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Miscellaneous Proceedings2019

SKK (H.K.) CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER v. TSUI PO HING AND ANOTHER

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Files (4)

[2022] HKCFI 619-EN-2022-03-02

SKK (H.K.) CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER v. TSUI PO HING AND ANOTHER

HTML content

HCMP 934/2019

[2022] HKCFI 619

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 934 OF 2019

_______________

 

IN THE MATTER of 2 Charging Orders Absolute granted in the High Court Action Number 16850 of 1998 (HCA 16850/1998) and in the Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 36 of 2012 (CACV 36/2012) both dated 17th January 2018 over the Defendants’ property as per the 1st Schedule hereto (“The Property”)

  and
 

IN THE MATTER of 2 Charging Orders Absolute granted in the High Court Commercial Action Number 42 of 2004 (HCCL 42/2004) dated 11th April 2018 and in the Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 101 of 2007 (CACV 101/2007) dated 10th May 2018 over the Defendants’ property

  and
 

IN THE MATTER of Order 50 Rule 9A of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A)

  and
 

IN THE MATTER of Section 25A of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)

_______________

BETWEEN  
 SKK (H.K.) CO. LTD.1st Plaintiff
 SK KAKEN CO. LTD.2nd Plaintiff

and

 TSUI PO HING1st Defendant
 TSUI PO CHEUNG2nd Defendant

_______________

Before: Hon Linda Chan J in Chambers

Date of Written Submissions:  16 February 2022

Date of Decision: 2 March 2022

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

1.  By Summons dated 21 January 2022, the 1st and 2nd defendants (“Ds”) apply for leave to appeal against this Court’s order made on 10 January 2022 (“Order”) refusing their application[1] for provision of transcripts of the hearings on 25 May 2021 (“May Transcripts”) and 22 October 2021 (“October Transcripts”).

2.  On 16 February 2022, the parties agreed that the Court can dispose of the Summons on paper, thereby waiving their right to an oral hearing. 

3.  The Summons, insofar as it relates to the May Transcripts, must be dismissed in limine.  Ds had applied for leave to appeal against my refusal to provide the May Transcripts in their summons dated 8 September 2021, and I refused the application for the reasons stated in §§15-17 of my Decision dated 28 October 2021 (“Leave Decision”).  Ds cannot make a second application for the May Transcripts when their application had already been refused, and leave to appeal against that refusal dismissed by this Court.  

4.  In their written submissions, Ds refer to their application for leave to appeal against the Leave Decision[2] and claim that for the purpose of that application, the Registrar of Civil Appeals has on 4 January 2022 approved the inclusion of the transcripts in the hearing bundle (in Chinese “批准被告人可以將書面聆訊謄本收納在申請文件冊內”).  This is clearly wrong.  The Registrar only stated that if Ds want to refer to any transcripts, such transcripts should be included in the hearing bundle (in Chinese “倘若第一被告及第二被告需要引用聆訊謄本以支持他們的上訴許可申請,他們亦可把有關的書面聆訊謄本(由法庭提供的版本)收納在申請文件冊內”[3]).  As this Court has already refused Ds’ application for the May Transcripts, there will not be any transcripts which need to be included in the bundle.

5.  As regards the application for leave to appeal against the order refusing Ds’ application for provision of the October Transcripts, it is an appeal against a case management decision.   

6.  It is well established that leave to appeal would only be granted if the Court is satisfied that the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.  This means the prospects of succeeding must be more than “fanciful”, without having to be “probable”.  Even if this threshold requirement is met, the Court has a discretion to refuse leave (Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2022, §59/2A/4).   

7.  Where, as here, the intended appeal is an appeal against exercise of discretion of the judge, the applicant would have to show that he has an arguable case, with reasonable chance of success, that the relevant decision exceeds the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible, is plainly wrong, and not merely the appellate court would prefer a solution which the judge had not chosen (RK v YS, HCMP 1969/2012, 1 November 2012 (CA)).  This is because an appeal court will not interfere with a judge’s exercise of discretion unlessthe judge has misunderstood the law or the evidence or the exercise of discretion was plainly wrong (北京橙天嘉禾影視製作有限公司v張承勷, HCMP 2666/2016, 11 November 2016).

8.  Ds have not prepared any draft notice of appeal against the Leave Decision.  Nor have they articulated any ground in support of their proposed appeal other than asserting that they have a right under the High Court Ordinance or the Rules of the High Court to be provided with transcripts. 

9.  I do not think that Ds have the alleged right to be provided with transcripts.  The starting point is that it is the responsibility of the parties to take notes of the proceedings if and insofar as they consider it necessary to do so.  The same applies to a litigant in person.  

10.  It must be emphasised that provision of transcripts is the exception rather than the rule as it involves the engagement of an outside transcriber to listen to the recording and transcribe the same into written form.  This can be a time consuming and costly process.  The amount to be paid by the applicant only covers part of the actual cost incurred in the process. 

11.  More importantly, where the proposed appeal is an appeal against an interlocutory order and the Court gave a written decision setting out the reasons for making the order, it is ordinarily sufficient for the parties to refer to the written decision and possibly, the submissions used by the parties at the hearing.  Provision of transcripts for interlocutory hearing would only add to the costs of the proceedings and encourage the parties to pick on matters said or not said at the hearing, when such matters would not assist determination of the appeal.   

12.  It is for these reasons that the Court would be slow to approve provision of transcripts of an interlocutory hearing where the parties only made submissions to the Court, and the Court gave a written decision on the application.  Consistent with this, it is the practice of the Court not to approve an application for provision of transcripts unless the hearing in question falls into one of the following categories:

(1)  an ex parte hearing where only the applicant was present.  The Court would ordinarily allow transcripts to be provided to the parties as the hearing was conducted in the presence of the applicant, but not the respondent or persons who may be affected by the order;

(2)  a trial where witnesses gave oral evidence, and such evidence is relevant to a pending appeal against the judgment;

(3)  a hearing where there is a dispute as to whether a party has  made certain concessions or admissions; and

(4)  a hearing where the Court gave oral reasons for the decision or judgment, and there is no written decision or judgment setting out those reasons.   

13.  It is incumbent upon a party applying for transcripts to satisfy the Court that there is a proper basis to accede to the application. For this purpose, the applicant has to (1) identify which parts of the transcripts he wishes to seek; (2) the purpose of seeking such parts of the transcripts; (3) why the notes of the proceedings which ought to have been taken by him are not sufficient; and (4) any other reasons sufficient to justify the Court exercising its discretion in his favour. 

