due date for her to file and serve her affirmation in reply, but opted to file the same at the time she chose herself.

17. The plaintiff said the Order I made did not require her to seek time extension before the due date. That is a blatant disregard to her duty to give effect to the underlying objectives to increase the cost-effectiveness of any practice and procedure to be followed in relation to proceedings before the court, to promote a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy in the conduct of proceedings, and to facilitate settlement between the parties. As the plaintiff only came to court to get the affirmations of the Other Parties on 5 January 2018, she knew full well that she would not be able to file her affirmation in reply before the due date, but she made no attempt to ask for consent of the other sides.

18. The other reason proffered by the plaintiff for the delay is that she had to get some documents from the LAD. P Third Affirmation made reference to 5 letters sent by the LAD on behalf of the plaintiff to Tsang, from 21 April 2016 to 20 December 2016. These letters had been in existence for about one year or more at the time the plaintiff filed the First Summons. The LAD was representing the plaintiff at that time and she could have access to them. Even if the plaintiff had not kept a copy of such letters earlier, she should have obtained all the relevant papers from the LAD once her legal aid certificate was discharged in May 2017 and made reference to them in P First Affirmation. If she only cared to obtain them at a much later time, she herself, and not the other sides, has to bear the consequences of leaving the matter to the last minute.

19. Another matter to be taken into account is the merits of the plaintiff’s case. As the extension of time applied for is for the filing of P Third Affirmation, it is time to consider the nature of the evidence sought to be adduced under P Third Affirmation. Part 1 of P Third Affirmation is “相關法律” and Part 2 is “相關事實”. In the said Part 1, the plaintiff referred to the definition of “畜養人” in section 2 of the Dogs and Cats Ordinance (Cap. 167), section 20A of the Rabies Regulation (Cap. 421A) and section 32 of the Rabies Ordinance (Cap. 421). All these references were not made in P First Affirmation.

20. The leave granted to the plaintiff is for adducing evidence in reply to the evidence sought to be relied upon by the Other Parties to oppose the First Summons only. It is not for her to file another around of fresh evidence which she could and should have produced when she filed P First Affirmation.

21. Although the plaintiff has the last say in the filing of evidence relating to the First Summons, the 1^st defendant and Tsang have to be given the chance to respond to her affirmation in support. If the plaintiff only discloses some of the evidence she wants to rely on in the last round of the filing of evidence but not before, the other sides, who can only know about it after they have filed their own affirmations, will have no further chance to respond. That is not in the interest of justice.

22. There are eight paragraphs in Part 2 of P Third Affirmation. Paragraphs 1-3 of Part 2 of P Third Affirmation are comments of the plaintiff on the evidence in Tsang Affirmation, while paragraph 7 of that Part 2 is in response to D1 Affirmation. They are indeed evidence in reply.

23. Paragraph 4 is where the plaintiff referred to the 5 letters mentioned in paragraph 18 above. As pointed out in that paragraph, they should have been raised in P First Affirmation. The same goes for the attendance of Tsang at a mediation meeting on 4 January 2017 referred to in paragraph 5 of Part 2 of P Third Affirmation and the receipt by the plaintiff of the relevant documents in June 2017 (incorrectly stated as June 2016 in P Third Affirmation) in paragraph 6 of that Part 2, which happened well before the filing of the First Summons.

24. In paragraph 7 of Part 2 of P Third Affirmation, the plaintiff referred to the admission of the 1^st defendant in his affirmation that he was keeping the Dog. The other matters dealt with in this paragraph 7 relate to another application of the plaintiff for issue of a writ of subpoena. That has nothing to do with the First Summons and should not be included in the affirmation in reply.

25. Paragraph 8 of Part 2 of P Third Affirmation is in reply to D2 Affirmation. With D2 Affirmation expunged, there is no need for the plaintiff to reply. That paragraph 8 should also be disregarded.

26. Having taken into account all relevant considerations, in particular the interest of justice, I grant retrospective leave to the plaintiff to file P Third Affirmation on 8 January 2018, but with Part 1 on “相關法律” and paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 8 of Part 2 on “相關事實” expunged. I make no order as to paragraph 1 of the Second Summons.

