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Civil Action2015

FU SHU WAH & FU SHU WING in their personal capacities as beneficiaries AND in their capacities as the Administrators of THE ESTATE of HO SUNG LAI (何崇禮), DECEASED 對 傅美玉<br>

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Files (3)

[2019] HKCFI 2969-EN-2019-12-03

FU SHU WAH & FU SHU WING in their personal capacities as beneficiaries AND in their capacities as the Administrators of THE ESTATE of HO SUNG LAI(何崇禮), DECEASED v. FU MEI YUK

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HCA 2791/2015

[2019] HKCFI 2969

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2791 OF 2015

________________________

BETWEEN  
 FU SHU WAH AND FU SHU WINGPlaintiffs
 IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AS BENEFICIARIES 
 AND IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS THE ADMINISTRATORS OF 
 THE ESTATE OF HO SUNG LAI (何崇禮), deceased 

and

 FU MEI YUK KEENY (傅美玉)Defendant

________________________

Before:Deputy High Court Judge To in Chambers
Date of Hearing:3 December 2019
Date of Decision: 3 December 2019

____________________

DECISION

____________________

Background

1.  This is the hearing of the plaintiffs’ (“Plaintiffs”) appeal against Master Au-Yeung’s order made on 27 September 2019 in relation to the Plaintiffs’ summons filed on 25 April 2019.  In their summons, the Plaintiffs sought, inter alia, leave to file the second supplemental witness statements of Fu Shu Wah and Fu Shu Wing and a witness statement of their mother’s sister, Ho Sung Mei.  Master Au-Yeung granted the Plaintiffs leave to file and serve the witness statement of Ho Sung Mei containing only paragraphs 1, 2, 8 (excluding the last sentence therein), 9 and 17 but dismissed all other applications in the summons.

2.  The Plaintiffs have also taken out a summons filed on 2 December 2019, seeking to strike out the defendant’s (“Defendant”) affidavit filed in opposition to the appeal.  The affidavit contains a lot of irrelevant matters in relation to this appeal.  The Defendant is acting in person.  I have already stood down the hearing for half a day to enable her to study the hearing bundle which she claimed she had not received.  For expediency, I shall take her affidavit into account but make no order on the summons.

The facts and the issues

3.  The Plaintiffs and the Defendant are three of the six children of their deceased mother, Ho Sung Lai, who died intestate on 1 September 2011 (“the deceased”).  The Plaintiffs were appointed as administrators of the estate of the deceased.  The estate consists mainly of a property in Fanling (“the property”).  Since 2012, the siblings were engaged in a probate action in HCAP 31/2012 and in HCA 813/2013 in which the Plaintiffs were defendants.  On 7 February 2014, the six siblings entered into a settlement agreement regarding the property through mediation.  It was agreed that the Defendant shall deliver vacant possession of the property to the Plaintiffs within three months after signing of the settlement agreement.  The Defendant failed to do so and the Plaintiffs commenced the present action.  The Defendant’s defence is that she had no mental capacity when entering the settlement agreement which should therefore be rescinded and in any event the parties have agreed to set aside the settlement agreement.  The issues raised by the pleadings are:

(a)  whether at the time of signing the settlement agreement the Defendant did not have the required mental capacity to sign it; and

(b)  whether the parties had entered into a binding agreement to set aside the settlement agreement.

4.  In essence, the Plaintiffs appeal against the Master’s refusal to grant leave to file paragraph 9 of the proposed second supplemental witness statements of the Plaintiffs and paragraphs 12 and 13 of the proposed witness statement of Ho Sung Mei.  These paragraphs refer to an incident in December 2018 in which one of the siblings, Fu Siu Ming, wrote a letter to Ho Sung Mei setting out the background of the parties’ dispute and enclosing some documents which the Plaintiffs felt objectionable.  These documents include:

(a)  a covering letter signed by Fu Siu Ming;

(b)  Tang Kai Sun’s witness statement dated 25 October 2018 (not filed or served);

(c)  Fu Siu Ming’s witness statement dated 25 August 2017;

(d)  Fu Siu Ming’s supplemental witness statement dated 25 August 2018 (not filed or served);

(e)  Defendant’s witness statement dated 25 August 2017;

(f)  Defendant’s supplemental witness statement dated 18 October 2018 (not filed and served);

(g)  Plaintiffs’ defence in HCA 813/2013 dated 14 August 2013; and

(h)  some apparently medical reports of the deceased.