14.  In the present case, other than stating that they have a right to be provided with the October Transcripts, Ds failed to explain why such transcripts are relevant to their renewed application for leave to appeal.  I do not think the October Transcripts are relevant to their application given that:

(1)  The hearing on 22 October 2021 was a hearing of Ds’ summons dated 8 September 2021 for leave to appeal against the “Dismissal Order”, the “Sale Order”, the “Costs Order”, the “1st Translation Order”, the “Transcript Order” and the “2nd Translation Order” (as defined in §2 of the Leave Decision).  Ps and Ds made detailed submissions and arguments in their respective written submissions served on the other party in advance of the hearing;

(2)  At the hearing, the parties essentially repeated the points already made in their written submissions.  Both Ds were present at the hearing, they could take their own notes of the hearing if they considered it necessary to do so.  If Ds did not do so, it goes to show that they did not consider it necessary to take note of what had been said at the hearing; and

(3)  More importantly, this Court has in the Decision ([2021] HKCFI 3219) set out the reasons for refusing leave to appeal.  It would not be necessary for Ds to refer to the October Transcripts to apprise of the arguments advanced by the parties and the reasons for dismissing their application.   

15.  In any event, as soon as Ds requested for provision of the October Transcripts by their letter dated 3 November 2021, this Court approved the provision of the audio recording of the hearing on 22 October 2021 to Ds at the usual charge of $170.  For reasons never explained, Ds did not pay the charge or take any step to obtain the audio recording.  Instead, Ds simply reiterated their request for the same transcripts in their letter dated 7 January 2022 as if their application had not been dealt with by the Court.  Such conduct is unacceptable.   

Disposition and costs

16.  For the above reasons, the Summons is dismissed.  

17.  Costs should follow the event.  I make a costs order nisi that Ds shall pay the costs of and occasioned by the Summons forthwith, to be assessed by way of gross sum assessment.  Subject to any comments which Ds may make, it seems to me that the costs claimed by Ps (HK$15,070) are very reasonable and should be allowed in full. If Ds wish to provide their comments on Ps’ statement of costs, they should do so within 7 days of this Decision by sending the same to e-Lodgement platform (https://e-services.judiciary.hk/elodge/hc/) or by fax.  This Court will assess the costs on paper.  

 (Linda Chan)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Tsangs, solicitors for the 1st – 2nd plaintiffs

The 1st and 2nd defendants act in person



[1]  Made by letter dated 7 January 2022

[2]  CAMP 508/2021

[3]  Underlined added

[2021] HKCFI 3219-EN-2021-10-28

SKK (H.K.) CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER v. TSUI PO HING AND ANOTHER

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HCMP 934/2019

[2021] HKCFI 3219

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 934 OF 2019

_______________

 

IN THE MATTER of 2 Charging Orders Absolute granted in the High Court Action Number 16850 of 1998 (HCA 16850/1998) and in the Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 36 of 2012 (CACV 36/2012) both dated 17th January 2018 over the Defendants’ property as per the 1st Schedule hereto (“The Property”)

  and
 

IN THE MATTER of 2 Charging Orders Absolute granted in the High Court Commercial Action Number 42 of 2004 (HCCL 42/2004) dated 11th April 2018 and in the Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 101 of 2007 (CACV 101/2007) dated 10th May 2018 over the Defendants’ property

  and
 

IN THE MATTER of Order 50 Rule 9A of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A)

  and
 

IN THE MATTER of Section 25A of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)

_______________

BETWEEN  
 SKK (H.K.) CO. LTD.1st Plaintiff
 SK KAKEN CO. LTD.2nd Plaintiff

and

 TSUI PO HING1st Defendant
 TSUI PO CHEUNG2nd Defendant

_______________

Before:  Hon Linda Chan J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 22 October 2021

Date of Decision:  28 October 2021

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

1.  By judgment dated 10 June 2021 [2021] HKCFI 1676 (“Judgment”), this Court make an order for sale in respect of a property known as Workshop 13 on 2nd Floor and Flat Roof, Harry Industrial Building, Nos 49-51 Au Pui Wan Street, Fo Tan, Sha Tin, New Territories (“Property”) registered in the names of the Defendants (“Ds”). Unless otherwise stated, I adopt the abbreviations used in the Judgment.

2.  By summons dated 8 September 2021 (“Leave Summons”), Ds applied for leave to appeal out of time against the following orders made by this Court:

(1)  The order dated 10 June 2021 dismissing D2’s Summons for (i) setting aside the 1st Charging Order; and (ii) an order of delivery of title deeds of the Property to Ds, with costs to be paid by D2 to Ps (“Dismissal Order”);

(2)  The order for sale dated 10 June 2021 in respect of the Property, with costs of the OS to be paid by Ds to Ps (save that Ps are not entitled to recover 20% of the costs of Nishida 1st and all the costs in preparing Nishida 2nd) (“Sale Order”);

(3)  The order dated 23 June 2021 assessing the costs of D2’s Summons at $30,000 and the costs of the OS at $280,000 (“Costs Order”);

(4)  The order dated 23 June 2021 refusing D2’s application by letter of 22 June 2021 for Chinese translation of the Judgment (“1st Translation Order”);

(5)  The order dated 6 July 2021 refusing D1’s application made by letter dated 2 July 2021 for provision of the transcripts of the hearing on 25 May 2021 (“Transcript Order”); and

(6)  The order dated 6 July 2021 dismissing D2’s application made by letter dated 2 July 2021 for Chinese translation of the Judgment (“2nd Translation Order”).

3.  In his written submissions, Mr Gary Lam, counsel for Ps, submits that there has been a delay of 1.5 – 2.5 months on the part of Ds in applying for leave to appeal.  In his supplemental submissions, Mr Lam fairly accepts that if one takes into account the date when D1 applied for legal aid (18 June 2021), the automatic stay of 42 days by virtue of s.15 of the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91)[1] and the summer vacation, by the time Ds issued the Leave Summons, only the time period for seeking leave to appeal against the Dismissal Order expired (on 6 September 2021). 

4.  It is well established that leave to appeal would only be granted if the Court is satisfied that the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.  This means the prospects of succeeding must be more than “fanciful”, without having to be “probable”.  Even if this threshold requirement is met, the Court has a discretion to refuse leave (Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2022, §59/2A/4).    

5.  Where, as here, the intended appeal is an appeal against exercise of discretion of the judge, the applicant would have to show that he has an arguable case with reasonable chance of success that the relevant decision exceeds the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible, is plainly wrong, and not merely the appellate court would prefer a solution which the judge had not chosen (RK v YS, HCMP 1969/2012, 1 November 2012 (CA)).  This is because an appeal court will not interfere with a judge’s exercise of discretion unlessthe judge has misunderstood the law or the evidence or the exercise of discretion was plainly wrong (北京橙天嘉禾影視製作有限公司v張承勷, HCMP 2666/2016, 11 November 2016).

6.  Ds have not prepared or appended any draft notice of appeal against the orders for which leave to appeal is sought.  Nevertheless, I have considered the grounds stated in D2’s affirmation filed on 8 September 2021 in support of the Leave Summons (“D2’s Aff”) as if it were a draft notice of appeal.   

Appeal against Sale Order

7.  Section 14(1) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4) provides that “[s]ubject to subsection (3) and section 14AA, an appeal shall lie as of right to the Court of Appeal from every judgment or order of the Court of First Instance in any civil cause or matter”. The Sale Order is a final order and does not fall within any of the exceptions listed in s.14(3) and s.14AA of the High Court Ordinance. Ds do not require leave of this Court to appeal against the Sale Order. 