27. I will hear parties on costs after dealing with the First Summons.

	(C. Chow)
	Deputy District Judge

The plaintiff was not represented and appearing in person

The 1^st defendant, the 2^nd defendant and the intended 3^rd defendant were not represented and appearing in person

DCPI 990/2015

[2018] HKDC 57

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 990 OF 2015

--------------------------

BETWEEN
	WEI WEI	Plaintiff
and
	CHI CHIH TONG	1^st Defendant
	WONG YIN MUI	2^nd Defendant
	TSANG CHI HO	Intended 3^rd Defendant

--------------------------

Before: Deputy District Judge C. Chow in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 15 January 2018

Date of Decision: 15 January 2018

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DECISION

---------------------

Background

1. The relevant factual background of this case has been set out in my earlier decision of even date (“First Decision”). I will not repeat it here. I also adopt all the abbreviations used in the First Decision in this decision relating to the First Summons.

Addition of Tsang as the 3^rd defendant

2. In P First Affirmation, the plaintiff pointed to a memo from the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (“AFCD”) to the DLA of 12 April 2016 which gave the name of Tsang as the previous recorded dog keeper of the Dog as at the date of the Accident.

3. According to Tsang Affirmation, he opposed the application on ground that any action against him is now time barred under the Limitation Ordinance (“LO”) which he says, provides for a 3 years’ time limit for the plaintiff to sue. He also stated that he had never been a de facto keeper of the Dog, giving an account as to how he became the previous dog keeper on record.

4. Tsang averred to his coming across the Dog when it was hit by a car in the evening of 7 February 2013. He took the Dog to The Society of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“SPCA”) and got registered as its owner. The Dog was taken care of by SPCA and foster families until, through the introduction by some friends, Tsang managed to find someone, the 2^nd defendant, who was prepared to adopt the Dog in May 2013. A blog of the adoption that was posted by Tsang on an internet social platform can be found in the exhibits. That blog referred to “領養家庭王小姐”. Tsang was under the impression, albeit incorrect, that all documentation for transfer of ownership was completed then.

5. Tsang further deposed to his becoming aware of the Accident when so informed by the 2^nd defendant in November 2013. To avoid any misunderstanding as to the ownership of the Dog as at the date of the Accident, Tsang and the 2^nd defendant immediately attended to the procedure for transfer of ownership of the Dog and the AFCD issued an “Amendment to Dog Licence” on 19 November 2013, showing the 2^nd defendant as the keeper of the Dog.

6. As indicated in D1 Affirmation, the 1^st defendant opposed the addition of Tsang as a defendant on two grounds, the first being the delay that will be caused. The 1^st defendant complained about the application at this late stage, when the amendments could have been sought for much earlier, when the plaintiff was legally represented. The 1^st defendant also referred to the inevitable lengthening of the trial.

7. The second ground relied on by the 1^st defendant is the running of inconsistent claims by the plaintiff. Given that the basis for the plaintiff to seek to add Tsang is the claim that Tsang was the owner of the Dog as at the date of the Accident, the plaintiff cannot continue to maintain her claim against the 1^st defendant which is also based on the allegation that the 1^st defendant was the owner of the Dog as at the date of the Accident. The 1^st defendant asked the plaintiff why her claim against him is not discontinued.

8. Section 27 of the LO sets out the applicable limitation period and is reproduced below:-

“27. Time limit for personal injuries
(1) This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under an Ordinance or imperial enactment or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person.
(2) Section 4 shall not apply to an action to which this section applies.
(3) Subject to section 30, an action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period specified in subsections (4) and (5).
(4) Except where subsection (5) applies, the said period is 3 years from—
(a) the date on which the cause of action accrued; or
(b) the date (if later) of the plaintiff’s knowledge.
(5) If the person injured dies before the expiration of the period in subsection (4), the period as respects the cause of action surviving for the benefit of the estate of the deceased by virtue of section 20 of the Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 23) shall be 3 years from—
(a) the date of death; or
(b) the date of the personal representative’s knowledge,
whichever is the later.
(6) In this section, and in section 28, references to a person’s date of knowledge are references to the date on which he first had knowledge of the following facts—
(a) that the injury in question was significant; and
(b) that that injury was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty; and
(c) the identity of the defendant; and
(d) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the defendant, the identity of that person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant,
and knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence, nuisance or breach of duty is irrelevant.
(7) For the purposes of this section an injury is significant if the plaintiff would reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.
(8) For the purposes of this section and section 28 a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire—
(a) from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or
(b) from facts ascertainable by him with the help of medical or other appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek,
but a person shall not be fixed under this subsection with knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.
(9) For the purposes of this section “personal representative” (遺產代理人) includes any person who is or has been a personal representative of the deceased, including an executor who has not proved the will (whether or not he has renounced probate); and regard shall be had to any knowledge acquired by any such person while a personal representative or previously.
(10) If there is more than one personal representative, and their dates of knowledge are different, subsection (5)(b) shall be read as referring to the earliest of those dates.”