The Plaintiffs’ objections are based on confidentiality. 

Discussion

5.  The Plaintiffs argue that it appears that the Defendant and/or Fu Siu Ming have used their personal data, namely the defence filed in HCA 813/2013, for another purpose which is not the original purpose when collecting it.  The Defendant and/or Fu Siu Ming were in breach of Principle 3 of the Data Protection Principles under Schedule 1 to the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, Cap 486.

6.  They argue that the medical reports of the deceased are regarded as part of the deceased’s estate which may not be disclosed to a third party, namely Ho Sung Mei, without their consent.  But they could not advance any argument why such violation of their rights would support their claim that these paragraphs should be included in the witness statements.

7.  As for the witness statement of the Defendant and Fu Siu Ming, the general rule is that witness statements exchanged under Order 38, rule 2A of the Rules of the High Court are not put in evidence by the fact of exchange and remain confidential until the witness makes the statement public by verifying it on oath in the witness box: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2020 [1].  The Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Defendant and/or Fu Siu Ming may waive the privilege.  Indeed, by disclosing them to Ho Sung Mei, they are deemed to have waived the privilege.  Thus, the Plaintiffs pray in aid section 2 of the Mediation Ordinance, Cap 620 and argue that certain paragraphs of these witness statements fall within the definition of mediation communications and are bound by the confidentiality rules set out in section 8. Hence, the Defendant may not disclose these witness statements or the offending part therein to Ho Sung Mei.  The Plaintiffs raised no objection based on confidentiality to the three witness statements which have not been filed or served.

8.  Even if the Defendant was in breach of confidentiality principle under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance and Mediation Ordinance, the Plaintiffs are not seeking any redress under these Ordinances.  They are not seeking to restrain the Defendant from using or producing these documents.  Instead, what they are trying to do is to adopt the Defendant’s breach and seek to produce these documents and the covering letter as evidence of impropriety on the part of Fu Siu Ming for the purpose of laying the foundation for discrediting Ho Siu Ming when cross-examining her at the substantive hearing.  It can be readily seen that the sole purpose of adducing the evidence in the various paragraphs in these witness statements excluded by the Master is not directly related to the trial issues but is to form the basis for launching a collateral attack on the Defendant’s witness or the Defendant herself.

9.  The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant’s purpose in disclosing the documents to Ho Sung Mei was to smear the Plaintiffs and to influence Ho Sung Mei when giving her witness statement or when testifying at the substantive hearing.  They suggest that such conduct amounted to an attempt to pervert the course of justice. 

10.  I find such argument very convoluted.  Ho Sung Mei made her previous witness statement on 7 September 2018, three months before she received Fu Siu Ming’s letter.  Thus, at the time she gave her previous witness statement she could not have been influenced by the letter and the documents contained therein.  That witness statement was struck out by Master Andy Ho for having been filed without leave.  Ho Sung Mei was not a witness.  There could be no perversion of the course of justice or attempt to pervert. 

11.  The Plaintiffs now seek leave to file a fresh witness statement of Ho Sung Mei.  As the Master observed, it is an extended witness statement of the previous one which had been struck out.  This witness statement was written after Ho Sung Mei had received Fu Siu Ming’s letter and the documents.  In paragraphs 12 and 13 of the witness statement which Master Au-Yeung excluded, Ho Sung Mei mentioned the letter and document sent to her by Fu Siu Ming.  She said that she considered what the Defendant or Fu Siu Ming did was calculated to influence her and to prevent her from doing justice among the siblings.  She considered the Defendant’s and/or Fu Siu Ming’s conduct objectionable and reported to the Plaintiffs.  Obviously, Ho Sung Mei was not the least affected by the letter and documents.  However, the Plaintiffs may argue that there was nevertheless an attempt to pervert the course of justice by attempting to influence a potential witness.