8.  In any event, for the reasons stated in §§9 – 12 below, I do not think that the grounds of appeal raised in D2’s Aff have any reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

9.  Ground 1: Ds allege that Ps obtained the 1st Judgment Debt in the 1998 Case by fraud in that although Ps had possession of the title deeds to the Property, they made fraudulent misrepresentation to the Court by seeking an order of “delivery of title deeds if any in [Ds’] possession” (D2’s Aff §§13 & 17).  There is no merit in the allegation:

(1)  The 1st Judgment Debt was obtained by Ps after a full trial and was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.  There is simply no evidence in support of Ds’ allegation that the 1st Judgment Debt was obtained by fraud. 

(2)  As Mr Lam submits, the order sought by Ps in the OS was “an order of delivery of title deeds if any in [Ds’] possession”, to ensure that if Ds had any other deeds in their possession, they would be delivered to Ps. As Ds had been occupying the Property at all times (up to at least the date of the Sale Order), it was prudent for Ps to seek such an order in the OS. 

10.  Ground 2: Ds allege that the Sale Order was obtained by fraud in that Ps fraudulently misrepresented to the Court that there had been amount due and owing under the Legal Charge and such amount formed part of Ps’ claim in the 1998 Case (D2’s Aff §§14 – 16).  The allegation is devoid of merit.  As stated in §25 of the Judgment, Ps acknowledged the mistake in Nishida 1st and corrected such mistake in Nishida 2nd. The Court was not in any way misled by the mistake.  Indeed, this Court deprived Ps of the costs occasioned by the mistake. 

11.  Ground 3: Ds contend that To J did not in the CFI Judgment rule on the 7 Cheques which, it is said, could have been used to set-off any sums due and owing by Ds to Ps (D2’s Aff §16).  The contention had already been considered by this Court and was rejected for the reasons stated in §§27 – 28, 36(3), 37 – 39 of the Judgment. 

12.  Ground 4: Ds argue that Ps breached the Legal Charge by retaining the title deeds and failing to lend money to Ds (D2’s Aff §17). Again, the argument had already been considered by this Court and was rejected for the reasons stated in §§36(1)-(2), 37 – 39 of the Judgment.

Appeal against Dismissal Order

13.  The Dismissal Order is a case management decision.  It is well established that “case management is pre-eminently within the province of the trial judge.  And it is only in wholly exceptional circumstances that [the Court of Appeal] will interfere” (Cheung Yee-mong v So Kwok-yan [1996] 2 HKLR 48 at 51, per Bokhary JA (as he then was)).  The appellant faces a very high hurdle and has to show that the judge has gone clearly wrong and made order which clearly involved an injustice or an inability for the trial court to carry out its task or had erred in principle or that his order was irrational (Wong Kar Gee Mimi v Severn Villa Ltd [2012] 1 HKLRD 887; Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2022, §59/0/55).

14.  The reasons for dismissing D2’s Summons have been stated in §§40 – 49 of the Judgment.  Ds have not identified any basis to demonstrate that the case management decision was in any way wrong or irrational. 

Appeal against the Transcript Order

15.  The intended appeal is an appeal against a case management decision.  Ds have not demonstrated how the refusal to provide the transcripts of the hearing on 25 May 2021 is clearly wrong.  This is unsurprising given that:

(1)  Ps and Ds made detailed submissions and arguments in their respective written submissions served on the other party in advance of the hearing. 

(2)  At the hearing of the OS on 25 May 2021, the parties made oral arguments on the merit of the OS.  No one gave evidence at the hearing.  Ds had ample opportunity to write down what had been said by Ps’ counsel, the Court or the other defendant during the hearing if they considered it necessary to do so. 

(3)  More importantly, this Court has in the Judgment set out the reasons for the Sale Order and the Dismissal Order.  It would not be necessary for Ds (or the Court of Appeal if the matter proceeds further) to refer to the transcripts of the hearing in order to apprise of the arguments advanced by the parties and the reasons for making the Sale Order and the Dismissal Order. 

16.  In any event, as soon as Ds requested for provision of the transcripts by their letter dated 22 June 2021, this Court approved the provision of the audio recording of the hearing on 25 May 2021 to Ds at the usual charge of $170.  For reasons never explained, Ds did not pay the charge or take any step to obtain the audio recording.  Instead, Ds simply reiterated the request for transcripts as if their application had not been dealt with by the Court.  Such conduct is unacceptable.    

17.  At the hearing of the Leave Summons, Ds assert that they require the transcripts of the hearing for the purpose of D1’s application for legal aid but fail to explain how the transcripts may assist such application.  In any event, as Mr Lam points out, D1’s application was already refused by the Director of Legal Aid on 26 August 2021.

Appeal against the 1st and 2nd Translation Orders

18.  The intended appeal against the 1st and 2nd Translation Orders does not have any prospect of success for the following reasons:

(1)  It is an appeal against case management orders and Ds have failed to meet the high threshold for appealing against such orders. 

(2)  As explained in the letter dated 23 June 2021, the contents of the Judgment had already been interpreted by the Court Interpreter to Ds on the date it was handed down (10 June 2021). 

(3)  The interpretation was specifically arranged for the benefit of Ds, having regard to their assertion made at the hearing on 25 May 2021 that they do not read or understand English.

(4)  In any event, upon Ds’ further requests, the unofficial Chinese translation of the Judgment was provided to Ds on 1 September 2021.  It is pointless for Ds to appeal against the 1st and 2nd Translation Orders. 

(5)  It now transpires that Ds’ assertion that they do not read or understand English may not be true.  As Mr Lam points out, Ds have not adduced any evidence to prove that they do not read or understand English.  Although D2 asserts (at §6 of D2’s Aff) that he does not understand English, there is no suggestion that D1 does not read or understand English.  Indeed, in their written submissions, they are able to use English legal terms such as “offer”, “acceptance”, “intention to create legal relations” and “consideration”, and quote the relief sought in the OS (in English) and make submissions on such relief without any difficulty.   

Appeal against Costs Order

19.  The Costs Order is an assessment of the costs ordered against Ds in respect of the OS and D2’s Summons.  They stand and fall with the intended appeal against the Sale Order and Dismissal Order.  In any event, Ds have not identified any basis to suggest that the costs assessed are in any way incorrect or irrational.

Disposition and costs

20.  For the above reasons, the Leave Summons is dismissed. 

21.  Costs should follow the event.  I make a costs order nisi that Ds shall pay the costs of and occasioned by the Leave Summons forthwith, to be assessed by way of gross sum assessment.  For this purpose, Ps are to lodge and serve a statement of costs for gross sum assessment within 3 days of this Decision and Ds are to provide their comments on such statement, if any, within 7 days thereafter. This Court will assess the costs on paper.   