9. Although the time limit prescribed under section 27(4) of the LO is 3 years, the three years is to count from the date of the plaintiff’s knowledge, if later. What amounts to plaintiff’s knowledge is provided for in section 27(6). Judging from P First Affirmation, the plaintiff is not disputing that all the matters referred to in section 27(6) were within the knowledge of the plaintiff before the expiry of the limitation period, save for the fact that Tsang was on record the keeper of the Dog as at the date of the Accident.

10. The identity of Tsang as the previous recorded dog keeper is set out in the memo from AFCD dated 12 April 2016. The LAD had been corresponding with Tsang as early as 21 April 2016. The plaintiff said while making submissions at the hearing, and not in any of her affirmations, that she was not aware of such actions taken by the LAD on her behalf. What she said is only bare allegation and I should not regard it as evidence. I also find such allegation inherently improbable given that the letters of LAD referred specifically to their being instructed to act on the plaintiff’s behalf. Nevertheless, even if I were to accept that as true, there is no evidence that the plaintiff did not have the means to find out. Being her legal representatives, the knowledge of the LAD is imputed to the plaintiff. There can therefore be no dispute that the plaintiff had, by April 2016, knowledge that Tsang was the keeper of the Dog on record at the time of the Accident. The clock would not start to run again upon the plaintiff switching from being legally represented by the LAD to her acting in person.

11. By April 2016, the three years’ limitation period had not expired. The plaintiff was then legally represented and there is no explanation from her as to why an application to join Tsang as a defendant to this action had not been made before the expiry of the limitation period. I cannot see any ground to allow her to do so now.

12. The concern raised by the 1^st defendant in D1 Affirmation about the plaintiff running inconsistent claims is another serious matter. Order 18 rule 12A of the Rules is relevant here. It provides as follows:-

“12A. A party may in any pleading make an allegation of fact which is inconsistent with another allegation of fact in the same pleading if –
(a) The party has reasonable grounds for so doing; and
(b) The allegations are made in the alternative.

13. To maintain a claim against Tsang on the basis that he was the owner or keeper of the Dog as at the date of the Accident, the plaintiff can only base her claim against the 1^st and 2^nd defendants in the alternative. However, not only has the plaintiff not indicated her attempt to plead her case against the two defendants and Tsang in the alternative, by entering judgment against the 2^nd defendant on the basis of her allegation that the 2^nd defendant was the owner or keeper of the Dog at the time of the Accident, the plaintiff has barred herself from so pleading in the alternative. I do not see how the plaintiff could introduce an alternative plea against Tsang now without first having set aside the default judgment obtained against the 2^nd defendant.

14. For the above reasons, I dismiss the application of the plaintiff under paragraph 1 of the First Summons. There is therefore no need for me to deal with the points raised in relation to the circumstances of Tsang being registered as the owner or keeper of the Dog as at the date of the Accident, including those made by the plaintiff in paragraphs 1-3 of Part 2 of P Third Affirmation.

15. I wish to add though that even if I were to take into account the provisions of the Dogs and Cats Ordinance, the Rabies Regulation and the Rabies Ordinance referred to in P Third Affirmation, it would not have made any difference to the outcome of the application in paragraph 1 of the First Summons.

