Case Detail

DCMP 2185/2004

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 2185 OF 2004

____________

	IN THE MATTER of a Deed of Mutual Covenant dated 13^th October 1983 and registered in the Shatin New Territories Land Registry with Memorial No. 239788 (“the DMC”)
	and
	IN THE MATTER of the property known as All Those 19/27,772^nd parts or shares of and in All Those piece or parcel of ground registered in the Shatin New Territories Land Registry as SHATIN TOWN LOT NO. 230 And of and in the messuages erections and buildings thereon known as “King Tin Court” Together with the full and exclusive right and privilege to hold use occupy and enjoy All That Flat 5, 23^rd Floor Block C (Bing Sam House), King Tin Court, 12 Chui Tin Street, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong, comprised in a Memorandum of Charge dated 11^th September 2001 made pursuant to the DMC and in favour of Urban Property Management Limited and registered in the Shatin New Territories Land Registry with Memorial No. 1244690
	and
	IN THE MATTER of section 19 of the Building Management Ordinance (Cap.344)
	and
	IN THE MATTER of Order 88 Rules 1 and 5A of the Rules of the District Court (Cap.336)

______________________

	URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED	1^st Plaintiff
	THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KING TIN COURT	2^nd Plaintiff
	and
	TSANG WING LAM (曾榮林)	Defendant

______________________

Coram: His Hon Judge Poon in chambers (open to public)

Date of hearing: 14 December 2009

Date of decision: 20 January 2010

______________________

D E C I S I O N

______________________

Introduction

1. The Plaintiffs obtained an order for sale of the Defendant’s property (“the Property”) in enforcement of a Memorandum of Charge (“MOC”) for outstanding management fees owed by the Defendant. H.H. Judge H.C. Wong, who gave the said order for sale on 4 August 2006, also awarded the costs of the proceedings to the Plaintiffs, to be taxed if not agreed.

2. The said costs of the Plaintiffs were taxed at a hearing before Master Lai on 27 May 2008 at HK$411,012.00 and the allocatur thereof was issued on 2 July 2008. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs obtained a charging order against the Property in respect of the taxed costs. The charging order was made absolute on 27 August 2009. Having failed to persuade the Masters to set aside the charging order and the allocatur, the Defendant appeals before me against the decisions of the Masters.

3. To put the matters into context, I should go a little backward to the events happened after the order of Judge Wong. Pursuant to the order of the learned Judge, the Plaintiffs took possession of the Property with the assistance of the bailiff on 16 October 2007. However, the Defendant has somehow regained possession of the Property on 18 October 2007.

4. The effect of the above is that the MOC was being executed and the Plaintiffs were precluded from relying on it further to secure any sums owed by the Defendant to them. As such, the Defendant had succeeded in obtaining an order for the release of the Property from the security constituted by the MOC before H.H. Judge Leung. In his Decision dated 3 November 2009[1], the learned Judge set out in details the long history of this action, including the events leading to the recovery of possession of the Property by the Defendant. I do not propose to repeat here the same.

Defendant’s arguments

5. The Defendant basically argued that his liability to pay costs pursuant to Judge Wong’s order was extinguished upon the execution of the MOC. He submitted that as the costs of the proceedings formed part of the amount secured by the MOC, the court should not allow the creation of another charge against the same property in respect of the same debt.

6. Ironically, at the hearing before Judge Leung on the Defendant’s application to release the Property from security, the Plaintiffs put forward similar arguments. In rejecting the Plaintiffs’ arguments, the learned Judge had this to say[2]:

“33.  It was argued on behalf of the Plaintiffs that costs of these proceedings are secured by the MOC.  Therefore the release should be refused.  For the following reasons, I do not agree with the Plaintiffs.
34.  The notice under clause 6(f) is supposed to be served in the event of an owner failing to pay any sum due and payable by the owner within 7 days “from the date on which such sum becomes payable”.  The notice served pursuant to clause 6(f)(i) is supposed to specify such sum due by then.  According to clauses 6(e) and 6(f)(i), costs of the action are separate and distinct from the expenses in or in connection with the recovery or attempt to recover the amount due.  However, by the time of the notice constituting the MOC subsequently registered pursuant to clause 6(f)(iii) came into existence, no civil action has been brought pursuant to clause 6(e), let alone these proceedings which were commenced in 2004.  No legal costs of any civil action was due or payable by the time of the notice constituting the MOC.
35.    To be in line with these provisions of the DMC, the “further moneys that may be due” under the MOC could not be any amount than that specified.  [The Defendant] was deemed by clause 6(f)(ii) to have agreed to a charge for the amount specified in the notice together with interest.  This did not include the legal costs to be incurred in these proceedings.
36.  I note paragraph 5 of the 4/8/06 Order which sets out the manner in which the proceeds of sale of the Property, if sold, should be distributed.  Paragraph 5(d) refers to all other expenses incurred in or in connection with the recovering or attempting to recover the sums secured by the MOC.  For reasons discussed above, they do not refer to the costs of these proceedings commenced pursuant to clause 6(e) of the DMC.
37.  Liability for costs at any stage of these proceedings arises upon the court’s order.  That is when the same becomes payable.  Costs of these proceedings were dealt with in paragraphs 7 and 9 of the 4/8/06 Order.  [The Defendant] became liable to pay such costs as a result of such order, and notalready secured by the MOC.”

7. I concur with the learned Judge on his reasoning and respectfully adopt the same in this Decision. I do not intend to duplicate the relevant provisions of the DMC or MOC here as the same can also be found in the Decision of the learned Judge.

8. The fact that the Defendant has satisfied the debt secured by the MOC, or that the MOC has been executed, or that the Property has been released from the security constituted by the MOC, can have no bearing on his liability to pay costs pursuant to Judge Wong’s order. Such liability to pay costs is a separate and distinct liability to the one secured by the MOC and there is no reason why a fresh charging order cannot be imposed in respect of it.

9. The Defendant submits that as the Plaintiffs failed to include the costs of the proceedings awarded by Judge Wong as part of the money secured by the MOC, they are then not entitled to claim against him such costs. As mentioned hereinabove, the Defendant’s liability to pay such costs is a separate and distinct liability. The Defendant has given no basis whatsoever to support his submission.

10. Apart from the above main arguments, the Defendant raised the following points:

(a)  The taxing Master should not continue the taxation hearing in his absence;
(b)  The amount of the taxed costs is in any event excessive; and
(c)  The Plaintiffs had on 10/7/2007 by way of a letter to the Defendant agreed that the said costs be in the amount of HK$3,000.

11. At the hearing, I asked the Defendant under what procedure he applied before the Master to set aside the Allocatur. The Defendant indicated that he was relying on O.32, r.6 of the Rules of the District Court.

12. On the morning of the taxation hearing before Master Lai, the Defendant said he told the learned Master that he feels uncomfortable and left the courtroom at around 11:10 am. At that time several items of the bill of costs have been taxed already. According to the Defendant, he intended to return in 10 to 20 minutes and went to wait inside his private car. However, as his condition was very bad, he was unable to go back until 1:00 pm. When he arrived at the courtroom, he learnt that the hearing was finished.

13. Directions have been given for filing of list of objections before the taxation hearing. However, the Defendant did not file any. When I asked whether there is any particular item in the bill of costs that he is objecting to, the Defendant mentioned a few.

14. The Defendant submitted that as he was not present at the time, the decision made by the learned Master at the hearing was “an order made ex parte” and therefore under O.32, r.6, the Court may set it aside.

15. This is misconceived. The Defendant appeared at the taxation hearing and advanced arguments before the Court. The fact that he chose to leave at the middle of the hearing does not make the hearing an ex parte hearing or render any order made therein an ex parte order. O.32, r.6 is simply not applicable in the situation.

16. The only possible provision for the Defendant to rely on to apply before a Master is O.62, r. 33 for review of taxation. As the relevant bill of costs was filed before 2^nd April 2009, the old rule applies which provides, inter alia, that:

“(1)  Any party to any taxation proceedings who is dissatisfied with the allowance or disallowance in whole or in part of any item be a taxing master, or with the amount allowed by a taxing master in respect of any item, may apply to the taxing master to review his decision in respect of that item.
(2)  An application under this rule for review of a taxing master’s decision in respect of any item may be made at any time within 14 days after that decision or such shorter period as may be fixed by the taxing master.
Provided that no application under this rule for review of a decision in respect of any item may be made after the signing of the taxing master’s certificate dealing finally with that item.
(3)  Every applicant for review under this rule must at the time of making his application deliver to the taxing master objections in writing specifying by a list the items or parts of items the allowance or disallowance of which or the amount allowed in respect of which, is objected to and stating concisely the nature and grounds of the objection in each case, and must deliver a copy of the objections to each other party (if any) who attended on the taxation of those items or to whom the taxing master directs that a copy of the objections shall be delivered.”

17. The Defendant’s application was made on 30^th October 2009, that is to say, more than 2 years and 5 months from the date of the taxation hearing. The time prescribed for reviewing the decisions was 14 days and there was no reasonable explanation from the Defendant to justify the inordinate delay.

18. Even if the application was made within time, the Defendant had failed to specify the items objected to and the grounds of objection thereof as required under sub-rule (3).

19. In any event, the Defendant did not see fit to file any list of objection as directed for the purpose of the taxation hearing. I do not see any unfairness in the learned Master’s decision to continue the taxation hearing in the Defendant’s absence given also that it was the Defendant who chose to leave the courtroom.

20. Regarding the letter from the Plaintiffs’ solicitors dated 10/7/2007, the figure of HK$3,000 referred to by the Defendant was described as “Costs of Memorandum of Charge” in the letter. There is nothing in the letter close to suggesting that the Plaintiffs offered to settle the costs of the proceedings awarded by Judge Wong in such an amount. The amount of costs taxed by Master Lai was HK$411,012.00. It would be unrealistic to expect that the Plaintiffs would offer HK$3,000 for settlement.

21. The learned Master was perfectly right to dismiss the Defendant’s application to set aside the Allocatur. There is also no reason to set aside or discharge the charging order in respect of the outstanding costs awarded by Judge Wong.

22. The Defendant’s applications to appeal against the Masters’ decisions are accordingly refused.

23. I can see no reason why costs should not follow the event and I make an order nisi that costs of these applications be to the Plaintiffs to be taxed if not agreed. This order nisi shall become absolute after 14 days from the date of handing down of this judgment.

Signed
District Judge
TONY S T POON

Messrs Leung & Wan for the 1^st and the 2^nd Plaintiffs

Defendant, in person, present

[1] DCMP 2185/2004, 3 November 2009, unreported.

[2] Supra, at Paragraphs 33 to 37.

DCMP 2185/2004

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 2185 OF 2004

____________

	IN THE MATTER of a Deed of Mutual Covenant dated 13^th October 1983 and registered in the Shatin New Territories Land Registry with Memorial No. 239788 (“the DMC”)
	and
	IN THE MATTER of the property known as All Those 19/27,772^nd parts or shares of and in All Those piece or parcel of ground registered in the Shatin New Territories Land Registry as SHATIN TOWN LOT NO. 230 And of and in the messuages erections and buildings thereon known as “King Tin Court” Together with the full and exclusive right and privilege to hold use occupy and enjoy All That Flat 5, 23^rd Floor Block C (Bing Sam House), King Tin Court, 12 Chui Tin Street, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong, comprised in a Memorandum of Charge dated 11^th September 2001 made pursuant to the DMC and in favour of Urban Property Management Limited and registered in the Shatin New Territories Land Registry with Memorial No. 1244690
	and
	IN THE MATTER of section 19 of the Building Management Ordinance (Cap.344)
	and
	IN THE MATTER of Order 88 Rules 1 and 5A of the Rules of the District Court (Cap.336)

______________________

	URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED	1^st Plaintiff
	THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KING TIN COURT	2^nd Plaintiff
	and
	TSANG WING LAM (曾榮林)	Defendant

______________________

Coram: His Hon Judge Leung in chambers (open to public)

Date of hearing: 17 December 2009

Date of decision: 21 December 2009

D E C I S I O N

1. Tsang, the Defendant, is the registered owner of the property at Flat 5, 23^rd Floor, Block C, King Tin Court, Shatin, New Territories (“the Property”). The 1^st Plaintiff is the manager and the 2^nd Plaintiff is the owners’ corporation of the building where the Property is.

2. On 11 September 2001, the manager registered in the Land Registry the captioned Memorandum of Charge against the Property for unpaid management expenses (“the MOC”).