 (Linda Chan)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Gary Lam, instructed by Tsangs, for the 1st – 2nd plaintiffs

The 1st and 2nd defendants appeared in person



[1]  As discussed in Brook v The Law Society of Hong Kong [1998] 1 HKLRD 113

[2021] HKCFI 1676-EN-2021-06-10

SKK (H.K.) CO. LTD AND ANOTHER v. TSUI PO HING AND ANOTHER

HTML content

HCMP 934/2019

[2021] HKCFI 1676

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 934 OF 2019

_______________

 

IN THE MATTER of 2 Charging Orders Absolute granted in the High Court Action Number 16850 of 1998 (HCA 16850/1998) and in the Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 36 of 2012 (CACV 36/2012) both dated 17th January 2018 over the Defendants’ property as per the 1st Schedule hereto (“The Property”)

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER of 2 Charging Orders Absolute granted in the High Court Commercial Action Number 42 of 2004 (HCCL 42/2004) dated 11th April 2018 and in the Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 101 of 2007 (CACV 101/2007) dated 10th May 2018 over the Defendants’ property

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER of Order 50 Rule 9A of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A)

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER of Section 25A of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)

_______________

BETWEEN

 SKK (H.K.) CO. LTD.1st Plaintiff
 SK KAKEN CO. LTD.2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 TSUI PO HING1st Defendant
 TSUI PO CHEUNG2nd Defendant

_______________

Before:Hon Linda Chan J in Court
Date of Hearing:25 May 2021
Date of Judgment:10 June 2021

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

1.  By Originating Summons dated 26 June 2019 (“OS”), the plaintiffs (“Ps”) apply for an order against the 1st defendant (“D1”) and the 2nd defendant (“D2”) (together “Ds”) that unless they pay the “1st to 4th Judgment Debts” (as defined in §§5(4), 7 - 9 below), which amounted to HK$9,124,377.52 as at 26 June 2019, within 28 days of the order to be made herein, there be an order for sale in respect of the property known as Workshop 13 on 2nd Floor and Flat Roof, Harry Industrial Building, Nos 49-51 Au Pui Wan Street, Fo Tan, Sha Tin, New Territories (“Property”).

2.  The Property has been subject to 4 charging orders absolute previously obtained by Ps (collectively “Charging Orders”).  Ds are the registered owners of the Property.  Protech Industrial Co (“Protech”) was a partnership formed by Ds to carry on business with Ps.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3.  P1 has since 1998 been embroiled in litigations with Ds.  The background to their disputes have been fully set out in the Judgment of To J in HCA 16850/1998 (“1998 Case”) dated 18 January 2012 (“CFI Judgment”) and will not be repeated here. 

4.  In the 1998 Case, P1 claimed over HK$8 million against Ds (trading as Protech) in respect of 64 unpaid invoices issued during the period from 11 September 1995 to 20 January 1998 (“Invoices”).  Ds counterclaimed HK$27 million for the works done under 22 contracts and damages for breach of 2 contracts[1].  The disputes between the parties were fully investigated at the trial which took 11 days (from 15 August to 21 October 2011) before To J.  The CFI Judgment runs to 109 pages.

5.  In the CFI judgment, To J considered the pleadings and the evidence adduced by P1 and Ds including Ds’ counterclaims and their assertion that the “7 Cheques’ Sum” (as defined in sub-§(1) below) could be treated as payment by Ds in respect of the Invoices[2].  Specifically, the learned Judge held that:

(1) Ds failed to prove that the sum of HK$3,228,048.57, being the proceeds of the 7 cheques issued by Ds in favour of P1 (“7 Cheques’ Sum”) was part payment made by Ds in respect of the Invoices and, to the contrary, the 7 Cheques’ Sum should be deducted from the amount said to have been paid by Ds to P1[3].

(2) P1 succeeded in its claim for payment due under the Invoices in the amount of HK$8,163,580.70[4].

(3) Ds succeeded in proving their counterclaim to the extent of HK$6,630,672.73[5].

(4) Taking into account the amount payable by P1 to Ds, Ds were liable to pay HK$1,532,907.97 to P1 together with interest at 12.5% p.a. from 5 October 1998 until judgment and, thereafter, at judgment rate[6] (“1st Judgment Debt”).    

Judgment Debts and Charging Orders

6.  Ds appealed against the CFI Judgment, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in CACV 36/2012 on 14 October 2016 with costs to be paid by Ds.  Following Ds’ failure to pay the 1st Judgment Debt, P1 obtained the charging order nisi over the Property on 18 December 2017, which was made absolute on 17 January 2018 (“1st Charging Order”).  Ds were ordered to pay HK$9,100 as the costs of the application. 

7.  On 20 January 2017, the Court of Appeal dismissed Ds’ application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal with costs assessed at HK$40,000 (“2nd Judgment Debt”).  Ds did not pay the 2nd Judgment Debt whereupon P1 obtained a charging order nisi over the Property on 18 December 2017, which was made absolute on 17 January 2018 (“2nd Charging Order”).  Ds were ordered to pay HK$9,100 as the costs of the application.

8.  On 6 March 2017, Stone J dismissed Ds’ claim against Ps and ordered costs to be paid by Ds to Ps in HCCL 42/2004 (“2004 Case”).  On 21 July 2009, the costs of the 2004 Case was taxed at HK$1,264,969.50 (“3rd Judgment Debt”).  Following Ds’ failure to pay the 3rd Judgment Debt, Ps obtained a charging order nisi over the Property on 16 March 2018, which was made absolute on 11 April 2018 (“3rd Charging Order”).  Ds were ordered to pay costs in the amount of HK$9,100. 

9.  Ds’ appeal against Stone J’s judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in CACV 101/2007 on 27 November 2009 with costs.  On 12 July 2010, the costs of the appeal were taxed at HK$570,000 (“4th Judgment Debt”).  Following Ds’ failure to pay the 4th Judgment Debt, Ps obtained the charging order nisi over the Property on 16 April 2018, which was made absolute on 10 May 2018 (“4th Charging Order”).  Ds were ordered to pay the costs in the amount of HK$9,100.

10.  As at 26 June 2019, the 1st to 4th Judgment Debts, together with interest accrued thereon and the costs of the application for the 4 Charging Orders, amounted to HK$8,594,874.71.

11.  Taking into account the interest from 27 June 2019 up to the date of the hearing, the amount owed by Ds is HK$9,387,611.71.

12.  The 1st to 4th Judgment Debts remain unpaid.  At the hearing, D1 and D2 inform the Court that they have no financial means to pay the Judgment Debts. 

DISCUSSION

13.  Mr Gary Lam, counsel for Ps, submits that the 1st to 4th Judgment Debts are not, and can no longer be, subject to any appeal.  The doctrine of res judicata applies to bar Ds from re-opening the issues already decided by the Court in the 1998 Case and the 2004 Case. 