16. When seeking to rely on the definition of “keeper” in the Dogs and Cats Ordinance, the plaintiff stated that Tsang comes within the definition of paragraph (a) of that definition, that is, “a person who owns the dog or cat or has it in his possession or custody” in relation to the Dog. The plaintiff then stated that the 1^st defendant and the 2^nd defendant come within paragraph (b) and (c) respectively of that definition when the Dog was kept at the flat of the Building where the two defendants lived together. It is important to note that the definition applies to the interpretation of the provisions of the Dogs and Cats Ordinance, but the plaintiff is not seeking to rely on any such provisions. The plaintiff has not drawn my attention to any judicial authority to show that the application of that definition goes beyond the Dogs and Cats Ordinance. The relevance of that definition has not therefore been demonstrated.

17. As regards section 20A of the Rabies Regulation, it provides that it is an offence for any person to whom a licence in respect of a dog has been granted under that Part of the Regulation to fail to notify the Director of AFCD of his ceasing to be the keeper of the dog as soon as reasonably practicable and in any case not later than 5 days. Whether to prosecute for a criminal offence is a matter for the Secretary for Justice and until a person is convicted, he or she is presumed to be innocent. There is no evidence of any prosecution or conviction of such offence in respect of any of the Other Parties before me. I do not therefore see how section 20A of the Rabies Regulation can bring the case of the plaintiff forward.

18. As for section 32 of the Rabies Ordinance, the plaintiff’s reliance on the provisions is misconceived. That section refers to a “place prohibited to animals” which is a term defined in section 2 of that Ordinance as “a place declared by the Chief Executive under section 31 to be a place prohibited to animals”. The notice of prohibition issued by the IO that the plaintiff referred to in P Third Affirmation is not within the coverage of that provision.

Abrogation of right of 2^nd defendant to defence during trial

19. There is only one reason given for the request to abrogate the right of defence of the 2^nd defendant in P First Affirmation, that is, the 2^nd defendant has never filed any documents as statement for trial. The plaintiff has not indicated under which statutory provisions her application was made. Without such critical information, I do not know where such power of abrogation comes from.

20. As noted in the above, as a result of the default of the 2^nd defendant in filing any notice of intention to defend, interlocutory judgment has already been entered against her on 28 July 2015, with damages to be assessed. There is no application from the 2^nd defendant to set aside such default judgment, and unless and until she applies to do so, she is prohibited from putting in a defence by the rules of procedure. Not only therefore do I not see the ground for the request of the plaintiff, nor do I see any need for it.

21. I note that in P First Affirmation, the plaintiff specifically referred to the lapse of over 6 months from the hearing in February 2017. The Order of Master D To dated 17 February 2017 did require the 2^nd defendant to inform the court at the next checklist review hearing whether she would continue with her defence of the present action. I do not find any record of the 2^nd defendant having done so.

22. Hence, even if the 2^nd defendant intends to put in a defence, she will have to not only satisfy the court that the default judgment should be set aside, but also to explain why the said Order of Master D To have not been complied with. It would be a considerable hurdle, but I cannot rule out the possibility of the 2^nd defendant being able to do so; and if she does succeed to do so, she will be allowed to come in even at a very late stage. Those are the rights of the 2^nd defendant under the rules of procedure and without the plaintiff identifying the relevant provisions under which her request can be entertained, I am at a loss as to how I can do so.

23. For the reasons stated above, I dismiss the application of the plaintiff under paragraph 2 of the First Summons.

Disclosure by CCTV or guard

24. According to P First Affirmation, the plaintiff sought discovery of CCTV and the report of the guard by the IO. The IO is not a party to the present proceedings. Disclosure of documents can be sought against a third party under section 47B of the District Court Ordinance. The relevant procedure is set out in Order 24 rules 7A and 8 of the Rules. The relevant parts of rules 7A and 8 are extracted below:-

“7A. – (1)…
(2) An application after the commencement of proceedings for an order under section 47B(1) of the Ordinance for the disclosure of documents by a person who is not a party to the proceedings shall be made by summons, which must be served on that person personally and on every party to the proceedings other than the applicant.
(3) A summons under paragraph (1) or (2) shall be supported by an affidavit which must –
(a) …
(b) in any case, specify or describe the documents in respect of which the order is sought and show, if practicable by reference to any pleading served or intended to be served in the proceedings, that the documents are relevant to an issue arising or likely to arise in the proceedings and that the person against whom the order is sought is likely to have or have had them in his possession, custody or power.
…
(4) A copy of the supporting affidavit shall be served with the summons on every person on whom the summons is required to be served.
…
8.(1)…
(2) No order for the disclosure of documents shall be made under section 47A or 47B of the Ordinance, unless the Court is of opinion that the order is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.”