3. These proceedings were commenced to recover the amount in arrears and to enforce the MOC by way of possession and sale. On 4 August 2006, HH Judge HC Wong granted the order sought by the Plaintiffs (“the 4/8/06 Order”).

4. On 23 December 2008, Tsang applied for the release of the Property from the security constituted by the MOC on the basis that the amount secured by the MOC has been paid. The Master dismissed the application. Tsang appealed to this court.

5. On 3 November 2009, this court handed down the decision allowing Tsang’s appeal and ordering the release (“the Decision”).

6. The Plaintiffs now seek leave to appeal against the Decision. They also ask for stay of execution of this court’s order pending the appeal, if leave is granted.

7. Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard: section 63A of the District Court Ordinance, Cap.336.

8. The long history of this case was summarised in paragraphs 4 to 28 of the Decision. The Plaintiffs basically intend to challenge this court’s discussion in paragraphs 33 to 41 of the Decision. I do not repeat the same here. The draft grounds of appeal annexed to the summons raise the points:

(1)  This court erred in holding that the amount secured by the MOC did not include the costs of these proceedings.
(2)  This court erred in holding that the order for possession has been validly executed and that possession has been resumed.
(3)  This court erred in holding that the amount secured by the MOC has been settled by way of the garnishee order.
(4)  This court has failed to give any or proper consideration to the Plaintiffs’ interest in terms of priority if the MOC is vacated.

9. I am prepared to consider the intended appeal as one concerning questions of construction. Nevertheless, for the purpose of section 63A, the Plaintiffs are expected to explain to this court how and why the above points are reasonably arguable. For the following reasons, I do not think they have managed to do so.

10. The Plaintiffs intend to argue “all other expenses in or in connection with the recovery or attempting to recover the same” in clause 6(e) of the DMC include the costs to be incurred as a result of the civil action yet to be commenced (to recover such expenses). In view of the wordings of clause 6(e), this is unarguable: see para.34 of the Decision. The terms of the 4/8/06 Order are no different: see para.36 of the Decision.

11. The major argument is that the costs of these proceedings are secured by the MOC. I agree that the MOC, if read literally and in isolation, may carry the meaning that it covers any further moneys that may be due by the owner to the Manager under the DMC than the principal debt of HK$12,870 with interest. But the MOC was supposed to be based on the very notice served pursuant to clauses 6(f) of the DMC. There is no way that the MOC could legitimately be created for a scope beyond what this clause permits: see paras.34-35 of the Decision.

12. If the costs of these proceedings were always secured by the MOC, it would have been wrong for the Registrar, as he then was, to order the return of the keys and vacant possession of the Property to Tsang upon payment of the sum specified in the order which obviously did not include the costs of these proceedings: see paras.16 to 21 of the Decision. Not only have the Plaintiffs not appealed against the Registrar’s order, but they have also kept and presented the cheque tendered by Tsang. Only that the cheque was subsequently dishonoured.

13. Contrary to what is suggested in the draft grounds of appeal, this court did not hold that the order for possession has been validly executed. This court merely stated the fact that the order for possession has been executed and, rightly or wrongly, the Property has been resumed by Tsang: see para.40 of the Decision. Though the Plaintiffs contend that Tsang’s resumption of the possession of the Property was a mistake, they did not reject the cheque tendered by Tsang and seek the Registrar’s clarification or direction upon at the material time. What the Plaintiffs did only afterwards was somewhat strange: see para.22 of the Decision.

14. The garnishee order referred to in the Decision was that made absolute on 30 May 2008 whereby the Plaintiffs managed to obtain payment in satisfaction of the principal and interest payable. It did not cover the costs of these proceedings. This court never suggest otherwise: see para.25 of the Decision. This is how this court’s reference to the amount secured by the MOC having been settled by that garnishee order should be understood: see para.40 of the Decision.

15. If the costs of these proceedings were already secured by the MOC and, according to the Plaintiffs, the MOC remains intact as long as the costs remain unpaid even after the resumption of the possession by Tsang, that seems to suggest that the Plaintiffs may now initiate another set of proceedings to obtain an order for possession and sale for the unpaid costs. They did attempt that but that ended up with no result: see para.26 of the Decision.

16. What the Plaintiffs eventually did was to impose another charge on the Property in 2009 in respect of the same indebtedness: see para.41 of the Decision. Miss Poon seemed to suggest that the charging order in 2009 was rightly imposed while the MOC should remain for the purpose of “preserving the Plaintiffs’ priority”. Neither counsel appearing for the Plaintiffs in the last hearing nor Miss Poon could really assist this court in understanding such contention as there were undeniably two encumbrances both enforceable as equitable charges on the same property in respect of the same debt. In my view, this contention cannot be right.

17. Indeed, after a notice has been served and the memorandum of charge has been registered pursuant to clause 6 of the DMC, the owner may continue to default. Other expenses and legal costs may have to be incurred to recover the amount specified in the notice and the memorandum of charge. Miss Poon questioned what if such further moneys become due and payable.

18. In my view, the answer is simple. Nothing prevents the Plaintiffs from serving another notice and registering another memorandum of charge for the further amounts due and payable against the property of the owner. In view of the wordings of clause 6 of the DMC, what the Plaintiffs cannot do is to purport to create a memorandum of charge for a scope covering any amount already as well as yet to be due and payable and specified in the notice served.

19. I refuse leave to appeal and dismiss the summons. It follows that costs of and occasioned by the application shall be to Tsang to be taxed, if not agreed.

20. As before, the hearing was conducted in Chinese for the benefit of Tsang but this decision is handed down in English.

	Simon Leung
	District Judge

Miss Kate Poon instructed by Messrs Leung & Wan for the 1^st and the 2^nd Plaintiffs

Defendant, in person, present

DCMP 2185/2004

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 2185 OF 2004

____________

	IN THE MATTER of a Deed of Mutual Covenant dated 13^th October 1983 and registered in the Shatin New Territories Land Registry with Memorial No. 239788 (“the DMC”)
	and
	IN THE MATTER of the property known as All Those 19/27,772^nd parts or shares of and in All Those piece or parcel of ground registered in the Shatin New Territories Land Registry as SHATIN TOWN LOT NO. 230 And of and in the messuages erections and buildings thereon known as “King Tin Court” Together with the full and exclusive right and privilege to hold use occupy and enjoy All That Flat 5, 23^rd Floor Block C (Bing Sam House), King Tin Court, 12 Chui Tin Street, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong, comprised in a Memorandum of Charge dated 11^th September 2001 made pursuant to the DMC and in favour of Urban Property Management Limited and registered in the Shatin New Territories Land Registry with Memorial No. 1244690
	and
	IN THE MATTER of section 19 of the Building Management Ordinance (Cap.344)
	and
	IN THE MATTER of Order 88 Rules 1 and 5A of the Rules of the District Court (Cap.336)

______________________

	URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED	1^st Plaintiff
	THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KING TIN COURT	2^nd Plaintiff
	and
	TSANG WING LAM (曾榮林)	Defendant

______________________

Coram: His Hon Judge Leung in chambers (open to public)

Date of hearing: 10 September 2009

Date of decision: 3 November 2009

D E C I S I O N

1. This case has a long history. Tsang, the Defendant, is the registered owner of the captioned property at Flat 5, 23^rd Floor, Block C, King Tin Court, Shatin, New Territories (“the Property”). The 1^st Plaintiff is the manager and the 2^nd Plaintiff is the owners’ corporation of the building. On 11 September 2001, the manager registered in the Land Registry the captioned Memorandum of Charge against the Property for the management expenses owed by Tsang (“the MOC”).

2. In 2004, the manager commenced the present originating proceedings to recover the amount due and owed by Tsang as well as to enforce the MOC by seeking an order for possession and sale of the Property. The owners’ corporation was subsequently joined as a plaintiff. Since then, many court hearings have taken place. As a matter of fact, there are still pending applications at the time of this decision. Besides this decision, I am also handing down my decision in respect of another appeal by Tsang against the Master’s decision.

3. On 23 December 2008, Tsang applied for an order for the release of the Property from the security constituted by the MOC. The Plaintiffs opposed. The Master dismissed the application on 8 June 2009. Tsang now appeals against the Master’s decision.

The MOC

4. To begin with, there is the deed of mutual covenant in respect of the building (“DMC”). Clause 6 of the DMC provides for the owners’ obligation to pay management expenses and the enforcement provisions including the following:

“(e)  All amounts which may be or become payable by any owner …… together with interest thereon …… and the said collection charge and all other expenses in or in connection with the recovery or attempting to recover the same shall be recoverable by civil action at the suit of the Authority.  The claim in any such action may include a claim for the solicitor and own client costs …… and the defaulting owner shall in addition to the amount claimed in such action be liable for such costs……
(f)  In the event of an owner failing to pay any sum due and payable by him in accordance with the provisions of this Deed within seven days from the date on which such sum becomes payable -
(i)  the Authority may serve upon that owner a notice specifying the amount due which shall include any interest payable thereon up to the date of the notice and any collection charge and all costs and expenses which may be incurred in recovery or attempting to recover the same including the legal expenses referred to in paragraph (e) above.
(ii)  Upon the service of a notice under (i) above the owner upon which whom such notice has been served shall be deemed to have entered into an agreement for a charge in favour of the Authority for the amount specified in the notice together with interest thereon at the rate stated and upon the terms and conditions therein set forth.
(iii)  The Authority may register in the District Land Office Sha Tin a copy of the said notice against the undivided share and interest in the said land of the owner upon whom the notice has been served and the said agreement to enter into a charge shall remain valid and enforceable as hereinafter mentioned notwithstanding that judgment may be obtained for the amount thereof unless such judgment has been fully satisfied.
(g)  Any notice registered in accordance with paragraph (f)(iii) of this Clause shall be enforceable as an equitable charge by action at the suit of the Authority for an order for the sale of the undivided share and interest of the defaulting owner of and in the said land together with the right to the exclusive use and occupation of the flat held and enjoyed therewith and the provisions of paragraph (e) of this Clause shall apply equally to any such action.”
(Emphasis added)

5. According to the MOC, service and management fees in the total sum of HK$12,870.00 (calculated from July 1999 up to August 2001) were then due and owing by Tsang. The MOC is in the following terms:

“NOW THIS MEMORADUM gives notice …… that the said sum of HK$12,870.00 is outstanding and unpaid and that the said sum or further moneys that may be due by the said owner to the Manager under the said Deed of Mutual Covenant shall stand charged on the said premises until the same shall have been settled in full by the said owner.” (Emphasis added)

6. By the time of the MOC, no civil action has been taken against Tsang for the unpaid management expenses pursuant to clause 6(e) of the DMC.

These proceedings

7. These originating proceedings were commenced by the Plaintiffs for dual purposes: (1) to recover the amounts payable pursuant to clause 6(e); and (2) to enforce the MOC pursuant to clause 6(g) of the DMC.

8. After numerous hearings, this case came to be heard before H H Judge HC Wong who made the following order on 4 August 2006 (“the 4/8/06 Order”):

“1.  The  1^st and the 2^nd Plaintiffs do recover against the Defendant all sums secured by the Memorandum of Charge dated 11^th September 2001 made pursuant to the DMC in favour of the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs and registered in the Sha Tin New Territories Land Registry by Memorial No. 1244690 (“the Memorandum of Charge”);
2.  Unless the Defendant do within 28 days from the date of the Order to be made herein pay to the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs all sums due to the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs and secured by the Memorandum of Charge, the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs may sell the property …… (“the Property”) to any purchaser in the open market or by way of private sale;
3.  The Defendant do within 28 days, after service upon him of the Order to be made herein deliver vacant possession of the Property to the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs ……
4.  Upon such sale of the Property, the solicitors for the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs appointed to conduct the sale and the Principal of the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs may execute the necessary agreement for sale and purchase, conveyance and/or assignment to give effect to the Order to be made herein;
5.  The money arising from such sale of the Property be applied in the following manner and priority:-
(a)  ……
(b)  ……
(c)  ……
(d)  to pay the sums due and owing by the Defendant to the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs under the Memorandum of Charge, i.e., the sum of HK$12,870.00 together with interest thereon and collection charge and all other expenses incurred in or in connection with the recovering or attempting to recover the said sum;
(e)  ……
(f)  ……
6.  Upon the Defendant paying to the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs the money ordered to be paid and all other moneys secured to the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs by the Memorandum of Charge, the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs (subject and without prejudice to the due exercise of any power of sale of the time being vested in it) do deliver to the Defendant possession of the Property and release to the Defendant the security constituted by the Memorandum of Charge as the Defendant may agree or this Honourable Court may direct;
7.  The Counterclaim by the Defendant be dismissed with costs;
8.  The parties hereto do have liberty to apply; and
9.  Costs of these proceedings be to the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs, to be taxed if not agreed.”
(Emphasis added)

10. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 4/8/06 Order entitle the Plaintiffs to recover all sums due to them and secured by the MOC. Paragraphs 2 to 4 of the order provide for the order for possession and order for sale, in the event that Tsang did not pay such sums due and secured by the MOC. Paragraphs 7 and 9 of the order entitle the Plaintiff to costs of these proceedings.