14.  Ds appear in person.  As far as I understand their contentions, Ds oppose the OS on the following 4 grounds:

(1) The application falls foul of the requirements of the Land Registration Ordinance (Cap 128) (“LRO”) which governs priority of the encumbrances registered over the Property.  Until the “Legal Charge” (as defined in §20(1) below) (a prior encumbrance) registered against the Property has been removed, Ps cannot enforce the Charging Orders (LRO ground).

(2) Article 105 of the Basic Law protects private property rights.  Ps have no right to retain the 7 Cheques’ Sum, and Ds are entitled to counterclaim the same against Ps (7 Cheques’ Sum ground).

(3) Ds did not owe the 1st Judgment Debt as such amount was payable by Protech.  Ps cannot enforce the Charging Orders by seeking an order for sale until they first “bankrupt” Protech (Protech ground).

(4) Ds have 3 counterclaims against Ps for (a) HK$31,139,661.06, being compensation for Ps’ failure to provide a credit line of HK$11,004,212.79 (“Credit Line”) to Ds from 5 October 1998 to 25 May 2021 at contractual interest of 12.5% p.a. (“1st Claim”); (b) HK$1,879,835.27, being the difference between the Credit Line and the 1st Judgment Debt as compensation for wrongful enforcement of the Charging Orders (“2nd Claim”); and (c) HK$12,362,762.73, being interest on the 7 Cheques’ Sum at 12.5% p.a. (“3rd Claim”) (Counterclaims ground).    

Applicable principles

15.  The principles are well established.  The enforcement of a charging order by sale of the property charged is governed by Order 88 rule 5A of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), which requires a judgment creditor to commence fresh proceedings by originating summons.  The purposes of going through such procedure are threefold:

(1) To enable the Court to judge whether there is sufficient equity in the property for the charge to justify ordering a sale;

(2) To ensure that if possible, the Court will be in possession of sufficient evidence at the first appointment under the originating summons to make an immediate order for sale; and

(3) To ensure that the rights of third party occupiers are protected.

(Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2021, §88/5A/2)

16.  Mr Lam submits that in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to make an order for sale, the Court will take into account a judgment creditor’s prima facie entitlement to enforce his judgment by a charging order.  While the Court has to weigh carefully the competing equities of the parties, there must be good reason to justify why the Court should on the one hand, grant an order in a party’s favour but on the other hand, refuse to enforce that very order (Union Finance Ltd v Leung Wai Ling & anor [2000] 2 HKC 821 at 823G, 824A-B, per Chung J). 

17.  With these principles in mind, I turn to the merit of the application and the contentions raised by Ds.   

Whether to make an order for sale

18.  In my judgment, an order for sale of the Property is appropriate and amply justified in view of the facts and matters discussed in §§19 – 23 below.   

19.  First, Ds admit that they do not have the financial means to pay the 1st to 4th Judgment Debts.  Therefore, an order for sale of the Property represents the only means through which Ps can recover the amounts owed by Ds.

20.  Second, there is sufficient equity in the Property.  Apart from the Charging Orders, there are 2 other charges registered against the Property:

(1) The legal charge dated 17 March 1995 (“Legal Charge”) whereby Ds acknowledged that they (trading as Protech) were indebted to P1 in the sum of HK$11,004,212.79 (“Secured Sum”) as at 1 January 1995, and had applied to P1 for general credit facilities which P1 agreed to extend to Ds.  In consideration thereof, Ds agreed to charge the Property to P1 as security for their obligation to pay the Secured Sum upon P1’s demand.  The Secured Sum was repaid in full in 1996.

(2) A Memorandum of Charge dated 13 March 2015 (“Memorandum of Charge”) whereby the manager of the building where the Property is situated exercised its right to register a charge against the Property in respect of arrears of management fees and contribution of improvement fund from July 2013 to March 2015 in the sum of HK$17,491.80.  Taking into account the interest accrued thereon, as at 30 May 2019, the amount owed was HK$88,066.71.

21.  According to the updated valuation obtained by Ps, as at 23 April 2021, the market value of the Property was HK$3,200,000 while the value for sale under repossession of the Property was HK$2,800,000. 

22.  After payment of the expenses to be incurred in selling the Property and the amount owed to the manager (subject matter of the Memorandum of Charge), there is still a significant equity or surplus which can be applied to pay the 1st to 4th Judgment Debts.

23.  Third, there is no third party interest in the Property.  Ds have been the only registered owners of the Property and have declared in the Legal Charge that they are the only beneficial owners of the Property.  As confirmed by Ds at the hearing, the Property has all along been used by Ds. 

24.  I do not find any of the contentions raised by Ds constitute a valid ground in opposition to the OS, for the reasons discussed in §§26 - 36 below.

Ds’ contentions

25.  Before dealing with the 4 grounds raised by Ds in opposition to the OS, I shall deal with a mistake contained in §34 of affirmation of Shinji Nishida dated 26 June 2019 (“Nishida 1st”) where he said that the Secured Sum formed part of Ps’ claim in the 1998 Case and had been taken into account in the 1st Judgment Debt, such that “there is no other sum due to [P1] under the Legal Charge”. 

(1) D1 in his affirmation dated 5 August 2019 pointed out the fact that the Secured Sum had already been repaid. 

(2) After the mistake was pointed out, Ps readily acknowledged the mistake in §4 of the 2nd affirmation of Shinji Nishida (“Nishida 2nd”) and confirmed that the Secured Sum did not form part of P1’s claim in the 1998 Case.  This is therefore not a point which can be maintained by Ds. 

(3) That said, I do not think it is just or fair to require Ds to bear the costs of and occasioned by the mistake made by Ps.  Mr Lam does not oppose to the Court disallowing the costs occasioned by the mistake.

LRO ground

26.  The LRO ground is misconceived. 

(1) P1 has not sought to enforce the Legal Charge in these proceedings.  This has been made clear in Nishida 1st. 

(2) While it is correct that the Legal Charge was a prior encumbrance registered against the Property, its existence does not affect Ps’ right to enforce the Charging Orders. All that it means is that if and to the extent that the Secured Sum has not been paid, P1 (qua chargee of the Legal Charge) has priority to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the Property over the 1st to 4th Judgment Debts owed to Ps. 

(3) Contrary to Ds’ assertion, the fact that the Legal Charge remains registered against the Property would not prevent Ps from enforcing the Charging Orders, whether as alleged or at all. 

7 Cheques’ Sum ground

27.  The 7 Cheques’ Sum was one of the issues raised by Ds in the 1998 Case and was determined by the Court in that:

(1) The invoices mentioned in D2’s Affirmation §13(3) were amongst the invoices pleaded in P1’s statement of claim (§12) and in Ds’ defence (§§13-16) both filed in the 1998 Case. 

(2) Ds’ contention that the 7 Cheques Sum should be deducted from the amounts claimed in 1998 Case had been considered by To J and was rejected for the reasons stated in §§60 - 63 of the CFI Judgment. 

(3) Ds’ appeal against the CFI Judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in 2016 (see §6 above). 

28.  As such, Ds are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and cannot raise the same issue again or argue that To J and the Court of Appeal have not determined such issue.  Article 105 of the Basic Law is not engaged. 