12.  Be that as it may, whether there was an attempt to pervert or an improper motive, putting it loosely, depends on the subjective intention of the person who disclosed the mediation communications, namely the Defendant and/or Fu Siu Ming.  Usually, their answer is conclusive.  It is open to them to give innocent explanations for what they did.  Though their express subjective intention has to be tested against the objective factual circumstances, a very strong or compelling inference to be raised from objective facts is required to overturn their express subjective intention.  Here, the intended cross- examination must be rested on the premise that the Defendant’s and Fu Siu Ming’s witness statements are false, otherwise there could be no perversion or improper motive.  But the truth or falsity of those statements are really the crux of the matter at trial.  Without establishing that the statements are false, there is no basis for any adverse inference to be drawn from their answers given in cross-examination.  If the Plaintiffs could establish the falsity, there would be no need for the cross-examination.  The Plaintiffs’ argument for cross- examination on the letter and documents is just circular and serve no real purpose.  

13.  Furthermore, as mentioned in paragraph 3, there are only two trial issues, the Defendant’s mental capacity and agreement to set aside the settlement agreement.  The letter and documents contained a whole load of allegations about the rights and wrongs of the siblings, most if not all of which are in dispute.  Those issues are irrelevant.  The trial will be unreasonably burdened with investigation into those irrelevant issues.  If those allegations are redacted, the cross-examination would probably be nugatory.

14.  The Plaintiffs referred me to the Court of Final Appeal decision in Champion Concord Ltd v Lau Koon Foo (No 1) [2] in which it was held that confidentiality in mediation is a sacrosanct principle which must be strictly observed save in exceptional circumstances. Though that statement is obiter, it is a very powerful statement from the highest court in Hong Kong which is binding on me.  However, the Plaintiffs are not arguing on how to preserve confidentiality.  They are arguing that because of the Defendant’s and/or Fu Siu Ming’s breach they should be punished by being cross-examined at trial on the mediation communications, otherwise this sacrosanct principle may be disregarded at will.  The principle is to preserve confidentiality.  But what the Plaintiffs are seeking is to continue and amplify the breach as a punishment and not as a sanction to preserve confidentiality.  The usual sanctions are injunction and damages.  The sanction suggested by the Plaintiffs is effectively indulging in the breach of confidentiality.  Such abuse of confidential information is novel and not supported by authority.  It should not be allowed.

Conclusion

15.  All in all, the evidence contained in these paragraphs are irrelevant to the trial issues.  They are in dispute.  Their inclusion in the witness statements would raise numerous side-issues which are unconnected with the trial issues.  The costs and time to be incurred in proving these side- issues would be out of all proportion with those required in proving the trial issues.  Cross-examination based on these side-issues could serve no useful purpose.  There is no legal basis for such misuse of confidential information.  For all these reasons, these paragraphs in three witness statements should be excluded.

16.  There was some complaint that the Master should not have dismissed paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Plaintiffs’ summons as the Plaintiffs had indicated that they would not be pursuing those applications and the Master proceeded on the understanding that the Plaintiffs were to withdraw those applications.  They argue that there is a distinction between dismissing an application and allowing the application to be withdrawn.  Be that as it may, there was no application made to withdraw those applications.  The Master could not be criticised for dismissing them as being abandoned at the hearing.

17.  For all these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. Usually, costs should follow the event.  However, the appeal has to be stood down for half a day to enable the Defendant to study the hearing bundle which she claimed she has not received.  The Plaintiffs’ costs wasted far exceeded the costs she would be entitled.  I therefore make no order as to costs. 