11. After numerous hearings whereby the execution of the 4/8/06 Order has been stayed, writ of possession of the Property was eventually issued on 7 March 2007 (“the Writ of Possession”).

12. On 29 March 2007, H H Judge HC Wong dismissed Tsang’s application for leave to appeal against the 4/8/06 Order with costs.

13. Since then, Tsang has taken out various applications in respect of the 4/8/06 Order and the Writ of Possession. The deadline for his compliance with paragraph 2 of the 4/8/06 Order has since been extended time and time again.

14. On 10 July 2007, H H Judge HC Wong dismissed the various applications by Tsang with costs; and for the last time extended the deadline for compliance with paragraph 2 of the 4/8/06 Order to 23 July 2007.

15. The deadline lapsed and Tsang has failed to settle the sums due. Tsang has chosen to tender cheques which were drawn in such a way that the manager and the owners’ corporation were named together as the payees. Without such a bank account in existence, the cheques simply could not lead to payment to the Plaintiffs.

16. The Plaintiffs therefore proceeded with the execution of the Writ of Possession. Execution took place on 16 October 2007 when the bailiff took possession of the Property.

17. Pursuant to Tsang’s application for the recovery of vacant possession of the Property from the Plaintiffs, the Registrar gave Tsang the last chance on 18 October 2007. He ordered that:

“1.  被告人須在今天下午4時30分前以支票支付欠款HK$27,002.50給原告人及支票抬頭寫上「梁溫律師事務所」；
2.  收取支票後，原告人須送達鎖匙予被告人作交還新界沙田大圍景田苑冰心閣23樓5號室管有權予被告人；
3.  被告人可自由處理門鎖；及
4.  申請的訟費不作出判令。”

18. The order by the Registrar was effectively that Tsang should pay HK$27,002.50 being the sum due and owing (and secured by the MOC) by way of cheque drawn in favour of the solicitors for the Plaintiffs by 4.30 pm of that day. Upon receipt of the cheque, the Plaintiffs should return the vacant possession of the Property to Tsang by way of handing over the keys to the Property. Tsang had liberty to deal with the lock (to the Property) thereafter.

19. Pausing here, it should be noted that a cheque does not amount to payment unless and until the cheque is honoured upon due presentment. It is upon payment when Tsang could really be said to have discharged his obligation to pay the amounts secured by the MOC. This is clear by referring to paragraph 6 of the 4/8/06 Order.

20. However, while paragraph 1 of the Registrar’s order “以支票支付欠款” must mean payment rather than mere tendering of the cheque, paragraph 2 directed the return of vacant possession to Tsang upon the Plaintiffs’ receipt of the cheque. The risk of that, of course, would be the uncertainty of whether cheque received would be honoured.

21. The risk mentioned above materialised. What Tsang drew in favour of the Plaintiffs’ solicitors and delivered to them was a cheque post-dated to 28 October 2007. Upon tendering of the cheque, Tsang somehow managed to get hold of the keys to the Property. The cheque was dishonoured upon presentment after the cheque has become due. Yet Tsang has resumed possession of the Property.

22. Since late 2007 and early 2008, the Plaintiffs have been seeking the court’s order for the re-delivery of vacant possession of the Property to them by Tsang. I have doubt as to the legal basis for such request as much as what the Master had when he raised his requisitions in this regard. In the meantime, the Plaintiffs also turned to other enforcement alternative.

23. On 31 January 2008, the Plaintiffs obtained a garnishee order nisi against Tsang’s money at the bank in respect of the sum of HK$24,155.95 (i.e., the principal sum of HK$12,870 and accrued interest secured by the MOC). Tsang has again made various attempts to rid himself of the order. But his application to set aside the nisi order and the subsequent appeal have all been dismissed by the court.

24. Tsang has purported to tender payment. However, not only did Tsang again insist on tendering his cheque made payable to the manager and the owners’ corporation together as the payee (which as mentioned above would have disabled the Plaintiffs from obtaining payment), but he also drew the cheque for an amount different from the amount of the garnishee order. Not surprisingly, this ended up with the court’s disapproval.

25. The garnishee order nisi was finally made absolute on 30 May 2008. The further appeals from the court’s decisions in this respect were all dismissed subsequently. Effectively this was when the Plaintiff managed to obtain payment in satisfaction of the principal and interest payable and secured by the MOC.

26. Insofar as the application for re-delivery of vacant possession of the Property to the Plaintiffs is concerned, attempts were made in November 2007 and January 2008, notwithstanding the execution of the Writ of Possession on 16 October 2007. In January 2009, the Plaintiffs decided to apply for a new writ of possession of the Property. This again met with the Master’s requisitions as to the legal basis.

27. By an Allocatur dated on 2 July 2008, the Plaintiffs’ costs pursuant to various costs orders adverse to Tsang made in these proceedings were taxed at the total sum of 411,012. Tsang has yet to pay such taxed costs.

28. Prior to this hearing and in respect of the unpaid taxed costs of HK$411,012, the Plaintiffs has also obtained from the court a charging order against the Property which was made absolute on 27 August 2009; and a charging order against Tsang’s majority interest in the shares in a company which was made absolute on 4 September 2009.

Tsang’s application

29. The application by Tsang for the release of the security by the MOC over the Property was filed on 23 December 2008. The Master handed down her written decision on 8 June 2009 dismissing the application with costs. By notice of appeal filed on 22 June 2009, Tsang appeals.

30. In his affirmations, Tsang questioned what the Plaintiffs’ solicitors deposed in opposition to his present application. Though he spoke in terms of the solicitors’ authority to make the affirmation, I consider it to be nothing more than his disagreement with the Plaintiffs’ solicitors.

31. Tsang mentioned the amount of his indebtedness by referring to the amount stated in the letter from the Plaintiffs’ solicitors to him on 10 July 2007. The might be the amount due and owing as at that day. However, the amount clearly kept on increasing with the overdue interest as long as the principal amount (HK$12,870) remained unpaid even after that date. This has been reiterated time and time again in the decisions of the court on the previous occasions.

32. Mainly, Tsang argued that possession of the Property has been returned to him and so should the release of the Property from the security constituted by the MOC. He argued that the right to enforce the security has been exercised. He also argued that he has already discharged his obligation to pay the amount secured by the MOC.

33. It was argued on behalf of the Plaintiffs that costs of these proceedings are secured by the MOC. Therefore the release should be refused. For the following reasons, I do not agree with the Plaintiffs.

34. The notice under clause 6(f) is supposed to be served in the event of an owner failing to pay any sum due and payable by the owner within 7 days “from the date on which such sum becomes payable”. The notice served pursuant to clause 6(f)(i) is supposed to specify such sum due by then. According to clauses 6(e) and 6(f)(i), costs of the action are separate and distinct from the expenses in or in connection with the recovery or attempt to recover the amount due. However, by the time of the notice constituting the MOC subsequently registered pursuant to clause 6(f)(iii) came into existence, no civil action has been brought pursuant to clause 6(e), let alone these proceedings which were commenced in 2004. No legal costs of any civil action was due or payable by the time of the notice constituting the MOC.

35. To be in line with these provisions of the DMC, the “further moneys that may be due” under the MOC could not be any amount than that specified. Tsang was deemed by clause 6(f)(ii) to have agreed to a charge for the amount specified in the notice together with interest. This did not include the legal costs to be incurred in these proceedings.

36. I note paragraph 5 of the 4/8/06 Order which sets out the manner in which the proceeds of sale of the Property, if sold, should be distributed. Paragraph 5(d) refers to all other expenses incurred in or in connection with the recovering or attempting to recover the sums secured by the MOC. For reasons discussed above, they do not refer to the costs of these proceedings commenced pursuant to clause 6(e) of the DMC.

37. Liability for costs at any stage of these proceedings arises upon the court’s order. That is when the same becomes payable. Costs of these proceedings were dealt with in paragraphs 7 and 9 of the 4/8/06 Order. Tsang became liable to pay such costs as a result of such order, and not already secured by the MOC.

38. What remains to be considered is paragraph 6 of the 4/8/06 Order. Return of the possession of the Property and release of the Property from the security constituted by the MOC were supposed to happen upon “the money ordered to be paid and all other moneys secured to the 1^st and the 2^nd Plaintiffs by the Memorandum of Charge” having been paid. If the costs of these proceedings belong to the money secured by the MOC, as the Plaintiffs suggest, it becomes unclear what “the money ordered to be paid” in the same paragraph could mean.

39. If on the other hand, the costs of these proceedings do not form part of the amount secured by the MOC but are part of the other money ordered to be paid, then payment of the costs of these proceedings pursuant to paragraph 6 of the order becomes effectively a condition precedent to returning possession and release of the security now imposed by the court.

40. Even assuming that payment of costs was such a condition precedent imposed by the court, paragraph 8 of the 4/8/06 Order provides for the return of possession and release of the security by the MOC as the court may direct. The order for possession has been executed by way of the Writ of Possession. Rightly or wrongly, possession was in fact resumed by Tsang without actual payment. Nevertheless, the amount has been settled by way of the garnishee order against his money in the bank subsequently in May 2008. In the circumstances, I would direct that the Property be released from the security constituted by the MOC.

41. Another reality is that by the time of this hearing, the Plaintiffs have separately obtained charging order against the Property in respect of the unpaid taxed costs of these proceedings. The actual position of the Plaintiffs could only be that the costs ordered to be paid in these proceedings are not secured by the MOC. Otherwise, there would be two enforceable charges against the same property in respect of the same indebtedness of Tsang to the Plaintiff.

42. Lastly, Tsang made reference in his affirmations to various other extraneous matters such as his dealings with other third parties and other actions. They are irrelevant. So is what is apparently stated in his affirmation he managed to file and sought to rely on without leave of the court just before this hearing began.

Order

43. The Master’s order dated 8 June 2009 is set aside. I order that the Property be released from the security constituted by the MOC. I make a nisi order that Tsang shall have the costs of the hearing below and this hearing. Costs shall be taxed, if not agreed. In the absence of an appointment within 14 days to argue costs, this costs order shall become absolute.

44. The court documents filed by the parties have all along been in English. As indicated during the hearing, notwithstanding this hearing being conducted in Chinese for the benefit of Tsang, I am handing down this decision in English. If necessary, Tsang may request to arrange the assistance of the court interpreter in receiving this decision.

Simon Leung
District Judge

Miss Minnie WAT instructed by Messrs Leung & Wan for the 1^st and the 2^nd Plaintiffs

Defendant, in person, present

DCMP 2185/2004

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 2185 OF 2004

____________

	IN THE MATTER of a Deed of Mutual Covenant dated 13^th October 1983 and registered in the Shatin New Territories Land Registry with Memorial No. 239788 (“the DMC”)
	and
	IN THE MATTER of the property known as All Those 19/27,772^nd parts or shares of and in All Those piece or parcel of ground registered in the Shatin New Territories Land Registry as SHATIN TOWN LOT NO. 230 And of and in the messuages erections and buildings thereon known as “King Tin Court” Together with the full and exclusive right and privilege to hold use occupy and enjoy All That Flat 5, 23^rd Floor Block C (Bing Sam House), King Tin Court, 12 Chui Tin Street, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong, comprised in a Memorandum of Charge dated 11^th September 2001 made pursuant to the DMC and in favour of Urban Property Management Limited and registered in the Shatin New Territories Land Registry with Memorial No. 1244690
	and
	IN THE MATTER of section 19 of the Building Management Ordinance (Cap.344)
	and
	IN THE MATTER of Order 88 Rules 1 and 5A of the Rules of the District Court (Cap.336)

______________________

	URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED	1^st Plaintiff
	THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KING TIN COURT	2^nd Plaintiff
	and
	TSANG WING LAM (曾榮林)	Defendant

______________________

Coram: His Hon Judge Leung in chambers (open to public)

Date of hearing: 2 November 2009

Date of decision: 3 November 2009

D E C I S I O N

1. Tsang, the Defendant, is the registered owner of the captioned property at Flat 5, 23^rd Floor, Block C, King Tin Court, Shatin, New Territories (“the Property”). The 1^st Plaintiff is the manager and the 2^nd Plaintiff is the owners’ corporation of the building. On 11 September 2001, the manager registered in the Land Registry the captioned Memorandum of Charge against the Property for unpaid management expenses (“the MOC”).