Protech ground

29.  As stated in the CFI Judgment, Ds were partners of Protech.  As such partners, Ds were liable to pay the debts owed by Protech (s 11 of the Partnership Ordinance (Cap 38)). Indeed, it can be seen from the CFI Judgment that Ds fought the 1998 Case on the basis that they were personally liable for the debts owed by Protech. 

30.  In any event, Ds’ liability to pay the Invoices was one of the issues determined by To J.  It is not now open to Ds to re-open the same issue in these proceedings. 

31.  As for Ds’ suggestion that Ps cannot enforce the Charging Orders until after they first “bankrupt” Protech, it is ill founded. 

(1) Protech was a partnership constituted by Ds and did not have separate legal existence.  It was open to P1 to enforce the obligations of Protech by suing Ds in their capacity as partners of Protech in the 1998 Case.

(2) As partners of Protech, Ds are personally liable for all the debts and liabilities owed by Protech.  It is unnecessary for P1 to sue or to “bankrupt” Protech before they enforce the Charging Orders. 

Counterclaims ground

32.  I do not think any of the counterclaims constitute a valid ground in opposition to the OS for the following reasons. 

33.  First, the 1st to 4th Judgment Debts are binding and enforceable by Ps against Ds.  As such, unless Ds are able to pay the 1st to 4th Judgment Debts in full, Ps are entitled to enforce the Charging Orders by seeking an order for sale. 

34.  Second, Ds’ counterclaims are, at their highest, unproved claims.  Unless and until Ds are able to prove such counterclaims, they are not and cannot be treated as payment for the 1st to 4th Judgment Debts.

35.  Third, on Ds’ own case, the counterclaims all arose out of the events which took place between 1996 and 1998.  By virtue of s 4 of the Limitation Ordinance (Cap 347), the 6-year limitation period for making the claims have long expired since 2002 and 2004 and, therefore, are liable to be struck out even if Ds now make such claims against Ps.    

36.  Fourth, I do not think there is any merit in Ds’ counterclaims:

(1) The 1st Claim: Ds have not identified the basis for suggesting that Ps were obliged to provide the Credit Line to them.  To the contrary, it appears from the Legal Charge that the Credit Line was provided to Ds for the purpose of repaying the Secured Sum, and was applied by Ds for such purpose.  There is therefore no basis to suggest that Ps acted in breach of any agreement.  Even if Ds are able to prove that Ps acted in breach of an agreement for failing to provide the Credit Line, they fail to demonstrate that the alleged breach has caused the alleged or any loss or damage to Ds. 

(2) The 2nd Claim: For the reasons stated in §§18 - 24 above, Ps are entitled to enforce the Charging Orders.  There is therefore no basis to suggest that the enforcement of the Charging Orders is “wrongful”.  In any event, there is no causal link between the alleged breach and the HK$1,879,835.27 claimed by Ds.

(3) The 3rd Claim: For the reasons stated in §§27 - 28 above, there is no basis for Ds to claim the 7 Cheques’ Sum or the alleged interest accrued on such Sum. 

37.  The above points are sufficient to dispose of the counterclaims raised by Ds.  If, contrary to my holding, To J did not determine the issue relating to the 7 Cheques’ Sum (ie 3rd Claim), it seems to me that Ds are nevertheless barred by the doctrine of res judicata in the wider sense or Henderson v Henderson abuse in raising the 3rd Claim and the 1st  Claim (which was not raised in the 1998 Case and the 2004 Case) in these proceedings.

38.  The principles governing the doctrine have been fully explained by Ma CJ  in Ko Hon Yue v Chiu Pik Yuk (2012) 15 HKCFAR 72, §83, and may be summarised as follows:

(1) The doctrine is founded on an abuse of process and, as such, it ought only to be applied when the facts are such as to amount to an abuse.

(2) An abuse is found to exist in seeking to raise in subsequent proceedings claims or issues which could and should have been raised in earlier proceedings.  This abuse will usually take the form of the other party being “vexed” (or in some cases, the terms “oppressed”, “unjustly harassed” or “unjustly hounded” are used) by the subsequent set of proceedings.

(3) The abuse can also take the form of the administration of justice being brought into disrepute.

(4) In considering this type of abuse, the Court is required to assess a number of factors and balance competing interests in the exercise of a discretion. 

39.  It is an abuse of process for Ds to seek to raise the 1st and 3rd Claims in these proceedings, given that:

(1) The relationship between Ps and Ds and the disputes arising from such relationship had been subject matters of the 1998 Case and the 2004 Case, which were finally determined by To J and Stone J.  It was open to Ds to make the counterclaims in the 1998 Case or the 2004 Case so that the issues could be investigated and determined once and for all. 

(2) No explanation has been put forward by Ds as to why they did not make the 1st and 3rd Claims in the 1998 Case or the 2004 Case. 

(3) It would be unjust to allow Ds to rely on the 1st and 3rd Claims in opposition to the OS as these proceedings, when they had plenty opportunity to do litigate their Claim but did not do so in the past 16 years.

(4) If Ds were allowed to raise the 1st and 3rd Claims now, it would be tantamount to allowing them to vex Ps again. 

D2’s Summons

40.  D2 belatedly issued a summons dated 6 May 2021 seeking to “set aside” the 1st Charging Order and to compel Ps to return the title deeds of the Property (“Summons”) and filed another affirmation dated 6 May 2021 in support of the Summons.  This is despite the fact that at the hearing on 25 March 2021, this Court gave indulgence to D2 to file his affirmation dated 15 January 2021 after Ps had already filed their affirmation in reply on 10 September 2019, and ordered that no affirmation should be filed without leave of the Court.

41.  It seems to me that the Summons was issued far too late  and there was no justification for the delay. It is unfair for Ds to try to ambush Ps with a late application.  For this reason alone, I dismiss the Summons in limine. 

42.  Nevertheless, as Mr Lam has made submissions on the Summons, I will set out the reasons as why I consider the Summons to be wholly without merit.

43.  As regards D2’s application to “set aside” the 1st Charging Order on the ground that he was out of jurisdiction while the 1st Charging Order nisi was served on him at his Hong Kong address, it must be rejected.   

44.  First, the application for a charging order is not an originating process. The procedure is to apply ex parte for the charging order nisi (Order 50 rule 1(2)) and did not need to be served on Ds personally.  Once the Court makes a charging order nisi, it will order the judgment creditor to serve the order on the judgment debtor to notify the latter to show cause (Order 50 rule 2).  Personal service of the charging order nisi is not required (Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2021 §50/9A/36). 

45.  Second, the proper avenue to set aside the 1st Charging Order is to make the application in the 1998 Case.  Ds have never made such application.  Nor have they proffered any explanation as to why they did not make such application, if there is any merit for them to do so. 

46.  Third, the OS was issued almost 2 years ago and was served on Ds.  They plainly have knowledge of the 1st Charging Order, which is one of the subject matters in these proceedings, and have filed affirmations in opposition to the OS.  