 ( Anthony To )
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Steve Kwan Lok Cheng, instructed by K Y Woo & Co, for the plaintiffs

The defendant appeared in person



[1] Vol 1, paragraph 38/2A/11

[2] (2011) 14 HKCFAR 534 at paragraph 17

[2019] HKCFI 1463-CH-2019-06-06

FU SHU WAH & FU SHU WING in their personal capacities as beneficiaries AND in their capacities as the Administrators of THE ESTATE of HO SUNG LAI, DECEASED v. FU MEI YUK KEENY

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HCA 2791/2015

[2019] HKCFI 1463

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事訴訟案件2015年第2791號

____________

原告人FU SHU WAH & FU SHU WING 
 in their personal capacities as beneficiaries 
 AND in their capacities as the Administrators 
 of THE ESTATE of HO SUNG LAI (何崇禮), 
 DECEASED 
and
被告人FU MEI YUK KEENY (傅美玉) 

____________

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭法官鍾安德內庭聆訊
聆訊日期:2019年5月30日
判決日期:2019年6月6日

判決書


1.  本席在2019年2月21日經聆訊後作出命令,撤銷了聆案官早前的命令(該命令基本上指令,倘若原告人將來存檔及送達任何以英文撰寫的文件,必須同時附以中文譯文)。

2.  被告人不服本席作出的命令,在2019年3月27日 (即法定提出上訴的時限已屆滿後) 取得傳票,要求延展提出申請上訴許可時限,及批予許可以提出上訴。

3.  本席在2019年2月25日頒布的 “判決理由書”,已述明作出上述命令的理由。該等理由可簡述如下:

(a)   相關的申請,早前已被撤銷,屬「一案不能兩審」原則涵蓋事項 (其中第7至9段);

(b)   即使相關申請,不屬上述原則涵蓋事項,亦應因以下理由被撤銷;

(c)   被告人的申請,並未遵照第5C章《高等法院民事程序 (採用語文) 規則》第5條規則的規定 (其中第 12(1) 及16 段);

(d)   被告人的申請,並不涉及第5B章《法定語文 (翻譯) 規則》涵蓋的文件 (其中第11、13及17段);

(e)   即使被告人的申請:(1) 已遵照第5C章的規定;(2) 屬第 5B 章涵蓋的文件,基於各種因素,本席亦應行使酌情權,拒絕被告人的要求 (其中第14至15及18至21段)。

4.  被告人在:

(1)   用以支持本申請的誓章中,僅針對前第 3(e) 段提出其他證據及資料;

(2)   聆訊時重覆上述誓章中所述的事項。

但她並未就前第3(a)、(c) 或 (d) 段提出任何理據,述明本席的判決理由所犯的錯誤。

5.  被告人亦沒有就她誤提出申請,提出良好理由。

6.  基於以上各點,本席判定,並無合理理據:

(a)   延展要求批予許可以提出上訴的時限;

(b)   批予許可以提出上訴。

本席故此撤銷本申請。

7.  由於本席已基於上述理由撤銷本申請,故無需處理,就被告人可否在本申請提出新證據,原告人提出的反對理據。

8.  經聽取與訟雙方的陳述後,本席判定,應依一般訟費慣例,判令本申請所涉訟費,由被告人支付予原告人。本席亦判定,所涉訟費應以簡易程序評定。為此:

(1)   原告人可於今日起計7天內,呈交及送達簡明訟費清單;

(2)   被告人可於其後7天內,呈交及送達訟費反對清單。

 
 

 ( 鍾安德 )
 高等法院原訟法庭法官
 
原告人:由余雄律師行轉聘鄭君樂大律師代表
被告人:無律師代表,自行應訊

[2019] HKCFI 510-CH-2019-02-25

FU SHU WAH & FU SHU WING in their personal capacities as beneficiaries AND in their capacities as the Administrators of THE ESTATE of HO SUNG LAI (何崇禮), DECEASED 對 傅美玉<br>

HTML content

 HCA 2791/2015

[2019] HKCFI 510

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事訴訟案件2015年第2791號

____________

原告人FU SHU WAH & FU SHU WING 
 in their personal capacities as beneficiaries 
 AND in their capacities as the Administrators 
 of THE ESTATE of HO SUNG LAI (何崇禮), 
 DECEASED 
and
被告人FU MEI YUK KEENY (傅美玉) 