2. In 2004, the manager commenced the present originating proceedings to recover the amount due and owed by Tsang as well as to enforce the MOC by an order for possession and sale of the Property. The owners’ corporation was subsequently joined as a plaintiff. On 4 August 2006, HH Judge HC Wong granted the order sought by the Plaintiffs (“the 4/8/06 Order”).

3. Besides this decision, I am also handing down today this court’s decision in respect of Tsang’s another appeal against the Master’s refusal to release the Property from the security constituted by the MOC. Much of the history of this case can be found mentioned in that decision. I do not intend to repeat the same here. I also refer to the terms of the DMC, the MOC and the various orders in these proceedings cited in that decision.

4. Insofar as this appeal is concerned, it suffices for me to say that pursuant to an Allocatur dated 2 July 2008, Tsang’s liability for legal costs as ordered by the court in these proceedings was taxed at the total sum of HK$411,012. Tsang has yet and, as he reiterated in this hearing, refused to pay the same. In respect of such taxed costs (together with statutory interest and costs of the application), the Plaintiffs have obtained, among others, a charging order against the Property. The order was made absolute on 27 August 2009.

5. Tsang has applied to set aside the charging order but was dismissed by the Master. Tsang appeals. The hearing of his appeal will be held on 14 December 2009. In the meantime, Tsang has applied for stay of execution of the charging order absolute pending his appeal. On 30 October 2009, the Master dismissed such application with costs. Tsang immediately filed his notice of appeal which is now before this court.

The principle

6. The law is trite. An appeal does not operate as a stay of execution of the order being appealed against: see O.58, r.3 of the Rules of the District Court. A stay has to be justified and justification is demonstrated only if good reasons exist. An important consideration is whether the proposed appeal has strong grounds. This entails the court forming a preliminary view of the merits of the proposed appeal. See World Trade Centre Group Ltd & Anor v Resourceful River Ltd & Anor, CACV 70/1993 (12 May 1993).: Star Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Co Ltd, HCA 4726/2001 (7 June 2002). See also Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2009 at 59/13/1 (or the same paragraph in the 2010 edition).

Discussion

7. As far as possible, one can deduce out of Tsang’s affirmation and submission in court the following major arguments for the proposed appeal to be heard on 14 December:

(1)  He is not liable to pay the taxed costs as the same did not form part of the amount specified in the MOC.
(2)  The possession order under the 4/8/06 Order has already been executed and he has resumed possession.  The Plaintiffs have delayed in taxing the costs and thus losing their only chance to enforce any costs order against him.
(3)  The court will not allow the creation of another charge against the same property in respect of the same debt.
(4)  The Allocatur was wrongfully obtained and for the wrong amount.
(5)  In the absence of a stay of execution, his appeal, if successful, will be rendered nugatory.

8. In respect of (1) above, I refer to the discussion in my other decision being handed down today. In summary, the costs of these proceedings, in my view, did not form part of the amount due and payable pursuant to clause 6(f) and therefore could not form part of the amount required to be specified in the notice constituting the MOC in 2001 in the present case. In other words, the costs of these proceedings are not secured by the MOC.

9. In this regard, Tsang emphasized the phrase “may be incurred” in clause 6(f)(i) and suggested that the Plaintiffs were expected to estimate the amount of legal costs to be incurred and to specify the same in the notice constituting the MOC. In view of the starting paragraph of clause 6(f), which refers to the sum due and payable as what is unpaid 7 days from the date on which the sum becomes payable, I can hardly see how this could include costs which may but are yet to be incurred by the time when the notice is served pursuant to clause 6(f)(i). The argument about somehow estimating a figure, which Tsang argued would have capped the amount of costs, simply lacks any basis as a matter of construction and logic.

10. In respect of (2) above, I concluded that the Property should be released from the security constituted by the MOC for the reasons stated in my other decision handed down today. Whether the Plaintiffs could have proceeded to tax the costs more promptly, I do not see how this affect the incidence of costs as already ordered by the court in these proceedings or Tsang’s liability to satisfy such costs orders. As mentioned above, whether the Property is released from the security constituted by the MOC is irrelevant.

11. In respect of (3) above, I agree that a creditor is not entitled to two charging orders against the same property of the debtor in respect of the same outstanding indebtedness. But no such issue arises in the present case as the costs ordered in these proceedings were not secured by the MOC at the time when the charging order was granted.

12. In respect of (4) above, Tsang argued that he was somehow taken advantage of when the Allocatur was issued by the Master. He questioned how he is required to pay any costs because he has also been awarded costs in these proceedings. None of these arguments sound compelling at all. If he has been awarded costs at any stage of these proceedings, it is for him to enforce the same against the Plaintiffs.

13. (5) above seems to be a relatively more relevant concern out of all. The court has to consider all the circumstances whether to grant the stay. The court does not make a practice of depriving a successful litigant of the fruits of litigation: see Star Play Development at para.10. Here the adverse costs orders against Tsang in these proceedings are incontrovertible.

14. It is always relevant to consider the prejudice to the successful party in the event a stay is granted and, if necessary, to impose condition as to minimise the prejudice to him: see Star Play Development at para.9(9). As Mr Ng submitted, while Tsang alleged his concern, there is nothing to suggest that a balance could be struck by imposing any condition on Tsang meaningfully for a stay of execution.

15. The appeal will be heard on 14 December 2009. To enforce the charging order, the Plaintiffs have applied for an order for possession and sale. In fact, the hearing of the Plaintiffs’ application will be heard later today. How the application will be dealt with is beyond this court. But even if the Plaintiffs manage to obtain an order in terms of their summons dated 19 October 2009, the order will give 28 days from the date of the order to be made for Tsang to settle the amount secured by the charging order. Unless Tsang delivered vacant possession voluntarily, the Plaintiffs would also have to apply for formal execution of the possession order by writ of possession. The writ will then have to be executed by the bailiff. The chance of Tsang losing actual possession of the Property by the time of the hearing of the appeal in December is not real.

16. In Star Play Development (at para.14), the court stayed the execution of an order for possession only for the actual possession of the premises in question without preventing the plaintiff from completing all procedures up to actual possession. I echo that and consider that the Plaintiffs here should not be prevented at this stage to seek to enforce the charging order by applying for the order for possession. In the event that an order for possession in granted, it will be for the court then to consider, if Tsang applies and for sufficiently good reasons, for stay of execution for the actual possession of the Property in the manner as the court did in the case cited.

17. If the court is not convinced that there exist arguable ground of appeal, no stay will be granted: see Star Play Development at para.9(6). Further considering the history of this case and what is discussed above, I am not minded to exercise my discretion to delay the Plaintiffs in reaping the fruits of the litigation without good reason.

Order

18. The appeal is dismissed and the Master’s order dated 30 October 2009 is maintained. I invited and heard arguments regarding costs from the parties at the end of the hearing. Tsang made no submission on costs save that he would leave the question of costs to this court. Mr Ng asked for costs if the appeal is dismissed. I agree and order that the Plaintiffs shall have the costs of and incidental to this appeal in any event. Costs shall be taxed, if not agreed, with certificate for counsel.

19. Tsang’s appeal against the charging order has been scheduled to be heard in this court. For the purpose of determining this appeal in respect of the stay of execution of that charging order, I have inevitably expressed my views on the merits of Tsang’s pending appeal. To ensure Tsang will have a fair hearing of his pending appeal without any concern about the court having pre-judged his arguments, I order that the appeal against the charging order to be heard on 11 December 2009 be removed from this court and re-fixed before another court.

20. As explained in the other decision being handed down at the same time as this one, I am also handing down this decision in English. If necessary, Tsang may request to arrange the assistance of the court interpreter in receiving this decision.

Simon Leung
District Judge

Mr Felix NG instructed by Messrs Leung & Wan for the 1^st and the 2^nd Plaintiffs

Defendant, in person, present

DCMP2185/2004

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟編號2004年第2185號

----------------------

第一原告人	URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED
第二原告人	THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KING TIN COURT
	對
被告人	TSANG WING LAM

----------------------

主審法官：區域法院法官黃慶春內庭聆訊（公開）

宣判日期：2008年8月19日

判案書日期：2008年8月19日

------------------------------------

判案書

------------------------------------

1. 被告人上訴本席在08年4月9日所發出的判詞及命令，拒絕他上訴潘聆案官不批準他申請暫停第三債務人的法律程序的上訴，以及被告人今天亦上訴李聆案官在2008年5月30日批准及頒下永久的第三債權人的命令，並且拒絕被告人申請押後當天的聆訊的要求。

2. 被告人的上訴理由是他已遵守法庭在2006年8月4日所發出的命令，因為他已把兩張支票交給原告人，該兩張支票是支付本席在2006年8月4日命令他需要支付的欠款，而該兩張支票的抬頭人是兩位原告人的聯名。被告人因此相信他已經遵守法庭的命令，他並聲稱倘若兩位原告人並沒有一個聯名的銀行戶口，亦非他的顧慮，只要他已遵守法庭所發出的命令已經足夠。

3. 他更聲稱聆案官違反法庭的命令，指示被告人需以原告的律師辦事處的註冊名字作為抬頭人，發出支票支付欠款。這指示是在2007年10月18日由潘聆案官所發出的。被告人認為這是違反了本席在2006年8月4日所頒下的命令。

4. 而被告人在上訴李聆案官批准第三債務人永久命令之時，並且拒絕押後該聆訊，他的上訴理由與他所前述上訴本席在08年4月9日所頒下的理由大致相同。

5. 在08年4月9日的聆訊，當被告人申請押後第三債權人法律程序，已經把他的反對理由、上訴理由陳述清楚。我亦在當天的判詞中一一解釋我當天拒絕他的理由，我不會在此重複，但因為他今天以同樣的理由上訴我在4月9日的裁決，以及以同樣的理由去上訴李聆案官在5月30日所頒下的第三債務人法律程序的永久命令。我認為我需要作出簡短的回應。

6. 被告人一直的論據是他以兩位原告人作為抬頭人聯名在他所支付的兩張支票上去支付所欠的欠款並無不妥，並且經已達成本席的命令要求。但這兩張聯名支票明顯地不能兌現，又明顯地不能過數，因此潘聆案官才在07年10月18日發出指示，給予被告人一個解決的方法，要求被告人發出一張支票，以兩位原告人的律師樓的名字作為抬頭人，去支付欠款，但被告人並沒有遵守這個指示，而且直至今天，被告人所欠的款項仍未支付，但被告人仍然堅持他已經完全遵從我在06年8月4日所頒下的命令。

7. 法庭不能夠接受一項法庭在2006年8月，兩年前所頒下的命令，命令被告人支付的欠款，在兩年後，仍然未有支付給原告人，理由是因為被告人用支票方式以兩位原告人聯合名字作為抬頭人所致。當法庭頒下一個支付欠款的命令，法庭會讓與訟雙方協議付款方法，若雙方能達成一個付款的形式的協議那當然是最理想。法庭亦沒有指定付款的形式是以現金或支票。但當法庭的命令沒有批淮付款一方特許延遲付款時間，即表示欠款應當立刻支付，被告人有責任使到原告人可以儘早收到所拖欠的款項。

8. 在此案中，被告人的付款方式是以兩張支票，抬頭人為兩位原告人的聯名，這兩張支票並不能妥善及第一時間令到原告人可以收到所拖欠的欠款。

9. 既然聆案官體恤雙方的情況，發出一個適當的指示，要求被告人把欠款支付到原告人的律師樓作為抬頭人，這是適當及合乎一般民事訴訟的程序，而且法庭聆案官是完全有權在合乎民事訴訟規則批准下發出此等指示及命令，這些是完全合乎法庭的民事訴訟規則的。

10. 我不接受被告人一次一次再一次地堅持他所發出的兩張以兩位原告人聯名作為抬頭人的支票，是一妥善而令到原告人可以收到欠款的方法。被告人的一再堅持，作為他上訴及要求暫停及押後的原因，也是基於這兩份聯名支票已經支付欠款的原因。我認為這只是他意圖繼續拖欠款項而已。