Delivery of title deeds

47.  In the Summons, D2 also applies for delivery of the title deeds of the Property apparently on the basis that Ds are entitled to claim the 7 Cheques Sum against Ps.  In light of my holding that Ds are not entitled to re-open or raise the 7 Cheques’ Sum, there is no basis for Ds to seek the return of the title deeds. 

48.  In any event, by virtue of clauses 2.1(k) and 4.1 of the Legal Charge, P1 is entitled to hold onto the title deeds if and for so long as there is any outstanding liability from Ds.

49.  For the reasons set out in §§40-48 above, the Summons is dismissed.

Disposition and costs

50.  No valid ground in opposition to the OS has been shown by Ds.  It is appropriate for the Court to make an order for sale as per the order sought in the Notice of Appointment to Hear Originating Summons save for the following amendments:

(1) §1 is retained: Although Ds confirm at the hearing that they do not have the financial means to pay the 1st to 4th Judgment Debts, D2 indicates that he wants time to find a buyer to buy the Property at the reserve price.  If this comes to fruition, Ds can obtain the agreement of Ps to proceed with the sale and pay over the sale proceeds to Ps within the 28-day period stated in §1;

(2) §(b): the words “title deeds” be deleted as it is common ground that the title deeds are in P1’s possession; and

(3) §(d): the reserve or minimum price at which the Property is to be sold is amended to HK$3,200,000 to reflect the increase in the market value as assessed by the valuer.  The words “either private treaty or” be deleted as Mr Lam confirms that Ps will seek to sell the Property by public auction. 

51.  As for costs, I make a costs order nisi that Ds shall pay the costs of and occasioned by the OS and the Summons, save that Ps are not entitled to recover 20% of the costs in preparing Nishida 1st and all the costs in preparing Nishida 2nd. The costs are to be assessed by way of gross sum assessment.  For this purpose, Ps are to lodge and serve a revised statement of costs for gross sum assessment within 3 days of this Judgment and Ds are to provide their comments on such statement, if any, within 7 days thereafter.  This Court will assess the costs on paper. 

 (Linda Chan)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Gary Lam, instructed by Tsangs, for the 1st – 2nd plaintiffs

The 1st and 2nd defendants appeared in person



[1]   CFI Judgment §1

[2]   Which was only raised for the first time during Ds’ closing submissions (CFI Judgment §61)

[3]   CFI Judgment §§60-63

[4]   CFI Judgment §248

[5]   CFI Judgment §249

[6]   CFI Judgment §250

[2020] HKCFI 3099-CH-2020-12-17

SKK (H.K.) CO LTD 及另一人 對 TSUI PO HING 及另一人

HTML content

HCMP 934/2019

[2020] HKCFI 3099

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

雜項案件編號2019年第934號

_________________

 IN THE MATTER OF 2 CHARGING ORDERS ABSOLUTE GRANTED IN THE HIGH COURT ACTION NUMBER 16850 OF 1998 (HCA 16850/1998) AND IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 36 OF 2012 (CACV 36/2012) BOTH DATED 17TH JANUARY 2018 OVER THE DEFENDANTS’ PROPERTY AS PER THE 1ST SCHEDULE HERETO (“THE PROPERTY”)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF 2 CHARGING ORDERS ABSOLUTE GRANTED IN THE HIGH COURT COMMERICAL ACTION NUMBER 42 OF 2004 (HCCL 42/2004) DATED 11TH APRIL 2018 AND IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 101 OF 2007 (CACV 101/2007) DATED 10TH MAY 2018 OVER THE DEFENDANTS’ PROPERTY
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF ORDER 50 RULE 9A OF THE RULES OF THE HIGH COURT (CAP. 4A)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 25A OF THE HIGH COURT ORDINANCE (CAP. 4)

________________

第一原告人SKK (H.K.) CO. LTD. 
第二原告人SK KAKEN CO. LTD. 

及

第一被告人TSUI PO HING 
第二被告人TSUI PO CHEUNG 

________________

主審法官 :高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官廖文健內庭聆訊
聆訊日期 :2020年12月17日
判決書日期 :2020年12月17日

判決書

 

1.  本席處理一張由第二被告人在2020年11月19日發出的傳票,以及另外一張由第二被告人在2020年11月30日發出的傳票(“該兩張傳票”)。

2.  第二被告人藉該兩張傳票提出的申請,是針對本席在2020年10月19日的聆訊中,所作的有關第二被告人分別於2020年9月25日和2020年10月9日在法庭存檔的傳票(“9月份傳票” 和 “10月份傳票”)的決定(“該決定”)的上訴許可申請。

3.  本席需要先說明一些背景。

4.  在本案中,原告人藉日期為2019年6月26日的原訴傳票,申請法庭頒令第一及第二被告人在指定的時間內支付予原告人4筆判定債務(每筆判定債務均有相關的絶對押記令),否則原告人可以出售第一及第二被告人持有的物業(“該物業”)償債,該物業已經在原訴傳票的附表中列出。

5.  於2020年8月24日,本席就著本案該如何繼續進行作出命令(“8月的命令”),當中包括:

(1)  本案的實質聆訊將另訂日期舉行,預留半天時間。

(2)  如無法庭許可,各方均不得存檔進一步的誓章作為證據。

(3)  任何訴訟方如欲申請許可,在法庭存檔其他的誓章或者專家報告,必須以“傳召各方的傳票”提出,並且把有關的誓章或者專家報告附於該傳票。

6.  於2020年9月18日,第二被告人在法庭存檔送達認收書(“該送達認收書”),表示擬在本案中抗辯。

7.  原告人代表律師約於2020年9月23日去信通知第一及第二被告人,將會於2020年10月14日往法院為實質聆訊進行排期。

8.  於2020年9月25日,第二被告人發出9月份的傳票,第二被告人在當中實質尋求兩項命令:

(1)  撤銷他本人於2020年8月14日在法庭存檔的誓詞(“該誓詞”)。

(2)  指明無需法庭的許可,他可以在2020年9月18日往後的42天內,在法庭存檔誓章證據。

9.  於2020年10月9日,第二被告人發出10月份的傳票,第二被告人在當中要求原告人向他提供有關本案文件的中文譯本及以中文處理與他的書信往來,並且要求待他存檔全部誓章、誓詞和證據後,本案的實質聆訊才可排期。

10.  於2020年10月14日,本案的實質聆訊編排了在2021年5月25日上午進行。

11.  在2020年10月19日的聆訊中:

(1)  就著10月份的傳票,基於原告人向法庭承諾(“該承諾”)將會向第一及第二被告人提供該承諾中指明的文件的中文譯本,以及往後以中文撰寫所有給予第一及第二被告人的信件,本席不作任何命令,除了指示該傳票的訟費保留待決。

(2)  就著9月份的傳票,本席頒令如下:

1.  該傳票被撤銷;

2.  任何訴訟方均不能在本案的實質聆訊中依賴該誓詞及其附件;