25. It is plain that the plaintiff has not complied with the requirements of Order 24 rule 7A. There is no evidence before me of the service of the First Summons and P First Affirmation on the IO. P First Affirmation has not specified which issue arising in the proceedings are the documents sought relevant to, why it is likely that the IO is likely to have or have had those documents in their possession, custody or power. There is also no explanation why disclosure is necessary as required under Order 24 rule 8. For these reasons alone, the application under paragraph 3 of the First Summons should be dismissed.

26. Although not entirely clear, it may be the case that the plaintiff seeks discovery to show that the 1^st defendant has not told the truth in his witness statement and in his reply to the letter issued by the LAD on 26 January 2017, which should be the Answer to the Request for Further and Better Particulars filed on 15 September 2017 (“Supplemental FBP”). In the Supplemental FBP, in answer to the question of the LAD “whether D1 allowed, permitted or acquiesced D2 to take the dogs to the roof when D1 went up to the roof with D2?” (“FBP Question”), the 1^st defendant stated that he did not have any dog. As far as I can surmise, the basis of the plaintiff’s complaint is her having found the 1^st defendant to have a habit of walking dogs every morning around 8 am. In support of this alleged discovery, the plaintiff has attached four photographs to P First Affirmation.

27. In the first place, the photographs are equivocal and do not amount to proof that the 1^st defendant is keeping dogs. The plaintiff describes the photographs as showing the 1^st defendant taking two dogs back to his apartment after he finished walking them. I have difficulty in accepting them as such.

28. One photograph shows the 1^st defendant entering an elevator with a dog on leash. I can only see one dog in that photograph. The dog can be the 1^st defendant’s own dog or it can be the dog of someone else. Ownership of a dog cannot be assumed by the mere fact that one is walking it. The position is the same with the so-called admission mentioned in paragraph 7 of Part 2 of P Third Affirmation, that is, the reference by the 1^st defendant in D1 Affirmation to his encounter with the plaintiff inside the elevator of the Building, alleging that the plaintiff was deliberating causing annoyance to the dog he had with him then.

29. The quality of the second photograph is so poor that I cannot accept it as showing anything at all. With some speculation, that may be a photograph of the interior of an elevator, but to say that it shows anything else would be beyond even speculation.

30. The last two photographs are those of the Dog taken by the AFCD on 18 November 2013. I fail to see how the plaintiff can rely on these two photographs for the purpose of the discovery that she now seeks.

31. In any event, having reviewed the witness statement of the 1^st defendant made on 11 October 2016 and the Supplemental FBP, I do not see how the plaintiff can make out a case of the photographs as being relevant to the question of whether the 1^st defendant was telling the truth. In that witness statement, the 1^st defendant said he was not the owner of the two dogs that were on the roof of the Building at the time the plaintiff was bit by the Dog and he himself did not have any dogs. What the plaintiff said in P First Affirmation was the position as at the date of P First Affirmation, and not as at the date when the 1^st defendant made his witness statement.

32. Similarly, what the 1^st defendant said in the Supplemental FBP about him not having any dogs was in answer to the FBP Question. So what he said was the position as at the date of the Accident. Even if the 1^st defendant is indeed keeping dogs now, this fact has no relevance at all to what he said in his pleadings or witness statements about the situation at the time of the Accident.

33. For the aforesaid reasons, even if the plaintiff had complied with the procedural requirements in seeking discovery, her application would have to be dismissed anyway.

COSTS

34. What remains is for me to hear the parties on costs in respect of both the First Summons and the Second Summons

	(C. Chow)
	Deputy District Judge

The plaintiff was not represented and appearing in person

The 1^st defendant, the 2^nd defendants and the intended 3^rd defendant were not represented and appearing in person

WEI WEI v. CHI CHIH TONG AND ANOTHER

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