11. 因此，我不認為被告人有任何良好的上訴理由，上訴李聆案官在5月30日批准第三債權人的法律程序的永久命令，我亦不認為他申請上訴權，上訴我在本年4月9日拒絕他上訴潘聆案官不再押後第三債權人的法律程序聆訊是有任何良好的理由，我更不認為被告人有任何良好理由，可成功上訴李聆案官拒絕他以申請上訴作為理由在5月30日申請押後當天的第三債權人的聆訊。我在本年4月9日已拒絕他上訴潘聆案官向被告人的申請，撤銷第三債務人的暫時命令的申請。

12. 我不認為被告人有任何良好的上訴理由及成功的機會，我認為被告人一直發出此等申請及上訴，均是想拖延支付欠款，因此，我完全拒絕被告人今天的兩項上訴申請，並且命令被告人必須支付第一及第二原告的訟費，全部的訟費。

13. 若雙方未能達成訟費協議，可由訟費評定官作出訟費評估。

（黃慶春）
區域法院法官

第一原告人：梁溫律師行延聘Miss Christine Law大律師代表

第二原告人：梁溫律師行延聘Miss Christine Law大律師代表

被告人：出席，並無律師代表

DCMP2185/2004

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟編號2004年第2185號

________________________

第一原告人	URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED
第二原告人	THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KING TIN COURT
	對
被告人	TSANG WING LAM

________________________

主審法官：區域法院法官黃慶春內庭聆訊（公開）

宣判日期：2008年4月9日

判案書日期：2008年4月9日

判案書

1. 今天被告人上訴司法常務官批准第三債務人的法律程序的暫准命令。被告人再加以申請法庭指引，關於他在07年9月19及07年10月16發出予兩位原告的兩張支票的支付是否已遵從法庭所頒布的命令，及利息的計算。

2. 被告人曾先生在法庭指出，他在2007年9月19日及2007年10月16日經已支付了給第一及第二被告一張聯名的支票，是根據法庭在2006年8月4日的命令的。他並指出因為經已在去年9月及10月支付該兩筆款項，因此原告不應繼續計算欠款數目的利息。曾先生更向法庭陳述，既然兩位原告是法庭2006年8月4日命令的得益人，該兩張支票的抬頭人為兩位原告是適當的。

3. 他指出，潘司法常務官在原告申請第三債務人的法律程序，指令曾先生的銀行須支付給兩位原告$24,155.95是一個錯誤的決定，他不應發出在2008年3月19日的命令。

4. 根據法庭的紀錄顯示，兩原告原定在2008年3月28日在法庭常務官席前聆訊，根據第三債務人的法律程序，著令被告人提出反對因由的命令的送達及效力。我相信此聆訊也因為曾先生的3月25日的上訴潘聆案官3月19日所發出的命令而暫時擱置至5月後才作出聆訊。

5. 原告人向法庭所申請的第三債權人的法律程序，是根據曾先生作為經法庭裁決下的欠債人身份，因為他一直未有遵從法庭所頒下的命令，支付所欠的債務，加上因債務一路滾存下來的利息，是根據大廈公契所定的利率而計算的，因此，兩原告向曾先生的銀行申請由曾先生的銀行戶口負責支付該筆所拖欠的債務。

6. 此案背景源於2006年8月4日本席所頒發的裁決，曾先生一直未有支付所欠的債務，因此，原告的律師在2007年10月18日，根據《區域法院規則》第45號命令第5條例申請一項收樓令，該申請亦於聆訊當天由潘聆案官頒發，並指令曾先生必須在2007年10月18日支付$27,002.55。根據潘司法常務官的命令，曾先生須立即支付$27,002.55給兩原告的律師，抬頭人是“Messrs Leung & Wan”。並命令在曾先生支付該支票給原告的律師之後，原告須把該物業的鎖匙交還給曾先生。

7. 我相信潘司法常務官當天所頒發命令時經已詳細聆聽及考慮雙方的陳詞。發現曾先生曾於07年9月19及10月16發出兩張支票，全是以第一及第二原告二人共同作為抬頭人，所以該兩張支票未能兌現，因此，才頒下命令要求曾先生的付款是以 “Messrs Leung & Wan” 的名義。很可惜，雖然潘法官在10月18日頒下命令，曾先生支付給兩位原告人的支票，在2007年10月29日仍未能兌現。

8. 在2008年1月間，兩位原告經他們的律師向法庭申請一項第三債務人的法律程序，該第三債務人的法律程序在1月23日經司法常務官發出一個臨時的命令。曾先生因此申請撤銷該臨時第三者債務人的命令聆訊中，曾先生提出他反對的理由並向法庭申請撤銷該命令。潘司法常務司並不接納曾先生的申請。

9. 曾先生所提出的上訴理由經已清楚在他的誓章中一一列出，我相信他同樣是基於該些理由，在3月19日的聆訊向潘法官提出。今天，曾先生亦坦白承認，潘法官曾經小心地再計算過所欠的債務及利息。

10. 曾先生在今天的聆訊之前，亦曾經提出以信件形式把一張抬頭人為兩原告的聯名的$22,470支票，在08年3月25日，送往原告的律師。原告律師並沒有接受該支票。原告指出，該支票以兩原告的聯名作為抬頭人是不能兌現的，而且，支票銀碼亦不對。曾先生則指出，原告所計算的利息是不對的，因為，他在去年9月及10月間經已支付該所拖欠的款項，因此，利息不應繼續算下去，只因為兩原告未能聯名到銀行開一個共同擁有的戶口，被告人不應該因此而受損害。我認為，今天的申請中，不應再重頭細數此案的背景，以上所述經已足夠解釋申請的來源。

11. 潘法官在2007年10月17日經已清楚地解釋曾先生應該作出的，是把一張支付給代表兩位原告的律師作為抬頭人的支票。可惜，這支票未能兌現，因此引致被告未有履行法庭的命令。

12. 既然曾先生未能履行法庭所頒發的命令，而在08年3月25日所發出的支票亦因以兩位原告作為抬頭人的形式發出，是原告不能兌現的。被告人因此明顯地未有遵從法庭的命令。因此，利息應該繼續滾存下去，因為他還未有支付拖欠的款項。

13. 潘法官所作出的決定是對的，因此第三者債項的法律程序頒令是適當的。曾先生今天的上訴是被拒絕。

14. 至於曾先生申請法庭的指示，關於該兩項支票2007年9月及10月的支付。支票是以兩位原告的名字作為抬頭人而發出的，明顯地，此兩張支票是不能兌現的。潘聆案官在去年10月所發出的命令，曾先生也未能遵守，若他經已遵守的話，那原告便不用發出這第三者債務人的法律程序了。因此，我拒絕曾先生的申請。

15. 曾先生需要支付給第一及第二原告的訟費。若雙方未能達成協議，可由司法常務官作出評估。

（黃慶春）
區域法院法官

第一原告人：	梁溫律師行律師Miss Christine Law，代表第一原告人
第二原告人：	梁溫律師行律師Miss Christine Law，代表第二原告人
被告人：	出席，並無律師代表

DCMP2185/2004

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟編號2004年第2185號

______________________

第一原告人	URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED
第二原告人	THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KING TIN COURT
	對
被告人	曾榮林

______________________

主審法官：區域法院法官黃慶春內庭聆訊（公開）

宣判日期： 2007年7月10日

判案書日期： 2007年7月10日

判案書

1. 被告人曾榮林先生向法庭申請擱置原告人所發出之2007年3月7日收樓令，指出收樓令乃錯誤發出。曾榮林先生亦指出，原告人在發出2006年9月28日的蓋印命令以前，從未通知被告人應支付的正確銀碼，而因為原告人未有人通知被告人應支付的銀碼，在2007年3月7日發出之收樓令是屬於錯誤執行該蓋印命令，因而應予以撤銷。

2. 被告人曾先生亦向法庭申請，因為以上的理由，2006年9月28日的蓋印命令應被擱置，收樓令亦應被擱置。曾先生又向法庭申請暫緩執行該收樓令。曾先生於本年5月17日所發出之傳票提出，原告人所能取得的訴訟費用只能相等於或低於根據香港法例344章第24條申請扣押令之訴訟費用。曾先生並且指出，被告人可取得過去因原告人錯誤的申請，或與被告人無關的，或當時法官已完成聆訊或聆案官已經裁定的訟費，據曾先生以上的申請，以下是我的決定。

3. 至於曾先生所提出因為原告人之事務律師未有及時在蓋印命令發出之日（即2006年9月28日）或之前，向曾先生作出通知應支付之欠款數目，因此，原告人已喪失全部因2006年8月4日裁決所得的權利。曾先生指出，因為被告人未能得知他所拖欠的款項數目，而令致未能及時支付該些欠款，因此，原告人的律師有濫權之嫌，就此，原告律師及原告應該已經失去執行該命令的權利。

4. 在此，我必須首先指出，根據法庭規則，法庭一旦頒下判令，不論是否有蓋印命令發出，法庭經已頒布命令及判決，而法庭的判案命令，根據香港法例以及《香港法院規則》2007年版第672頁42/1/3號命令及區域法院規則第42號命令第3段：「區域法院的判決或命令，由該判決或命令的日期開始生效」，並非在命令蓋印之後才生效。因此，就算原告人未能及早發出蓋印命令，也不能把法庭的裁決及命令推翻，除非敗訴一方成功向上訴庭提出上訴，上訴庭接受上訴而推翻原判，否則法庭的命令一直生效。

5. 至於被告人指出，原告人的律師未能及時向被告人通知應支付的數目，根據所謂“all sums due to the first and second plaintiffs secured by the memorandum of charge”，即由押記所擔保之全部所欠第一、第二被告的欠款數目，以及命令所提及的“interest thereon”，即欠款的利息，而被告人指出因為原告律師未有在2006年9月28日或之前向他通知應付的欠款數目，因此，後來才向他通知欠款數目並不生效。我經已在本年6月7日的聆訊判案，一一解釋此一論點不能成立的理由，我不會在此聆訊中重複該天的判案書及判案理由。

6. 至於被告人指出，原告人未有列出原告人如何計算欠款利息。根據文件的顯示，原告人的申索是向被告人追討拖欠管理費及其他相關費用，是根據大廈公契的條款而進行的。原告人在2004年7月17日梁先生所存入法庭支持原告申請的誓章中，不但把大廈公契作為附件，更列出扣押登記備忘錄以及計算利息的列表，更加附錄在該誓章中一封2004年6月12日申索前通知信件副本，要求被告人支付拖欠管理費及利息等等，此信中亦有列舉出被告人所拖欠的款項以及利息的計算，即每月所欠的管理費數目，及每項管理費因拖欠而產生的利息的數目等等。

7. 再者，物業扣押備忘錄中亦有表列出每月所拖欠的管理費或其他費用。根據大廈公契第6條D，利息為每100元需支付1元，以每三十天計算。因此，被告人在收到原告人的申索書及支持誓章後，應已清楚明白原告人的申索根據及利息的計算。

8. 再者，原告人亦在07年2月23日在聆案官的指示下去信被告人，一再通知他，至5月23日被告人應支付的欠款及欠款所產生的利息，以及附列計算利息的表格。

9. 至於被告人在今天提出及重複他在聆訊之時的論據，指出大廈公契在1997年7月1日後已不再生效之論點，我亦已經在06年8月4日的裁決書中詳細解釋他的論點不成立的理由，我不再在此重複。

10. 總而言之，根據本案的證據，被告人經已有充分機會去計算他所拖欠的款項以及利息，他大可以計算出原告人向他通知的拖欠款項是否計算正確。

11. 至於被告人提出，既然大廈公契在97年7月1日後並不生效，公契內所列出的利息當然也不能生效。這一說我不能接受，理由在06年8月4日經已作出裁決，大廈公契是一直有效的，就算1997年7月1日之後是仍然繼續生效。因此，公契內所列出被告人因為拖欠管理費的利息應該也一樣參照大廈公契第6條D內所列出的利率去計算，若被告人能採取一個比較合作的態度，正如我在07年6月7日的聆訊中所提及，被告人所拖欠的管理費及利息、其他相關欠款早已解決了。

12. 本席在2006年8月4日所頒佈的判案結果，是根據原告人的申索書及申索書的支持誓章所列，並根據大廈公契中所提及的利率而計算的。概然06年8月4日的裁決是根據原告人的申索書及誓章而作出裁決的，利率當然也應跟從大廈公契所規定的利率去計算，直至到判案當日止。而法院規則所定的利息是在判案當日以後才實行的，我不認為原告人對欠款的計算有任何差錯。

13. 根據以上的理由，我不同意被告人所提及原告人在07年3月7日取得的收樓令是過早獲得。法庭並沒有過早頒發收樓令給原告人，因為法院的命令已給予原告人可以作出收樓的權力，一旦被告人未能在二十八天內支付全部欠款的話。我在此重複，除非06年8月4日的裁決被推翻，既然未有被推翻，該裁決及命令仍然生效。