3.  無論訴訟結果如何,該傳票的訟費由第二被告人支付給第一及第二原告人,假如就著訟費金額雙方不能達成協議,則交由法庭評定或簡易評定。

12.  第二被告人其後來信索取2020年10月19日的聆訊謄本,本席於2020年11月11日批准申請。

13.  於2020年11月13日,第二被告人來信,索取2020年10月19日的“法庭日誌”(實應為“案件審訊表”)。本席於2020年11月16日指示,第二被告人沒有說明索取案件審訊表的原因,拒絶他的申請。第二被告人於2020年12月7日再次來信,表示因為他已提出上訴,所以需要2020年10月19日的案件審訊表(“該案件審訊表”)。

上訴許可

14.  原告人要取得上訴許可,擬提出的上訴必須有合理機會得直,或者有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,因而該上訴應進行聆訊。參見《高等法院條例》第14AA(4)條; SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125。

15.  本席先處理有關9月份傳票的決定的上訴許可申請。

16.  本席在2020年10月19日的聆訊中,頒令訴訟各方在本案的實質聆訊中,不能依賴該誓詞,這其實是第二被告人所申請的命令。在這一點上,原告人和第二被告人是一致的。

17.  第二被告人主張,他是於2020年9月18日才存檔該送達認收書,故此根據《高等法院規則》第28號命令第1A條,他享有當然權利,無需得到法庭的許可,在任何時間均可存檔誓章證據。本席在2020年10月9日的聆訊中,拒絶接納第二被告人的論點。

(1)  原告人的代表律師在2020年10月19日的聆訊前提交了書面論點綱要(日期為2020年10月16日),原告人的代表律師在當中表示:

(a)  第二被告人在2020年8月14日的該誓詞中提到有關本案的內容,顯然第二被告人在2020年8月14日之前的某個時間,已經收到本案的原訴傳票和相關的文件。

(b)  第12號命令第6(2)條規定:

“…… 本規則或根據本規則發出的任何令狀或作出的任何命令,不得解釋為阻止被告人在一宗訟案中在送達認收的時限後作送達認收,但如被告人在該段時限後作送達認收,則除非法庭另有命令,否則被告人無權在遲於假若他是在該段時限內作送達認收他本有權送達抗辯書或作出任何其他作為的時限,送達抗辯書或作出任何該等其他作為。”

(c)  被告人沒有在《高等法院規則》規定的時間內存檔誓章證據,故此他需要得到法庭的許可才可以逾時存檔誓章證據。

(2)  本席認為原告人的論點是有道理的。再者,更重要的是,第28號命令第1A條並非如第二被告人所言,沒有為存檔誓章證據設下時限,相反,第1A(4)條規定如下:

“凡已作送達認收的被告人意欲提出誓章證據,他必須在原告人的誓章證據的文本根據第(3)款送達他後28天內,將他本人的誓章證據送交法院存檔,並將其文本送達原告人及任何受該等證據影響的被告人。”

(3)  即或以該送達認收書存檔的日期,即2020年9月18日為起始點,在2020年10月19日聆訊的時候,第28號命令第1A(4)條中指明的28天期限已經屆滿,第二被告人並不享有存檔誓章證據的當然權利。

18.  本席在2020年10月19日的聆訊中,已經向第二被告人解釋,如果他想取得法庭的許可,存檔誓章證據,應該按照本席在2020年8月24日所作的指示處理,即以“傳召各方的傳票”提出申請,並且把擬存檔的誓章附於該傳票。然而,直至現在,第二被告人也沒有這樣做。

19.  基於上述理由,本席撤銷了9月份傳票。有關訟費的一般原則,是根據訴訟的結果決定訟費,9月份傳票既然被撤銷,第二被告人應當支付該傳票的訟費予原告人。第二被告人今天首次提出,原告人代表律師有關2020年10月19日聆訊的書面論點綱要,是少於該聆訊舉行前48小時才提供的,不符合《實務指示》5.4的規定,故此原告人不應得到訟費。本席認為,第二被告人的論點不成立。第二被告人作為2020年10月19日聆訊中的申請方,沒有根據《實務指示》5.4的規定,在2020年10月19日的聆訊前不少於72小時提交書面陳詞,原告人只是在聆訊前提供一份論點綱要藉以協助法庭,本席不認為在此情況下,原告人需被剝奪可以得到訟費的權利。再者,第二被告人的這個論點,他沒有在2020年10月19日的聆訊中提出,他不可以此作為上訴理由。

20.  本席認為,第二被告人擬提出針對有關9月份傳票的決定的上訴,沒有合理機會得直,也沒有任何利於秉行公正的理由,因而該上訴應進行聆訊。

21.  本席接著處理有關10月份傳票的決定的上訴許可申請。

22.  第二被告人提出針對該決定的論點,是他認為原告人代表律師除了在該承諾中指明的文件外,還需向他提供在2019年6月26日存檔的第一份Shinji Nishida誓章中附件“SN-6”的Legal Charge的中文譯本。

23.  第二被告人的這項主張,是毫無道理的。

(1)  該份Legal Charge,是第一及第二被告人在1995年3月17日把該物業抵押予第一原告人的法定押記。根據文件的紀錄,當年第一及第二被告人在簽署這份法定押記前,有一位律師事務所的職員把文件翻譯了給他們知道,他們應該清楚明白文件的內容。

(2)  無論如何,原告人在本案中不是申請行使在該法定押記中的權利,而是執行原告人取得的4項絶對押記令。該法定押記在本案中,無關宏旨。

(3)  第二被告人在2020年10月19日的聆訊中,完全沒有提出除了在該承諾中指明的文件外,他還需要該法定押記的中文譯本,現在卻以此點表示要上訴,是說不通的。

24.  第二被告人擬提出的針對10月份傳票的上訴,沒有合理機會得直,也沒有任何理由致使該上訴的聆訊應予進行。

25.  本席最後處理第二被告人索取該審訊案件表的申請。2020年10月19日的“審訊案件表”不是當天在本席席前進行的聆訊的紀錄。本席已經給予第二被告人當天聆訊的謄本,該謄本是當天聆訊的逐字紀錄,清楚地記載了當天聆訊中發生的事情。本席不認為有任何理由,需要給予第二被告人該審訊案件表。

結論

26.  基於上述理由,本席撤銷該兩張傳票。

27.  第二被告人申請失敗,須支付該兩張傳票的訟費予原告人。本席認為,第二被告人藉該兩張傳票提出的申請,實屬瑣屑無聊,毫無理據。本席頒令該兩張傳票的訟費,由第二被告人即時支付予原告人,該等訟費由法庭作簡易評定,按彌償基準計算。本席指示原告人須於7天內在法庭存檔訟費清單並將之送達予第二被告人,第二被告人須於其後的7天內在法庭存檔對該清單的書面回應並將之送達予原告人。

( 廖文健 )
高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

第一及第二原告人:  由曾約瑟律師行轉聘雷佩華律師代表。

第二被告人:  無律師代表,親自出庭應訊。