____________

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭法官鍾安德內庭聆訊
聆訊日期:2019年2月21日
判決日期:2019年2月21日
判決理由書日期:2019年2月25日

判決理由書

1. 原告人不服聆案官在2018年12月5日作出的命令的第 12段 (原告人在本上訴聆訊時澄清「上訴通知書」的不清晰處),凴藉香港法例第4A章《高等法院規則》第58號命令,向原訟法庭法官提出本上訴。本席在聆訊後裁定原告人得直。以下是判決理由。

2.  2018年12月5日的命令的第12段規定:

“倘若原告人存檔及送達任何以英文撰寫的文件,原告人必須同時附以中文譯本”。

正如被告人在本上訴時確認,上文指的 “文件”,是指原告人在本訴訟中將會存檔及送達的任何文件 (而非過往已存檔及送達的文件)。

3.  導致本上訴的訴訟背景,可簡述如下。

4.  根據與訟雙方已存檔的狀書:

(a) 兩位原告人及被告人是兄妹關係;

(b) 與訟雙方的雙親原為涉案物業 (位處粉嶺的住宅單位) 的共同業主。他們的雙親,分別在2003年及2011年逝世;

(c) 與訟雙方的母親逝世時,已是涉案物業的唯一業權人。由於她並無訂立遺囑,故她的遺產應是以無遺囑遺產方式處理;

(d) 被告人至今仍獨自居住在涉案物業。

5.  原告人以母親的遺產管理人身份,在2015年提出本訴訟。他們指,被告人違反眾兄弟姊妹在2014年2月達成的和解協議的條款,未在訂定和解協議後的3個月內交回涉案物業。

6.  被告人在已修訂抗辯書及反申索書則指:

(1) 她因情緒病而不能理解和解協議的內容;

(2) 因此,和解協議是無效的;

(3) 此外,與訟雙方經各自的代表律師,在2015年7月至8 月期間,以書信形式達成另一份協議,將2014年2月的和解協議取消。

7.  被告人前曾在2018年11月6日取得傳票,要求法庭:

“批准於訟案中日後各方所有往還文件以中文書寫作準” (傳票第1段)

被告人並在用以支持該申請的誓章中指,英語並非她的母語,而且法律專用的英語,對她作為一個需要定時服藥的情緒病人增加了負擔壓力。

8.  另一聆案官在2018年11月21日經聆訊後,撤銷了上述傳票中該部份的申請。

9.  單以前第7至8段所述,雖然該傳票要求的濟助,與本上訴所涉的命令不盡相同,但因兩者均是要求原告方,提供以中文書寫的文件/譯本,其實性質並無分別。

10.  雖然如此,本席仍假設本上訴所涉的命令 (及該命令涵蓋的事項),與前第7至8 段所述的申請有異,故不構成「一案兩審」的情況。

11.  由於被告人並無律師代表,她並沒有提供,要求作出本上訴所涉命令 (前第2段) 的法律基礎是甚麼。本席同意原告人指,被告人的申請,應是凴藉:

(a) 第5章《法定語文條例》(尤其第3條 (及第5條));

(b) 第5C章《高等法院民事程序 (採用語文) 規則》(尤其第 5 條)。

此外,被告人亦有可能是凴藉第5B章《法定語文 (翻譯) 規則》(尤其第1條) 提出申請。

12.  簡略而言,凴藉第5C章第5條規則提出的要求,必須:

(1) 以書面形式,在有關文件送達後3天內作出 (其中第 5(2) 條規則);

(2) 是合理的要求 (其中第 5(5)(a) 條規則)。

13.  而凴藉第5B章第1條規則提出的要求,必須涉及 “將會作為證據提出的 … 文件” (其中第1(1) 或 (2) 條規則)。第5B章第 1 條規則,亦賦予法庭隨時免除將文件翻譯的需要 (其中第1(3) 條規則)。

14.  本席在寶生銀行有限公司對許成水 [1995 – 2000] HKCLRT 360 的判決中指出:

(a) 前第13段所述的法例條文,賦予法庭免除翻譯文件的需要的權力,性質屬法庭的酌情權;

(b) 法庭在行使該酌情權時,應考慮包括下列的事項:

(1) 免除翻譯是否會引致與訟雙方或其中一方蒙受不利;

(2) 要求提供翻譯本的一方的「訴訟因由」或「抗辯因由」為何。

(其中第7段)

15.  本席在上述判決中亦指出,在考慮是否會導致與訟雙方或任何一方做成不利時 (前第 14(b)(1) 段),應考慮包括以下的事項:

(a) 與訟雙方或其中一方的語文能力;

(b) 與訟雙方或其中一方可用於翻譯與訴訟有關文件的資源或能力;

(c) 與訟雙方或其中一方有否合理的時間及機會,翻譯有關的文件;

(d) 涉及的文件在訴訟中的重要性;

(e) 即使有關文件並無翻譯本,與訟雙方或其中一方是否實在已知悉,或在合理的角度而言,應已知悉有關文件的內容及/或性質。

(其中第7段)

16.  本上訴所涉的命令 (前第2段),並非:

(1) 涉及已送達的文件;

(2) 在被告人已提出書面要求後作出。

(比對前第12段) 故此,單凴此點,該命令已不具第5C章賦予的法律基礎。

17.  本上訴所涉的命令規定原告人提供的翻譯本,亦超越了第5B章所述的 “將會作為證據提出的 … 文件” (前第13段)。故此,單凴此點,本上訴所涉命令,亦不具第5B章賦予的法律基礎。

18.  第5C章第 5(5)(a) 條規則規定,相關的翻譯要求,必須是合理的 (前第12(2) 段)。除前第16及17段所述,本席認為,第5C章第 5(5)(a) 條規則有關衡量要求是否合理的規定,與第5B章第1(1) 或 (2) 條規則賦予的免除翻譯權力 (前第 13 段),兩者所賦予法庭的,性質均屬法庭可行使的酌情權。

19.  本席亦認為,法庭在行使第5C章第 5(5)(a) 條規則賦予的權力時,所需考慮的事項,與行使第5B章第1(1) 或 (2) 條規則的權力時所需考慮的事情類同 (見前第14(b) 及 15段)。

20.  由於被告人並未存檔誓章支持本上訴所涉的申請,本席在本上訴聆訊時,經向她查詢後,獲知悉以下資料:

(a) 被告人在香港接受中學會考水平的教育;

(b) 被告人其後前往法國,修讀並完成等同香港的大學頒授的設計學位的課程;

(c) 被告人的中、英、法文故此已具 (或應已具) 一定水平;

(d) 前第 (c) 分段所述,可見證於已修訂抗辯書及反申索書。該狀書是被告人自行撰寫、修改 (並獲免費法律指導律師 (被告人未清楚說明,是由「無律師代表訴訟人資源中心」或「免費法律諮詢計劃」提供) 協助,對用詞作出微調)。

(順帶一提,在作出本上訴所涉的命令 (前第2段) 之前,聆案官並未查詢前第14及15段所述的事項)

21.  雖然被告人聲稱患上情緒病,但她在本上訴聆訊過程中,並未在與其他人溝通時出現困難。此外,她亦沒有提供有關情緒病的醫療記錄或資料。

22.  基於前第20至21段所述各點,本席認定,(除前第16及17段所述之外) 被告人的要求並不合理 (第5C章第5(5)(a) 條規則)。

23.  由於本訴訟至今並未排期審訊,故此並未知在原告人已存檔的文件中,那些 “將會作為證據的 … 文件”,而且,所涉的文件的確實數量,亦未可知。本席因此無須在本上訴考慮第5B章第1(1) 或 (2) 條規則賦予的酌情權。

 
 

 ( 鍾安德 )
 高等法院原訟法庭法官

原告人:由余雄律師行轉聘鄭君樂大律師代表
被告人:無律師代表,自行應訊