14. 至於被告人提出，原告人應根據香港法例第344章第24條給予大廈管理處或大廈業主立案法團一個可以行使如香港法例第7章《租務條例》內的「扣押令」的權利，而被告人則質詢為何原告人不以香港法例344章第24條的方法向被告人收取拖欠的管理費，却利用大廈公契裡的條款向被告人收樓。香港法例第344章第24條所提供的追討欠款的方法，只是其中一種追討拖欠管理費的方法，並不代表那是唯一的方法，而24條亦無指明原告人只有一種途徑可行，或應該只用此種方法先行。實際上，第24條只給予大廈業主法團或管理公司另類收取欠款的方法而已，原告人大可以選擇任何一種方式進行。

15. 當然，香港法例344章第24條「扣押令」的方法可能是比較廉宜，律師費比較低，但此種方法不一定適合全部案件，原告人及其律師可選擇適合的方法去追討欠款。我不認為原告人可取得的訟費只限於香港法例344章第24條的費用，因為原告人經已透過合法途徑向被告人追討欠款。

16. 至於被告人向法庭申請，以分期付款方式以四期歸還欠款，很可惜，這要求並不是在去年2006年8月4日當天裁決後作出，時至今天，裁決已發出有十個月之多，蓋印命令亦已發出達九個月之久，被告人仍未支付所拖欠的款項。在此段頗長的時間，被告人應當已有足夠時間去儲蓄好應支付的款項，而且管理費一直自1999年欠交。我曾多次給予被告人機會去遵守法院的命令支付拖欠的費用，尤其是在此之前的兩個月當中，但被告人一直也未能支付所拖欠的款項。我不認為應當再拖延原告人收取到已拖欠多月的款項，固此，被告人的申請被拒絕。

17. 至於被告人提出，就法庭以前所頒佈下的訟費命令，應當他曾獲得勝訴的，已獲得法庭所頒發。這當然是對的，被告人可能因為並非執業律師，誤解了本席的命令。簡單來說，本席以前發出關於訟費方面的命令，若法庭在之前的聆訊已作出訟費命令，那些訟費命令當然是有效的。本席所作出的命令指出，若法庭未有作出安排及保留的訟費命令，在該次一併處理，這並未影響法庭以前已經作出的訟費安排。

18. 根據以上的理由，我拒絕被告人的傳票作出的申請。今天的訟費應由被告人支付給原告人，若雙方未能達成協議，可由法庭聆案官作出評估。以上的訟費命令是包括以前全部保留而未有作出安排的訟費。

（被告人向法官作出申請）

19. 由今天開始，十四天內被告人需要支付全部所拖欠的款項。

（黃慶春）
區域法院法官

第一原告人：	梁溫律師行律師Mr Yuen Ching Pong，代表第一原告人
第二原告人：	梁溫律師行律師Mr Yuen Ching Pong，代表第二原告人
被告人：	出席，並無律師代表

DCMP2185/2004

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟編號2004年第2185號

______________________

第一原告人	URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED
第二原告人	THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KING TIN COURT
	對
被告人	曾榮林

______________________

主審法官：區域法院法官黃慶春內庭聆訊（公開）

宣判日期：2007年6月7日

判案書日期：2007年6月7日

判案書

1. 今天，被告人有兩份申請，第一份是上訴黎聆案官於本年5月18日命令原告人須於七天內通知被告人應付的數目，被告人則須於十四天內繳付該數目；第二項的申請是關於2006年9月28日本席在8月4日的命令的蓋印命令。

2. 被告人指出，原告人須於2006年9月28日，或之前通知被告人有關第2段的銀碼數目，而非於以後的時間通知被告人該數目。因為原告並沒有在9月28日或之前通知被告人應付之數目，因此，原告人並未有遵守該命令。第二，被告人指出，關於2006年9月28日蓋印命令中第5D段所述“interest thereon”，被告人只是從2004年6月25日開始計算$12,870所產生之利息，而非指其他利息。

3. 經過今天的聆訊以及調查黎聆案官在07年5月18日的命令後所發生的事情，本席發覺，原告的確有在命令發出之七天內去信被告人，通知他根據本席8月4日2006年的命令第2段的裁決被告人應付的銀碼加上利息之正確數目。但被告人投訴，在原告5月23日所發出的信件，原告並未有附上利息計算表，因此被告人不能知曉數目是如何計算出來。

4. 今天的聆訊中，代表原告人的袁律師表示，5月23日之信件的確有附上利息計算表，但既然被告人投訴他沒有收到附件，袁律師亦當庭送遞一份給被告人。

5. 經過考慮這上訴的背景，我認為黎聆案官的命令是正確的，他之所以把聆訊押後至到被告人其他的申請一起由本席決定是適當的，尤其是被告人的申請是涉及本席在2006年8月4日所發出的命令的解釋。至於他在擱置暫緩扣押令的進行直至到07年6月8日，相信是因為他經已發出命令要求原告人去信被告人，詳細列出被告人應付的準確數目，而被告人亦需要在收信之後十四天內支付該項數目。根據他的計算，明顯2007年6月8日應當是那十四天的最後一天，而被告人須於這一天或之前支付該數目。

6. 被告人第二項的申請，是要求法庭決定2006年9月28日之蓋印命令第2段中所指“all sums due to the first and second plaintiffs secured by the memorandum of charge”之數目，是否指出原告人必須於9月28日或之前通知被告人該數目，以便被告人可準時支付該數目。

7. 我同意袁律師所說，在我2006年8月4日的命令中，我並沒有列出原告人必須告訴被告人在任何時間內或之前告訴被告所應支付的數目。但，我亦同意曾先生所說，若原告人未有通知被告人他應支付的欠款加上全部的利息的數目，被告人不能履行該命令而及時把款項支付給原告。我的命令中並沒有規定原告人必須於甚麼時間把數目告知被告人，這是應由原告及被告互相聯絡、互相合作才能順利進行，法庭亦不會把命令中沒有包括的字眼強加於命令中，若法庭的命令是有通知數目的時限的話，那命令當會包括這些字眼。

8. 原告現在同意被告可在2007年6月8日或9日之前支付該數目給原告，若原告在6月8日或9日收到被告的付款，那當然原告不用執行收樓令；但若被告經過十四天仍未有支付該數目的話，該收樓令根據黎聆案官的命令便應該即時執行。

9. 在今天的聆訊，被告人指出，若被告人未有支付在2007年6月8日或9日把該數目支付，黎聆案官的命令不單生效，而且收樓令可以即時執行，那便把被告人在5月存入法庭的申請傳票本應在6月22日的聆訊變為沒有意義。當然，若被告人有心遵從法庭之命令，一旦得知應付的數目及利息之後，遵守法庭命令去支付這項欠款，那當然6月22日聆訊的申請亦根本不需要繼續。

10. 經過考慮，我會給予被告人一個機會，去看是否他會履行法庭的命令，在2007年6月9日或之前支付本席在2006年8月4日所判決的命令第2段的欠款。因此，我批准暫緩執行收樓令，我亦保留6月22日的聆訊，以便經過考慮後決定被告是否有履行本席在2006年8月4日的命令才作出最後的決定。

11. 因以上的理由，我保留今次聆訊的訟費，直至下次聆訊才一起決定。

（黃慶春）
區域法院法官

第一原告人：梁溫律師行律師Mr Yuen Ching Pong，代表第一原告人

第二原告人：梁溫律師行律師Mr Yuen Ching Pong，代表第二原告人

被告人：出席，並無律師代表

DCMP2185/2004

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟編號2004年第2185號

------------

第一原告人	URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED
第二原告人	THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KING TIN COURT
	及
被告人	曾榮林

------------

主審法官：區域法院法官黃慶春內庭聆訊（公開）

聆訊日期：2007年3月29日

宣判日期：2007年3月29日

判案書日期：2007年3月29日

判案書

1. 被告人曾榮林先生向法庭申請上訴許可權，上訴本席在2006年8月4日的裁決，以及申請擱置執行2006年9月25日之法庭蓋印命令。

2. 曾先生的上訴理由已在他的陳詞大綱及他在去年10月13日及10月18日之兩份誓章中一一列出，大致上他重複了他在本案曾經存入法庭的反對誓章，即2006年5月16及6月29日的誓章中的抗辯理由。概括來說，曾先生的上訴理由可以歸納如下：一、大廈公契已不再生效，因此大廈的全部業主也不需要依照公契內的條款行事。

3. 理由曾先生指出，是公契第六條之權力，即押記及出售土地利益權力，並未由房委會按照公契第16條所訂出而轉讓給原告人，因此，原告人並沒有權向大廈業主行使公契內的任何條款。

4. 第二，房屋署沒有把公契的權力轉讓給大廈業主法團（即景田苑業主立案法團），因此，大廈業主法團根據公契的權力並不存在。

5. 曾先生的理由為，在1997年6月28日後，該屋苑的地契經已完結，既然大廈的公契只是在屋苑的地契期間生效，當1997年6月27日以後，公契內的權力又未被轉讓，因此，原告人不能向曾先生及其他業主施行公契內的其他條款，或以條款所賦予的權力去執行公契內所指出的責任。曾先生更指出，就算房委會在2000年9月29日已經脫離作為大廈的管理人，原告人也不能根據公契內的第六條延續房委會的工作。

6. 第三，根據《建築物業管理條例》，香港法例第344章第19條內所賦予的權力，並不可由第一原告人行使。

7. 第四，曾先生又指出，在原本的管理人或負責人「房委會」離開管理該屋苑的責任後，實在再無其他的管理人取而代之，因為第二原告人景田苑業主立案法團並非根據公契授命的，而第一原告人雖然在1998年與房委會簽訂合約作為該屋苑的管理有限公司，亦不能在房委會2000年脫離管理人一職之後繼續行使權力，作為屋的管理公司。

8. 第五，曾先生在是次的申請加上以前未有提出的論據，他同意屋邨是需要訂立一些例規去良好管理該屋苑，但也不能襲用原告人在公契內的條款，除非全部1424位業主同意，就算有部分業主同意繼續襲用公契的條款管理屋邨，曾先生指出，他作為其中一位業主，從未同意沿用公契內的條款，而且他認為公契第六條根本不合情理、不合時宜、不合適，並不適用。

9. 第六，曾先生更加指出，在香港法例第219章第42條3段，如政府租契於期滿後獲得續期或就相同土地由新的政府租契代替，則除非有明訂的相反用意，否則與該土地有關的任何契諾須繼續有效，這一條款，所列出的「除非有明訂的相反用意」，曾先生指出，他已明確地表示他不同意公契的沿用，因此，第42條第3節並不適用於此案。

10. 經過考慮曾先生的上訴理由，既然大部分也是在他以前所存入法庭的反對誓章及他以前聆訊當時的陳詞中經已提出，我亦經已在我的裁決書中一一列出裁決理由。我不再在此重複當日的判案理由，只是希望指出根據《新界土地契約續期條例》，香港法例第150章第6條指出，契約的續期，「本條例所適用契約的年期現予續期，由契約若非因本條例便會屆滿的日期起續期至2047年6月30日完結時止，毋須補繳地價」。

11. 由此證明全部新界在1997年6月30日或之前屆滿的租約經已據香港法例第150章第6條得以延續，延續至2047年6月30日為止。再加上香港法例第219章第42條第3款，明顯地，景田的公契已經有繼續的效用，而且屋苑的全部業主也需要遵從該公契是繼續生效的。

12. 再者，根據《建築物業管理條例》，景田業主立案法團是根據《物業管理條例》而產生，第一原原告人亦因為是曾經立約接受物業管理的職責，根據《建築物業管理條例》，他們是全權可以執行《建築物業管理條例》的條款的，我同意林大律師的陳詞指出，在香港法例第219章第42條第3款所指「除非有明訂的相反用意」，是指除非立例的香港特區政府訂出有相反用意，而並非向各位業主詢問，經過徵詢之後，是否他們同意或有相反的意見的意思。

13. 至於曾先生指出不合理、不合時宜的公契條款，因此亦不應該仍然襲用當用，當然若全部百分之一百的業主要求及同意修改公契的話，在法律上是准許公契的修訂的。既然大廈業主立案法團是經香港法例344章第18段賦予權力去管理屋邨，而且景田苑大廈業主立案法團是經由《物業管理條例》的條款而成立的，當然有職責、有責任去執行條例之下的工作，亦可以依照條例下所賦予的權力去管治屋邨之外，收取管理費以及執行法例所賦予的法律上的權力及提出訴訟。既然根據《建築物業管理條例》以及大廈公契，被告人是需要支付管理費，而他未有遵照條例及公契作出付款，那原告人當然可以根據法例及公契去執行，包括執行扣押行動等等，而此些執行行動是根據《物業管理條例》第19條。

14. 至於曾先生反對原告大律師所提出的論據，指原告並沒有在原告人的誓章中列出，原告人又未能在被告人存入法庭的誓章2005年6月27日作出回應，在法庭頒下命令之下，原告人未有作出回應，他指出是不當的行為。曾先生對這些法庭程序可能有些誤會，存入法庭的誓章，原告人在提出申索之後已經首先作出，雖然被告人存入一份反對誓章，雖然法庭批准原告人可在某一段時期內存入一份回覆誓章，這，並不表示原告人在沒有新的資料透露下，必須存入一份無謂的誓章。法庭的規則指出，答辯人與申索人（若法庭批准）可存入誓章，但他們可選擇不存入誓章，並不表示他們沒有依照法庭命令。只是，在法庭沒有批准誓章存入之下，若其中一方貿貿然存入多份的誓章，那這才是不遵守法庭命令的行為。

15. 此案在事實背景上，並沒有很大的爭議，全部的爭議也屬於法律上的爭議。因此，本席可以明白原告人不再用存入更多的誓章的理由。

16. 再者，法庭是不鼓勵在未有法庭批准的情況之下，任何一方屢次屢次存入更多的誓章予法庭。在今天聆訊的下午，曾先生再在庭上遞上一份補充誓章，這份新的補充誓章從未有法庭的批准，更沒有存入法庭的檔案中，而且更在曾先生完成他的陳詞後才遞上法庭，這種行為是非常之不當的。

17. 至於曾先生所提出，他並沒有作出反申索，因為他在04年12月15日在吳法官席前經已提出撤銷反申索的申請，這在我的2006年8月14日在判案書的修訂並沒有影響本案的結果，因為撤銷的反申索已不存在。

18. 我未能預見曾先生所提出的上訴理由有任何良好的成功機會，因此，我並不批准他的申請，以同樣的理由，我亦未能預見曾先生可上訴成功，因為他的上訴理由在法理並不成立。因此，在這件案所頒下的命令不應因此而擱置，命令可以繼續執行，申請的訟費及今天的訟費以及之前每一次的訟費也應由被告人支付，若雙方未能達成協議，可由法庭經歷司作出評估。

（原告人律師向法庭申請大律師證書）

19. 好，批准。

（黃慶春）
區域法院法官

第一原告人：梁溫律師行律師Mr A Tam，代表第一原告人

第二原告人：梁溫律師行律師Mr A Tam，代表第二原告人

被告人：出席，並無律師代表

DCMP2185/2004

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事雜項案件2004年第2185號

------------------------

第一原告人	URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED
第二原告人	THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KING TIN COURT
	對
被告人	曾榮林

------------------------

主審法官：區域法院法官吳美玲法庭聆訊

宣判日期： 2006年10月18日

判案書日期： 2006年10月18日

判案書

1. 本案在2006年5月16日及6月29日在區域法院黃慶春法官席前進行聆訊，而黃法官在2006年8月4日頒下判決書，判令第一及第二原告人勝訴。隨著黃法官的判案書擬備的蓋印命令（下稱[該命令]），在2006年9月25日存檔法庭。第一及第二原告人的代表律師隨後將該命令送達被告人。

2. 依據該命令，黃法官作出如下命令：

(一) 第一及第二原告人可向被告人索取在沙田土地註冊處存檔的一份依據大廈公契擬備的編號及日期，分別為1244690及2001年9月11日，並以第一及第二原告人為受益人的扣押備忘錄（下稱[該扣押備忘錄]）。
(二) 除非被告人在28天內支付給第一及第二原告人所有欠付第一及第二原告人的款項，及該扣押備忘錄項下的款項，第一及第二原告人可在公開市場或以私下型式出售香港新界沙田翠田街12號景田苑冰心閣C座23樓5室（下稱[該物業]）予任何買家。
(三) 被告人須在送達該命令給他後28天內將該扣押備忘錄項下的該物業空置管有交予第一及第二原告人。
(四) 被告人的反申索被撤銷，須支付相關訟費。

3. 該命令餘下條文涉及誰負責安排出售該物業及簽署相關文件，出售該物業所得的售價款項如何使用分配，被告人若然還款，如何處理該物業，及本案訟費如何處理等事宜。

4. 第一原原告人是景田苑的前管理公司，而第二原告人是景田苑的業主立案法團。被告人是該物業的業主。

5. 於2006年10月13日，被告人以傳召訴訟各方的傳票申請擱置執行該命令，並以其日期為2006年10月13日的誓章支持該申請。

6. 本席留意被告人在其誓章中所依賴支持其申請的論據，全部是針對黃法官的判案書及隨該判案書擬備的該命令，及/或在黃法官席前聆訊時所作出的論據，其實該命令及黃法官的判案書是最終判決，如果被告人對該判決不滿，可依法提出申請，要求法庭批予上訴許可，但依據《區域法院規則》第58號命令第2（5）條，在切實可行範圍內，要求批予上訴許可的申請，必須向作出判決的法官提出。就本案而言，這便是黃法官。

7. 被告人於2006年10月18日以傳召雙方傳票提出申請上訴許可，該傳票釐定在2006年12月21日，在黃法官席前進行聆訊。被告人支持上述申請的誓章，一盡說明黃法官判案書的錯誤，及誤解他立場的地方。

8. 雖然是次申請（即擱置執行該命令的申請）的理據全是針對黃法官的該判案書及/或該命令，被告人沒有安排本傳票在黃法官席前進行聆訊。黃法官既作出最終判決，本席作為同級法官，並沒有司法權力挑戰或推翻黃法官的判決，因此，亦沒有司法權力考慮被告人所提出的理據。本席認為只有上訴法庭(如果被告人取得上訴許可)及/或黃法官(如果她認為適合的話)才可考慮應否接納被告人支持是次申請的理據(但其實該理據是挑戰黃法官判案書及/或該命令)，否則，黃法官的該判案書及/或該命令作為原審最終判決，對其他同級法官具約束力。

9. 被告人認為本席有司法權力處理擱置執行該命令，但是被告人就此申請所依賴的眾多理據均針對黃法官判案書，及隨其該判案書擬備的該命令之錯誤，而該命令經蓋章後亦據效力及約束力，除非原審法官認為有手筆錯漏，可作修正，或有上訴情況，本席未能接納針對判案書及/或該蓋章命令有效性或合法性的質疑。因此，本席未能考慮被告人提出的理據。若然被告人對該蓋章命令的有效性提出質疑，其唯一途徑是向黃法官作出申請，及/或向黃法官提出上訴許可申請。被告人並沒有依賴其他本席可考慮及處理的理據，例如他若然指稱他沒錢，要延展付款時間，這論據不涉及判案書或該命令有效性和合法性，則本席可考慮處理，但這不是被告人的論據，故此，本席沒有司法權力處理被告人針對該命令有效性及合法性的論據。

10. 本席亦不同意被告人的陳述，指稱該命令乃法院行為，而與黃法官的判案書是兩碼子事。該蓋章命令清楚書面述明是黃法官的命令，被告人的說法本席不能接納。再者，該命令既已蓋章，本席亦無權反駁其有效性或合法性。

11. 因此，在上述前題下，本席毋須亦不應考慮及分析被告人各項論據。

12. 再者，被告人支持是次申請的誓章指稱黃法官採納一些他沒有依賴的理據，而忽略或誤解了一些他在聆訊時採納的理據，由於聆訊非在本席席前進行，本席亦不應處理該等申請理據，本席認為這些論據應由原審法官處理。

13. 基於上述原因，本席認為最妥善的處理方式是將是次申請押後至2006年11月10日早上九時半，在黃法官席前進行公開內庭聆訊，預留三小時。至於被告人的日期為2006年10月18日申請上訴許可的傳票，也在上述2006年11月10日的聆訊日期一併進行聆訊，而2006年12月21日的聆訊日期將被擱置。

（法官向與訟雙方詢問訟費事宜）

14. 今天聆訊的訟費將會保留。

（吳美玲）
區域法院法官

第一原告人：	梁溫律師行律師Mr A Tam，代表第一原告人
第二原告人：	梁溫律師行律師Mr A Tam，代表第二原告人
被告人：	出席，並無律師代表

DCMP 2185/2004

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事司法管轄權

雜項案件2004年第2185號

______________________

第一原告人	URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED
第二原告人	THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KING TIN COURT
	及
被告人	TSANG WING LAM （曾榮林）

______________________

主審法官：區域法院黃慶春法官法庭聆訊

審訊日期： 2006年5月16日及6月29日

頒下判案書日期： 2006年8月 4日

判案書

1. 本案第一及第二原告向法庭作出申請，根據區域法院第31號命令以及第88號命令，要求法庭頒佈因被告人過期多月未有支付的管理費，命令被告人必須支付過期未支付的管理費、利息及堂費。並據法團已根據大廈公契之條款，因被告人沒有支付管理費，違反支付公契所訂的款項條款，因而在田土廳被告人單位項目上作出押記註冊。原告更向法庭申請可就被告人並未支付的管理費及公契內所訂的款項，准予原告出售被告人之單位作為賠償被告人所未付的費用。原告更因此向法庭申請一項命令，要求被告人把該物業交吉，交予原告拍賣。

2. 被告人反對原告之申請。被告人的反對理由如下：-

(1) 大廈公契已於1997年6月27日屆滿及停止生效，對被告人再沒有約束力。因此，被告人不再需要根據該大廈公契所訂支付任何大廈公契所訂的款項。
(2) 被告人與原告及原告管理人並沒有任何合約或法律關係。
(3) 原告沒有權力代替該屋苑之業主立案法團提出訴訟。

本案背景

3. 第一原告原是位於沙田大圍景田苑（下稱“該屋苑”）的前任經理人。第二原告是該屋苑的業主立案法團。

4. 被告人則為該屋苑冰心閣23字5室單位的業主（下稱“該單位”）。

5. 自1997年7月，被告人開始拖欠大廈管理費。根據大廈公契（簽訂日1983年10月13日）的第6（a）條，被告人是有責任向大廈管理人支付管理費的。直至2004年6月底，被告人已拖欠了大廈管理費共$29,700之多。根據大廈公契第6（d）條，被告人更必須支付拖欠管理費的利息，此些利息直至2004年6月底，共$9,150。因此，原告向被告人的申索，在2004年6月底共為$38,850。時至審訊之日，當然，因被告人一直未有支付管理費，他所拖欠原告人的大廈管理費，一定已超出原訴傳票中的數目。

6. 在2001年9月11日，當時被告人已欠下管理費$12,870，而第一原告亦根據該大廈公契第6（f）（iii）條，在沙田土地註冊處的註冊登記中作出押記（見文件夾44頁）。

7. 因被告人一直欠交管理費用，第一原告在2004年決定到區域法院入禀向被告人申索所拖欠的管理費用及利息，以及要求法庭頒下命令，下令被告人必須把物業交吉，以便原告可執行押記註冊及把單位出售，以支付所拖欠的款項。

原告提出控訴之根據

8. 第二原告在2006年2月17日，根據高聆案官之命令加入本訴訟中作為第二原告。第一原告在2005年6月1日，因為與第二原告的管理合約已終止，不再是該屋苑的經理人。而第二原告亦同時委聘另一物業管理公司，代替第一原告作為該屋苑之經理人。

9. 在2005年9月15日，法團的管理委員會一致通過批准法團加入本訴訟作為第二原告。法團管理委員會更委聘梁溫律師事務所代表原告進行此訴訟。

10. 以上一切資料亦在第二原告2006年2月14日之誓章中一一列出，誓章更詳列法團是基於大廈公契第6（c）及16條，賦予法團權責聘請經理人或其他專業機構，代表法團執行法團根據公契中所列的職責或權力。而公契中所列的職責包括向該屋邨的每位業主收取屋邨管理費。

11. 第二原告更根據香港法例第344章建築物管理條例第18及22條向被告人追討所拖欠的管理費用。

被告人的抗辯

12. 被告人曾先生在聆訊中堅持原告並不能代替房委會在公契中之地位，曾先生更聲稱兩原告無權引用公契中所授予房委會之特殊權力，即公契第5及6條款之權力，針對被告人之土地利益作出物業押記，或對被告人作出任何法律行動，要求被告人交出物業。

13. 被告人指出，該物業公契已早在1997年6月27日屆滿，因而不能繼續對被告人有任何約束力。

14. 被告人更指出，原告根本不可能具備公契及經理之法律地位。而房委會在1997年6月27日至2000年9月29日，只是案中屋苑之臨時管理代理人，已並不再具備公契中之經理地位。至於第二原告法團，被告人指出，是屋苑的部份業主按照法例第344章的指示而成立，而該法團所擁有的權力是香港法例第344章所授予的，但被告人並不承認第二原告經已擁有經由全體業主所確認之公契經理的廣泛權力。他指出，房委會雖然曾為公契之經理，但在過去從未在任何時間引用公契中第16條所規定的指示，把它的經理地位及權力轉移給法團。法團的權力既然來自香港法例第344章建築物管理條例，該些權力並不包含公契第5及6條所述之權力。被告人承認法團的一切行為都必須符合並跟循香港法例第344章建築物管理條例的規矩。被告人承認第一原告的唯一身份就是根據建築物管理條例第18（2）（c）條所指之經理人而以，與該屋苑之公契無關。因此，被告人曾先生指出，第一原告引用該公契第5及6條之權力，對被告人作出物業押記的行動，明顯是錯誤的。

15. 代表原告的譚律師對被告人的抗辯有以下的陳詞：-

(1) 大廈公契並非在1997年6月27日經已失效。因為該屋苑所座落之政府地契，並未有在1997年6月27日因約滿而終止。根據物業轉易及財產條例香港法律第219章第42（3）條指出：
“ 如政府租契於期滿後獲得續期或就相同土地由新的政府租契代替，則除非有明訂的相反用意，否則與該土地有關的任何契諾須繼續有效。”
(2) 根據被告人在1983年11月15日的轉讓契上的條款第2（1）條，清楚指出被告人作為購買該物業的承買者，已作出承諾遵守大廈公契全部的條款。既然大廈公契因為該屋苑的政府租契已獲得續期直至2047年，大廈公契理應繼續生效（見附件文件夾第160頁）。
(3) 譚先生更指出，根據大廈公契第6（c）條指出，若該業主未有就公契內的條款規定支付任何應付的管理費，房委會可循法律途徑到法院作出申請，向該屋苑之物業業主作出申索（見附件文件夾第43頁）。
(4) 根據香港法例第344章建築物管理條例第22（3）條指出：-
“ 業主根據本條應付的款額由應付之時起即屬該業主法團的債項”。
(5) 至於房委會在2000年9月29日已終止作為該屋苑之經理人是沒有爭議的事實。而該屋苑的大廈業主法團即第二原告，亦已在2000年5月24日正式成立，並且經已接管該屋苑的一切管理事宜。根據香港法例第344章建築物管理條例第18（2）（c）條指出：-
“ 法團可就下述事情行使其酌情決定權
（c）聘請並酬予經理人或其他專業機構、專業商號或專業人員已由其代表法團執行法團根據本條例或公契（如有的話）而有的職責或權力”

16. 因此法團可運用香港法例第344章建築物管理條例以內所賦予的權力及責任，以及在大廈公契內所賦予的權力，經過2002年11月3日，大廈業主法團的仝人大會中通過的決定，正式聘任經理人代表法團行使法團在香港法例344章的權力及大廈公契的權力，而此經理人當時正是第一原告（見附件文件夾182頁）。

裁決

17. 被告人曾先生根據他的抗辯誓章中所解釋，他並不否認他自從1997年7月1日起，一直未有支付任何大廈管理費用。他拒絕繳付管理費用的原因是因為他拒絕承認大廈公契在1997年6月27日之後的效力，更不承認根據大廈公契在1997年6月27日之後所聘請的經理人第一原告的地位。理由是因為政府租契在1997年6月27經已停止生效，因此大廈公契亦不能繼續有效。

18. 被告人曾先生的抗辯理由的基礎顯然是錯誤的，因為根據香港法例第150章新界土地契約（續期）條例第6條指出：

“ 6. 契約的續期
本條例所適用契約的年期現予續期，由契約若非因本條例便會屆滿的日期起，續期至2047年6月30日完結時止，無須補繳地價。”

19. 根據香港終審法院案例Chan Tin Shi v. Lee Ting Sung and others [2006] 9 HKCFAR 29香港終審法院案例彙報在2006年第一集第30頁至31頁，該案例的中文簡介有以下的敍述：-

“中英政府於1984年就香港問題簽署聯合聲明，當時所有新界租契的租期將於13年後屆滿。為消除不明朗因素，中國政府在聯合聲明內同意確認上述租契續期至2047年6月30日。香港亦根據此協議而制定了新界土地契約（續期）條例第150章（下稱條例）當中第6條訂明本條例所適用的契約的年期現予續期，由契約若非因本條例便會屆滿的日期起續期至2047年6月30日完結時止。終審庭的裁決指出，條例第6條的文意相當清晰。它訂明現存租契的年期得以續期，又該等租契若非因條例便會屆的日期（即1997年6月27日）起，續期至2047年6月30日為止。”

20. 據以上的香港法例經過香港終審法庭的詮釋，明顯地，政府契約因為得到香港法例第150章新界土地契約（續期）條例第6條的契約續期，該屋苑的政府契約已得到繼續續期至2047年6月30日止。而且根據香港法例第219章物業轉易及財產條例第42（3）條指出：-

“ (3) 如政府租契於期滿後獲得續期或就相同土地由新的政府租契代替，則除非有明訂的相反用意，否則與該土地有關的任何契諾須繼續有效。”

因此，該屋苑的大廈公契得以延續直至政府租契在2047年6月30日終止為止。

21. 至於第一原告在本申索中提出申索的地位，明顯地，第一原告是根據該大廈公契受委派的經理人，並且亦根據建築物管理條例第18（c）條所委任的經理人。至於第二原告，它是根據建築物管理條例成立的業主法團，因此可以行使該法例內所賦予的權力及責任去管理該屋苑。至於房委會作為該屋苑的發展商，雖然經已出售全部屋苑的物業，但根據大廈公契，它有權力及有責任繼續作為該屋苑的管理人或經理人，直至它把這權力轉移給他人為止。既然房委會在2000年9月29日已終止其作為大廈公契內所委派的管理人，並且把公契內所賦予的權力交給大廈業主法團（即第二原告），第二原告當然承受了房委會在公契內指定的權力及責任，以及根據香港法例第344章建築物管理條例所賦予的權力及執行職責的責任，包括向大廈業主追討公契所訂應付的任何款項。並且可根據建築物管理條例第18條所賦予的職責聘請經理人或專業機構，代表法團執行法團根據條例或公契的職責及權力。

22. 被告人曾先生曾經指出，第二原告並沒有法定的代表性，但曾先生未有在審訊中提出任何證據證明第二原告在成立之時或在成立之後，在仝人大會中的決議有任何不當的安排，或未有遵守法例所訂下的開會程序及決議程序。若被告人指出第二原告因未有依循法例的指示成立，或管理委員會有不依循法例的規則去委任經理人，這些證據應由被告人以指控的一方，提出指證及足夠的證據佐證。既然被告人一方並未有提出任何證據，證明第二原告人的成立是不合法的或它的委任並未依循法例而作出的，被告人未能完成舉證責任，因此他的抗辯並不成立。

23. 根據以上的理由，明顯地，原告可就香港法例第344章建築物管理條例第18條及第22（3）條向被告人追討大廈管理費。並且可向法庭申請所欠付的管理費作為一項債務，到法院向被告人作出申索。而且更可執行香港法例第344章建築物管理條例第19（1）條：

“ (1) 如公契規定，業主如沒有繳付公契所訂應付的任何款項，某人即可將該業主的土地權益出售，或於土地註冊處針對該業主的權益註冊一項押記，則儘管公契的條文有所規定，法團而非該人亦可循同樣方式，受同樣條件的限制，行使上述出售土地權益或註冊押記的權力，猶如法團乃公契所提述的人一樣。”

24. 而且，根據大廈公契第6段(c)及第16段，兩位原告完全有法定地位到法院向被告人提出申索，並且根據公契所賦予的權力，在被告人的物業登記冊上作出押記註冊，因為所欠的應付未付的管理費已經成為被告人拖欠業主立案法團的一項債務。而此等押記與區域法院規則第88號命令中所列舉的適用範圍及釋義相同。第2條指出：-

“在本命令中按揭（mortgage）包括法律按揭及衡平法按揭以及法律押記及衡平法押記，而凡提述按揭人、承按人及按揭財產之處，均須具此解釋。”

25. 因此，根據區域法院規則第88號命令第1條所適用的範圍，原告可運用第88號命令作出申索，向被告人要求（a）支付以該按揭為保證的金錢；（b）售賣按揭財產；（c）已贖；（e）贖回；（f）有關財產的再轉易或獲免作保證；（g）由承按人交付管有。

26. 再者，根據區域法院規則第31條命令，原告可藉此命令要求區域法院作出命令把土地出售。並且根據區域法院規第31條第2款指出進行出售的方式。

總結

27. 據以上的理由，本席並不接受被告人曾先生有任何良好的抗辯。他所提出的抗辯理由完全不能成立。據此，本席批准原告的申請，依照原告的原訟傳票內的申索作出命令。

暫定訟費命令

28. 原告一方勝訴，因此可得訟費並由被告人支付，若雙方未能達成協議，可由區域法院聆案官作出評估。

（黃慶春）
區域法院法官

出席人士：

第一及第二原告人：由梁溫律師行譚律師代表

被告人：出席，無律師代表

URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LTD AND ANOTHER v. TSANG WING LAM

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(一)	第一及第二原告人可向被告人索取在沙田土地註冊處存檔的一份依據大廈公契擬備的編號及日期，分別為1244690及2001年9月11日，並以第一及第二原告人為受益人的扣押備忘錄（下稱[該扣押備忘錄]）。
(二)	除非被告人在28天內支付給第一及第二原告人所有欠付第一及第二原告人的款項，及該扣押備忘錄項下的款項，第一及第二原告人可在公開市場或以私下型式出售香港新界沙田翠田街12號景田苑冰心閣C座23樓5室（下稱[該物業]）予任何買家。
(三)	被告人須在送達該命令給他後28天內將該扣押備忘錄項下的該物業空置管有交予第一及第二原告人。
(四)	被告人的反申索被撤銷，須支付相關訟費。

(1)	大廈公契已於1997年6月27日屆滿及停止生效，對被告人再沒有約束力。因此，被告人不再需要根據該大廈公契所訂支付任何大廈公契所訂的款項。
(2)	被告人與原告及原告管理人並沒有任何合約或法律關係。
(3)	原告沒有權力代替該屋苑之業主立案法團提出訴訟。

(1)	大廈公契並非在1997年6月27日經已失效。因為該屋苑所座落之政府地契，並未有在1997年6月27日因約滿而終止。根據物業轉易及財產條例香港法律第219章第42（3）條指出：
	“	如政府租契於期滿後獲得續期或就相同土地由新的政府租契代替，則除非有明訂的相反用意，否則與該土地有關的任何契諾須繼續有效。”
(2)	根據被告人在1983年11月15日的轉讓契上的條款第2（1）條，清楚指出被告人作為購買該物業的承買者，已作出承諾遵守大廈公契全部的條款。既然大廈公契因為該屋苑的政府租契已獲得續期直至2047年，大廈公契理應繼續生效（見附件文件夾第160頁）。
(3)	譚先生更指出，根據大廈公契第6（c）條指出，若該業主未有就公契內的條款規定支付任何應付的管理費，房委會可循法律途徑到法院作出申請，向該屋苑之物業業主作出申索（見附件文件夾第43頁）。
(4)	根據香港法例第344章建築物管理條例第22（3）條指出：-
	“	業主根據本條應付的款額由應付之時起即屬該業主法團的債項”。
(5)	至於房委會在2000年9月29日已終止作為該屋苑之經理人是沒有爭議的事實。而該屋苑的大廈業主法團即第二原告，亦已在2000年5月24日正式成立，並且經已接管該屋苑的一切管理事宜。根據香港法例第344章建築物管理條例第18（2）（c）條指出：-
	“	法團可就下述事情行使其酌情決定權
		（c）	聘請並酬予經理人或其他專業機構、專業商號或專業人員已由其代表法團執行法團根據本條例或公契（如有的話）而有的職責或權力”

“	6.	契約的續期
		本條例所適用契約的年期現予續期，由契約若非因本條例便會屆滿的日期起，續期至2047年6月30日完結時止，無須補繳地價。”